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Abstract 
This study of corruption in the context of Vanuatu government and society asserts that international 
models of “good governance” do not adequately acknowledge the role of culture and entrenched 
social practices in shaping relations between the governed and the governing. Of such influences, 
certain sections of Vanuatu’s elites have used kastom authority, kinship networks, and the power of 
the state to entrench their interests and those of their clients. There is, however, an aspect of kastom 
authority that may be a means to break down these power structures through processes of deliberation 
and reform that harness kastom practices as a way to re-engage the country’s populations in a national 
governance reform process. This research describes ways in which traditional ideas and practices and 
the modern world can be better reconnected in order for society to implement reforms that will avoid 
conflict. It also maps out layers of customary practice and authority in Vanuatu and highlights the 
ways in which their absorption into the modern structures of government has led to serious problems 
of official corruption. These findings were achieved through an empirical investigation of key 
selected case studies of government institutions, including the analysis of key government documents. 
The semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and nakamal storian were used to generate 
the data or inform its interpretation. This research data was analysed using a thematic and category 
analysis approach, and by interpretative methods which were informed by the grounded literature 
review from which the themes emerged. The emerging themes were discussed and analysed in 
accordance with the findings of the research outlined in previous chapters and the literature.  
The findings illustrate that the clash between traditional ways of doing things and the expectations of 
international institutions about how things ought to be done creates a gap in which corrupt practices 
emerge. As such, what looks like corruption from a legal-rational point of view is actually perceived 
as normal behaviour by local communities. Understanding corruption as a consequence of tension 
between different social obligations and authority in a localised context, this research argues that 
addressing corruption in Vanuatu is not a matter of stamping it out, but rather of unravelling and 
addressing the social expectations and practices that have allowed corruption to evolve. Hence, this 
thesis proposes a collaborative and deliberative governance framework, using traditional authority 
structures in Vanuatu, to help guide Vanuatu through the process of social change that is necessarily 
to become a resilient and independent state. The Jifly institution (MNCC) and its nakamal system, 
despite some imperfections, are considered to be the best equipped institutions still within Vanuatu 
society to achieve reconnection and reform in order to restore state legitimacy. 
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Preface 
Why study corruption and governance in Vanuatu? I answer this question using my personal 
reflections as a son of kastom jif, an elder in the church, and a departmental Director in the 
government of Vanuatu. I grew up in a traditional village of Amok, North West of Malekula in 
Vanuatu. My father was a kastom jif and he married ten wives. I had eleven brothers and eleven 
sisters. We lived in a tightly knit community and grew our food on our communal land. Christian 
missionaries came into our village and sowed seeds of division, dividing my family into two groups: 
one group converted to Christianity and moved to a coastal area, and the others live in the interior of 
the island. Those who settled in the coastal area embraced modernity by enrolling their children in 
Christian education and by working as wage labour in European-run plantations growing cash crops 
such as coconut, cocoa, and cotton. The two groups usually came together during the pig killing 
ceremony called nimangi, which was one of the important traditional festivals in the local community 
upon which local leaders altered their leadership status. Pigs were valuable commodities in the local 
community during the ceremonial activities, and people built their prestige and status through the 
number of their pigs they sacrificed at the pig killing ceremony. The members of the family who 
joined religious denominations were banned by their churches from trading pigs in the pig killing 
ceremony and thus they had to find a substitute. They brought goats, chickens, cows and bulls instead 
of pigs as their contribution to pig killing ceremonies.  
The changing requirements of the traditional pig killing ceremony from pigs to other animals started 
to cause ill feelings and quarrels among family members in the local community, because it was 
viewed by the kastom authority and the local community as an insult to our traditional values of social 
order and authority. The Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) church banned their members from eating and 
raising pigs, and this was a direct challenge to the traditional values placed on boars and the political 
leadership system in the local community. This transition could have been done smoothly if there had 
been dialogue and negotiations regarding meaning and common values between church authority and 
kastom authority at the levels of local community. The other members who joined different 
denominations also had to relinquish certain practices such as kava drinking, smoking, and dancing to 
the spirit of ancestors. Hence, the nature of our local community became more complex to manage 
given the presence of the multiple layers of leadership authority: kastom jif, missionary chiefs, 
assessors, pastors and clergy, and the colonial government. As one could imagine, in a village of 
fewer than one hundred members, there existed multiple authorities with undefined boundaries of 
responsibilities and roles, as well as different beliefs and philosophies that each authority operated 
within. In such a circumstance, there was a significant opportunity for conflict, defined by different 
religious beliefs, practices and, most profoundly, the religious clash with traditional values of social 
order and authority. 
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In my local village we had ten different religious denominations that became established permanently, 
and these were distinct in their doctrines. The impact that they have had in our small local community 
is the segregation of families into small denominational groups; and this started to create religious 
differences within family members in the local community. Indeed, the church divisions created 
perspectives of ‘us and them’ within a family community, and thus challenged the collective sense of 
unity and belonging which was formerly the moral binding code in local communities. Thus, the seeds 
of wider conflicts and clashes that were displayed at national levels in various forms began at 
community level, through the attitudes of missionaries and the experiences of colonisation that forced 
local communities to abandon their communal ways of life. The two colonial governments (Britain 
and France) added another leadership layer, called “assessors”, who worked as middlemen between 
the colonial government and kastom authority in villages or local communities. When Vanuatu gained 
independence in 1980 it inherited multiple layers of leadership authority, most of which were 
established by the churches and the two colonial authorities, besides kastom authority. At present, in 
each local community or village, there exist multiple authorities: church leaders, kastom jif, provincial 
counsellors, and elected representative to national parliament. In 2009 I led a consultation team on 
rural infrastructure to the islands of Futuna and Santo, and during the consultation one of the locals 
stood up and said: I kat tumas instraksen I mekem mifala nomo save se which wan bae mifala I folem 
(There is too much instruction and we do not know which leader to follow.) Indeed this is the current 
governance challenge in local communities and, most importantly, at the national level. 
My first job was at the Ministry of Education as a scholarship officer, and it was from there that I 
discovered that at the national level there were wider local divisions between those who spoke French 
and those who spoke English, island versus island, and more recently province versus province. The 
division between Francophone and Anglophone permeated all facets of life, starting from religion, 
education, health, and to government organisations in Vanuatu. As a scholarship officer, I 
encountered conflict between Francophone versus Anglophone persons on the allocation of the 
scholarship awards. I witnessed politicians and State Ministers who worked through the Minister of 
Education to influence the process and policies of the scholarships in favour of their relatives and 
immediate families. We received calls and letters from State Ministers and appointed politicians 
pressuring us to grant scholarships in favour of their children and close relatives. During my term in 
the office the Vanuatu government had only one hundred scholarships to allocate each year, and 
ninety seven percent of the scholarships were funded by the Australian and New Zealand 
governments. Each year the scholarship office received four to five hundred applicants, and our task 
was to select the best out of the best to be awarded the scholarship. The job was challenging because 
of the increased political interference in the process of allocation and administration of the 
scholarships. The end result was that the sons and daughters of political leaders and supporters were 
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awarded scholarships irrespective of their merits, at the broader expense of the other students who 
deserved the scholarship award but did not have political connections.  
I was appointed in 2000 as the Assistant Director of the Public Sector Reform process, and was 
responsible for coordinating the public sector reform initiatives. The prescriptions of this governance 
reform were imposed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as the conditions of their loan, and our 
bureaucratic tasks were to abide by these conditions. While our concerted efforts were on the desired 
outcomes of the reform, little thought was given to the appropriateness and relevance of the programs 
to the local context. The 2006 Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP) review noted that while the 
ADB and the government were concerned about getting their numbers right, the whole reform 
program had little impact on the lives of the eighty percent of the population who resided in the rural 
and remote islands of Vanuatu (Vanuatu Government 2006). In other words, the state’s transformation 
policies through reform programs have had little impact on the lives of people because of the fact that 
the content of the governance reforms were not connected to existing local governance structures and 
values of social order and authority. As such, the eighty percent of the population who live in rural 
and remote areas are not familiar with new institutional values, norms and processes.  
The reform was formulated to address increased political instabilities, decline in business confidence, 
macroeconomic instabilities, and the deterioration of law and order. However, since 1991 Vanuatu 
has gone through a series of unstable coalition governments, which period has seen the influence of 
multiple parties in the running of the nation’s affairs. This situation provides a significant opportunity 
for corruption in the form of horse trading between members of parliament to make sure they 
maintain their numbers in the government. In 2005, I was appointed as the Director of the Department 
of Strategic Management (DSM), responsible for the implementation of the Comprehensive Reform 
Program (CRP) and to provide strategic policy advice to the Office of Prime Minister. I had the 
opportunity to experience a change of Prime Ministership more than four times in one year; and the 
increased political instability this created demonstrated the challenges to the government of the day to 
satisfy personal political aspirations of individual parties in government. The party politics of the 
ministerial portfolios and top political positions in government would seem to be one of the reasons 
for political instability in Vanuatu, as many political parties use cash to lure support for other political 
parties and members to support them in their endeavour to change government. The involvement of 
money to pay members of parliament to switch their allegiance has compelled many political parties 
and leaders to either be involved in corrupt dealings with external funding sources, or to extract state 
resources outside rules and procedures. 
These leadership instabilities have had impacts on policy consistency, continuity and credibility, 
because of the short-term goals and ambitions of the government of the day to make sure they 
maintain their political numbers in government. Hence, the state resources that were intended for 
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development and delivery of services to rural and remote communities have instead been diverted by 
State Ministers to short-term political activities that helped maintain the numbers in the government. 
The political parties in government have used state allocated budgets to carry out activities for their 
political parties and to travel to their constituents to promote party solidarity, with little consideration 
for the national development objectives.  
Vanuatu commenced the CRP in 1997; however, the reform did not address the fragmented political 
nature of the country at the time, and most importantly did not change the nature of the political 
system in Vanuatu. There are two observations that can be made from this experience. Firstly, in all 
the reform programs that were spearheaded by the World Bank and other aid development institutions 
in the region, a careful consideration was made to make sure that their approaches were not 
interpreted by the recipient government as foreign interference into domestic politics. In adherence to 
their various mandates, the World Bank, United Nations and other aid agencies have worked with the 
assumption that their structural adjustment requirements are sufficient only to ensure responsible 
government. Secondly, the state-centred governance reform approach in Vanuatu has reflected a 
conventional approach where reforms are imposed on developing countries with little consideration 
given to local context and governance capabilities to manage the transformation process (Knapman & 
Saldanha 1999). 
The experiences of different levels of conflict and clashes of values that I encountered in my 
childhood and at the work place in three different departments of government prompted me to 
undertake this research, to try to plot a way through the complexities of religion, authority, language 
and custom in order to find a possible strategy to address the challenge of official corruption in 
Vanuatu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
Acronyms, Terms and Meanings 
 
Assessor This is a new leadership position created by the two colonial 
powers (French and British) in the local communities to act 
as a middleman between local communities and colonial 
authority (Rodman, W 1977). 
Bislama This is a language that has long history of development. The 
term Bislama comes from Beach-la-mar or bech-de-mer, 
which is mostly referred to as a sea slug that was used to 
trade. It is a national language for Vanuatu as per the 
constitution (Crowley 1990). 
Chief Chief is an English term, which is used here to differentiate 
the Western understanding of a leader from a traditional 
leader (Rouseau 2004). 
Condominium The term “condominium” is used to refer to joint colonial 
administration of British and French in Vanuatu (Miles 
1998). 
Jifly system The term jifly system is used to describe the essence and 
fabric of traditional political institutions in local communities 
and villages. It covers traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms, leadership, governance, and the role of the 
kastom jif in development within their own jurisdiction. 
Whenever it is used in this thesis it means the traditional 
institution of jif in the local community and village. 
Kastom Jif(s) This is the Bislama term for kastom leader, which is used 
throughout this thesis to refer to traditional authority. Article 
29 of the Constitution makes an explicit distinction with the 
prefix Kastom in front of the term jif - Kastom jif. Thus the 
term jif or Kastom jif is used to denote a traditional leader 
who, according to the1983 national policy of the MNCC, 
has: inherited their position through a bloodline; who follows 
the proper kastom fashion and has a nasara, nakamal, land 
and people; who is known by the whole village and has 
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killed the pigs at the nasara while people from his village 
have followed him and participated in his pig killing 
ceremony; and whose title name and meaning is from his 
original language (Lindstrom & White 1997). 
Kastom This Bislama word loosely translates as “tradition(al)”. The 
terms Kastom in Bislama and its English cognate “custom” 
refer to two different understandings. Kastom is understood 
in the Vanuatu context as a total way of life (Bolton 1999b; 
Jolly 1997). 
Kastom authority This term is used to refer to kastom jifs as the only authority 
in local communities recognised under kastom principles. 
Kastom governance This is a holistic way of life that encompasses traditional 
ways of dealing with socio-economic development and 
political relations in the local communities of Vanuatu 
(Bolton 1999b; Jolly 1992; Regenvanu 2009). This term has 
also been referred to as a manner and way people might 
apply collective wisdom or kastom practices to deal with 
contemporary challenges, and how people might envision 
organising their lives to live well together (AusAID 2005, p. 
7). This thesis applies the first understanding, as a holistic 
way of life. 
Kava The drug that comes from the roots of the plant Piper 
Methysticum. It is consumed as a drink on special occasions 
in traditional society of Vanuatu. However, the uses and 
culture of kava drinking have changed drastically in the last 
three decades (Crowley 1995). 
Missionary Chief The term that referred to an individual who was appointed by 
the missionary in the colonial days as a leader in the local 
community (Rodman, W 1977). 
Modernist state expectations This term is used interchangeably in this thesis with 
modernist governance values, both of which are largely 
borrowed from the modernization theory of liberal economic 
and political democratisation.  
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Nakamal This is a traditional house in a village that symbolises the 
functional leadership structure of a village. It is where 
members meet and dialogue over certain issues affecting 
their welfare and also discuss ceremonial activities such as 
marriage, circumcisions, funerary services, and birth 
celebration (Huffer & Molisa 1999b). 
Nasara This is a consecrated area and a house where a chief 
conducts the pig killing ceremony, and also it is a place 
where the head of clans performed the leadership ranking 
ceremony. 
New Hebrides Prior to independence Vanuatu was called the New Hedrides, 
until 1980 when it achieved its independence from Britain 
and French. 
Nimangi This is a traditional pig killing ceremony where a kastom jif 
is graded with jifly status and titles. 
Ni-Vanuatu This term is used to refer to all ethnicities originating in 
Vanuatu. It also refers, more generally, to nationals and 
citizens of Vanuatu, whatever their ethnicity. 
Socially Embedded Practices This is a term used interchangeably with a kastom practices, 
in this thesis and means traditional ways of life that are 
embedded in the society and valued by the people. 
Wantok The term wantok is a slogan used in the Melanesian region to 
refer to someone who speaks the same language or comes 
from the same tribe or village. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
The persistent failure of international institutions to recognise the importance of adjusting their 
governance principles to local conditions is one of the root causes of the governance challenges 
confronting Vanuatu. In the South Pacific region, and more specifically in Vanuatu, the state has 
imported Western ideas and models of democracy and, as a consequence, institutional design and 
practices reflect a strong Western influence. In the case of Vanuatu, the British Westminster system is 
the model upon which the country’s constitution is founded (Larmour 2002). There was obvious 
utility in this approach in forming a viable structure of government for Vanuatu. 
This thesis explores the gap between political modernization and traditional bases of authority. It asks 
how this gap can be bridged in order for Vanuatu to re-start a national conversation about democracy 
and social development. It seeks available avenues and means to integrate traditions into governance 
and transform it in ways that are positive, progressive, democratic, inclusive, and equitable, in order 
to minimise opportunities for corruption. This introductory chapter gives an overview of the research 
setting. It begins to describe the central concerns of this study and looks at the issue of “good 
governance” as an imposed strategy to address corruption in developing countries. This is followed 
with an outline of the research aims, research questions, and research significance and the 
contribution the research will make towards existing governance knowledge in Vanuatu. The chapter 
ends with a brief outline of chapters covered in this thesis. 
1.1  The statement of the problem 
In discussions about constitutional drafting in Vanuatu, Professor Zorgbibe, a French government 
representative and a Technical Advisor to the constitutional committee, made the following 
comments: 
I agreed with Professor Ghai [British representative and Technical Advisor to the committee] that 
the constitution for the New Hebrides [Vanuatu] should draw more from the British political 
system with its simplicity and deeply democratic inspiration, rather than from the French, which 
tended to be more complicated (Minutes of the Constitution 1979, p. 24).  
This quotation illustrates the colonial approaches to decolonisation in the Pacific, where the Euro-
centred notions of the state and democratic statehood were simply transferred into a landscape of great 
diversity and complex socio-political structures. This transplanted political model was never 
fashioned to accommodate the socio-cultural and political realities of Vanuatu. For example, this 
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model failed to take into account the traditional bases of political authority, which varied across the 
culturally and geographically diverse country. This failure to consult is one of the root causes of 
enduring social division and conflict in Vanuatu and, as is argued in this thesis, also one important 
contributor to the problem of official corruption.  
The Vanuatu Constitution created a common socio-economic and political space in which there 
existed multiple sources of authority, each having a distinct worldview concerning the appropriate 
relationship between rulers and ruled. In the preamble to the Constitution the principles of kastom 
governance and Christianity were enshrined as the two additional pillars of legal-rational state 
governance in Vanuatu. The term kastom in Bislama and its English cognate “custom” differ in 
meaning and understandings. As Bolton (1999b, p. 11) observes, in English ‘custom refers to specific 
practices, rather than to the whole interlocking network of knowledge and practices denoted by 
culture’. Kastom, as understood in the context of Vanuatu, is a total way of life, which encompasses 
knowledge and practices that are critical for human survival and well-being (Jolly 1994). People 
believe that kastom governance encompasses traditional values of social obligation and authority, and 
these traditional values include collective entitlements, subsistence living, holistic life, traditional 
politics, strong kinship ties, and restorative justice. The recognition of kastom in the preamble of the 
Vanuatu Constitution implies that the state has accepted the whole interlocking network of traditional 
knowledge and values of social order and authority as part of the state governance system: 
We, the people of Vanuatu, proud of our struggle for freedom, determined to safeguard the 
achievements of this struggle, cherishing our ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity, mindful 
at the same time of our common destiny, hereby proclaim the establishment of the united and 
free republic of Vanuatu founded on traditional Melanesian values, faith in God, and 
Christian principles, and for this purpose give ourselves this constitution (Constitution of the 
Republic of Vanuatu 1980, p. 6). 
However, the Vanuatu Constitution is also a state-centric political model that does not always work to 
the benefit of Vanuatu and its people. As stated above, there are tensions in Vanuatu between 
religious faith and kastom. Eighty percent of the population live in rural areas and retain a deep 
attachment to kastom governance, and accord greater legitimacy to kastom authority than to the state 
legislative authority based upon legal-rational principles of government (VNSO 2009; Regenvanu 
2009). As such, people hold that kastom authority should become the supreme authority controlling 
and managing national socio-economic and political affairs. The ensuing contradictions present major 
governance challenges for Vanuatu on all development fronts. In the last three decades there have 
been some elected politicians who have claimed the jifly title and held a ministerial position in the 
state. Most importantly, it is now becoming a political norm that whoever holds the position of Prime 
Minister and Head of State has to be endowed with a jifly title. This is a classical example of 
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traditional values of social obligations and authority being entangled with legal-rational forms of 
authority and, as a consequence, complicating the emerged state-centric political model.  
The traditional values of social obligations and authority work in contradiction to legal-rational forms 
of authority premised on democratic values of election, fairness, competition, leadership impartiality 
and impersonalisation of roles and authority. In Vanuatu people are familiar with kastom governance 
and use it in their daily life, as compared to state-centred government institutions that are alienated 
from the local context (Regenvanu 2009; Wairiu 2006). Kastom governance, as discussed in this 
chapter, is a holistic way of life that encompasses traditional ways of dealing with socio-economic 
development and political relations in the local communities of Vanuatu (Bolton 1999b; Jolly 1992; 
Regenvanu 2009). In this sense “governance” extends beyond the realm of political decision-making 
and reaches into the daily routine and actions of people living by their accepted traditions. 
It is argued here that government in Vanuatu thus falls short of social expectations. The traditional 
political system is much more extensive and is regulated not by codified law but based upon kastom 
principles. Hence, people hold that kastom authority is crucial to the political authority of Vanuatu’s 
elected leaders, carrying with it high expectations from local communities of official duties and 
responsibilities and how these should be carried out according to local social norms, values, and 
practices. For these reasons, political power is strongly personalised (Lawson 1993); and it is either 
inherited through blood line, or achieved through alteration of status and must instead be “won” 
(Allen 1984). Tensions between traditional and legal-rational forms of political organisation are thus 
an enduring feature of Vanuatu’s political and cultural landscape. 
Government and governance refer to different types of relationships between the state and citizens. 
According to Bevir and Rhodes (2003), while government refers to a hierarchical mode of governing, 
governance encompasses a wide range of formal and informal processes through which common 
problems are discussed and addressed. In other words, governance is no longer a synonym of 
government, but has become an antonym (Bevir & Rhodes 2003). For the purpose of this research, I 
have used Douglas’ (2000, p. 1) definition of governance, in which he refers to ‘governance’ as ‘the 
myriad ways in which people organize themselves, attempt to relate to each other, and represent what 
they do in the process’. However, contextual differences, including cultural divergences, render 
formal control by a single system of governance very difficult to achieve in practice (Chhotray & 
Stoker 2009). What we have witnessed in the last two decades is that the process of establishing 
liberal democratic institutions in many developing countries has collided with local obligations and 
expectations, especially where limited attention has been given to cultural context. Thus, not only has 
the shift to central state authority been problematic, but any move to decentralise stable power is 
likely to be very complicated because state capacity is very limited, and the power, roles and 
relationships of the existing authorities are not clearly defined. This situation is compounded by the 
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diverse nature of a traditional socio-political system that is entrenched along the lines of local values 
of social obligation, which work contradictorily to legal-rational governance expectations. 
In the constitution, the kastom jifs are recognised and mandated to preserve and promote kastom 
governance in all spheres of life. The term jif, or kastom jif, is used to denote a traditional leader who, 
according to the 1983 national policy of the Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs (MNCC), has 
inherited his/her position through a bloodline (Lindstrom & White 1997). The kastom jifs have 
promoted kastom values of social collectivism, kinship, and reciprocal relationships, based on 
customary values of strong family support and respect for local tradition. These traditional values 
exist in tension with the legal-rational state authority and liberal expectations of individual property 
rights, a free market system, democracy, merit, specialised professions, and retributive justice through 
a courts system, as is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Indeed, those kastom values of social order have now 
been grafted to state political organisations and development. Thus, Vanuatu politics can be viewed 
usefully through the lens of a patron-client relationship model or family network. The patron-client 
network model helps in understanding how informal powers undermine formal legal-rational authority 
and institutions (Scott 1972). Christian theology constructs yet another worldview that rejects local 
values and beliefs. Thus, the state’s constitution creates and works within a discordant political space 
that generates conflict and provides incentives for official corruption. 
In this context, conflict is defined as a state of disharmony between two institutions, or incompatible 
values, norms and processes that operate in contradictory ways. In all societies there are social 
structures that determine which values and norms dominate, as well as how different resources are 
used and distributed (Abrahamsen 2000). Local communities or groups have their own social norms 
and values, and they will always strive to preserve their existing values and social order. Therefore, it 
is natural that they will react when there are external interferences in their traditional jurisdiction, and 
as such they will exploit all the available avenues to maintain their status quo. The local values of 
social order and authority are significant pillars within local communities throughout the Vanuatu 
archipelago, and they rely upon these as a governing system in their daily life. Where the presence of 
the state is limited and there is no state delivery of services to people, local values of social order and 
authority are critical to the maintenance of social order and the socioeconomic wellbeing of the 
people.  The studies used in this thesis illustrate how traditional values of social obligation and 
authority are interpreted, respected, and applied by people of different social status. Kastom authority, 
it is argued, plays an important role in keeping the peace. 
Local communities thus find more relevance in using kastom governance to order social life. As such, 
they give more legitimacy to kastom authority at all levels of society because kastom jifs work as 
volunteers taking care of the socio-economic and political needs of their respective communities. The 
implication is that there is a strong power resistance to legal-rational authority from those who enjoy 
5 
 
kastom status and who interpret state-led modernization as a threat to their ascribed social and 
political roles. This situation is compounded by the fact that the constitution has recognised both 
authorities as having respective governance systems, and that these were seen as legitimate 
foundations for the building of the post-colonial state, leading to tension between these two systems. 
For example, the traditional land tenure system and principle of reciprocity sit incongruently with 
formal authority and state institutions on many development fronts. Chapter Seven of this thesis 
illustrates that when there is conflict between social order and authority it is the politicians (both 
elected and appointed) and government officials who benefit, by using their public positions to extract 
state resources for their personal gain. 
While Christian beliefs and values are recognised as part of the conflict that Vanuatu experiences, this 
research focuses almost exclusively on the conflict between traditional social order and authority on 
the one hand, and the more recent imported legal-rational form of authority and governance.  Chapter 
Four of this thesis gives a more nuanced analysis of the nature of this conflict and the social fractures 
within Vanuatu society defined by religious rivalry, traditional socio-political values, and the imposed 
legal-rational political authority. 
Figure 1.1 Conflicting values enshrined in Vanuatu's Constitution 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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The endemic problems of governance, and development in general, that Vanuatu is confronting are a 
result of the conflicting values of social order and authority that the two discrete and broadly 
conceived systems, legal-rational governance expectations and kastom governance, create at their 
points of interaction. The interaction points are at the state administration levels, state development 
projects, and the delivery of services to rural and remote areas of Vanuatu (Vanuatu Ombudsman 
1998a, 1998b, 2001). For instance, the traditional land tenure system often clashes with donor-
inspired and -funded land tenure systems of leasing, when the government and individual investors 
want to implement development projects such as schools, dispensaries, churches, airports, and 
agriculture, to name a few, in Vanuatu. Where these worlds overlap we find practices that can be 
deemed as corrupt according to legal-rational standards of government (Cain & Jowitt 2004). There 
have been incidents where government and individual investors bribed the traditional landowners with 
cash, vehicles, schools, dispensaries, and public phones in order to facilitate hectares of land for 
development projects such as airports, resorts, and cattle farming. In a similar vein, a State Minister 
can influence the formal process to divert all the development projects to his constituency, as was the 
case in an ADB shipping infrastructure project in 1985, where the Minister of Finance at the time 
instructed the contractors to build a wharf on his constituency despite the recommendation of experts 
and a feasibility study (ADB 2002). This thesis is concerned with how and why such behaviours arise, 
and also with what can be done to address their root causes.  
1.2 Corruption in Vanuatu 
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon; and the reasons for this are not to be found only in the 
behaviours and attitudes of individuals (Buchan & Hill 2014; Felson 2011). Given the ambiguity of 
the term corruption, it is broadly defined into two streams: corruption as a misuse of power or public 
office for private gain (Walton 2015) ; and corruption as a decay or deterioration of government 
standards (Buchan & Hill 2014; United Nations 2004; World Bank 2006b). In Vanuatu, the issue of 
corruption is more to do with the performance of members of parliament and those who are employed 
in public offices (Cain & Jowitt 2004). This is because the embedding of liberal democratic 
institutions and the adoption of the notion of sovereign state brings to the fore the idea of “public 
interest”, and as a consequence the elected parliamentarians are meant to represent the interests of the 
people. Hence, within the sphere of government and liberal forms of governance, the operation of 
self-interest (family ties and friendship) is considered a corruption because it violates public interests 
(Kolstad 2012). Thus, in Vanuatu, the evidences collected through case studies suggested that 
corruption revolves around government not behaving in the way it should because of the clash of two 
different sets of values of social obligations, authority and expectations, which undermines the rules 
and the processes of government. In this thesis the definition of corruption adopted is ‘a misuse of 
public office or power for private gain’(United Nations 2004,p.6), an understanding which is captured 
in the international legal definition of corruption employed by multilateral institutions such as the 
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World Bank, the United Nations and aid development agencies (United Nations 2004, p. 6; World 
Bank 2006b). 
In Vanuatu, as noted by Peter Larmour (2009), the issue of corruption was first aired in public after 
the establishment of the Vanuatu Ombudsman’s Office in 1994 and the enactment of the Leadership 
Code Act of 1998, Larmour notes:  
About one-half (35) of the 75 reports produced by the Vanuatu Ombudsman Commission 
between 1996 and 2000 involved misbehavior by ministers, ranging from the issuance of 
phoney letters of credit to foreign fraudsters through to awarding themselves compensation 
and favoring their relatives (2009 p.145). 
 
This quotation draws attention to the entanglement of traditional family expectations and the legal-
rational process. Importantly, this raises an ethical question about good and bad and also how 
standards and codes of conduct are determined in the legal-rational world by the government and 
multilateral organisations(Kolstad 2012). As Larmour (2009) points out, most of the standard 
measurements used today to track down the incidents of corruption in developing countries are based 
on Western concepts and experiences, which have little relevance in the context of developing 
countries. These include Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Bribe Payers Index (BPI), and Global 
Corruption Barametre (GCB) (Harrison 2007). In a similar vein, Buchan and Hill (2014) note that the 
notion and global definition of corruption is derived mainly from Western political thought and 
history. Many developing countries that adopted Western political institutions have encoded in their 
legal frameworks norms, values, and process that are in tension with their local values of social 
obligation and authority. For example, when local political elites divert state resources to benefit their 
personal interests, they do so at the expense of poor and remote communities, in the case of Vanuatu. 
When they are blamed for such corrupt dealings they hide under the banner of kastom governance, 
claiming the obligation to provide for their people. Likewise, when they are accused of breaking 
kastom laws they defend themselves under the legal-rational state’s rules and governance. 
The individuals who are elected as members of parliament by the people often resort to traditional 
practices of distributing goods and services to their electorates as a popular strategy to secure and 
maintain political support (Morgan 2004). This means that re-election to parliament is often 
determined on the basis of how much in goods and cash donations each candidate provides to 
individuals and communities rather than on the basis of policies that will contribute to the 
development and wellbeing of everyone in the community. This reciprocal relationship based on 
traditional values of social obligation and kastom practices is not factored into state governance 
institutions, and thus it is seen as corrupt behaviour from a legal-rational world view. In Vanuatu the 
kastom practice of distributing goods and services to close families and political supporters is in fact 
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considered moral, because a leader is fulfilling their social duty. However, in a legal-rational 
governance system, this practice is labelled as corrupt because a leader is favouring his close relatives 
and in-groups and therefore distorting the processes of justice, fairness, and equity. The immediate 
consequences of this gap in understanding between what is and what is not corruption are the 
development of short-term responses to short-term goals by individuals and personalized political 
parties and misappropriation of state resources to repay party supporters. Such behaviour is below 
optimum development outcomes, and to the detriment of the broader interests of society. 
Corruption experts argue that corrupt practices undermine democracy and the rule of law and, as a 
consequence, hurt the poor and remote local communities by diverting resources that could be used to 
build infrastructure, health, education, and clean water (Buchan and Hill 2014; Ackerman 1999; 
Larmour 2009). Since 1991, Vanuatu has witnessed an increased number of independent candidates 
contesting elections, as well as continual competition between members of parliament fighting for 
ministerial positions and key state positions (Morgan 2004). The public consequently perceive 
political participation to mean the pursuit of private material gains, which pursuit undermines 
“rational” economic planning, whether defined by liberal technocratic standards or standards of social 
justice and public welfare. It encourages political short termism and patron-client relationship 
networks ahead of the public or common good (Reilly 2004). This is a scenario that is described by 
the World Bank as a “distant big man”, with elected politicians expected to provide material benefits 
to their constituencies in exchange for their votes (World Bank 2008). Van Trease (2011) describes it 
as the politics of the ‘black truck’, defined as horse-trading between members of parliament fighting 
for ministerial portfolios and key positions in the government on behalf of their constituencies. Reilly 
(2004) has identified similar trends in Papua New Guinea, where the popular expectation is that once 
a candidate is successfully elected into the parliament he/she will use his/her position to extract 
resources from the government and distribute them back to his/her clan. This would seem to be a 
common expectation in Melanesian societies, where ‘people have come to regard government as the 
major, or only, source of opportunity and finance’ (Reilly 2004, p. 50). It is argued in this thesis that 
this expectation is indeed one of the root causes of development impasses, which many outsiders have 
failed to understand, tending instead to use other factors such as ethnicity, linguistic diversities, and 
fragmented societies to explain development failures in the post-colonial Melanesian societies (Reilly 
2004; Morgan 2004). Furthermore, this thesis argues that many leadership challenges in Melanesian 
societies, and Vanuatu in particular, are due to inherent tensions within traditional beliefs 
underpinning customary leadership values and practices. In the absence of structures to define and 
regulate competition for power, wealth, and status, compromises are struck, accommodation sought, 
and understandings confined, resulting in the misallocation of public money. The present research 
treats corruption as a consequence of a wider internal process of social conflict and change, which is 
either running out of control or taking Vanuatu in a dangerous direction.  
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The uneven distribution of state resources resulting from such corruption has caused a poor standard 
of delivery of services, and poverty of accessibility to almost all rural remote communities of 
Vanuatu. Because the political parties were developed and sustained on the basis of resource 
distribution to electorates, the parties that were on the government’s side have had a powerful 
influence and the opportunity to divert state resources and projects to their constituencies and political 
support groups. This happened at the broader expense of other constituencies that were on the 
opposition side; and thus the battle to hold a ministerial portfolio or be in the government is a 
continual challenge to political stability and continuity of policy in Vanuatu. The use of money as a 
form of bribery to solicit the loyalties of members of parliament has been a feature of Vanuatu’s 
politics, and this practice urges individual parties to seek funding abroad through means that are 
outside the rule of law. In November 2014, the government of the Prime Minister Natuman suspended 
the leader of the opposition, Mr Carcasses, plus fifteen other members of parliament, for alleged 
bribery and the use of illicit funds to destabilise his government. The suspension was challenged in 
the court and the court reinstated the sixteen members of parliament on the basis that their rights had 
been breached. The case was further challenged in court, which saw fourteen members of parliament 
being convicted of alleged official bribery on 9th of October 2015 and sentenced to jail on 22nd of 
October 2015. On the 9th of October 2015, the Supreme Court of Vanuatu found that the individual 
payments of one million vatu were “corruptly made” by Mr. Carcasses to the 14 other convicted 
members of parliament and “corruptly accepted” by them, as an inducement to secure their support in 
the motion of no-confidence that ousted the then Prime Minister Joe Natuman and brought the 
government of Sato Kilman to power with Mr. Carcasses as Deputy Prime Minister (Joshua 2015). 
This instance was representative of other cases of increased leadership instability and continual 
constitutional challenges in the court (VanTrease 2011). On the other hand, the government makes 
sure it satisfies members of parliament by resourcing them with government vehicles and travel 
incentives abroad, all at the expense of public funds and poor delivery of services to local 
communities.  
Corruption in the public sector is corrosive of state resources (and of public trust); and, as a 
consequence, many rural and remote communities in Vanuatu confront poverty of accessibility to 
basic services such as infrastructure, health, education, clean water, and market accessibility. In July 
2014, Prime Minister, Joe Natuman, in his official address to the people of Vanuatu at the 
independence celebration, acknowledged that the greatest enemy to Vanuatu is corruption and 
poverty: 
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The common enemy, which was colonialism, has gone.  We as the people and leaders of 
today, in the government, civil society, church, chiefs, women and youth, must know what 
our common enemy is today. It’s not about who our common enemy is but rather what is our 
common enemy today?  Once we have identified this, we must work hard to eliminate it from 
our society. Unlike colonialism, which was then the only common enemy, today we have 
many common enemies. The major common enemy is poverty and corruption. Poverty breeds 
corruption and corruption breeds poverty (Natuman, 30 July 2014).  
At the global level, corruption is recognised by the President of the World Bank Group, Jim Yong 
Kim, as the “public enemy number one” in developing countries (World Bank 2013). However, it is 
suggested here that the global recipe and approach to addressing corruption in Vanuatu and elsewhere 
has little relevance in contributing to good governance and therefore, as it is argued in this thesis, 
there is a need to recognise and give greater relevance to the local context. The universal Worldwide 
Governance Indicators and Principles assume that corruption is a global challenge that can be treated 
similarly throughout the world regardless of contextual differences. This thesis argues that this could 
be a fundamental error, given the immense differences in socio-economic and political characteristics 
around the globe.  
1.3 Good governance 
Governance is an idea that has been popularised by international institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the United Nations, especially to guide development and eliminate malfeasance. The first 
discussions of “governance and corruption” were promulgated by the modernization school, which 
tried to justify the lack of democracy and the presence of corruption in many of the developing 
countries that were colonised by Europeans or ruled by undemocratic and corrupt regimes 
(Huntington 1968; Khan 2004). In the South Pacific region, it was between the 1960s and the 1980s 
that many countries made the transition from colonisation to independent statehood by adopting new 
institutional values premised on the principles of liberal economics and liberal democracy (Larmour 
2002). However, in many instances, particularly in the South Pacific region, new states began to 
experience serious budget crises and political instability after the first and second decades of working 
with newly established democratic and market institutions (Fraenkel 2013; Knapman & Saldanha 
1999). Rent-seeking behaviours (where individuals or groups of people seek to obtain financial 
advantage in the form of monopolies), compounded by issues of political instability, budget crises, 
and macro-economic instability, have impacted detrimentally on the economies of most developing 
countries (Khan 2006). 
As will be discussed, those challenges triggered a change in policy direction, at the behest of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which led to the adoption of structural 
adjustment programs in the 1980s. These programs were intended to head-off future budget crises in 
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developing countries thought to weighed down by unsustainable indebtedness (Khan 2004). The debt 
problems that rocked Latin America in the 1980s brought about the so-called “Washington 
Consensus”, built largely on the liberal economic principle of reducing the size of the state’s function 
and empowering market institutions to promote economic development, based upon Williamson’s 
analysis of the Latin American crises (2004). 
As Khan (2004, p.109) points out, liberalisation policies carry the expectation that they will prevent 
such crisis by removing the incentive of rent-seeking. However, frequently, the adoption of liberal 
model of governance can have the reverse effect. Indeed, the results of the structural adjustment 
reform policies in developing countries were more disappointing than anticipated; and there is 
evidence from the experiences of Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere that the reduction of the state’s 
role did more harm than good (Khan 2004; Ogbaharya 2008).  
During the decolonisation phase, developing countries were forced to adopt political institutions 
imposed by their departing colonial authorities, and later through policies and programs of the 
international aid institutions. Once institutions are established, pressure is then applied from aid 
donors for governance practices to be reformed to correspond with international expectations; 
however, no sustained thought is given to the “governance capabilities” required to effectively 
implement desired reforms and manage the complexities of “transition” in respective countries (Khan 
2004). 
The World Bank’s governance agenda places emphasis on capabilities and on the roles of the state in 
creating a policy environment that would allow the market to drive growth and development. Integral 
to this new discipline, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) have now become universalised 
as measure of governance effectiveness and also of compliance with international governance norms. 
While this framework was based on the experiences solicited from industrialised societies and 
advanced economies, it nevertheless provided a starting point to understand how the imposed 
development policies, priorities, and institutions in developing countries come into tension with 
existing local governance practices.  
 
Characteristic of this new governance agenda is the expanded definition of governance, beyond the 
mere exercise of power in the public domain (World Bank 1992) to a broader view that encompasses 
state legislated authorities and informal authorities in the society. In this understanding, governance is 
defined as the ‘traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common 
good’ (Kaufmann 2005, p. 82). This definition forms the foundation of the WGIs, and it encompasses 
three key areas of governance and six indicators, as depicted in Figure 1.2. However, while 
acknowledging the place of tradition and authority, these indicators still describe “good governance” 
in terms that accord with Western political and economic liberal “scripts”. 
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Figure 1. 2 Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
Source: (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2010, p. 4) 
 
This is a standard liberal model of democratic politics, made into a universal measure of good 
governance that is disseminated by state and international aid development agencies. Firstly, the 
essence of good governance, as per this framework, is described as a participatory process where 
citizens have equal rights and opportunities to choose and elect their representatives to government 
and, most importantly, participate in public decision-making that impacts on their livelihoods. 
Inherent in this participatory process is the element of voice and accountability mechanisms, which in 
most cases implies a single generic approach, neglecting the fact that the democratic government can 
also invent policies that are repugnant to international law. As Reilly (2004) points out, the 
accountability processes are more difficult in South Pacific countries, especially archipelagic states, 
where islands are dispersed and people are divided on the basis of languages, religions, and traditions.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no opportunity to develop a common coherent 
accountability mechanism among different polities and institutions; however, as is argued in this 
thesis, the changes cannot be imposed in a locality without negotiating the meanings for local peoples 
of such changes and establishing a common understanding of what it means to be “well governed”.  
 
Secondly, according to Khan (2004), good governance reform aims to promote government 
capabilities to design policies that are market enhancing. Hence, the term “effectiveness” is a 
borrowed economic term from the private sector, which has been transferred into the public sector to 
measure “government effectiveness”. In the public sector, the term “effectiveness” refers to policies 
that make markets more efficient by reducing the transaction costs (Khan 2004). In addition, there is 
the notion of pro-poor service delivery, as a means to measure state effectiveness in addressing 
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poverty, enabling the majority to benefit from state’s basic services such as schools, clean water, and 
health services, as well as creating expectations that would drive a popular demand for greater 
accountability. However, this approach does not take into account structural problems in most 
developing countries that pose greater hindrances to the implementation of market-enhancing 
strategies. For instance, inherent in the market reform policies is the notion of property rights, which 
tend to collide with the collective rights of traditional societies and other local resource management 
practices in most developing countries (World Bank 2006a, 2010). Indeed, the regulations governing 
the leasing system and property rights in most developing countries contain many provisions that are 
in conflict with socially embedded local practices, thus inviting corrupt practices (Cain & Jowitt 
2004), as this thesis will argue is the case in Vanuatu. Thus, using effectiveness measures as an 
indicator to test government performance in promoting policies that are market friendly is inadequate, 
in the sense that many developing countries experience various binding constraints that limit their 
growth and the size and capacity of the private sector to boost their economies (Bazeley & Mullen 
2006). 
 
Thirdly, the state requires effective law enforcement agencies and accountable institutions (for 
example, police, an ombudsman, an auditor general and judiciary), to enforce rules and regulations as 
well as monitor compliance. In most developing countries, weak capacity in law enforcement is 
compounded by the absence of public demands for accountability. The rules and laws are not widely 
known or understood by the general population, and often the state does not have sufficient resources 
to educate its citizens about new laws and regulations. This has weakened accountability and creates 
an opportunity for local elites to manipulate the regulations for their own benefit (Cain & Jowitt 2004; 
Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998b). In other words, the limited knowledge by the public of laws and 
regulations has weakened capacity to hold the perpetrators accountable for their actions. However, as 
Khan (2007) argues, governance capabilities are critical to effecting change in the structure of the 
economy in developing countries, and often aid donors do not appear to take into account the critical 
need for improved governance capabilities, in their lending policies. 
 
These phases of governance reform pressure from international institutions have not resolved the 
challenge presented by multiple sources of legitimate authority in Vanuatu. The present thesis argues 
that, in the context of Vanuatu, the gap between state-led governance and kastom governance ensures 
that institutions work in conflict with each other. This conflict can translate into various sources of 
corruption, which pose greater challenges to governance reform and political stability. As such, 
understanding the sources of corruption as a consequence of various social relations in localised 
contexts, and of the conflict between the two sets of values, solicits a greater appreciation of the 
relevance for the Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs (MNCC) to act deliberatively, utilising 
collaborative strategies to mediate between different multiple authorities and expectations. Indeed, the 
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kastom jifs have demonstrated their capabilities to adapt to the changing development context in 
Vanuatu and effectively address social, economic and political conflicts at various levels of society in 
which the state cannot operate. Thus, it is argued in this thesis that the perennial struggle for equal 
development power and authority between the two institutions may be managed by upgrading the role 
of the kastom authority from a mere consultative and advisory body to a meaningful, deliberative and 
collaborative institution. It would then have the capacity to negotiate between different political 
authorities and institutions in Vanuatu, with the intention of promoting relevant and effective 
development objectives at the national and local levels. 
 
To address contested political institutions and the issues surrounding the top down process of 
approaching development in Vanuatu, a collaborative governance model is developed taking into 
account the challenge of increasing active participation of mass population in far remote and rural 
areas of Vanuatu. This collaborative governance model is covered in Chapter Eight of this thesis and 
it builds on a sound literatuve review of the work done by John Dryzek and Ansell and Gash (Ansell 
& Gash 2007; Dryzek 2009). According to Dryzek (2009) collaborative governance will help reduce 
confrontational nature of policy debates and will create an avenue for a greater dialogue and 
consensual decision making. 
1.4 Research aims and objectives 
The aims of this research project are to: 
 EXPLAIN how the “collision”, between traditional values of social order and authority, and 
modern imported models of rational-legal government, creates opportunities and incentives 
for practices deemed “corrupt”   
 UNDERSTAND corruption as a consequence of social and political tensions traceable to the 
colonial era in Vanuatu  
 EXAMINE the potential for traditional institutions, especially the jifly councils which enjoy 
broad legitimacy and credibility, to play a pivotal role in building a resilient governance 
system in Vanuatu and to contribute to bridging modern and traditional concepts and practices 
of governance 
1.5 Research question 
The overarching research question is:  
 
What are the sources of corruption within Vanuatu government and society?  
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This is followed with four sub-research questions to help address the overarching research question. 
The purpose of these sub-research questions is to guide the data generation: 
a) In functional terms, in Vanuatu, what is corruption? 
b) What are the dimensions of corrupt behaviour within Vanuatu society? 
c) How do we explain the phenomenon of corruption in Vanuatu? 
d) What strategies are available using local cultural means and traditions to build resilient 
governance institutions in Vanuatu? 
1.6 Rationale and the significance of the study 
This thesis will add a new perspective to understandings of good governance in Vanuatu by providing 
new ways of identifying major sources of corruption within government and society. It adds a new 
dimension in that it views sources of corruption as consequences of the collision between two value 
systems in a local context. Therefore, understanding the sources of corruption as a consequence of a 
collision between two broadly conceived sets of cultural values helps us to understand why the 
MNCC can be seen as an important mediator between different multiple authorities that operate in 
that created empty space for socio-economic and political development. It is anticipated that other 
neighbouring Pacific countries which share similar challenges with Vanuatu will benefit from this 
research, through identified practical approaches of how kastom governance and state governance 
institutions can work collaboratively to promote sustainable, resilient and inclusive development, as 
well as promoting effective delivery of services to the people of Vanuatu.  
1.7 Structure and outline of thesis 
Chapter One provides an introduction to the problem investigated in this thesis, followed by the 
research aims, research questions, and the research significance, as well as the contribution it will 
make to the knowledge of good governance in Vanuatu. Chapter Two reviews literature underpinning 
the World Bank’s ‘good governance’ strategy, and its philosophical foundations based on theories of 
economic and political modernization, democratization and development, as these relate to Vanuatu. 
It examines how the concept of governance has been universalised and imposed on developing 
countries in a manner that gives scant consideration to local contextual factors. It is evident that 
liberal governance prescriptions fail to “compute” traditional values of social order and authority. 
Chapter Three provides the theoretical underpinnings of the research methodology and methods used 
in this thesis. To understand the nature of corruption in Vanuatu, this thesis employs a patron-client 
network relationship as a framework of analysis to unpack the contestability of power between kastom 
authority and legislative authority, and how the collision between the two values creates a space and 
opportunity for significant corruption within Vanuatu government and society. This is followed by a 
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discussion of the research framework, case study methodology and the methods utilised. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the ethical framework and limitations of this framework and methodology. 
Chapter Four sets out the divisions and fractures within Vanuatu society, which are clear fault lines of 
conflict that stem from religious beliefs, kastom practices and traditional rivalries overlain with 
imposed ideologies from outside. In other words, the ideologies of Christianity, kastom practices or 
socially embedded local practices, and ideologies of the nation state brought in from outside have 
contributed to multiple fault lines that can develop into serious fractures.  
Chapters Five and Six contain two selected case studies that have been used to exemplify and 
interrogate the issues and challenges to governance in Vanuatu that are investigated in this thesis. The 
first case study is of the MNCC, and the focus is on the formation of the jifly council as an exemplar 
of the kinds of mistakes that the colonial authorities and, more recently, international institutions such 
as the World Bank and the United Nations have made in transforming or reforming power and 
authority in the developing world. 
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Figure 1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Phase 1. Philosophical Foundation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 2  Research Evidence 
 
 
 
Phase 3. Synthesising the findings 
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Chapter 8: Policy Implication 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
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Narrative of documentary and empirical analysis 
Visualising the way forward - using Democracy's New Discipline: Public Deliberation as 
Organizational Strategy 
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The second case study is of the Development Bank of Vanuatu (DBV), and the focus is on how legal-
rational institutions fail to accommodate socially embedded local practices and, as consequence, on 
the flaws that emerge in institutions, which provides significant opportunities for corrupt practices and 
conflict within government and society 
Chapter Seven focuses on the sources of corruption as consequence of various social relations in 
localised contexts, and the working out of contradictions and conflicts between socially embedded 
local practices and beliefs and the expectations of rational legal state governance. Chapter Eight 
suggests a way forward to reduce conflict between the different powers and authorities, in order to 
establish amicable relations in the best interests of promoting equity, equality and sound development 
practices. Acknowledging that the conflicting values between the two worlds can translate into 
various sources of corruption in a localised context encourages a greater appreciation and 
understanding as to why the jifly institution is an important institution for mediating between the two 
worlds. Chapter Nine provides a conclusion and highlights the contributions and limitations of this 
study as well as pointing out future research areas that are not covered in this thesis. 
1.8 Conclusion 
Vanuatu, as a new nation, confronts a particular set of development challenges, including the 
challenge to reconcile diverse social customs (kastom) with state governance expectations and a 
democratically elected parliament. Secondly, there is a tension between state governance and kastom 
governance, which creates legitimacy and governance gaps within which the opportunities for 
corruption are significant. This compromises institutional performance and hinders the equitable and 
efficient delivery of services to the citizens. Thirdly, notions of state leadership and authority in 
Vanuatu are infused with customary ideals and values, which creates conflict between practices based 
on customary (kastom) values with that of state governance expectations. This is reflected in the way 
in which members of parliament are compelled to compete with each other to gain access to state 
resources in order to distribute them to their electorate as a means to validate their political authority. 
This practice has led to political volatility, with frequent changes of government since 1991 as well as 
the proliferation of political parties, causing further polarization (White 2007; Morgan 2004). It has 
also led to maladministration of a number of government enterprises, including the National Provident 
Fund (VNPF) and the winding down of the Vanuatu Maritime Authority (VMA), and the 
Development Bank of Vanuatu, to name a few. Most of the key development problems as experienced 
in Vanuatu stem from these three key issues: the conflict between kastom governance and imposed 
legal-rational state expectations; the legitimacy crisis confronting the state; and rivalry between those 
claiming kastom authority and those claiming legislative authority. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
The course of political development in Vanuatu reflects the influence of global ideologies and the 
forces of globalization, ranged against, it would seem, local traditions. The prevailing “ideal model” 
of political, social and economic development in Vanuatu is largely one imported from abroad 
through the experiences of colonization and more recently in the form of development priorities 
imposed by external agencies such as the World Bank, the United Nations, and aid agencies. This 
development approach is often carried out in a manner that exhibits little consideration for existing 
traditional institutions and how they can be blended with international expectations and norms to 
address local and specific development challenges in developing countries. As argued in the previous 
chapter, the collision between widely contrasting value systems translates into potential and actual 
sources of corruption within the Vanuatu government and society, where multiple institutions operate 
and compete in a common political space. This chapter reviews the literature on the World Bank’s 
‘good governance’ strategy to address corruption related problems in developing countries. It explores 
the philosophical foundations of this World Bank construct through theories of economic and political 
modernization, governance, democratization, corruption and development, as these relate to Vanuatu. 
Indeed, there is a wide and varied literature on culture and modernization in the Pacific, much of 
which draws upon the work of anthropologists, and all of which in some way informs this analysis of 
governance and corruption in Vanuatu. 
2.1 Governance as a global discourse 
‘It was only in the 1990s that a confluence of factors emerged that vaulted governance onto the main 
stage of international development’ (Carothers & Gramont 2011, p. 3). The accumulated frustrations 
of donors over development failures in many developing countries led international institutions such 
as the World Bank and the United Nations to push for global attention to governance (Carothers & 
Gramont 2011). This frustration was evidenced in the 1989 World Bank report on the shortcomings of 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. This report became a landmark publication sparking discourse 
around global governance. The 1992 World Bank report aligned governance to development and 
stated that without improved governance, sustainable development, both economic and social, is 
impossible (World Bank 1992). This was followed by the 1997 World Development Report, which 
recognised that without an effective state it would be impossible to achieve sustainable development 
(World Bank 1997). From that time, the World Bank and the United Nations have become influential 
in shaping global governance discourse as an integral strategy for sustainable development and 
growth, to the point where there are now Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) as universal 
benchmarks for good governance reform. 
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Furthermore, the World Bank, in its 2007 Governance and Anti-corruption Strategy, spelled out the 
need for coordination at the global level to improve governance, including support for transparency 
measures, efforts to combat money laundering and tax havens, and international anti-bribery 
regulations (World Bank 2007). Around the same period, the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) was signed by UN member countries, recognising, among other things, the 
need to repatriate looted assets stashed abroad by corrupt leaders (United Nations 2004). Furthermore, 
in 2007 AusAID launched its policy on tackling corruption for growth and development in Asia and 
Pacific region (AusAID 2007). As Buchan and Hill (2014) observe, over the last three decades, the 
increased discussion of corruption-related problems and of the ‘good governance’ agenda as the 
strategy to address them has led to the development of a plethora of national and international policy 
proposals, international agreements and anti-corruption program initiatives. Many of these 
development initiatives are driven by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the United 
Nations, and other aid development agencies in which anti-corruption and good governance strategies 
have been integrated as pre-conditions of their financial lending and technical support to developing 
countries. 
 
Pacific Island states have been forced to adapt to fiscal austerity measures imposed by donors and by 
changing international economic conditions. For instance, Saldanha points out that it was around the 
period beginning in the 1990s that many developing countries, and more specifically the South Pacific 
region, experienced a ‘fiscal crunch’ (2004, p. 30). This was a situation where state governments 
faced fiscal crisis and political instability, and this triggered governance reform and, as a 
consequence, has brought a number of Pacific countries to the negotiating table with donors (Saldanha 
2004). Saldanha (2004, p. 30) further argues that, in some countries, wide ranging reform measures 
were designed and implemented in the context of a “no choice situation”, given the graveness of their 
public finances. 
 
The 1997 Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP) in Vanuatu was triggered by increased political 
instabilities, a budget crisis, macro-economic instabilities, and weak governance accountabilities (Gay 
2004). The accusation of the misuse of public resources led to external intervention by development 
financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other aid agencies. In 1997, 
Vanuatu borrowed US$20 million from the ADB to restructure and reform the whole public sector 
(ADB 2002; Gay 2004). The loan was provided in two tranches, and the reform was staged in two 
phases, phase one being a pre-requisite for phase two. The conditions for the release of the funds are 
shown in Table 1. The five main objectives of the CRP were: renewing the institution of governance; 
redefining the role of the public sector; improving public sector efficiency; encouraging private sector 
led growth; and improving social equity.  
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Table 2. 1 Loan conditions 
First tranche loan disbursement conditions 
1. Pass new government act to define boundaries between political leadership and public service. 
2. Enact leadership code for politicians, senior civil servants and other leaders. 
3. Pass public finance and economic management act. 
4. Pass expenditure review and audit act. 
5. Pass public service act. 
6. Establish department of strategic management to coordinate the CRP. 
7. Pass foreign investment act. 
8. Restructure National Bank of Vanuatu. 
Conditions for second release under first tranche 
1. Introduce value-added tax. 
2. Cut public sector employment by 10–15 per cent. 
3. Establish Development Committee of Officials. 
4. Establish Asset Management Unit. 
5. Externally recruit new executive staff. 
6. Appoint new board of directors to the Vanuatu National Provident Fund. 
Conditions for release of second tranche 
1. Establish expenditure review committee. 
2. Implementation of management improvement plan to improve key management systems. 
3. Establish government remuneration tribunal. 
4. Establish master plan for national infrastructure development. 
5. Transfer good loans from former Development Bank of Vanuatu to the National Bank. 
Source: (UNESCAP 2002, p. 4) 
 
The ADB applied the same neo-liberal principles as the IMF and World Bank, thus ADB loans to 
Vanuatu were conditional on meeting specific “structural adjustment” targets. As Gay (2004) argues, 
to remedy the capacity constraint of the existing institutions, the ADB deployed forty- two 
international consultants on the ground to carry out the first phase of the reform programs. However, 
this kind of approach has often led ‘to the imposition of institutional models that are out of touch with 
the social and economic realities of recipient countries, and at the expense of tapping the potential of 
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political institutions already on the ground in these countries’ (2011, p. 12). An example can be 
solicited from the CRP in Vanuatu, of which Gay makes the following observations (2004, p. 24): 
 Governance reform left a lot to be desired, the political system was unstable and corruption 
was growing. 
 It was a mistake to enact a governance-heavy package of reforms rather than attack 
macroeconomic problems 
 The lack of tailoring of the reform to local circumstances further emphasises the apparent lack 
of consultation with national policymakers, despite attempts to portray the program as home 
grown. 
 The worst failing of the CRP is perhaps not that it worsened economic performance, rather it 
was the missed opportunities. Vanuatu has taken on the garb of economic restructuring but 
little of the substance. 
On a broader scale, there have been increased criticisms of international development approaches to 
governance reform in developing countries (Carothers & Gramont 2011). These criticisms, as argued 
by Carothers and Gramont (2011, p. 4), are levelled at international development aid agencies for 
‘exporting precooked and inappropriate institutional blueprints as well as failing to take into account 
local political realities and resistance to reform within many host governments’.  In a similar vein, 
Hydén makes the following observation: 
 
The principles of ‘good’governance have been based on a single formal model built around 
the twin concepts of participation and freedom of choice that, when applied, has all the 
features of the liberal (Western) version of democracy. Good governance in the international 
development discourse has been so closely tied to forms of liberal democracy that a belief in 
good governance as a cause of economic development has emerged (2011, p. 8). 
 
This carries the assumption that the best practices come from Western democratic institutions, and 
thus that the ultimate purpose of international development aid agencies is to institute these best 
practices and values in developing countries that by implication lack them (White 2007). Carothers 
and Gramont challenge this assumption and argue that to advance development status of developing 
countries it is critical that donor communities strive for ‘best fit’ rather than ‘best practices’ (2011). 
They observe that: 
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[g]overnance aid initially focused on building best practice institutions, that is, pushing and 
helping developing countries to conform to a set of recommended practices for such 
institutions drawn from the experience of developed countries. This approach has proved 
problematic. To start with, of course, are problems with the concept itself - whether coherent 
sets of best practices in fact exist across the varied domains of each institutional category in 
developed countries (Carothers & Gramont 2011, p. 10). 
 
This quote demonstrates that it is important for aid development agencies to recognise local context. 
For instance, Court (2006, p. 1) argues that ‘governance is contextual and while it is possible to 
identify concepts and principles of governance that are universal, they make no sense without 
adequate contextual references’. Furthermore, in commenting on the interaction of governance and 
growth, North and his colleagues argue that there is no general recipe for improving institutions and 
therefore ‘exporting good economic institutions is as hopeless as exporting democracy’ (North et al. 
2008, p. 3). 
 
According to Ogbaharya (2008), Sub-Saharan African experiences of the implementation of the 
Washington Consensus policies provide a vivid example of imposing reform that disintegrated the 
established forms of collaboration that states, non-state entities, and informal institutions used to 
cultivate institutional reconciliation, interpretation, and integration between macro-level government 
structures and sub-national social institutions. Similarly, Abrahamsen (2000, p. 2) argues that ‘good 
governance discourse serves to legitimise a minimal form of liberal democracy based on civil and 
political rights, while delegitimatizing and marginalising alternative conceptualization based on 
popular particpation and the promotion of the social and economic rights of the poor’. The World 
Bank model is inherently suspicious of any relationships between governance actors that imply 
principles deemed incongruent with policy and market efficiency. 
 
In the Pacific region, as Ray (1998) observes, many policy reform initiatives focusing on good 
governance have failed to achieve the desired objectives of lifting economic performance or 
improving government functioning, because essential features of these societies were not factored into 
new policies and programs. Similarly, Duncan (2011, p. 20) argues that ‘aid agencies should therefore 
attempt to develop institutions in the Pacific that are a better match with Pacific values’. This point is 
supported by Gay (2004), when he makes reference to reform in Vanuatu as an exemplar of the kind 
of mistake where donors mismatch the realities on the ground with an overambitious reform package. 
Furthermore, in considering a modern governance approach in the Solomon Islands, Morgan Wairau 
argues that: 
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[t]he ordinary people in Solomon Islands are marginalized by the modern governance system 
of government, and [he] calls on his compatriots to seize the opportunity offered by the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands [RAMSI] to construct governance that is 
more inclusive and that underpins people’s livelihoods (2006, p. 409). 
 
In a similar context, Scales (2005, p. 146 ) suggests that informal systems of governance that are 
already home grown in the Solomon Islands villages can better deliver the notion of liberal democracy 
through greater participation. It is therefore important to incorporate this notion within the Solomon 
Islands way of getting things done through multiple network partnerships. He further argues that this 
will help provide answers to the continued challenge of how to connect dynamic, ‘traditional’ local 
level governance with legal-rational systems of government in the Pacific and, more broadly, in other 
developing countries.  
 
 Clearly, the absence of uniformity across different countries and regions is evidence enough that 
there is no single universal governance prescription. For instance, in commenting on South Asian 
governance and economic growth, Jamil and Dhakal made the following observation:  
 
The recipe preferred by international development agencies such as the WB, UNDP, and the 
IMF has coined bad governance as the major obstacle to economic development. The South 
Asian case, however, depicts a different scenario. Despite poor political governance, the 
economic governance has been effective and successful which may suggest that governance is 
not a pre-condition for economic development, rather, it may be the other way round as we 
observed in the case of the East Asian nations (2013, p. 2). 
 
This quotation challenges the universal governance approach, and demonstrates the ambiguity of the 
words “governance” and “corruption”, which can mean different things in different local contexts. 
There is now, as Kelsall (2011) argues, a need for a “grounded approach” to understanding the 
interaction of traditional culture and local practices, which exert greater influence in social and 
political systems at the local level, with that of legal-rational governance and global ideologies at the 
national and sub-national level. This is echoed by Carothers and Gramont (2011, p. 4), when they 
suggest that good governance is all about ensuring political feasibility, local ownership, and greater 
understanding of the local practices and rules of informal institutions, rather than technical elegance. 
In a similar vein, Booth observes that governance reform is more effective when donors and other 
international agencies ‘work with the grain’ of the society that hosts them (2011, p. 1).  
 
In the grounded approach, Pritchette and Woolcock (2004) argue that governance is no longer about 
resources and what the international institutions deem to be the right approach, but more about how 
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context matters for development. Carothers and Gramont refer to the grounded approach as the 
‘theory of the second best’ or ‘second generation of governance’, which: 
 
seeks to be more politically attuned in conception and implementation, to address demand for 
governance alongside supply, to reach the local level as much as or more than the national 
level, to push for institutional change that best fits local circumstances, to take into account 
informal institutions, to integrate a governance focus into traditional aid sectors, to address 
international causes of poor governance alongside domestic ones, and to modify internal 
donor governance to allow for the positive adaptation to these new principles (2011, p. 17). 
 
From the literature on the second governance generation, to find the best fit requires a greater 
understanding of existing informal institutions and local politics on the ground that can become 
solutions to governance problems (Carothers & Gramont 2011; Hydén 2011; IDS 2010). This 
includes civil society, informal traditional institutions such as family and kinship, and chiefly 
organizations that are key players in ensuring sustainable governance and development 
(Tuimaleali’ifano 2006). As is argued by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), ‘[i]nformal 
institutions and personalized relationships are usually seen as governance problems, but the research 
suggests that they could also be part of the solution’ (IDS 2010, p. 2). It further argues that to view 
informal institutions as part of the solution, development practitioners need to change their mental 
models and to stop viewing the world through Western lens. Without this they will not make the 
necessary investment in understanding the dynamics of local politics, or make fundamental changes in 
their own organization, values, attitudes and behaviour (IDS 2010). Hence, this is where 
understanding of the traditional local practices or kastom governance is critical to the improvement of 
governance problems in Vanuatu, and broadly in the South Pacific region. 
2.2 Traditions as the opposite of modernity 
Traditions and modernity are frequently portrayed in literature in opposition to each other. Beginning 
with definitions, tradition in its Latin meaning denotes a process of passing knowledge and doctrine 
from one generation to the next (Gross 1992; Lawson 1996). This definition, as argued by Gross 
(1992, p. 8), implies a ‘set of practices, a group of beliefs, or a mode of thinking that exists in the 
present, but was inherited from the past’. On the other hand, modernity, according to Gillespie (2008) 
and Gross (1992), is defined as a change from a primitive state of being to an “innovative” and 
“rational” state of being. According to Lawson (1993), this view invites criticism of the notion that 
whatever is traditional in social and political life is, in some normative sense, opposed antithetically to 
something we call modern. She further argues that this ‘antithetical treatment of the concepts has 
given rise, inter alia, to the entirely mistaken idea that as everything that comes under the rubric of 
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“modern” is, practically by definition, “rational,” so everything that can be categorized as 
“traditional” is “irrational” or at best non-rational’ (1993, p. 4). Indeed, as she further points out, 
developing societies are now living in two worlds - one standing for the rational, innovative West, and 
the other for the primitive, traditional third world. This implies that the concepts of “innovative and 
rational” can be interpreted differently in the two worlds, and that what make sense in many social 
systems may not accord with the Western notion of rationality and innovation. For instance, according 
to Gillespie (2008), in a rational world people define themselves in terms of time, while in a 
traditional society people define themselves in terms of place or land, their race or ethnic group, their 
tradition or their gods, but not explicitly in terms of time.  
Traditional society in the Pacific region has been built on certain traditional values of social order and 
authority that are quite distinct from that of the legal-rational state values and institutions, as 
discussed in Chapters One and Four of this thesis (Lawson 1996, 2012; Ratuva 2008). These 
traditional values of social order are embedded in the minds of people, and they have cherished and 
valued them as an integral part of their lives. These values, among others, include reciprocal 
relationships, strong family support and respect, traditional politics, restorative justice, and respect for 
leaders. A survey of the current literature in the region demonstrates that there is a knowledge gap 
between the two societies (legal-rational and traditional), and that therefore the design of rational 
socio-economic and political institutions is often ill-conceived and misguided to the extent that it 
creates conflicts of values of social obligation and authority in society (Dinnen 2008; Kabutaulaka 
2008; Rio 2010). For instance, taking a classical example of the land tenure systems, in the Pacific 
region land ownership is embedded in collective rights, versus the legal-rational land tenure system of 
land leasing and individual rights (VanTrease 1983, 1987). The 1998 Ombudsman’s report on corrupt 
land dealing in Vanuatu is a case in point, where a State Minister abused his ministerial position and 
power to sell state land to his close relatives (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998b). The conflict between 
these two systems of land tenure, arguably, can translate into various sources of corruption in the 
legal-rational sphere. 
Tradition is central to human life(Inglehart & Welzel 2005). In medieval societies and most 
importantly in many developing countries tradition remained a crucial source of social order and 
political authority. In traditional societies, as Lawson (1993) observes, social order is conceived as 
hierarchical, organic and unchanging; and therefore there is a view that it is imbued with a strong 
emphasis on personal and particularistic relations, which could undermine any sort of independent 
political aspirations. Paradoxically, this view of feudal custom is at odds with the depiction of 
traditional social systems by Adam Smith, one of the intellectual leading lights of what we know 
today as modernization theory (Smith 1977). It would appear that even economic rationalisers can, or 
at least once did see the value of social institutions that bind people together in communities. In Adam 
Smith’s view, the fabric of social order in traditional societies is an important complementary tool to 
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support a market system and individualism in order to bring wealth to nations. This is a critical point 
that has been misconstrued by the modernization school of thought and the good governance 
discussions, in which the values, norms, and process of traditional society are perceived as inferior 
and impediments to rationalist political institutions and market-enhancement strategies. In Adam 
Smith’s thesis on the moral sentiment, he argues that moral values of benevolence are a binding basis 
for social fabric, harmony, and unity in traditional society, which are necessary pre-conditions to 
boosting development and markets (Smith 1759). In other words, as Coker puts it, the theory of the 
wealth of nations is not meant to reject the social system of the theory of moral sentiments, but rather 
it is intentionally constructed in a manner that it will emerge from the foundation of social order in 
local communities, which is critical for self-regulating markets and institutional stability in societies 
(1990). 
The seminal contribution of Adam Smith, of the concept of ‘individualism’, which he argues should 
be developed within a context of social system, as stipulated in his theory of moral sentiments, 
demonstrates that social institutions are malleable and can work in a complementary manner to 
support development objectives (Smith 1759; Coker 1990). To Smith, there are two potential sources 
of social order: order derived from the practices of moral virtues of love, respect, sympathy and social 
collectiveness; and order that is derived through the market system and Durkheim’s later concept of 
contract (Cotterell 1999; Giddens 1972). In this understanding, there is a possibility that informal and 
formal institutions can work in tandem to spur development growth in developing countries.  
There are thus strong theoretical and empirical grounds for challenging the supposed dichotomy of 
tradition and modernity, and for the argument that this “opposition” no longer has relevance to the 
challenges facing developing countries, excepting where this dichotomy remains embedded in 
Western discourses of governance and development. Debate in the literature has reflected this shift, 
from the dichotomy of the two institutions to the acknowledgement of the informal institution as a 
solution to governance challenges in developing countries (Booth 2011; Carothers & Gramont 2011; 
Goran Hyden, Court & Mease 2004). As Lindstrom (1982) and Lawson (1993) observe in the South 
Pacific, the view of tradition as being in opposition to modernity challenges the traditional power and 
political institutions, because traditions form the basis of their political identity. The present thesis 
argues for a need to shift the focus, from viewing informal institutions as a major part of the 
governance problem to the analysis of tradition as a source of resilience and a vehicle through which 
to initiate social and political change in Vanuatu (IDS 2010). 
Furthermore, as Durkheim argued, social order is achieved through inherited values of kinship 
hierarchies, and family institutions in which order is fixed as a natural condition (Giddens 1972). To 
Smith and Durkheim, traditional institutions provide a foundation for a moral character that gives rise 
to natural order, as reflected in kinship systems where families support one another in all aspects of 
28 
 
socio-economic and political development (Coker 1990; Giddens 1972; Smith 1759). However, Adam 
Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1977), argues that traditional authority can also block the emergence 
of an individualistic mercantile class; which illustrates the need for a more nuanced analysis of how 
the two systems can be integrated to support economic growth. Smith’s writings have been 
enormously influential in shaping liberal ideas of economic progress. What we have witnessed in 
contemporary debates on tradition and modernization is that classical economists rely solely on the 
economic arguments of Smith, and in particular the self-regulating market system, and ignore Smith’s 
broader view of the social system as expounded in his theory of moral sentiments (Cotterell 1999; 
Smith 1759).  
On the other hand, modernization is based on the notion of human progress predestined by 
technological innovation, rationalisation, and systematic research (Gillespie 2008). Inglehart and 
Welzel provide a succinct summary of how modernization through socio-economic development 
brings radical transformation in society: 
Socio-economic development starts from technological innovation that increases labour 
productivity; it then brings occupational specialisation, rising educational levels, and rising 
income levels; it diversifies human interaction, shifting the emphasis from authority relations 
towards bargaining relations; in the long run this brings cultural changes, such as changing 
gender roles, changing attitudes toward authority, changing sexual norms, declining fertility 
rates, broader political participation, and a more critical and less easily led public (2005, p. 
19). 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that this theory assumes that economic advancement will make 
people more secular, tolerant, and trusting, and will lead them to place more emphasis on self-
expression, participation, and quality of life. Sahlins (2013) makes the point that in a legal-rational 
society the economist sees organisation of material life as an expression of social order in society. 
This is based on the notion that in the economic world a self-regulating market system is a perfect 
institution for regulating order, through its own mechanisms of setting prices and wages as well as 
allocating resources in society (Khan 2004; Willis 2011). In this frame of thinking, development 
process entails structural changes in the national economy, including a shift from the traditional 
agricultural sector to manufacturing-based industries and a service economy (Willis 2011). To make 
this transition, neoliberal theory argues for the redefinition of the state’s role, from being a main 
driver of the economy to being a facilitator and a regulator, in order to enhance and promote the 
effectiveness of the market. This redefinition is done according to orthodox liberal governance theory, 
which emphasises the provision of basic public and private goods, such as secure property rights, 
development of infrastructure (roads, wharves, jetties, airports, and telecommunications), law and 
order, and security (World Economic Forum 2014). 
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As is argued by Gross (1992), modernization theory assumes political rationalisation and capitalism 
as important vehicles to bring about fundamental change in the economy and political development in 
society. In other words, the best-governed states are those built on market principles and supported by 
legal-rational authority. One of the chief proponents of political modernization, Huntington, claims 
that: 
[p]olitical democracy is rational and legal on a basis that its most powerful collective decision 
makers are selected through open, fair, honest, and periodical elections in which candidates 
freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote 
(1996, p. 6). 
 
The essence of his argument is that in a democratic state there is a strong element of political 
participation, competition, openness, and freedom of expression, which enable economic 
development. This has been an influential view, and thus the legal-rational liberal governance model 
of institutional development is subscribed to by international aid agencies as the “best” way to 
improve the socio-economic and political status of developing countries (Huntington 1996; Dinnen 
2008; Lawson 1993). 
The modernization project in its secular post-colonial guise begins immediately after the Second 
World War (Esteva 1992). In 1949, the United States President, Harry Truman stated: 
 
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old 
imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a 
program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing (Truman 1967 p. 6). 
 
This speech is widely regarded as a landmark in development history, and sets the concept of 
development within a liberal framework. Looking at the West as a ‘beacon on the hill’ or the 
‘lighthouse’ of development, the President called every nation to follow in its footsteps (Escobar 
1995). What can be easily deducted from his speech is the essence of development, which emphasizes 
the need to spread the benefits of economic growth, dismantle the colonization project, and foster 
democratic institutions as tools for development and growth in underdeveloped countries. As Esteva 
put it: 
 
Since then the relationship between North and South have been cast in this mould: 
‘development’ provided the fundamental frame of reference for the mixture of generosity, 
bribery and oppression which has characterized the policies towards the South (1992, p. 1). 
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The call to development polarizes the world into two major categories, developed and 
underdeveloped; as well as being a call to escape from the primitive conditions called 
underdevelopment (Esteva 1992; Gillespie 2008). The Truman approach emphasized development as 
a process of technical adjustment by developing nations to comply with a normative agenda set by the 
developed North. In this understanding developed north is refered to Western countries that have a 
high standard of living measuring though their gross national product per capita and also their highest 
consumption and service economy. This is a development call that does not provide alternative ways 
for developing countries except to follow the footprints of countries such as the United States and 
Europe, which have become rich in technologies and are also categorized as highly industrialized and 
serviced economies (Escobar 1995). 
 
Reflective of this modernization project is Rostow’s (1960) sequential model of development, in 
which he argues that development happens in a linear fashion - moving from traditional society to a 
stage of high mass consumption. This notion underpins prescriptions for economic development 
oriented towards export-led industrialization, foreign investment, and a self-regulating market system.  
Many developing countries have been forced to adopt these economic prescriptions through bilateral 
and multilateral agreements that they have signed with key international aid organizations. The linear 
stage theory carries the assumptions that many developing countries are ‘underdeveloped’ or 
‘backward’ societies and that they need to move away from this stage to a developed stage defined by 
industrialization, a market economy, and service industry (Esteva 1992; Njoh 2006). The reasons 
often offered are because of their dependency on subsistence farming, and their strong persistence in 
traditional practices that are primitive and antithetical to development and thus hinder their 
development progress (Njoh 2006) . As such, as Hydén argues, reform in developing countries is 
structured around liberal economic principles and political democracy, which will, it is assumed, 
promote economic development and gradually transform their development status from subsistence 
society to a service economy (2011). 
 
However, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue, changes in society are not actually happening in a 
linear fashion. This point is reinforced with consideration of the experiences of East Asian economies, 
which have shown a different path of development amidst increased criticisms of corruption or 
“cronyism”. As Jamil and Dhakal (2013, p. 2) have demonstrated, ‘East Asian economic development 
has soared with a steady growth over the last decades’. This has indeed challenged the neo-liberal 
development paradigm, which carries the expectation that good governance, market enhancement 
strategies and economic liberalization, and political democratization are necessary drivers for growth 
and development (Khan 2004). While such strategies have some benefits, there is no single path to 
political modernization, as Huntington has observed (1991). Political development is non-linear; and 
because economic modernization is disruptive it can generate conflicts as traditional elites and 
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traditional power relations are challenged (Huntington 1996). Huntington’s main contentions have 
been taken up by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) in their study of modernization, cultural change, and 
democracy, which demonstrates the powerful forces of modernization and traditions that shape the 
world in different development directions. Their seminal discussions on social order and different 
development paths highlight the need for international institutions such as the World Bank, the United 
Nations and other aid agencies to reconsider their development strategies and priorities in many 
developing countries (Booth 2011; IDS 2010).  
 
One of the challenges facing developing societies today in creating a sustainable, participatory and 
representative system of government is that governing elites in many developing states regard liberal 
democracy as a “luxury” and an alien concept (Huntington 1991; Reilly 2004, 2010). In most 
developing countries we find that almost three quarters of their population remain in remote and rural 
areas where infrastructure is very limited. They live in traditional societies that are heavily embedded 
with traditional practices and a subsistence economy (Morgan, M 2004). In this context, it is difficult 
to implement participatory democracy because of the limited and poor infrastructure and, most 
importantly, many developing countries are classified as Least Developed Countries with low income 
and literacy rates (UNDESA 2012). These are binding constraints for local communities as they 
struggle to experience the benefits of democracy in terms of their full participation in elections and 
exercising their power of choices (Sen 1999). These challenges, according to Dinnen (2008), are 
manifested through the process of post-colonial state building, in which new institutional values of 
socio-economic and politic organisation are institutionalized in a local context by European 
colonialist and then development agencies ignorant of already existing informal local institutions. 
2.3 Building a post-colonial state 
The structure of most post-colonial states has been inherited from European colonial powers (Dinnen, 
2008; Henderson 2003; Larmour 2008). As such, it builds on the principles of liberal democracy and 
political modernization theory, which put greater emphasis on political participation, competition, and 
liberty as fundamental objectives of democratic institutions  (Fry 2010; Sinclair 2008; and Lawson 
2010). Larmour (1994) cites the Westminster system as an example of colonial created institutions 
where one of the requirements was for individual countries to develop their own constitutions. In this 
model the power is clearly separated between three important institutions: the state, legislature or 
parliament, and executive and judiciary, with the intention that each institution will provide a check 
and balance on each other’s performance. Their roles are independent but complementary.They 
facilitate the operation of the market; encourage participatory development and participatory 
democracy; and empower the state to generate its income to support its operation (Bevir & Rhodes 
2003). Having participatory development and participatory democracy as an ultimate goal of state 
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building, it dictates the design of democratic institutions in developing states, and influences the 
development programs of the multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations (Dinnen 2008; Henderson 2003; Kabutaulaka 2008). These experiences have become evident 
in building post-colonial states in most countries in the South Pacific (Dinnen 2008).  
In the South Pacific region, Saldanha  (2004) points out that the structure adoped in post-colonial 
constitutions has generally reflected the biases and influence of the colonial masters. In other words, 
the post-colonial states have incorporated the institutional principles and structures of Western 
democracies, with less consideration of existing traditional governance institutions. For instance, 
Larmour (2002, p. 40) argues that ‘in British, Australian, and New Zealand colonies in the Pacific, 
independence was achieved by transferring executive power from a Governor or High Commissioner 
to a local executive, responsible to a local legislature’. In similar vein, Kabutaulaka (2008) notes that 
in the Solomon Islands the government system was introduced by the British, beginning with a 
government by committee, called a governing council, which replaced the legislature and executive 
council. All this, as Dinnen (2008, p. 6) points out, shows that ‘many developing states have their 
origin in the era of colonial expansion by major European powers during the eigtheen, nineteenth and 
the first half of twentieth centuries’. In the case of the South Pacific region, Larmour (2008 p. 42) 
notes that the era of decolonisation began in the 1960s and 1970s, calling it a ‘heyday of Westminster 
constitution-making’ in which a new political values were embedded into the constitution with little 
input from the local communities. This view is shared in Dinnen’s account of the post-colonial state in 
the Melanesian region, where he argues that: 
…[c]olonial powers created arbitrary borders and imposed external systems of governance 
with little, if any, consideration as to their fit with existing polities and other forms of 
indigenous social organisation. Colonial states were external creations with (initially, at any 
rate) an inherently non-democratic character (2008, p. 6). 
Moreover, in considering the process of the building of post-colonial states in the South Pacific 
region, Larmour (2008) notes that many ingredients of the states’ system are borrowed from outside 
or transplanted from external experiences elsewhere into the Pacific context. He makes reference to 
the introduction of a Westminster constitution, arguing that it was predominantly influenced by the 
technical experts and advisors who worked in the best interests of the European colonial powers. 
Because of the limited local capacity, local input into constitution making was very minimal, and 
what are perceived as local ingredients in the constitution were introduced to appease the local 
political needs of the elite at that time (Dinnen 2008). In the Solomon Islands, Dinnen (2008, p. 7) 
notes that at ‘the time of independence in 1978 there were only about a dozen university graduates’. 
This reflection can also be made on other neighbouring states that were decolonised in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s (Dinnen 2008; Lawson 2010; VanTrease 1995). Initially, as is argued by Dinnen 
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(2008), the building of post-colonial states occurred when neither the colonial authority nor the 
indigenous local authority were ready to accept or take on new political challenges. 
2.4 Challenges to post-colonial states 
 Faced with such a dilemma, the newly formed post-colonial states of the South Pacific region have 
exposed themselves to greater challenges in implementing and managing new political institutions 
(Dinnen 2008). These challenges included challenges of limited capacity, inappropriate institutions,  
and global pressure to “do it like everyone else does” (Dinnen 2008, Lamour 2008, Henderson 2003). 
The lack of local capacity and the limited understanding of what makes effective state-building and 
democratic institutions created a space for critical input by the external advisors and experts who 
came to occupy key line positions at the initial phase of state-building. This was because the post-
colonial state institutions were grounded in new management models and skills (time management, 
reporting, and prioritisation of activities, bound by rules and process) that were limited in developing 
states (Larmour 2002). Indeed, at the initial setting up of the post-colonial institutions in the 
Melanasian region, Dinnen (2008, p. 6) notes that ‘local particiapation in political development was 
limited and any hint of emerging nationalism was viewed as a threat to the maintenance of colonial 
order’. This, according to Dinnen (2008), has ramifications for the legitimacy rendered to the post-
colonial institutions because of the absence of local participation and ownership. 
The other challenge is in a context of transplanting institutions from a different context to another 
context without taking into account the local existing institutional structures and authorities 
(Henderson 2003). Larmour (2002, p. 39) argues that ‘Westminster has been spread by replication, 
almost irrespective of underlying social and political conditions’. In a similar vein, Henderson (2003, 
p. 225) speaks about his experiences of political institutions in the South Pacific region, concluding 
that ‘democracy cannot be imposed, and that attempts to do so makes nonsense of the term’. What we 
have seen very lately in the post-colonial projects are elaborated state structures and infrastructures, 
including new development institutions such as leadership codes and ombudsman commissions, that 
are externally driven by the international development agencies and donors to address the 
deteriorating law and order in developing states (Saldanha 2004; Dinnen 2008; and Larmour 2008). 
Despite the substantial amount of finance donor communities have invested in this process, Dinnen 
(2008) argues that the development agencies are not happy with the results they get from their 
investment in strengthening weak recipient institutions and improving living standards. One of the 
reasons, as Henderson (2003) notes in his analysis of development agencies towards good governance 
reform in the Pacific region, is that donors have transferred modern principles that have not been 
translated into the Pacific context.  
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Some commentators refer to the approach of development agencies in the Pacific as a ‘hands-on 
approach’, where they bring foreign personnel to occupy the senior positions and run most of these 
insititutions on behalf of the locals (Dinnen 2008; Lawson 2010). In this scenerio, the sustainability of 
these institutions and associated reforms is questionable, when development agencies leave the 
recipient country, as has been demonstrated in the case of the Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (Dinnen 2008, Kabutaulaka 2008a). Similarly, the question of 
sustainability is also made in reference to the promotion of ‘participation’ through the mode of 
projects and, as McGee (2002) points out, the sustainability of participation will always be challenged 
once a project reaches its conclusion. Any assumption that institutional arrangements will continue as 
planned misses the fundamental importance of contextualisation: the need to give attention to the 
governance capabilities of national and local institutions (Dinnen 2008; Henderson 2003). These 
challenges persist, despite decades of careful research into the social and cultural bases of political 
authority in post-colonial states. 
An additional political development challenge for new states is the creation of political space to which 
all sections of society can subscribe and contribute. This reflects the principle feature of political 
democracy: one that gives equal rights of participation in development to all citizens. Thus, 
democratic theory would seem rather to be an extension of modernization theory, which emphasises 
inclusiveness, participatory development and democracy (Kothari & Minogue 2002a). In the case of 
the South Pacific, Dinnen (2008) argues that, in the absence of nationhood and a strong sense of 
shared political community, it is challenging to implement new political institutions that will promote 
participatory development and democracy. The experiences of the post-colonial states in the South 
Pacific reflect what Dinnen (2008, p. 7) refers to as ‘a state without a nation’. He further argues that 
nations, like the states, have to be made, they do not emerge naturally. One of the challenges of post-
colonial states’ leaders is to build a nation in a landscape of the great diversity of languages and 
cultures found in Melanesian societies (Dinnen 2008; Booth 2011). Indeed, as Dinnen (2008, p. 7) 
suggests, ‘the absence of a sense of shared identity makes it hard to fashion the cohesive national 
community needed for the development of effective and durable state institutions’. On a similar note, 
Reilly (2004) points out how ethnic diversity complicates the process of democracy in Papua New 
Guinea, to the extent where it impacts on decision-making, and on national goals and vision to 
promote participatory development and democracy. This is also a challenge for Vanuatu. 
While it is widely acknowledged that the implementation of liberal democracy and participatory 
development is far more challenging in developing states, there is also now a wider consensus that 
there is more than one path to modernization and democracy (Huntington 1991; Inglehart & Welzel 
2005; Kothari & Minogue 2002b). This understanding swings the pendulum back to the study of local 
knowledge and traditional institutions, and of how modernization and global ideologies can be 
blended together in a manner that enhances democratic institutions and promotes inclusive 
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development (Booth 2011; Scales 2005; Tuimaleali’ifano 2006). For instance, according to Scales 
(2005), Wairau (2006), and Henderson (2003), the informal existing governance institutions provide 
alternative ways of ensuring inclusive and participatory development in developing states where the 
degree of internal diversity is wide. This brings the discussion back to the importance of 
understanding the nature of traditional society and how it can provide an opportunity to enhance 
sustainable democracy and participatory development in developing states. 
2.5 Constructing “traditional society” 
Traditional society, as discussed further in Chapter Four of this thesis, revolves around subsistence 
agriculture and traditional practices. As in contemporary societies, traditions are often referred to in 
the anthropological literature of the Pacific as a way of life that is passed on from one generation to 
another (Keesing 1982; Jolly 1994, Bolton 1999). This way of life, according to Tonkinson (1982b 
p.310), refers to ‘indigenous languages, pig killing ceremonies; men’s and women’s secret societies; 
practices associated with marriage, including bride wealth payments; reconciliation, feasting, and 
funerary traditions’. Most of these lived cultural practices, it is argued by Ratuva (2008), are rooted on 
the long established principles of restorative justice, reciprocal support systems, collective rights, 
consensual politics, holistic life, kinship systems, respect, communal and family support systems, and 
subsistence living. These practices are an integral part of the social fabric and order of the society, in 
which they form a foundational basis for their being and doing. 
However, culture and tradition are not static and can be changed. Gross (1992) notes that culture 
transforms itself either through extermal inteferences or naturally through the manners and ways in 
which these traditional values are passed on, through the various forms of oral communication and 
practices that impact on the content of these traditions. In other words, there is a likelihood that some 
of the traditional values and practices will gradually vanish as time goes by due to the penetration of 
external influences through Western materialism and education. For example, Crowley (1995) 
observes that the culture of kava drinking in Vanuatu has change dramatically among the young urban 
in Vanuatu and also in many rural areas, where the consumption of kava have been commercialised 
rather than used only in special ceremonial occasions. So culture and tradition, as Newman (1995) 
suggests, are neither objective or static but are socially constructed and therefore malleable. However, 
as Lindstrom (2008) argues, this does not mean that they can be easily swept aside, because they are 
culture and traditions that people feel they are part of and perceive as a basis on which they define 
their own identity, land, and self, and which maintain the vibrancy of the social collectivity. As a 
consequence, if that collective sense is disrupted, then there is a likelihood that the society will react 
in a manner that is sometimes detrimental to the socio-economic wellbeing of the whole society. 
Societal disruption was the underlying contributor to armed conflict in Boungainville in the late 1980s 
(Wesley-Smith 1990), ethnic tension in the Solomon Islands in 2001 (Allen, Matthew 2008; Aqorau 
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2008), and the three coups in Fiji, 1987, 2000, and 2006 (Lal 2009). All these conflicts have an 
element of disruption to traditional connections to land, resources, and identity. Vanuatu is not exempt 
from such challenges.  
2.6 Tradition and social order: Vanuatu’s context 
The study of Vanuatu’s culture and society is influenced heavily by the works of European and North 
American anthropologists. Their writings focus on the nature of society and how social order is 
established and the division of labour is organised (Codrington 1891; Layard 1942; Lindstrom 1997). 
For instance, Roadman (1977) notes that in the ‘graded society’ of Langana in Ambae, legitimacy and 
power to sanction social order in the public domain emerges from the status a leader gains in reaching 
the highest graded rank in the society. The ‘graded society’, according to Blackwood (1981, p. 37), ‘is 
founded upon an ideology of reciprocity and exchange, and that each individual rank-taking ceremony 
is embedded in a wide and continuing network of financial transactions in pigs’. This financial 
transaction in pigs is bound up with others that have gone before and others that will take place later. 
Almost every male member of the community is indebted or is in expectation of receiving pigs from 
every member (Blackwood 1981). Indeed, the traditional political leadership system of grade taking is 
an idiom of exchange and reciprocity. In this political system there are two types of exchange: 
‘balanced or reciprocal exchange, which forms the bulk of the transactions, and the less specific 
generalised exchange’ (Blackwood 1981, p. 38). 
Michael Allen (1972), in his study of the ranking ceremony in Ambae, in the nothern part of Vanuatu, 
notes how competing candidates mobilise themeselves with their resources to muster the support of 
their kinship and other external networks to sponsor them in the ranking ceremony. He further argues 
that on this occasion people come together to trade their valuable boars and exchange resources with 
those who are earmarked for the ranking ceremony. Secondly, leadership prestige and status is 
achieved through distribution of resources by a jif to his people rather than via the accumulation of 
wealth (Allen 1972; Duncan 2011). These two scenarios expose how social order in society prevails 
and the level of trust is gained through trading of resources within the kinship system. As Allen 
(1972) notes, in Ambae, people who lend their pigs during the grading ceremony are expected to have 
them back when they have their turn. This social value system can also be observed where leadership 
is practiced through matrilineal and patrilineal structures (Allen 1972, Thomas 2013). In other words, 
the traditional political system of Vanuatu is an idiom of reciprocity and exchange of resources, and 
these exchanges are instrumental in the creation of social relations between different sections of 
society, as portrayed in Figure 2.1 (Blackwood 1981). The resources are shared at the nasara and 
nakamal, and the order of distribution follows the heads of nakamal and family bloodline. 
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Figure 2.1 Generic model of resource allocation and distribution in villages 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
In Vanuatu, the ‘big man’ or jifly political culture of distribution is still in place and heavily 
influences contemporary governance institutions. Similarly, Duncan (2011) observes that in the South 
Pacific the ‘big man’ political culture of distribution has transcended the legal-rational political 
administration, and is currently perceived by the aid agencies as corrupt practice. However, he argues 
that while ‘big man’ political culture is currently the main obstacle to governance reform in the 
Pacific, it could also be part of the solution to the Pacific’s development problems, given properly 
designed institutions. Duncan’s argument draws on the three important features of traditional political 
culture in the Pacific: ‘the importance of distribution, the public nature of gifts and the obligations that 
flow from them, and the competitive nature of big men’ (Duncan 2011, p. 19). As illustrated in Figure 
2.1, distribution is an integral part of the traditional political culture of big man and jifs in Vanuatu’s 
society. 
2.7 Traditions and politics 
Traditions and politics are intertwined in the South Pacific region. As argued by Ratuva (2008), 
tradition still plays an important role in the broader dynamics and configuration of politics in the 
Pacific. Tonkinson (1982b) argues that traditions form the basis of political identity in the South 
Pacific region, and therefore traditions has a strong connection to traditional forms of authority and 
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socially embedded local practices. Similarly, Lawson (1993) argues that the manner and ways in 
which people define their identity on the basis of their tradition cements a strong link with political 
authority and therefore legitimacy. Lindstrom (2008) notes that the utility of traditions in the political 
environment has profound significance in many areas of life: as an identity, a source of unification, 
and as criteria for demarcation of boundaries at local, national, and regional levels. He further argues 
that in this context tradition encompasses land and other natural resources, and therefore traditional 
values of social order cannot be completely reinvented (Trevor-Roper 1988), because in doing so it 
would change the rules of land ownership and cause greater conflict in local communities (Lindstrom 
2008). Thus, traditional values of social order and authority or socially embedded local practices 
cannot be easily extinguished, because traditional values of social order are deeply embedded in the 
lives of people who see it as integral part of their self-identity. 
In traditional societies of the South Pacific, there is a broad consensus that leaders have authority not 
because they have powers, but because they have respect derived from their legitimacy in the eyes of 
people who give them respect (Allen 1981; Jolly & Thomas 1992; Jowitt 2005; Keesing 1992; Knauft 
2007; Rodman 1984; Tonkinson 1982a; White 2007). Weber talks about charismatic authority, and 
how authority is often legitimate because the person who is in a position of authority acts as a 
representative who embodies the values of the society that he is leading (Weber 1948). However, 
Lawson (1993) argues that the manner in which Weber contrasted traditional authority with authority 
derived from the legal-rational places traditional forms of leadership in direct opposition to ideas of 
modernization. She further argues that traditional and charismatic forms of authority differ from the 
Weberian notion of legal-rational authority in which authority is derived from broad acceptance and 
being representative of values that are held in common and become valued (Lawson 1993). In other 
words, as Marcus Felson puts it, the ‘legal-rational system of authority is closely related to Weber’s 
textbook concept of formal organisation and bureaucracy’ in which there is a clear distinction 
between personal and public life (2011, p. 13). 
The literature on traditions and politics in the South Pacific region and specifically in the Melanesian 
context is about charismatic and traditional forms of authority, not legal-rational forms (Allen 1972, 
1981; Jolly & Thomas 1992; Jowitt 2005; Keesing 1992; Knauft 2007; Rodman 1984; Tonkinson 
1982a; White 2007). There is a problem in moving from charismatic and traditional authority to legal-
rational authority, using Weber’s notion of authority; accepting that although Weber’s ideas are not 
necessarily accurate they are useful to make a distinction between three different types of authority 
(traditional, charismatic, legal-rational). In the literature on political authority, starting with Weber, 
there seems to be general acceptance that legal-rational authority is not the only form of authority 
(Fraenkel 2010; Lawson 1993, 1996; Lindstrom 1982; Ratuva 2008). Critically, from the survey of 
the literature, it would appear that there are many informal sources of power and of authority, and if a 
person holds no office whatsoever but nonetheless is seen by some people as embodying values that 
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they believe are important, that person will enjoy greater authority, even the same as the officials 
themselves; and this is the challenge of modernization. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, this is a 
basis for a mistake made by those attempting political change since the time of the colonial era right 
through to the post-colonial state period when the new political elites came into power: their attempts 
to change the society threw the existing political relationships out of balance, thus sparking social 
tension and conflict in traditional societies. For instance, the colonial failure to transform kastom 
authority in Vanuatu and integrate this with state institutions created imbalances in the power 
relationships with state legislative authority, at all levels of society. 
A comparative example can be drawn from neighbouring Melanesian countries such as Fiji, where the 
colonial authorities had manipulated jifly institutions to suit their political motives of developing a 
legal-rational institution based on democratic values of election, participation, and fair dealing. As 
Lawson (1997) argues, the British conservative approach to constructing a homogeneous jifly 
institution in Fiji, based largely on the tradition and cultures of the eastern part of the country, was a 
major fuel for perennial conflict within the indigenous Fijian population from the west, south and 
north parts of Fiji (Lawson 1997). She further argues that: 
[t]here is no point in denying, for example, that the sudden and forcible welding of 
heterogeneous communities, such as those which existed in Fiji in the late nineteenth century, 
into national political entities under the control of the European colonial government was 
anything other than a severe rapture (Lawson 1997, p. 113). 
This quote highlights the fact that British colonialism virtually created and nurtured in Fiji a national 
jifly elite that was to become the very embodiment of a conceptually unified Fijian tradition, 
antipathetic to democratic principles of political participation and inclusion, and arguably the most 
powerful force in post-independence Fijians politics (Lawson 1997). Indeed, as Lawson further 
argues, the political-legal apparatus of the modern nation-state of Fiji now operates to protect the 
status of chiefs, and as a consequence, when they felt that their positions were threatened they reacted 
in a manner that challenged democratic values (Lawson 1997). The 1987 and other subsequent coups 
in 2000 and 2006 emerged from the default jifly political structure, which was established during the 
colonial years in a manner that it was against non-indigenous Fijians and other races that resided in 
Fiji. This was indeed a fuel for disunity within indigenous Fiji, and broadly with other cultural 
groupings that formed part of the larger Fijian community (Lawson 1997). 
The jifly institution in Vanuatu has remained more or less in its rudimentary stage, and despite the fact 
that it was embedded into the national constitution little effort was made to formally construct it into a 
homogeneous system. Chapter Five of Vanuatu’s constitution is devoted to the establishment of the 
Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs (MNCC), which has a similar status to parliament and the 
executive arm of government (Jowitt 2005, 2007; VanTrease 1995). Similar cases can also be found 
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in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Fiji, where the traditional institution of jifs has been 
recognized in their constitutions as part of the states’ framework of operation (Tarakabutala 2008; 
Larmour 1998). This would seem to be the only traditional authority that is featured strongly in the 
constitution as a custodian of traditional values of social order and practices in contemporary society. 
The reason for this is that the traditional political structure of jif and ‘big man’ is the only appropriate 
institutional system that connects the state with its dispersed population (Howell & Hall 2010; 
Maltali, Sandy & Tamashiro 2009). Commentators on the roles of jifs in Vanuatu have recognized 
that the jif has the potential capacity to proactively participate in contemporary development to muster 
the necessary public support for policy implementation and also mitigate social and development 
conflict (Kernot & Sakita 2008; Linstrom 1997; White 2007; Bolton 1999a). However, Vanuatu, the 
Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea should learn from the Fijian jifly council, and where 
necessary avoid similar traps that Fiji has experienced. Because there is division between indigenous 
Fijians over the way the jifly council was established based on eastern traditions, this ruins the social 
foundation of unity at all levels and has created the space for military coups (Lawson 1997, p. 113). 
Vanuatu has cherished its diverse socio-political system and traditions, and all have been united under 
the general rubric of the kastom and jifly system, which has gained broad legitimacy from the people 
throughout the archipelago (White 2007). 
In a comparative analysis of the jifly system in Vanuatu and Africa, Miles (1993, p. 31) identifies five 
modern roles of traditional rulers in development administration:  
1) Linkage or "brokering" between grassroots and capital;  
2) Extension of national identity through the conferral of traditional titles; 
3) Low-level conflict resolution and judicial gate-keeping;  
4) Ombudsmanship; and  
5) Institutional safety-valve for overloaded and sub-apportioned bureaucracies. 
This implies a renewed recognition of traditional modes of governance as complementary tools for 
effective democracy and administration. In Vanuatu, Howell and Hall (2010, p. 8) comment that the 
MNCC plays an informal role in bridging various aspects of customary life with non-church-based 
civil society, and works with government on land tenure issues. Thus, as is argued in the present 
thesis, the traditional institution of jif is an active organisation that is relevant to the local 
communities, because it creates centre-periphery linkages and holds societies together around a 
communal centre of recognised common practices and values.  
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2.8 Civil society and democracy 
According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, good governance is measured through the extent 
to which members of civil society at large are able to express their opinions and participate in the 
process of development. As Hydén (2011) argues, the reconfiguration of the state function in the 
development process, after the implementation of IMF structural adjustment policies, means that even 
more importance needs to be given to the voice of civil society, to provide necessary checks and 
balances on the state’s role. This points to the importance of the concept of civil society in 
development and political discourse, as one of the social foundations for a vibrant democracy (Carver 
& Bartelson 2011; Haynes 2013; Putman 1993).The model of democracy that is promoted and 
embeded in many developing states is what Bastian and Luckham (2003, p. 15) refer to as ‘liberal 
democracy’, which has the ultimate purpose of building liberal institutions that will meet the 
following goals:  
 To enable participation of all citizens either directly or through elections; 
 To avoid tyranny by autocratic rulers and (in some democratic systems) by the majority; 
 To promote open and fair competition for power on the basis of the vote; 
 To ensure the accountability of government; 
 To provide a forum for rational discussions of political problems and settlement of conflicting 
social interests. 
In democratic theory, civil society is seen as one of the strategic alliances in promoting democracy, by 
connecting the ordinary citizens to the state authorities and facilitating their participation in decisions 
that impact on their lives. Putman’s experiences in Italy’s democracy is a case in point, in which civil 
society contributes largely to increasing the participation of their citizens in the process of 
development and in the sharing of its benefits (Putman 1993). However, what works in one context 
may not necessarily be applicable to another; and as Putman points out, a vibrant civil society is 
contingent upon the historical socio-political context and development of each country. Like some 
other models, Putman’s model of making democracy work has its own criticisms.  
Firstly, as O’Neill (1996) points out, Putman’s model would seem to put more emphasis on efficiency 
rather than democracy. There is a risk of assuming a causal link between a political culture of 
associations and the practices of democracy, because, as is argued by Tarrow (1996), the link is not 
straighforward. Having a strong civil society does not necessarily imply greater democracy. As 
Tarrow (1996) points out, policy performance is as likely to be positive in non-democracies, and 
therefore it may not be a good indicator of democratic consolidation.  
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Secondly, Levi (1996) notes that in earlier accounts Putman (1993) discounts how government 
institutions may have influenced the organisation of local society. Indeed, the state can be influential  
in shaping the activities of civil society, as has recently occurred in Fiji, where non-government 
organisations were banned from doing certain things that contradicted government positions (Lal 
2009). In Vanuatu, over the last three decades, the media was controlled by the government until the 
recent inauguration of the freedom of media policy. Despite different political contexts, Haynes 
(2013) argues that there is now a wave of change towards recognition of the need for a colloborative 
and partnership approach with the members of civil society. This is reflected in Australian 
government funded programs in Pacific Islands, which stress engagement between state and civil 
society (Howell & Hall 2010, AusAID 2011). In other words, the role of civil society is widely 
recognised as an important vehicle to foster strong accountability and an environment for good 
governance. Furthermore, in the context of the developing world, a robust democracy depends on 
colloborative efforts between different agencies, government, the private sector, civic communities 
and international aid agencies (Haynes 2013). In other words, there is a need for a state to establish a 
mechanism to promote a collaborative environment where various authorities work together in the 
best interest of citizens at large. 
The nature of civil society in the developing world is more complex than Western experiences 
suggest. As is argued by Haynes (2013), the analysis of civil society and democracy in developing 
worlds has to be viewed in their historical context and, most importantly, understood in the context of 
their inherent characteristics and challenges. The term civil society is new in most developing 
countries; however, this is not to say that there is no presence of civil society organisations in 
developing states. As Haynes (2013) argues, the term ‘civil society’ only emerged in developing 
countries after decades of post- colonial state operation, when many had experienced development 
issues and challenges such as poverty, marginalisation of rural farmers, environmental degradation, 
gender inequality, and unequal distribution of development benefits. Civil society organisation came 
into existence to redress what may be seen as the state’s weakness in addressing those development 
challenges in a way that its citizens expected. Many post-colonial states in the Pacific were 
established in an era when the global economic system was already well developed and its material 
benefits and knowledge had travelled across the globe (Haynes 2013). As such, they were dealing 
with an economic system that was not of their making and whose rules they could not change (Haynes 
2013, p. 2). As Feeny (2010) points out,  in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, their populations 
connected directly to global markets through the prices of fuel, kerosene, and other goods and services 
that are controlled by external market actors, which impact upon local production and consumption 
patterns. Thus, it would seem that civil society organisations in developing countries were putting 
pressure on the state to tackle some of the development challenges that are beyond the state’s capacity 
to deal with.  
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Many developing countries, according to Ron (2011), have experienced low to moderate economic 
performance, compounded by increased population growth rates and geographical isolation from 
major market centres. The absence of basic infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, and 
credit facilities inhibits the participation of local communities in economic activities. Nevertheless, 
where the opportunity is provided, civil society organisations mobilise to address the challenge of 
accessing government services such as education, health, infrastructure, and telecommunication. In 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, Haynes (2013, p.7) notes that civil society, which he calls ‘action 
groups’, are mobilised around three broad aims: alleviating poverty, achieving greater social justice, 
and preserving the environment. Therefore, civil society can mount strong pressure on the state to 
achieve a vibrant democracy; however, as Haynes (2013) points out, they themselves need a 
governance framework to regulate their activities. 
The challenges to participatory development and participatory democracy in developing states, as 
argued by Haynes (2013), stem from increased diversity inherent in different contexts, including 
languages, cultures and socio-political structures. In a similar vein, when considering how civil 
society and aid donors work together in developing countries, Court (2006, p.1) argues that country 
and local circumstances matter, in that they provide both the constraints and opportunities for 
improved governance. On the experience of the Pacific, Saldanha (2004, p. 35) argues that the 
diversities of opinions and culture inhibit the coalescing of public opinion that is required to generate 
the public pressure needed to force governments to be accountable to their citizens. On the same note, 
Haley (2008, p. 10) makes the obvious but significant point that among all civil societies ‘there is very 
little convergence between national interest and more parochial local ones’. One of the reasons for 
this, as is argued by Haley (2008, p. 11), is that ‘many of these groups are born of personal and clan 
aspirations rather than a desire to mobilise the wider community around issues of greater good’. 
However, as Haynes (2013) argues, in order for civil society to become effective in promoting 
participatory democracy, there must be a recognizable governance framework that will govern broad 
community interactions and bring genuine participation to address development challenges. For 
instance, Howell and Hall (2010, p. 4) note that ‘civil society organisations, including churches and 
jifs play important roles in community governance and local service delivery, but have limited formal 
influence on government policy.’ According to Howell and Hall (2010), there is a relational gap 
between jifs, churches and the state, and in most cases the three institutions work independently from 
each other. One of the reasons for this, as noted by Maltali and Kalontano (2005), is due to the 
adversarial roles of civil society as ‘watch dogs’, which creates an unfriendly working environment 
with the state; and this prevents the state from sharing information with civil society organisations for 
fear that they may use it to damage the political credibility of the state. In this situation, the 
inaccessibility of information from the government side prevents civil society from participating fully 
in development, particularly in developing states where the means to disseminate information is 
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poorly developed or does not exist. This means that, while civil society can play an important role in 
participatory development and democracy, its success is contingent on the collaborative efforts of the 
other institutions such as government and development aid agencies.  
2.9 Participatory development and democracy in developing societies 
Participatory development is identified as one of the indicators of good governance. Since the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators were released, participatory development has been embraced by 
international development aid agencies as an approach to improve the development outcomes in 
developing countries (McGee 2002). In this approach, the focus of development has shifted from a 
traditional top-down approach to a bottom-up approach that puts greater emphasis on people, 
particularly disadvantaged groups and marginalised local communities (Syokau 2010). Underlying 
this shift, according to Mansuri and Rao (2012, p. 15), is ‘the belief that giving the poor a greater say 
in decisions that affected their lives by involving them in at least some aspect of project design and 
implementation would result in a closer connection between development aid and its intended 
beneficiaries’. Thus, the participatory development approach is supposed to create a political space for 
donors, civil society, policy makers and disadvantaged groups to participate in what previously would 
have been considered a top-down model of development (Syokau 2010).  
One of the criticisms of the top-down approach is that it is a highly centralised development strategy 
and, hence, it is disconnected from the needs of the poor and the marginalised sections of society 
(Mansuri & Rao 2012). Local participation has been proposed by aid agencies as a way to improve 
poverty targeting, build social capital and, most importantly, increase demand for good governance. In 
other words, what participatory development is aiming to do is to empower the marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups to fully participate in development, by directly contributing their views and 
ideas to the process that leads to the outcomes. This notion is reflected in the definitions of the term 
‘participation’, which Stan Burkey refers to as: 
[a]n educational and empowering process in which people in partnership with each 
other and those able to assist them, identify problems and needs, mobilise resources 
and assume responsibility themselves to plan, manage, control and assess the 
individual and collective actions that they themselves decide upon (1993, p. 205).  
This definition, according to Kothari and Minogue (2002a), camouflages the notion of mainstream 
practices of development and alternative approaches into a new concept of participation. While 
participatory development may sound like a paradigm shift in development approaches, Kothari and 
Minogue (2002b) argue that this is not the case, and the practices indicate that alternative approaches 
are now absorbed into mainstream development approaches. Thus, participatory development is one 
of the alternative approaches that aims to redefine the goals and practices of development (Kothari & 
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Minogue 2002b; McGee 2002). In this sphere of planning, Makuwira (2003, p. 14) argues that a 
participatory development approach must be ‘a culturally grounded process where outsiders (donors, 
researchers or technocrats) can neither formulate objectives nor define development outside their own 
cultural sphere’. This point is critical, because it emphasises the need for participatory democracy and 
partnerships in aid interventions. In this sphere of understanding, participation is now perceived a 
democratic right of the individual citizen (Syokau 2010). 
2.10 Participation as a democratic right 
The recognition of the voice of civil society as one of the indicators of good governance implies that 
participation in development and the decision-making process is now seen as a democratic right of 
individual citizens. As McGee (2002) argues, the understanding of participatory development is 
closely linked to the view of participation as a right. The implication of this view is that development 
has to be initiated and planned at the local community level where everyone is entitled to contribute 
their ideas in shaping the outcomes of development. Feeney also argues that: 
[p]articipation is a fundamental right. It is a means of engaging poor people in joint 
analysis and development of priorities. Its ultimate goals should be to foster the 
existing capacities of local, poor women and men to increase their self-reliance in 
ways that outlast specific projects. The purpose of participation is to give a permanent 
voice to poor or marginalised people and integrate them into the decision making 
structure and processes that shape their lives (1998, p. 7).  
The implication of Feeney’s argument is that, in this sphere of development practice, control and 
power over development has shifted from the hands of central administrators and aid agencies to civil 
society and marginalised groups in local communities (McGee 2002). The shortfall of this argument is 
that it fails to acknowledge that rights always come with responsibility of citizens to contribute to 
harmonious and peaceful environments that will facilitate development growth. The challenge for the 
state is that more often responsibilities of citizens and institutions are either not clearly defined or 
undefined. In similar vein, the responsibilities of respective institutions and authorities are not clearly 
defined, thus creating insurmountable governance challenges. 
This raises another important question: how to democratize development in ways that optimise 
empowerment and social benefits to disadvantaged groups. The answers to this question have exposed 
the shortfalls of participatory development and democracy in developing countries. For instance, 
Cornwall (2003) argues that participation is used to support elites’ interest in aid programmes without 
necessarily engaging with the root causes of disadvantage. In a similar vein, Cooke and Kothari 
(2001) argue that, despite its stated aim of promoting ownership and sustainable development, 
participation has, in the main, become a form of tyranny in which participatory development is 
46 
 
advocated, but related practices hardly lead to meaningful benefits to disadvantaged people. Further 
tensions are made in respect to how donors empower civil society, disadvantaged groups and 
government. For instance, Ife (2002) points out that aid development has disempowered 
disadvantaged groups and individuals rather than empowered them. A similar argument is also made 
in relation to how international capitalism and global markets tend to disempower government and 
individuals, in the sense that they have limited capabilities to cope with new development innovations 
(Chambers 2005).  
All of this implies that there is a greater need to engender a balance between local and global 
perspectives. The processes of development and participation involve interpersonal interactions and 
decision-making practices, which are not value free. In other words, the increased citizen participation 
and their active involvement in the development process will eventually lead to a balanced 
governance system between global practices and locally embedded practices. Critically, as Court 
(2006, p. 1) points out, any developments ‘without adequate contextual references’ do not make 
sense. On this basis, context refers to: historical context; socio-cultural context; the political economy 
of the country; ethnic, racial or religious homogeneity; technical capacity; and the international 
environment (Court 2006; Haley 2008). Similarly, the literature on Pacific governance and democracy 
highlights the importance for institutional design of recognising local existing governance practices 
that have the potential to promote greater participation and ensure a functioning liberal democracy 
(Duncan 2011; Henderson 2003; Wairiu 2006). In considering the interaction of market, state, 
government, and civil society, Mansuri and Rao suggest that: 
[s]uch interactions are deeply conditioned by culture, politics, and social structure, and they 
vary from place to place. A policy that works in one country, or even one municipality, may 
fail miserably in another. Moreover, effective collective action is usually conditioned by a 
‘cooperative infrastructure’ that presupposes functional state institutions and is likely to be far 
more challenging in its absence (2012, p. 4) . 
This brings into the discussion the need for a grounded approach to institutional design that recognises 
the critical importance of cooperative infrastructure and the local context. It is recognised that when 
the institutions encourage a collaborative and deliberative dialogue between the government, aid 
donors, civil society, including the marginalised and poor, there is the likelihood that participation 
will transform passive residents into effective public citizens (Mansuri and Rao 2012). The effective 
public participation of citizens can be a means to hold the states, markets, and aid donors accountable 
for their decisions and actions, and to influence decisions that affect their lives (McGee 2002). 
However, as is argued by Mansuri and Rao (2012), participation can only be an effective means of 
sustainable development, inclusiveness, and effective democracy if it is supported by the appropriate 
institutions and infrastructures. 
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2.11 Institutional design and citizen participation 
Institutions are a matter for growth and development, but they are not self-generating or self-
sustaining (Leftwich & Sen 2010). Institutions, according to North et al. (2008), are best understood 
as the ‘rules of the game’. In this understanding it is assumed that they will shape human behaviour in 
economic, social and political life. On the contrary, Leftwich & Sen (2010) argue that institutions do 
not shape human behaviour, and their effectiveness depends on how individuals and organisations 
interact with the rules. In other words, individuals and organisations may play the game according to 
the rules or they may seek to evade and avoid the rules, thereby undermining them; further, they also 
seek to shape or influence the rules (Leftwich & Sen 2010, p. 9). 
Similarly, North et al. (2008, p. 2) note that institutions may create incentives ‘for politicians to work  
towards creating a growth-enhancing environment or they may encourage rent-seeking activities, 
corruption, and the unfettered pursuance of personal gain at great cost for the rest of the society’. This 
simply means that development outcomes depend critically on the way in which institutions interact 
with organisations and individuals, and therefore it is important to understand how and why 
institutions work and also how the rules are negotiated (Leftwich & Sen 2010). While it is recognised 
that there is no single recipe for successful institutional change, North et al. (2008, p. 3) argue that our 
best hope for institutional improvement lies with internal dynamics, and we should strive to 
understand what generates positive internal dynamics rather than offering recipes for general 
institutional improvements. This implies that institutional design matters, but it is only effective when 
it recognises and uses the existing informal institutions together with formal institutions to promote 
inclusive and participatory development (Scales 2005). In the absence of a grounded approach there is 
a likelihood of promoting public institutions that have flaws in them and which are in conflict with 
existing traditional governance. As has been argued earlier, the conflict and fractures that occur 
between the two contrasting sets of values of social order and authority in a shared common political 
space have weakened the legal-rational governance institutions, within which situation the 
opportunity for corruption is significant. 
2.12 Institutions and corruption 
Corruption implies decay or deviation from an ideal or set of rules in pursuit of private gain (Buchan 
& Hill 2014). Concern for political corruption is closely associated with the notion of the ‘public 
interest’. The challenge for Vanuatu is that the concept of ‘public interest’ does not have a close 
cognate in local languages, and thus if there is no word that corresponds to this term it is difficult for 
local communities to understand what ‘public interest’ means in a legal-rational organisation. 
However, knowledge of corruption, in the post-colonial Melanesian countries, is a relatively new 
development phenomenon that came into existence just a few decades after the establishment of most 
of the state’s institutions. Larmour (2009), in his account of the incidences of corruption in the South 
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Pacific, concludes that corruption came into public knowledge through the establishment of 
corruption commissions such as the Ombudsman’s Office in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, and 
anti-corruption commissions such as the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC). 
This tends to suggest that the Westminster system of government institutionalizes certain allocative 
practices, through development projects, finance, and public enterprise formation, that have 
encouraged corruption. 
 
As such, there is a growing perception in developing countries that modernization and democracy 
breed corruption; and therefore there is a tendency to blame the capitalist system as a tempting zone 
for corrupt activities (Larmour 2009). In a similar argument, traditional irrationality and influences 
have been blamed in development discourse as the breeding ground for corruption (Ackerman 1999; 
Crocombe 1994; Huntington 1968; Larmour 2008). This is a counter perception that reflects the 
ambiguity of the concept of corruption and misunderstanding of the term in the landscape of 
Melanesian’s cultural and linguistic diversity. Indeed, Lamour (2009) has acknowledged the 
complexities of the uses of the term in different cultural contexts and the difficulty to define it, as well 
as the fact that it is often a new concept in developing countries.  
 
In the realm of economics, corruption is referred to as a misappropriation of resources for private 
gains as opposed to intended purposes (Ackerman 1999). The economists have used economic tools 
such as the principal-agent model (Ackerman 1999), and rent-seeking model to identify the social cost 
impacts of corruption on the economy and more generally on development (Buchan & Hill 2014; 
Klitgaard 1988). However, as Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Huffer (2005) note, economists are not able 
to answer the cultural and traditional questions. In similar vein, the political definition of corruption as 
misuse of power for private gain confines the corruption framework of analysis within imposed public 
institutions, and it does not cover informal institutions of jif, churches, and non-government 
organizations that are not funded by the state and not under its laws (Cain & Jowitt 2004; Larmour 
2008). This issue has been addressed by Kaufmann, who expands the definition to encompass both 
public and private sectors; and for whom corruption is ‘the privatization of public policy in which 
public policy is seen as including access to public services’ (2005, p. 82). This definition can be 
stretched to encompass informal institutions, in this case the Vanuatu jifly institution and kastom 
governance. In traditional society there is no clear distinction between the concept of public goods 
and private goods. What the local community is upset with, is how they can draw a line between 
private and public at all levels in society; and this is a question for which Western society does not 
appear to have a straightforward answer (Ackerman 1999). This an example of a complex question 
related to the nature of corruption as an ambiguous term that transcends all levels of development 
without finding a linkage to the local context. 
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As mentioned previously, corruption and governance are ambiguous terms and there is still a need to 
reach consensus on their definition. Thus, from theoretical and empirical perspectives, corruption and 
governance studies have increased in diversity and complexity, particularly in terms of the approaches 
and analytical frameworks in which research is conducted (Buchan & Hill 2014). Corruption is most 
widely conceived as the misuse of public office for private gain and, in legal texts, is most commonly 
associated with bribery (United Nations 2004). Under the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) and the United Nations Transnational Convention Against Organised Crime 
(UNTCAOC), the concept of corruption is only limited to formal and legal-rational political 
institutions and organisations that are prescribed or covered under the state legal frameworks, and 
therefore the charges of corruption are laid against “public officials”. Under the UNCAC’s Article 
Two, public officials are limited to: ‘elected and appointed politicians; any individual who performs a 
public function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provide public service as 
defined in the domestic law; and any other person defined as a public official’ (United Nations 2004, 
p. 7). The nature of informal institutions, for instance the jifly institution and authorities, though they 
are widely acknowledged, is outside the scope of formal and legal-rational institutions and as such has 
not been taken into consideration in the legal and global framework of corruption (Cain & Jowitt 
2004). 
 
Other literature on tradition and corruption tends to suggest that corruption is a result of a clash 
between two different values or institutions (Rose-Arkerman 1999; Crocombe 1994; Larmour 2008).  
According to Rose-Ackerman (1999), all modern states are dominated by a formal set of rules and 
laws, and as such the states may incorporate values and practices that clash with a society’s traditions. 
This means that what is morally and conceptually acceptable in traditional societies may well be 
viewed by outsiders as corruption. For instance, as discussed in Chapter One and reflected in Figure 
1.1, the reciprocal support system is a morally binding social system that is enacted through giving 
and sharing of resources within and between members of kinship and families (Knauft 2007). This 
practice is often highly criticised as a form of corruption in post-colonial Melanesian societies, 
because it is viewed by outsiders as personalised practice favouring the kinship networks (Douglas 
2000; Larmour 2008). Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues this disjunction is particularly acute if a society 
is making a transition from personalised modes of interaction between rulers and the ruled to 
relationships based on ‘arm’s length’, impersonal, and professional interactions. 
2.13 Patron-client relationship network. 
In a context where the enduring attachment to traditional values of social order and kastom practices 
becomes the norm of the society, the incidences of patron-client or political clientalism become 
obvious and have a negative spillover effect on development (Oskar 2007). Political clientalism, 
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according to Oskar (2007), means rent-seeking activities that promote the collective interests of 
groups through regular formal administrative and political channels. In a similar vein, Scott (1972)  
notes that the patron-client network is highly characterized by traditional politics, which means that it 
is strongly rooted in local norms, social orders, and process. This, as will be discussed later in the 
present thesis, is very much the case in Vanuatu. 
 
The patron-client network is found to be a relevant model to unpack challenges of power in 
developing countries. Scott (1972) refers to the patron- client network relationship as:  
 
…..an exchange relationship between roles - may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two 
person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher 
socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or 
benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by 
offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron (1972, p. 
92) 
 
From this definition, Scott (1972) further argues that there are three possible distinguishing features of 
patron-client links: i) inequality in wealth, status, and power; ii) personal quality of the relationship, 
which is usually achieved through face to face interaction; and iii) flexibility. There are actually two 
models of patron-client relationship networks, horizontal class, and primordial sentiments, both of 
which help to explain two different types of conflict in society (Kwong 2007; Scott 1972). While the 
former helps to explain conflict arising from different classes in society, the primordial model 
naturally helps to explain tension and conflict that increasingly occurs as these isolated, ascriptive 
groups come into contact and compete for power (Kaufman 1974). In this understanding, James Scott 
further argues that when we leave the realm of class conflict, ‘we are likely to find ourselves in the 
realm of informal power groups, leadership centered cliques and factions, and a whole panoply of 
more or less instrumental ties’ (Scott 1972, p. 89). In other words, Scott (1972) implies that the 
structure and dynamics of such seemingly ad-hoc groupings can be best understood from the 
perspective of patron-client relations. This was picked up by Bruce Kwong (2007), who analyses how 
the election of the Chief Executive Office in Hong Kong entails a patron-client network. In the same 
manner, Zhang, Ding, and Bao (2009) have used the patron-client network to understand how the 
patron-client concept is used to better describe the asymmetric exchange of resources and 
opportunities between unequal individuals or groups in the rural tourism sector in China. All these 
imply, according to Scott (1972), that to understand how informal power groups penetrated modern 
institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties in Asia and in other developing countries and 
undermined formal structures and authority, we should apply the patron-client network relationship 
model to our analysis. Depending on where one is standing, these informal structures and powers can 
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also become an agent of civil society working with the state to support development objectives. 
However, as mentioned on several occasions in this chapter, there is a need for the state to recognize 
local governance and authority and work with these to bring development benefits across wider 
sections of the population. 
2.14 Civil society and development 
Civil society is viewed in the eyes of aid donors as one of the strategic actors in addressing 
contemporary development challenges such as corruption, inclusive development, inequality, gender 
imbalance, poverty, and violence against women, to name a few (Haley 2008; Howell & Hall 2010; 
Putman 1993). Indeed, one of the global agendas that cemented the roles of civil society, government, 
and aid donors at a partnership level is the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The MDGs 
consist of eight goals initiated and administered by the United Nations, following the agreement of 
world leaders in 1990, as a global effort to eradicate poverty by 2015 (Sumner & Tiwari 2009). The 
eight goals emphasise a need to develop a global partnership for development. According to Summer 
and Tiwari (2009), one of the mechanisms for that global partnership is the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, which spells out the mutual obligations of international aid agencies and recipient 
governments. As Riddell (2007) points out, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is a global 
model of working together that obliges international aid agencies to harmonise their development 
assistance and align it with the national priorities of recipient governments. This framework 
emphasises mutual accountability and management for results, which, in a sense, pushes government, 
civil society, and international agencies to harness their cooperation and participation mechanisms in 
order to secure ownership of the project.  
 Over the past decade, the funding commitment of international aid agencies towards civil society has 
increased dramatically, and this is reflected through US$85 billion that the World Bank has allocated 
to participatory development (Mansuri & Rao 2012, p. 15). In the Pacific region, Davies (2014) notes 
that the aid Australian NGOs provided through the principal subsidy mechanism actually went up in 
2012-2013 by AU$144 million; but this figure was reduced by seven percent in 2014. Civil society, 
according Riddell (2007), has implemented specific projects or programs that target particular groups 
of poor people and poor communities, such as services delivery activities (school, health, housing, 
water and sanitation), and also focuses on activities that aim to raise the incomes and enhance the 
livelihoods of these communities. However, as discussed in this chapter, civil society does not 
function in a vacuum, and its success depends on the concerted efforts of the state, development 
agencies and informal governance institutions and authority. 
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2.15 Conclusion  
In the process of post-colonial state building in developing countries and more specifically in the 
context of the Pacific, little thought seems to have been given to understanding the disconnection 
between legal-rational political values and traditional values of the society that is meant to adopt 
them. While there is the possibility of adopting traditional values, more thought is needed to be given 
to the negotiation of meanings and negotiation of common values that would facilitate greater 
interactions between different development actors in that almost empty space of socio-economic and 
political development. One contributing factor to these problems is the intellectual discrimination and 
consequent misunderstandings between tradition and legal-rational governance, which is being driven 
by current development policies and planning, neo-colonialism, and more recently through the global 
development agenda and the associated programs that penetrate developing states.  
Moreover, in the Pacific region and more specifically in Melanesian society, the challenges are of 
interest to political elites who see an opportunity to consolidate their powers at the expense of the 
broader population; and they have manipulated and, too often, marginalized traditions to achieve their 
ends. The real danger is that the development agencies, intentionally or unintentionally, are colluding 
with emerging self-interested local elites in promulgating policies and programs that are contrary to 
the stated aims of all involved and function at the expense of those who are still located and 
functioning in the large traditional groupings. This encourages conflict over resources distribution and 
management, conflict that has the potential to escalate into serious ethnic tension and corrupt 
practices.  
The review of the literature presented in this chapter suggests that there is a gap of empirical evidence 
and understanding of local context in the South Pacific. This gap can be filled through a grounded 
approach and nuanced analysis of the specific country context, to support a shift of focus from best 
practice to best fit. The present thesis takes the opportunity to push the frontier of governance further 
by viewing issues of governance as a failure of international institutions and legal-rational state 
governance approaches to accommodate existing informal governance institutions. Hence, the whole 
focus of this research is to find strategies to use cultures and traditions to build a more resilient system 
of governance within Vanuatu. 
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Chapter 3:  Research Methodology 
3.0. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of analysis, methodology and methods applied in the 
conduct of this research. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section establishes the 
main theoretical underpinnings of the researcher’s approach and justifies the use of a qualitative case 
study methodology. The second section details the research design and field research processes 
including the collection of field interviews. The last section discusses the quality of the research 
project in terms of its ethical considerations and cross-cultural dimensions, which in turn help to 
foreground the major concerns addressed in this thesis pertaining to the commensurability of Western 
or modern and traditional modes of thought and social organization. Of central importance are the 
operative definitions of “corruption” and “governance”, which guide the interpretation of field 
interviews and published documents and which shape critiques of national political and bureaucratic 
structures in Vanuatu. Acknowledging that there can be no neutral definition of either term, the 
researcher nonetheless formulates a rough approximation of the range of accepted working 
definitions, detailed in Chapter Two, for each to enable their operationalization as constructs for 
investigation and critique. Importantly, and innovatively, these terms are defined through a set of 
interrelated “tensions” or “polarities”, between the ideals of good governance and the tangible 
realities of society and politics in Vanuatu, as interpreted through the eyes of the researcher. 
3.1 Theoretical framework  
At the theoretical level, this thesis uses a patron-client relationship model as a framework of analysis 
to understand sources of corruption and how these can be explained within Vanuatu government and 
society, and more importantly in the governance of Vanuatu society. Governance is commonly 
conceived in liberal terms as the ‘many ways in which people manage their common affairs’ 
(Commission on Global Governance 1995, p. 2). Received definitions imply majority agreement or 
consensus as the basis of institutional legitimacy; and hence, logically, governance relationships 
underpin legitimate government and are essential to the act of governing. Such conceptions tend 
towards the valorisation of democratic modes of political organization, but there are in practice many 
ways by which people’s “common affairs” are “managed” that do not approximate to any social 
democratic ideal. The patron-client relationship or network model of association, for example, affords 
opportunity for nuanced analysis of how informal authority, such as kastom authority in Vanuatu, and 
local values of social order complicate the exercise of state authority within externally imposed 
political institutions. As discussed in Chapter Two, Max Weber (1948) argues that each society has a 
prevalent authority system that governs its behaviour, and that there are three authority systems: (a) 
traditional, (b) patrimonial, (c) legal-rational. While traditional and patrimonial authority are, in the 
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Weberian sense, characterised by the personalisation of power, the legal-rational system of economic, 
social, and political organisation is underpinned by an entirely different set of expectations. Under 
legal-rational or state institutions, all persons follow rules and fit into formal roles that are separate 
from the personal, family, and friendship interests of their incumbents (Weber 1948). In this sphere of 
understanding, conflict occurs where there are multiple sources of authority and where traditional 
(kastom, in the context of this thesis) authority intersects with legal-rational authority and creates a 
significant opportunity for practices deemed corrupt to occur, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. 
Economists and public policy analysts commonly use rational actor approaches to explain corruption, 
as a challenge for good governance in developed and in developing countries that arises out of the 
“selfish” behaviour of individuals who thus need to be “disciplined” by society to conform to the 
global anti-corruption norm (Ackerman 1999). For instance, the theory of “principal-agent model” is 
widely used to unpack the social costs of corruption to an economy, and to national development in 
general (Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 2010). Such an analytical framework associates 
“corruption”, above all, ‘with activities that impose wasteful economic costs, by distorting the 
operation of market’ (Buchan & Hill 2014, p. 2). These costs were usually identified with ‘rent-
seeking behaviours’ (Buchan & Hill 2014, p. 3), “self-interested behaviours” (Ackerman 1999), and 
with the pursuit of advantage by “principals” through “agents” to which bribes are paid in cash or in 
kind (Klitgaard 1988). The challenge for the present research project is thus to both identify instances 
and forms of “self-interested” and “individualistic” behaviour by government officials and political 
power-brokers, and to then interpret these through the socio-cultural lens developed in Chapter Four. 
While social scientific and legal explanations of corruption go largely unchallenged in the official 
literature and much of the academic literature on governance, economists struggle over questions 
about the socio-cultural origins of practices deemed corrupt in law or judged as corrupt (Ackerman 
1999; Huffer 2005). Rational actor explanations, focusing upon individual behaviour and assuming a 
relatively uniform pattern of decision-making, fall short of “factoring-in” the collective nature of 
traditional societies, including interpersonal power relations. Most importantly, these explanations fail 
to accommodate the reality that informal authority often transcends, or is prior to, the legal-rational 
institutions of the state (Ackerman 1999; Buchan & Hill 2014; Huffer 2005). In similar vein, legal 
explanations of corruption fail to recognise those informal institutions and interpersonal power 
relations in traditional local communities, wherein decisions are made and actions taken through 
processes of negotiation, reciprocity and barter, and to which personal power considerations are 
pivotal (Cain & Jowitt 2004; Huffer 2005). From a conventional viewpoint, corruption occurs when 
political leaders and bureaucrats operate outside the rule of codified laws to secure power and 
privilege or to advance the interests of their circle of sponsors. However, in Vanuatu, the jifly 
institution, churches, and other community organisations that are not prescribed by state laws and 
funded from the public purse have been excluded from the contemporary charges of corruption (Cain 
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& Jowitt 2004). Kastom authority is one of the authorities that eighty percent of the population 
subscribes to, and it enjoys broader legitimacy from the people throughout the archipelago. The 
kastom jifs are the only authority that continues to promote kastom governance at all levels of society. 
That said, kastom cuts across legal-rational and traditional bases of political authority, and the 
contradictions and opportunities created by this hybridity has generated patterns of decay, both in 
terms of adherence to traditional norms and the imported norms of responsible government. Hence, 
corruption can also be argued as the decay of transitional institutions, which is a precursor to corrupt 
practices by those who move into the bureaucracy or into the political system and are able to use that 
position to undermine formal institution and authority. In other words, the decay of traditional 
institution can be a source of corruption, where opportunity to behave in corrupt ways are presented 
by the legal-rational state.  
Governance in Vanuatu entails the “arrangement” of relationships and social expectations formed 
within a social context into which notions of legal-rational authority have been imposed. To 
understand the nature of these governance challenges, and appreciate the behaviour of the bureaucrats, 
wherein they depend more on their personal following and extra-bureaucratic connections than on 
their formal post, we must rely heavily on the patron-client network model of analysis (Scott 1972). 
Scott (1972) and Kaufman (1974) assert that political science and governance scholars should 
consider patron-client relations as a potential alternative research framework to penetrate behind often 
misleading formal arrangements in small local communities, where interpersonal power relations are 
salient (Kaufman 1974; Scott 1972). As discussed in Chapter Two, imposed state institutions disrupt 
established political, social and economic patterns, creating imbalances that give rise to the formation 
of patron-client relationships between two parties with inequality in status, wealth, and influence 
(Uslaner 2008). Scott (1972) identifies two features: where patrons and clients value the personal 
quality of their relationships (face to face interaction); and at the same time where their relationships 
are diffused and not bind by an explicit impersonal contract.  
Using the patron-client relationship model as a framework for the systematic analysis of tensions 
between liberal governance ideals and actual local practice creates opportunities to discover the 
societal dynamics that generate “corrupt” behaviours. Such analysis treats corruption as a 
consequence of a significant societal disruption and disconnection that cannot be addressed through 
the application of legal-rational measures alone. Corruption in Vanuatu can be seen when the 
government system is not operating the way it should because of frictions between different social 
expectations of authority. As argued in this thesis, this opens up opportunities for individual political 
leaders and bureaucrats to exploit their position of authority. This builds on the following 
assumptions: 
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 The existence of a traditional patron-client system of governance works well in the local 
context of Vanuatu. This is now being crafted into the bureaucratic state system of 
government and political organisations, where the patron-client tie develops between two 
parties of unequal status, wealth, power, and influence. This relationship is formed and 
maintained through the reciprocal exchange of symmetrical goods and services and face-to-
face contact. 
 The newness of the institution in Vanuatu and the level of disconnection between rational 
government theory and local kastom governance practices in Vanuatu society gives rise to a 
patron-client network relationship as a mechanism for protection and advancement. 
 The absence of sufficient numbers of professionally trained administrators to actually govern 
the country and consequently a tendency for people to occupy mixed roles means there is 
considerable contradiction between expectations and actual practice attached to these roles. 
This can create a greater opportunity for traditional values of social order and authority to 
transcend the borders of legal-rational institutions and undermine formal authority. 
 Disconnection between the notion of customary law, and customary notion of right and 
wrong, with the institutional frameworks that are associated with a bureaucratic state.  
 There is also tension between established social kastom practices and expectations, and the 
principles of impartiality among the public servants.  
 In Vanuatu, distinctions between principal and agent are often absent because, instead of 
having the principal and agent institutionally separate from each other, both can exist within 
patron-client networks inside public organisations. This is the reason the state owned 
enterprise, the Development Bank of Vanuatu, was selected as a case study for the present 
project. 
3.2 Ontological considerations 
The present project is first and foremost an interpretive exercise in which the researcher is conscious 
of his position as an insider “looking in”, and he is seeking to establish, albeit artificially, a degree of 
distance between researcher and subject. In the realm of social science research, the research design is 
determined by the researcher’s view of the nature of the world (ontology), what is presumed we can 
know about it (epistemology), and how we can know it (methodology). The present researcher 
concurs with Barkin (2003) and Yin (2003) that social phenomenon are not representative of absolute 
conditions and static truth that we can observe explicitly and with certainty. Rather, the world is 
socially constructed in a subjective manner from context to context, from time to time, and from 
individual to individual. On the basis of this understanding, the ontological position of this research 
strongly aligns with realism and interpretivism, informed by the conceptual and empirical approaches 
discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. Taking a realist position, I acknowledge that the 
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kastom governance of which the patron-client relationship network becomes an integral component is 
real, and it is socially constructed as a basis of social bonding and forming mechanisms to support one 
another in local communities. In a similar vein, from this position corruption is viewed as a reality, 
which causes dysfunction throughout all democratic society including government institutions; and, 
therefore, can be and needs to be resolved, but in a way that actually enables people to understand 
what corruption is and how corruption could be detrimental to their wellbeing.  
As Barkin (2003) points out, social constructivism has epistemological implications in terms of 
subjectivity and reflexive knowledge that is generated in a complex and diverse society; in this case, 
Vanuatu society. Accepting that institutions are socially constructed out of human knowledge, beliefs, 
and ideas, the present thesis concurs with Barkin (2003) and Bevir (2009) that the meanings, beliefs 
and practices of a society can only be unpacked through an interpretive approach that acknowledges 
their social origins. Constructivist epistemology reflects the way that we can know reality and the 
construction of knowledge along with social order and authority structures within local societies. 
Therefore, taking a realist/ social constructivism approach, knowledge will be sought with the 
understanding that truth and meaning materialises in and out of our engagement or interaction with 
the real life practices in our world (Crotty 1998). Acknowledging that subject and object emerge as 
important partners in the generation and negotiation of meaning, this research takes the subject 
seriously as one of the means of obtaining first -hand knowledge (Crotty 1998). In understanding the 
social world from this perspective, knowledge can be obtained through a case study and historical 
approach (Bryman & Burgess 1999).  
For these reasons, corruption and governance are not defined in absolute terms, but are instead 
conceived through a pattern of tensions, as conceptualised in Figure 3.1. The challenges of 
governance in Vanuatu society need to be understood in that context where the constitution recognises 
democratic practices and kastom as foundations upon which post-colonial institutions are built. The 
present thesis is addressing a gap between social obligations and expectations, and a legal-rational 
model of governance, which needs to be dealt with in Vanuatu as a critical issue. Weak political 
institutions and the inability of the state to meet local expectations give rise to a patron-client network 
relationship as a mechanism for protection and advancement, in contemporary Vanuatu. This situation 
also provides a greater opportunity for kastom governance and personalisation of power to cut across 
the borders of legal-rational institutions and undermine formal authority.  
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Figure 3. 1 Governance dynamics in Vanuatu society 
Democratic practice Kastom
State Personalised power
Collision
 
Source: Author’s own work 
Figure 3:1 presents a governance dynamic within the existing political institutions in Vanuatu. 
Kastom is featured strongly in the Vanuatu Constitution as a second pillars upon which it becomes a 
foundation of the building of state institutions. It also illustrates contested social and political 
practices where democratic values work in conflict with kastom values and principles, such as in the 
case of elected representatives which challenges the traditional political system based upon concensus 
and heriditary right.  
3.3 Researcher position within the research paradigm 
As a social constructivist, the present researcher pursued a reflexive and interpretive approach to this 
research, and in doing so acknowledged that research participants are a real and accurate reflection of 
social reality. This approach positions the researcher as a critical observer within the research 
framework, and therefore requires ongoing recognition of reflexivity throughout. As someone who 
was born to and grew up in Vanuatu society, my interpretation is informed by my cultural inheritance 
and life experiences as an insider. However, I am also fully aware that this immersion might cause 
problems (for example, some subjectivity); but this challenge has been addressed through the 
methodology deployed in this research, which illustrates how distance and rigour in recording, 
analysis, and findings has been maintained. The methodology also clearly illustrates how my intimate 
knowledge and access to the resources informs this research. 
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This prior framework was directly and indirectly influenced by my experience as a son of a kastom jif, 
my previous position as Director of Strategic Policy, Planning and Aid Coordination, and my tertiary 
education as a scholarship undergraduate and then post-graduate in development administration. My 
career in the public sector began at the Ministry of Education as a Scholarship Officer in 1998, and it 
was from there that I first discovered how politicians, both elected and appointed, misuse their public 
position and authority to influence the sharing of scholarships to their immediate families and close 
political allies. My experiences of how the patron-client network influenced political development in 
Vanuatu, which is characterised by personalised power relations and strong kinship bonds, began 
when I saw politicians marshal their collective efforts to divert state resources to their personal 
interest groups, their families, and friends. In 2000 I was appointed as the Assistant Director of 
Reform Programs, and in 2005 I was promoted to the position of Director of Strategic Policy, 
Planning and Aid Coordination at the Ministry of Prime Minister. The influence of political 
groupings, kinship networks, and the collective nature of leadership defined by party in-groups, across 
Vanuatu’s islands, and provinces, were daily administrative challenges that were beyond our capacity 
to control as civil servants. As a civil servant I found myself in a difficult position, to stand by the 
rules and right processes even though there was not a security mechanism in place to protect me and 
the position I occupied. Hence, in Vanuatu, because of the weak enforcement of rule of law, patron-
client networks have a strong influence on the ways the state conducts its domestic and external 
affairs. As a consequence, the state’s resources are captured by political groupings at the broader 
expense of development of the society as a whole. 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Qualitative research strategy 
The present research design was informed by the theoretical and practical literature reviewed in 
Chapter Two, and integrated with the approaches by the research philosophy discussed in this 
Chapter. Because governance and corruption are ambiguous concepts, the conceptual and empirical 
works offered a wide range of research methodology options. Economics and public policy scholars 
tend to vary their methodological positions between quantitative and qualitative research in their 
studies of governance and corruption (Ackerman 1999; Khan 2004; Klitgaard 1988). On the other 
hand, in the domain of political science, and generally in the social sciences, the deployment of the 
qualitative research method is commonly favoured as a means of exploring meaning, perspective, and 
understanding of people who live and work in specific social settings (Schensul 2012). It also helps to 
explain social power relations and how beliefs and actions shape social and political behaviours in a 
localised context (Bevir, Rhodes & Weller 2003).  Consequently, the design of this research was 
informed by governance literature that advocated a qualitative approach, with a case study method 
that employed historical or ethnographic techniques. This approach yielded a new study of how 
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informal institutions and actions shape political behaviours and rational forms of authority, in 
Vanuatu but also with wider relevance (Bevir 2009; Bevir & Rhodes 2003; Bevir, Rhodes & Weller 
2003; Lipset & Lenz 2000). This qualitative research approach enabled the present researcher to 
explore in depth social and contextual characteristics, and individual behaviours that influence 
rational imposed institutions in localised contexts, in and within Vanuatu. This aligned well with the 
recommendation by Bevir and Rhodes (2003) that the qualitative method and interpretive discipline 
were useful to highlight the voices and views of the participants, and most importantly to explain the 
beliefs and actions of relevant actors in a localised context. It also reaffirmed the epistemological 
position taken in this research that no understanding of the social world is valid without an 
examination of the interpretation of the world by its participants (Bryman 2001). This position, in 
turn, fits well with the constructionist view that social properties are the outcome of the interaction 
between individuals, rather than phenomena “out there” and separated from those involved in their 
construction (Bryman 2001, p. 264). 
Several scholars suggest that it is relevant to address research questions that focus on: processes, on 
detailed contextual or historical descriptions, or on the meanings, interpretations, and explanations 
people assign to events, activities, and behaviours (Bevir, Rhodes & Weller 2003; Schensul 2012; Yin 
2003). The justification for using a historical and case study approach is to foreground the challenges 
of governance in a localised context, and gain in-depth understanding of how the historical context 
contributes to individual and governmental behaviours that are deemed as corrupt in a legal-rational 
world. As Bevir; Rhodes and Weller (2003) suggest, a qualitative approach provides an opportunity 
for the researcher to deepen his/her understanding of the social context through interpretation of 
“lived experience” and the member voices. Given the nature of the present research, the present 
researcher combined an insider and outsider view of the content and meaning of governance and 
corruption, drawing heavily on the historical literature, government documents, academic books, 
journals, and the researcher’s personal reflexivity.  
This was followed with selected case studies of the two key government institutions, which, according 
to Yin (2003), would expected to provide a broader framework to investigate the sources of 
corruption using multiple sources of evidence. Indeed, the present researcher concurs with Yin (2003) 
that a case study approach is valuable when boundaries between the phenomenon and context are 
complex, as reflected in the challenges of governance and conceptual understanding of corruption in 
the traditional context of Vanuatu. Consequently, the case study approach was relevant for this 
research for the following reasons:  
 it provides an opportunity to develop rich contextual data from generalizations to specificity; 
it provides an opportunity for understanding the social process and related outcomes (Bryman 
& Burgess 1999);  
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 it provides an opportunity to analyse government policies, including past policy experiences 
in detail, and also it can generate information for policy purposes (Yin 2003); and  
 it provides an effective approach to study complex behaviours and relationships between and 
among actors and agencies, and how those relationships influence change (Thomas, Allan 
1998).  
As a consequence, case studies of two institutions were selected to investigate the nature and sources 
of corruption and to explore the challenges for and of governance in Vanuatu government and society.  
3.4.2 Research approaches and techniques 
The research methodology combined historical and case study approaches. The case study focused on 
key government institutions that were representative of governance challenges and issues investigated 
in this thesis. These approaches provided a systematic revelation of the social context, using multiple 
research tools such as interviews, documentary analysis, and participation observation to generate 
relevant information pertaining to the nature of corruption and governance challenges within the 
Vanuatu government and society. The information collated through case studies was used to explain 
and interpret instances and forms of self-interested behaviours by government officials and political 
power-brokers, through a social cultural lens, in particular the patron-client network. These 
approaches were informed by the link between the research question, the conceptual model and 
research philosophy, and the research methodology, and all contributed to the formation of the 
research design. The design covered two phases: 
 Historical approach 
The historical literature on Vanuatu, which was written mostly by American and European 
anthropologists, was explored for this thesis.  Most importantly, the historical documents studied 
related to the establishment of a rational political institution in Vanuatu. The historical records on 
Vanuatu date back to the eighteenth century, and the national archive of Vanuatu keeps all accounts of 
development since the increased interaction with Europeans in the mid-1820s. The national archive is 
located in a very limited space and crowded with cartons of books, making it often difficult to locate 
information. During my trip to Vanuatu as part of data collection, at the beginning of 2013, the staff 
of the archive were busy moving cartons of books to a new permanent building with a bigger capacity 
for storage and possibly an advanced modern catalogue system. As a consequence, it was very 
difficult to locate the books and the staff found it difficult to assist the researcher. However, some of 
the sources that could not be located in the archive were readily available on the web and also at 
universities in Melbourne such as the Melbourne University, Victoria University, La Trobe 
University, and the State Library of Victoria. The researcher’s first impression of the national archive 
was that it had become a repository for all studies done in and on Vanuatu and, as such, it contained a 
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wealth of information relevant to the research. It included complete files of chiefly administrations 
since the establishment of MNCC in 1979, and the anthropological writings on socio-political 
organisations, as well as documents related to the joint influence of Britain and France in Vanuatu.  
 Case study approach  
The first case study was the traditional institution of jif, Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs 
(MNCC). The nature of analysis focused on the processes whereby the two colonial authorities, 
missionaries, and the post-colonial attempts failed to rationalise kastom authority and traditional 
values of social order in Vanuatu. The second case study was of a legal-rational institution, the 
Development Bank of Vanuatu (DBV), which was established in September 1979 with the objective 
of providing loans for small but sound projects that lacked the size and security requirements of 
commercial lenders (DBV 1994). The investigation focused on how the social and economic system 
channels and controls human needs through formal institutions that are at odds with traditional values 
of social order and authority, as defined by social collectivism and strong family support and respect. 
3.4.3 Research techniques and procedures 
The research techniques were guided by the research methodology and approaches, which in turn 
directed the generation of data and analysis. To address the biases and critics, Maxwell (2005) 
advocates for a “triangulation approach” where multiple techniques are deployed to provide a more 
complete and accurate account of the social context. As such, participant observation was used in the 
present research to explore and explain behaviours and events; while semi-structured interviews were 
used to uncover meanings and perspectives of the participants (Maxwell 2005). In addition, nakamal 
storian was used (see below) to provide a validity check, by asking local experts and others who 
know Vanuatu whether the researcher’s model and explanation for it made sense. Hence, the data 
methods were semi-structured interviews, nakamal storian, document analysis, and participation 
observation. 
 3.4.3.1   Semi structured interviews 
Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were found to be useful, given the fact that the targeted 
audience for this research were politicians, traditional authorities, bureaucrats, non-government 
organisations, youths, development aid agencies, women’s group, and local elites. This method was 
found to be flexible and relevant in dealing with sensitive issues such as corruption within Vanuatu 
government and society (Mary 2002), as it provided an opportunity for the researcher to tailor 
interview questions to a particular circumstance or group of people without losing sight of the core 
questions and themes (Maxwell 2005). The questions were a mixture of semi-structured and 
unstructured ones, with key probing points to help the researcher focus the answers to the themes of 
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the research, which were: conflict, power, corruption, institutions, and governance and state 
governance expectations. The format and the questions used are attached as Appendix A. 
The interviewees were selected using the “snowballing technique”, where the first interviewee 
proposed the next relevant person to be interviewed. In a small capital such as Port Vila, where people 
knew each other well, the snowballing technique was useful; however, one of the great challenges 
encountered was the availability of people. There were three senior government bureaucrats of whom 
the present researcher could not ask all the questions that had been planned because of their busy 
work schedules and travel within the provinces. One State Minister agreed to the appointment and 
then had to postpone because he had other urgent priorities. Prior to interviews the researcher’s 
position as a researcher was clarified, and it was explained clearly that the researcher was on study 
leave in order to undertake this research. Such an explanation was found to help to create an 
environment where bureaucrats and the general public were open to discuss issues and challenges of 
corruption and government as a whole. 
The present researcher also had to be conscious of not being trapped within groups of like-minded 
interviewees. To avoid such circumstances, one interviewee per organisation, and people from 
different islands, villages, and also from different age groups and gender, were selected. The 
questions were translated into Bislama; and the researcher had two sets of question sheets: one in 
Bislama; and the other one in English. The interviews were conducted in Bislama; and only one 
interview was conducted in English.  
A total of forty interviews were conducted; and the interviews were held in Port Vila and in local 
communities in Efate.  The forty partcipants were selected randomly from different sectors and from 
different sections of Vanuatu’s population. This includes the representatives of the youth, women, 
traditional authorities, politicians, bureaucrats, private sectors, and development partners. 
3.4.3.2  Nakamal storian 
The nakamal storian is a traditional method of collecting data in the local communities of Vanuatu, to 
complement the other methods. Based on the present researcher’s past experiences, nakamal storian 
was found to be an effective method of conversing with the busiest technocrats and leaders who did 
not have time during the official hours of work. Indeed, the nakamal storian method is widely used by 
development aid agencies, government and non-government organisations to collate information on 
the past studies on Vanuatu (AusAID 2005; Maltali, Sandy & Tamashiro 2009). It is a meeting place 
where people come together to discuss plans or solutions to their development challenges. In the 
villages and communities, nakamal is an important education institution that senior elders and jifs use 
to communicate important ideas to younger generations, such as history, belief systems and kastom 
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values (Huffer & Molisa 1999b). As such, it has its own intellectual property rights that govern types 
of information that can be released to outsiders versus insiders. 
The present researcher interviewed three jifs at nakamal, and they commented that the nakamal 
approach was the appropriate method of uncovering traditional knowledge, often seen as secret. The 
researcher knew that there was valuable traditional information that was governed by traditional 
intellectual property rights, and that using the nakamal storian approach provided significant 
opportunities to uncover missing parts of the context that were not possible to find in any available 
documents. As a son of one of the kastom jifs, the present researcher knew that there was certain 
information that could not be communicated to outsiders. The nakamal in urban centres are turning 
into social clubs, unlike the ones in rural areas where there is a strong adherence to kastom and 
traditions. The researcher would have liked to visit more nakamals in rural areas, but was limited by 
time and finance.  
3.4.3.3 Documentary analysis 
Secondary data was also used in this thesis, including histories, scholarly publications, government 
documents, records of state and local events, ombudsman reports, national census, church records, 
maps, World Bank publications on justice for the poor in Vanuatu, Transparency International 
publications in Vanuatu, and development aid reports and non-government organisation reports on 
governance in Vanuatu. In addition, two national papers were accessed, the Vanuatu Daily Post and 
the Vanuatu Independent Paper, for evidence of various facts presented in this thesis. Indeed, the 
newspaper articles were used to follow developments in politics, traditional governance and analysis 
of public perceptions of the performance of the state. They were also valuable in that they provided a 
sense of the development context in Vanuatu, and basic information helped to predict the policy 
direction of the government. During the researcher’s fourteen years with the government, most policy 
documents pertaining to the themes of this thesis were collected; and, more broadly, documents on the 
socio-economic and political directions of Vanuatu. All these documents were used to investigate the 
sources of corruption and conflicting governance values in Vanuatu government and society. 
3.4.3.4 Observation 
Two approaches used for observations. The first approach occurred when the participants were 
interviewed. Secondly, as an insider the present researcher reflected on his fourteen years of 
experience in government as a Director of Strategic Policy, Planning and Aid Coordination 
(DSPPAC), and also his life experiences as a son of a kastom jif on Malekula in the northern part of 
Vanuatu. The researcher lived with his parents on communal land and a close village settlement with 
relatives and extended families. The researcher was therefore well placed to observe the workings of 
kastom law and to assess its effectiveness as an instrument for settlement of land issues, including 
questions of tenure and ownership. During the research work in Vanuatu the researcher was able to 
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assess how the needs of the poor and people with disabilities are taken care of by family and extended 
members through sharing of food and other resources. In addition, he was able to observe how his 
observation, acknowledging his position of power and status, yielded important insights into the 
subject matter of the present project. All these experiences were blended together with outside views 
to build a foundation of this research.  
3.5 Analysis of research findings 
The analysis of findings utilised two approaches: thematic analysis approach, and category analysis. 
Each will be discussed in some detail. 
 Thematic Analysis Approach 
The notes and data generated through interviews, participation observation and secondary sources 
were analysed using the thematic approach or “thematic analysis” (Dawson 2009). The thematic 
analysis approach was chosen because ‘it provided a flexible and useful research tool, and also 
potentially provided a rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data’(Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 78). 
Indeed, it can also be applied across a range of theoretical and epistemological approaches. This 
process is referred to as “coding”, and involves the classification of elements in text data into themes 
and categories that are related to the research questions and are useful in analysis (Schensul 2012, p. 
98). The tape interviews used in the present analysis were the re-production of interviewee’s words 
‘verbatim’, and where modification was made for the sake of clarity this text was bracketed. Themes 
selected for coding were for different forms of corruption (abuse of power, conflict of interest, 
nepotism, bribery, and patronage), concepts related to governance (power, participation, 
inclusiveness, exclusiveness, expectations), and different types of authority (legal-rational authority, 
and kastom authority). 
The coding was informed and guided by the research questions, the conceptual model and the 
literature review in Chapter Two, and the philosophical foundation that was discussed in this chapter. 
Using a realist social constructivism approach, the data analyses were organised into two phases. In 
the first phase, the researcher looked for patterns of meaning and issues of potential interest across an 
entire data set rather than within a data item. In this process the researcher transcribed the data, 
generated initial codes, searched for themes, and continued reviewing the themes back and forth as the 
analysis moved to the second phase. The second phase involved defining and naming themes and 
interpreting the data, which analysis was in turn incorporated into Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and 
Eight. However, during this process and in particular the writing part, the researcher was constantly 
moving back and forward between the entire data set, the coded extracts of data that were analysed 
and the analysis of the data that was produced. This process provided greater flexibility to look for the 
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voices of participants and how their voices could be meaningfully represented and interpreted in the 
texts. 
 Category Analysis Approach  
The category analysis approach is used in qualitative research to categorise research objects according 
to salient and relevant characteristics and, most importantly, to assist in codifying interview 
transcripts to address the research question(s) (Yin 2003). The first category of analysis was a group 
of jifly elites who have been absorbed into the modern state political system and have exploited the 
opportunity presented by modern state bureaucracy to enlarge their power and influence within the 
state. This particular group of jifly elites are those who were well educated and have the greater 
advantage of being elected to the jifly council or of representing their local communities in 
government meetings. There are also some who have been employed on their merit as civil servants 
and occupy high-ranking positions in the public service. However, it was also acknowledged that 
there are those who remain faithful to traditional governance and were not discussed under the state 
political institutions. The kastom jifs who were not on the MNCC were not considered as leaders 
according to the definition of a leader that was provided in Articles 66 and 67 of the Constitution and 
the Vanuatu Leadership Code Act of 1998.  
The second category of analysis covered political elites who are endowed with jifly titles and have 
been absorbed into the state political system. It is now a political norm that elected leaders to 
Parliament have to go through a traditional ranking ceremony to get their jifly titles, in order to 
command public order and also to be recognised at different levels of society as a national leader. 
Thus, the Vanuatu parliamentary system is composed of political elites who are recognised in both the 
two systems as leaders. The effect that this has on broader perceptions of power and leadership in all 
aspects of governance in Vanuatu is manifested when this major source of authority in Vanuatu 
essentially operates without checks and balances. In this context, the political elites, including elected 
and appointed politicians who are employed in public offices, create complicated and confusing 
socio-legal-rational expectations where there is no clear separation between ‘rules’ and personal ties, 
or agents and principals. 
Analysis of the Ombudsman’s reports provided greater opportunity to explore evidence of corrupt 
practices and how certain powerful individuals use their positions to undermine legal-rational 
expectations of governance and formal authority. The findings presented in the Ombudsman’s reports 
were substantiated by interview transcripts, which captured the perceptions of different groupings in 
Vanuatu society. Thus, the interview transcripts were categorised according to sectoral groupings, 
which were grouped according to their positions and status in Vanuatu society, to determine the 
perceptions and understandings of corruption from different groups within society, such as 
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bureaucrats, youth, politicians, kastom authority, women, aid donors, and non-government 
organisations, at various levels of society. The tabulation and analysis of these findings clearly 
illustrated understandings of corruption and also what was considered corruption in traditional 
practices. In other words, the tabulated format , which presented findings based on detailed, first hand 
research documentation, was a significant part of the present research methods, which supported and 
illustrated and contributed to the analysis of the range of practices that were seen as corrupt or merely 
expected traditional behaviour.The findings of the two case studies and the data generated through 
interviews and documentary analysis informed the overall argument presented in Chapter Seven of 
this thesis. 
3.6 Ethics 
Ethic is an integral component of research. When conducting this research the researcher kept in mind 
cultural differences, power relations and gender differences. These varied between each island, 
community, and individual; and they had the potential to become a barrier to unlocking data and 
presenting it objectively. The successful ethics submission to the researcher’s university Research 
Committee was developed around these areas. Throughout this research study the researcher was 
always conscious of the Australian Code of Research Conduct, and more specifically the university’s 
ethics policy, which outlines ethical codes of conduct for research as suggested by Heaslop and 
Salisbury (Heaslop & Salisbury 2007).  Although the context may vary, undertaking research studies 
in a landscape of great cultural and linguistic diversity is quiet challenging, and as an insider the 
researcher was always conscious of these diversities and cultural sensitivities. 
3.6.1 Cultural differences 
Vanuatu is a country of diverse cultures and languages that have an important influence on how 
information is gathered and relayed. It has about 110 languages, in addition to French, English, and 
Bislama, the latter which are recognised in the constitution as the official languages. Because of the 
wide degree of cultural difference within and between societies, it is important to have a broad 
knowledge of how information is communicated in various societies. Bryman and Burgess (1999) 
warn researchers who engage in qualitative research of the need to be aware of how cultural 
differences between researcher and researched may be influenced by the choice of research field. 
For instance, body language and facial expressions have various explanations that vary widely from 
one island to the other. In the northern part of the country, eye contact during speaking is disrespectful 
to the person who you are speaking to. In this cultural group they usually address the authority using 
neutral languages without singling out his/her specific identity. The nodding of heads is another 
example where it is very difficult to determine whether a person agrees or not. This is because in most 
parts of Vanuatu society nodding a head or saying yes to a person is often a gesture of showing 
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respect to the person you are talking to, even if you do not agree with them. Being a ni-Vanuatu, 
culture was not a major challenge for the present researcher; however, it was important to recognise it 
as a critical factor in the process of research. The semi-structured and unstructured interviews allowed 
greater flexibility to handle this challenge at a professional level. 
To help the interviewees understand the purpose of the research and give their consent, a letter was 
provided to each of them that explained the whole purpose and objectives of this research. Each 
interview began with a full explanation of the purpose and objectives of the research, and it was 
ensured that the interviewees understood these issues prior to the commencement of the interview. In 
addition, a consent form was provided to each interviewee to seek their consent for the interviews. 
3.6.2 National authorities 
Three important authorities that required respect were the traditional chiefs, religious leaders, and 
political leaders. The researcher interviewed ten members of parliament, ten chiefs, fifteen senior 
government bureaucrats, a former President of the State and staff of the Malvatumauri National 
Council of Chiefs. They communicated their views freely and with great enthusiasm, believing that 
this research was an important study that could shape the focus of Vanuatu in dealing with the clashes 
and disconnection that affects the lives of people. Indeed, the researcher received many calls from 
other members of parliament who wanted to talk to me, but due to time constraints the researcher 
could not afford to talk to everyone. Those who were selected for interview were the ones who had at 
least ten years’ experience as a member of parliament, and also those who were part of the 
constitutional drafting process. The church leaders were also keen to see the relationship between the 
state and chiefs improve, and as such most of them were happy to share their views. 
3.6.3 Gender considerations 
Gender is an important factor in a research project that examines traditional authority relations in 
developing societies. Given the nature of this research, equal gender participation was attempted in 
order to make sure there was a fair representation and a balanced view in the data collection. The 
balance of gender in the interviews was selected randomly, but an attempted was also made to ensure 
that equal numbers of men and women were interviewed in each case study. It was important to be 
aware of how cultural differences come into play when talking to males and females in Vanuatu 
(Bryman & Burgess 1999). The sensitivity to gender is higher in rural areas than in urban centers, 
because culture and traditions are more strictly observed in rural areas of Vanuatu. In most rural areas 
males dominate and are the decision-makers. Because the present researcher grew up in a rural area, 
his in-depth understanding of the cultures in Vanuatu helped him to cope with some of the gender 
related challenges that were likely to emerge during the course of the research. For example, in rural 
areas the researcher ensured that females who participated in the interviews came with their husbands. 
The challenge was the unavailability of their husbands, and sometimes the male counterparts 
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proposed a time that was more convenient to him. The researcher followed their proposed timing, and 
this worked well. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This thesis adopts a realist/social constructivist approach to understand how newly imposed rules, 
norms and values are socially constructed in a manner that contributes to tensions between socially 
embedded kastom practices and legal-rational forms of governance. These tensions therefore 
weakened the emerging state governance system, creating opportunities for corruption. It was argued 
in this thesis that corruption emerges from the collision of the two broad value fields, broadly 
represented in abstract as kastom governance and legal-rational authority. By taking the 
realist/constructivist approach, it was acknowledged that traditions and culture are social facts that 
people value and cherish as fundamental to their governing and wellbeing. The state transformation 
policies are ingrained in the notion of neo-liberal economic and political democratisation, which tends 
to be at odds with socially embedded practices. This creates for most ni-Vanuatu a limited sense of 
ownership of governance institutions in the local context. Often state governance is treated locally as 
a foreign import that is alienated from their real experiences. Through the lense of realist social 
constructivism, there is a wider opportunity to blend different research methods to identify the sources 
of corruption in government and society as well as the tensions that ensue. Hence, it is believed that 
the present research will contribute to governance development by broadening this understanding.  
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Chapter 4:  The Cultural Landscape 
4.0 Introduction 
Vanuatu is culturally diverse and is one of the more complex societies in the South Pacific region. As 
such, it is sensitive to interference or external pressure and, most importantly, variable in terms of its 
development trajectories. Its diversity is reflected through its 110 different languages, with cultures, 
kastoms and diverse socio-political structures that vary within and between each island (Crowley 
2000). Hence, within Vanuatu there are many layers of social practices and social expectations; and a 
significant cultural distance between the legal-rational values of the urban elites and rural-based 
traditional communities. Such diversity creates an almost insurmountable challenge for Vanuatu as a 
nation to reconcile into a Westminster style system of government by elected parliament. Traditional 
society embraces certain values and practices that sit in tension with both legal-rational or state 
expectations, and the principles of liberal market economy. In addition to these “two worlds” 
(traditional society and legal-rational state), Christianity constructs another set of particular values and 
social institutions that also clash with traditional ideas and traditional beliefs, and thus also provokes a 
degree of resistance to outside influence on Vanuatu’s society.  
In developed Western societies, tensions between religious thought, traditional values, and 
Enlightenment rationalist principles have been worked through over much longer time periods 
through historical processes of political and socio-economic development. As is the case in many 
post-colonial societies, Vanuatu does not have the luxury of history to accommodate and reconcile a 
much more complex set of social, political and cultural tensions. Given the cultural differences 
between different parts of Vanuatu, there are significant horizontal variations that increase resistance 
to the imposition of contemporary political values. This chapter sets out the divisions in Vanuatu 
society and highlights the fractures that have the potential to become deep ‘fault lines’, between social 
groups defined by their attachment to diverse and divergent religious beliefs, kastom, and state 
demands for social order. The chapter further exemplifies the nonlinearity of social, cultural and 
political development so as to problematize, through contextualization, legal-rational assumptions 
about the nature of “good governance.”  
4.1 Traditional society 
Eighty percent of Vanuatu’s population live in local communities on remote islands, practicing what 
is referred to as ‘kastom economy’ (Rousseau & Taylor 2012), traditional economy (Regenvanu 
2009), and  kastom system (Forsyth 2009). The present thesis uses the term “traditional economy” to 
describe the holistic way of life in traditional societies of Vanuatu. This socially embedded way of life 
is today largely observed only in the traditional local communities and remote islands of Vanuatu, and 
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revolves around traditional practices of subsistence farming, social reciprocity, leadership by 
consensus and inheritance, and communal rights.  
People clear areas of forest, grow yams and taro in their gardens, raise pigs and fowls, gather nuts, 
collect shellfish, and are very skilful at fishing and hunting wild animals (MacClancy 2002). 
Reflecting back on my life experiences, I was born into a jifly family on the island of Malekula, north 
Vanuatu. I grew up in a traditional local village located in the interior of the island and we got all our 
food from our garden and forest. Although we were not close to the sea, our relatives who lived in the 
coastal areas supplied us with all the sea resources that we needed. This social reciprocity system and 
community support was an important network that bonded and united our family, and we cherished 
and valued it in our local community. At all levels of community there is a strong sense of communal 
and collective responsibility to support and help those who are in need. As such, the cooperation 
within the communities based on family and kinship, and covering all aspects of development, could 
possibly be construed as acting against the legal-rational state expectations of fairness, equity, and 
justice. Indeed, social reciprocity is seemingly one of the embedded social principles across all 
Vanuatu societies, and often times it transcends leadership governance at national levels (Morgan, 
MG 2004). This is manifest where state leadership and authority are infused with customary practices 
of social reciprocity between leaders and their communities. This creates a contested ground for 
corruption based on the social reciprocity of customary (kastom) practices, and the state governance 
expectations and principles of a rational market economy (McLeod & Morgan 2007). 
In traditional communities there is a formalised and widely accepted distribution mechanism in place. 
One of the principal functions of the jif in traditional communities is to collect goods to distribute to 
his people. This was an important distribution system because, as was mentioned in Chapter Two, it is 
through distribution of wealth and resources that kastom jifs gain prestige in their local community 
(Duncan 2011). The jif allocates land to people in the local community who are landless so that they 
can cultivate a garden for food. Furthermore, the jif can reorganise resources to make sure that 
everyone in his local community benefits equally. Thus, the jif is not supposed to accumulate wealth 
but rather is expected to distribute goods to his local community. However, in this context the goods 
and services can be either accumulated by the community or donated by other communities and 
individuals. The kastom jif has the prime responsibility to distribute them fairly in times of need to his 
people, and usually this is done at the nasara level where everyone in the community can witness the 
sharing. The distribution is carried out in a manner that is transparent and follows the traditional 
norms and processes of the local communities. 
The influx of Western materialism in villages and the dependency on what money can do for the 
people have actually distorted the cultural values and practices underlying the distribution role of 
kastom jifs in villages (Stefanova, Porter & Nixon 2012). The fear of scarcity accompanying Western 
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materialism and cash often creates an ad hoc situation where the kastom jif becomes more 
conservative in his distributional role, and in doing so he is unconsciously favouring close clans at the 
expense of the broader interests of his village. In the contemporary society of Vanuatu the prime 
function of a leader as a “distributor” transcends all levels of organisations from national, regional, 
sub-regional, to traditional local communities. The challenge for the state is when political leaders 
extract state resources and distribute them to their close political allies or family at the expense of the 
broader interests of society. The 1998 Ombudsman report detailed how a former Prime Minister 
diverted to his personal account funds donated by the British and French governments towards 
rehabilitation programs initiated in the wake of ‘Cyclone Betsy’ in January 1992 (Edward 2001a; 
Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998a). The funds were later distributed to his political supporters in the 1995 
national election, in fulfilment of, arguably, the socially sanctioned expectations of his local 
constituents (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998a). Importantly, at this level, “distribution” occurs in the 
absence of transparency and thereby represents a double distortion of traditional practice. 
Ministers of state are frequently accused of extracting state resources for distribution to their political 
supporters and close relatives, and of appointing their friends to public posts (Cain & Jowitt 2004). 
On a broader scale, incidents of State Ministers getting funds externally by using their state privileges 
have surfaced in the local media on a regular basis. A more recent example is the public criticisms 
levelled at the practice of selling passports to foreign diplomats in return for political gain at the 
expense of the socio-economic interests of the state (Cullwick 2013b). However, it can be argued that 
these are examples of how kastomary values of “distribution” were infused with legal-rational 
governance, and thus created a collision of values defined as “corrupt” political dealings. Because the 
state resources are scarce and there is increasing demands to meet electorate expectations, members of 
parliament often resort to activities that contradict their institutional values, norms, and processes at 
the state level in order to maintain political support. As such, state leaders have been accused in the 
media of hijacking public resources and distributing them to their political supporters and families, 
and this has remained as one of the sources of corruption within the Vanuatu government. 
Similar attitudes have been revealed in the manner and way State Ministers handle land registrations, 
leases and other natural resources (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998b). Land in Vanuatu is regarded as the 
“earth mother” and as such has a close spiritual connection with people as with a child to its mother 
(Molisa, Vurobaravu & VanTrease 1982; VanTrease 1987). In the southern part of the country space 
and land are valuable because this is where tribes and clans derive their names, position or status in 
the village and hence their authority (Lindstrom 1982). In the northern part of Malekula, tribes and 
clans trace the genealogy and history of their land from living objects such as rocks, trees, birds, and 
animals (Deacon 1970). For example, drawing upon my own cultural inheritance, in my tribe we 
believe that our ancestors come from a bird called the ‘fruit-dove’, and this is to where we trace our 
genealogies and the history of our land. In this context, nature such as land is not a commodity but 
73 
 
rather a culturally valued source of self-identity, food, traditional medicine, materials for constructing 
houses and most fundamentally the source of spiritual and physical being (MacClancy 2002; 
Regenvanu 2009). Therefore, from a traditional standpoint, the selling and exploitation of land, and of 
resources from the sea, and water, constitutes a threat to the foundations of human life, identity, 
heritage, birthright and family. Development, as conceived by international policy makers and 
experts, is at odds with, and conflicts with, the beliefs, lore and practices of people living the 
traditional way of life. As discussed in Chapter Two, the rationalist orientation of contemporary 
development thinking disregards or misinterprets the spiritual understandings and the myths which 
influence the manner and ways in which life is conducted and managed at the level of local 
communities and the broader society. As argued in previous chapters, it is at such points of conflict 
that we find the sources of behaviour that might be deemed corrupt in international development 
policy and also under international law. We also begin to appreciate how it is possible for Vanuatu 
people, living according to their local lore, to view the demands of international agencies and the state 
as socially and spiritually disruptive or “coercive”. 
 
As noted, land is communally owned and subject to collective rights (VanTrease 1987, 1995). People 
plant gardens on their communal land and have user rights such as women’s rights to gardening, 
access to coastal areas and so forth. Traditional land tenure systems are incongruent with market 
principles such as private property rights, land survey and leasing practices. Leasing is a legal-rational 
land tenure system imposed by the two colonial powers (France and Britain) and adopted in the 
building of the post-colonial state in order to maintain investor confidence and promote agricultural 
and other development activities throughout Vanuatu (Stefanova, Porter & Nixon 2012; VanTrease 
1995). Chapter Twelve of the Constitution of Vanuatu sets out what can be interpreted as 
incompatible principles of private and collective land ownership:  
 Article 73: “All land in the Republic of Vanuatu belongs to the indigenous 
kastom owners and their descendants.” 
 Article 74: “The rules of custom shall form the basis of ownership and use 
of land in the Republic of Vanuatu.”  
 Article 75: “Only indigenous citizens of the Republic of Vanuatu who have 
acquired their land in accordance with a recognised system of land  
tenure shall have perpetual ownership of their land.”  
(Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, p. 26) 
Land ownership under the traditional land tenure system has proven to be a major challenge for 
development in Vanuatu, as reflected through land management practices that have become a source 
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of corrupt practice - as defined by the Western political idea of corruption. Land management 
practices in Vanuatu, encompassing negotiations, leases, registrations, sub-divisions, and so forth, 
over the last three decades have received great criticism from development partners and the private 
sector, as well as the general public, as one of the major sources of corrupt practice (Lunnay et al. 
2007). The total land area of Vanuatu is 12,236 square kilometres, of which 90.7% is under the 
kastomary land tenure system, and 9.3 % is leased out mainly in the two urban centres, Port Vila and 
Lugainville (World Bank 2011). Corruption is reported to have occurred in the process of identifying 
kastom landowners and lease approvals, which were very often open to abuse by individuals and 
small groups of people who registered the land without proper consultation. There were two cases on 
the island of Epi in which the piece of land was secretly registered and leased without consultation 
with kastom landowners or approval from the island council of chiefs (Stefanova, Porter & Nixon 
2010). Similarly, a large area of agricultural land in Epi was registered and leased without the consent 
and knowledge of the landowners. These experiences are not unique to Vanuatu, and other examples 
can be drawn from many other developing countries where land dealings have come to be critically 
viewed by international aid development agencies and non-government organisations as a source of 
corrupt practice and conflict in government and society (World Bank 2006a, 2010). 
The 2006 National Land Summit was purposely organised to restore the best international practices of 
land management with the objective of eliminating increased corruption in land dealings. As will be 
discussed below, land conflicts arise from the ambiguity surrounding the legal powers and 
responsibilities of the kastom owners of land and the uncertainty over the Government’s role in 
relation to land dealings. In a country where, under the Constitution, the full land ownership of the 
kastom owners was entrenched, and dealings in land are carried out directly between kastom owners 
and outsiders, failure to address this ambiguity and uncertainty has made kastom owners very 
vulnerable to exploitation and bribery (Lunnay et al. 2007). Where the Government is given a role in 
land dealings (for example, the Minister’s power of approving negotiators, and the dealings which 
eventuate from direct negotiations), the powers have frequently been abused. The 1998 Ombudsman 
Report documented an example of the abuse of power by a former Minister of Land who granted a 
land lease to his family members and “wantok1” (Cain & Jowitt 2004; Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998b). 
These policy weaknesses must be addressed. The challenge then is how to arrest the decay of widely 
held social values while at the same time acknowledging that Vanuatu society must change with the 
times.  
                                                          
1
 The term wantok is a slogan used in the Melanesian region to refer to someone who speaks the same 
language or comes from the same tribe or village. 
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4.1.1 Kastom governance 
Kastom governance encompasses the manners and ways in which local communities organize 
themselves to deal with socio-economic and political affairs in the interests of the whole community. 
The former secretary of the MNCC refers to kastom governance as the manner and way people might 
apply collective wisdom or kastom practices to deal with contemporary challenges, and how people 
might envision organising their lives to live well together (AusAID 2005, p. 7). Using this 
understanding, kastom governance encompasses broadly the principles and practices of social, 
economic and political interaction, including specific social institutions that have traditionally 
maintained social order. In order to illustrate why kastom governance is of fundamental importance to 
this study, it is necessary to investigate further the nature of social interaction, including the 
organisational structures of the society. 
 
In traditional Vanuatu society, people occupy specialised roles, and this includes fishermen, hunters, 
carpenters, warriors, traditional medicine doctor, and magicians; and everybody knew precisely what 
was expected of them. This creates a well-disciplined and self-reliant social order where everybody is 
assigned work to do and is involved in the activities of the community. The rules and norms in this 
traditional society are robust and anyone who transgresses them is answerable to kastom authority. 
We had, and still have a greatest respect for elders and senior leaders in the community, and this 
respect for leaders is one of the social norms that ensures community cohesion. Disputes and conflicts 
are resolved using the traditional resolution mechanisms, and people respect this because consensus is 
valued. This process also covers tribal conflict between and within villages, and in Malekula where 
women play an instrumental role as brokers in inter-tribal disputes. They communicate the words of 
the two kastom jifs concerned and establish an agreement for the two villages to come together and 
solve the dispute. In addition, traditional society exhibits resilience and a robust disaster management 
system. This is reflected through the provision of social welfare and security against natural disasters. 
For example, when there is a cyclone people know how to protect their thatched roof, usually by 
cutting coconut leaves and tying them over the thatching. They harvest their root crops (yams, taro, 
and cassava) and store them in a locally made cage. They also have intricate ways of preserving 
foods, in particular breadfruits, fish, and other flesh products, for a considerable time. Kastom was 
and remains an important source of social resilience that is not easily replaced by state-directed 
programs.  
The challenge for modernization is not to dismiss and disparage these cultural practices, but to 
recognise them and the need for them to be incorporated in discussions around the nature of health 
and care and medical treatment, in particular. Traditional medicine, including a traditional view of 
health and disease and cure, is very important to local Vanuatu culture. Simeon, in his study of one 
community on the island of Malekula in Vanuatu, defines ethnomedicine as a set of beliefs and 
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practices that encompasses ‘empirical, psychosomatic, and mental disease and illness’ (Simeon 1979, 
p. 195). While based upon fieldwork completed more than four decades ago, this characterization of 
traditional Vanuatu society holds true. He writes: 
 
The pharmacopeia of botanical cures — that is, "leaf medicine" — appears to have remained 
reasonably intact but the number of curers, or practitioners, is rapidly dwindling due partly to 
outside pressure against the maintenance of traditional medicine. However, and as with many 
other societies, medicine, magic, and religion provide a holistic background for the beliefs 
and associated practices concerned with the individual's attempt to achieve physical and 
mental harmony (Simeon 1979, p. 195) 
 
‘Leaf medicine’ is still practiced today throughout the archipelago, particularly in remote islands and 
in rural areas (Bourdy et al. 1996; Bradacsa, Heilmann & Weckerle 2011). My parents and I grew up 
using a traditional medication system and we depended on traditional medication during the birth 
process, circumcisions and, even today, we still value traditional knowledge regarding the use of 
natural plants and fruits as medicine. Given the diversities of culture, the practices of using natural 
leaves as a medicine differ widely from one part of the country to another. Research on traditional 
medicine conducted in 2011 found that: 
 
The bio cultural diversity of Vanuatu is reflected in the variability of medicinal plant 
knowledge and differences in the traditional medicinal system between the three islands 
investigated. Traditional medicine is more vital on remote islands. The better connected the 
islands are to the main city, the more dominant Western medicine becomes and traditional 
medicine mainly remains to treat illnesses with a magical origin (Bradacsa, Heilmann & 
Weckerle 2011, p. 434) 
 
Traditional medicine reflects a particular view of the world that is at odds with Western notions of 
medicine and health. This gulf is difficult to bridge, and past experiences suggest that development 
agencies and state agencies have failed to bridge this gap because traditional culture has been seen as 
backward, and something to be eliminated - that is, as an obstacle to be overcome. As has been argued 
in this thesis on numerous occasions, cultural traditions cannot be shaded overnight, and cultural 
traditions have meaning within contemporary Vanuatu society, even around the areas where Western 
medicine or science claims privileged knowledge over the non-Western traditional medical system. 
Traditional medicine is part of the traditional socialisation that is perpetuated through traditional 
education systems, in which specialised local practices and knowledge are still valued and transmitted 
from one generation to another. 
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The traditional education system is based on learning by doing, and the children are segregated by 
gender. The boys would live with their grandfathers until they reached maturity, and while with their 
grandfathers they learned their traditional lore, techniques of planting, harvesting, fishing, hunting, 
and their ancestral history. Similarly, the girls were taught by their grandmothers on the duties and 
responsibilities pertaining to females, as well as history, planting techniques, harvesting, and child 
rearing. In this learning system, traditional norms, values, and way of life are passed on from one 
generation to another through oral communication and practices. The introduction of formal Western 
learning methods has distanced the younger generation from this important source of education, 
where traditional knowledge and history of the land are communicated orally from older generations 
to the youngsters. The children are now trained in a formal education system that is predominantly 
oriented to European values, culture and the secular world, resulting in the great loss of traditional 
knowledge. As a consequence, the gap between traditional knowledge and the state-run education 
system is growing faster, at the expense of the younger generation losing the knowledge of their true 
cultural identity. There are two foreseeable implications of this. The first is the loss of histories that 
are attached to land ownership, and therefore this has increased cases of land disputes. The second 
implication is that it is a challenge to reintegrate the younger generation into village life, particularly 
those who are not able to make it to the senior cycle of education and university and are jobless in 
urban areas. In 2008, a major research study was undertaken on youths in Port Vila, and a total of 
1572 youths aged thirteen to twenty- five were interviewed. The report suggested that twenty percent 
of the youths dropped out of grade six and had no opportunity to continue their education further 
(Mitchelle 2008, p. 3). Similarly, the report showed that about fifty-five percent were unemployed and 
thirty-six percent who were employed received a monthly salary of $AU100, which was too low to 
meet all their basic needs living in the capital. It can be argued that this is but one more unplanned 
consequence of the social disruptions caused by the imposition of external values and systems as 
opposed to careful integration. 
The increased number of youths in the two urban centres has raised concerns for the Urban Council of 
Chiefs, because the failure of the state to provide employment opportunities in these centres can lead 
to lawlessness (Daily Post 2013a). The President of the Efate Council of Chiefs, Kalkot Murmur, 
suggested that urban migration and the increased number of youths in Port Vila had given birth to 
issues such as unemployment and increased crime. The unemployed young people would go into the 
shops and steal. Rape had become a serious issue (Daily Post 2013b). However, over the last two 
decades, Vanuatu has witnessed jifs from various islands taking up prominent roles in addressing the 
social problems of their people now residing in Port Vila and Lugainville. The jifs play an informal 
role in mediating between kastom and the state on education, law and order, land tenure issues and 
other pressing social matters arising from increased urban migration (Howell & Hall 2010; Kernot & 
Sakita 2008; Mitchelle 2008). 
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4.1.2 Jifly system 
As argued above, Vanuatu had a range of complex social systems that existed prior to the European 
encounters and, in local communities, these systems remain extant. In the central part of Vanuatu, 
leadership title was based on a hierarchical hereditary system (Bolton 1999a; Lindstrom 1997). In the 
southern region, on the island of Aneityum, leadership was also hereditary, while on Tanna, 
leadership was ‘situational and contextual, diffused and dependent on acknowledged access to and 
control of ritual knowledge’ (Bronwen 1998, p. 228; Lindstrom 1997). In the northern part of the 
country the political system is a mixture of heredity and status alteration, as is the case in Malekula 
and Ambrym (Blackwood 1981; Deacon 1934; Guiart 1993; Layard 1942). In this system, the 
leadership position is either inherited through the bloodline or participated in via the grade-taking 
ceremonies where the individuals have an opportunity to alter their status. 
The European encounter in Vanuatu began with the Spanish in the early seventeenth century; 
however, it was only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that France and Great 
Britain established their presence in various parts of the archipelago. When the early explorers, 
traders, and missionaries arrived in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) they found indigenous traditional 
leaders in all villages that they had contact with, and began to label them as ‘kings’ or ‘chiefs’ 
(MacClancy 2002). For example, writing in 1891, Robert Codrington observed that:  
[c]hiefs exist and still have in most islands important place and power, though never perhaps 
so much importance in the native view as they have in the eyes of European visitors, who 
carry with them the persuasion that savage people are always ruled by a chief. A trader or 
other visitor looks for a chief and finds such a one as he expects; a very insignificant person 
in this way comes to be called and to call himself, the king of his island and his consideration 
among his people is of course enormously enhanced by what white people make of him. The 
practices moreover of the commanders of ships of war by which local chiefs are held 
responsible for the conduct of their people and are treated as if they had considerable power, 
undoubtedly increases their importance, nor can that result be regretted (Codrington 1891, p. 
46). 
Thus, the terms ‘chief’ (or ‘jif’ in Bislama), ‘custom’ (kastom), and ‘big man’ were the products of the 
European encounters, which consisted of colonial administrators, traders, missionaries, and labour 
recruiters (Deacon 1970; Lindstrom 2008; Lindstrom & White 1997; MacClancy 2002; Rouseau 
2004). Seventy-five percent of the participants interviewed for this research felt that it was 
disrespectful to use the term ‘chief’ in local communities, because this was used during the colonial 
period and was a title given by the Europeans to local traditional leaders. At the local level the people 
referred to their local leader in their indigenous languages, and the term ‘chief’ was only mentioned 
when people communicated in Bislama or English to refer to a traditional leader. However, the 
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indigenized terms ‘jif’ and ‘kastom’ are nowadays incorporated into the local context and in the 
Constitution of Vanuatu, and when people speak about chiefs they speak of them as kastom jif. With 
110 languages in Vanuatu, there is a possibility of finding 110 different names and meanings of a 
traditional leader or ‘chief’. In the northern part of Malekula, a ‘chief’ is referred to as a ‘mlin’ (chief), 
and ‘rabath’ (sacred), which means a sacred jif. A rabath in north Malekula is someone who is 
traditionally consecrated as a sacred leader, and the term rabath endows a leader with credibility and 
integrity. A traditional leader is more than a leader because he is not only regarded by his local 
community as a ‘mlin’ (leader) but also as a rabath (sacred) (Deacon 1970; Layard 1942).   
In Tanna, a traditional leader is called ‘ierumanu’ (sacred leader), which means someone who has 
traditional knowledge of the place and is endowed with ancestors’ spirit (Lindstrom 1997). In 
Pentecost, Ambae and Lepers Islands, a designated chief is called ‘ratahigi’, and a similar trend can 
be observed in the northern, southern, and central parts of Vanuatu, where a leader’s title has the 
indigenous term meaning ‘sacred’ at the beginning of their title (Blackwood 1981; Rodman, W 1977). 
All these terms imply that the meaning and understanding of the term ‘chief’, as equated to a leader in 
traditional society, is blurred and debatable; and thus it is still an issue that needs to be resolved at the 
various levels in local communities and more broadly across the country. In this chapter and 
throughout this thesis, the terms kastom jif or jif are used to refer to traditional leaders in traditional 
society and local communities, and jifly to refer to the institution. This is done purely to differentiate 
kastom jif from the missionaries’ ‘chiefs’ and the assessors who were appointed later by the 
missionaries and the two colonial powers, Britain and France. 
The jifly institution is an important kastom governance system in the villages. The role of the jif in 
kastom governance at the village level is to sustain social order and ensure that people have freedom 
to move and experience a meaningful life. The details of what a jif does and the relevance of his work 
in contemporary society, including how they can be more effective to assist the state, is fully covered 
in Chapter Five of this thesis. However, in terms of kastom governance it is worthwhile to mention 
briefly the role that jifs play in keeping the whole framework of kastom governance consistent and 
useful to the lives of people at the village and community levels. The jif and his council are central 
players in village organisation, with the council comprised of heads of clans or heads of small 
nakamals, as has been shown in Figure 2.1 in Chapter Two. The organisational function of jif is 
democratically shared within the members of the council in two main areas, namely development and 
justice, at the village level. In the development area, the jif and his council are responsible for water, 
health, education, and law and order in the village. On the other hand, the heads of clans who make up 
the jif’s council play an important role in looking after the socio-economic needs of their members 
within their own specific jurisdiction, divided or based along bloodlines.  
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Importantly, political authority in communities still living close to a traditional way of life rests upon 
local indigenous beliefs about the nature of the world. As the previous discussion of ethnomedicine 
illustrates, belief in magic and in natural spiritual forces remain potent and integral sources of power 
in local communities living according to traditional principles and practices (Bonnemaison 1991; 
Deacon 1970). Therefore, within the traditional political system, magic, sorcery, and supernatural 
forces are integral parts of the power structure at the leadership level. They become useful during a 
tribal war between and within villages, because the traditional warriors used magic to project the 
outcome of war. The villages that have greater varieties of magic have the potential to conquer, and 
are well equipped to fight, their enemies. As such, magic and sorcery are performed by the warriors in 
the local communities, who work closely with their jif and his council (MacClancy 2002). The kastom 
jifs are protected by the spiritual forces, and hence people who criticise them risk their life to illness or 
death. While the parliamentarians are not immune to public criticisms, in Vanuatu, the fear of sorcery 
and magic puts people in an uneasy position, so they tend to avoid criticising their jifs or questioning 
them in the public domain. On the other hand, the traditional manners and ways of honouring and 
respecting the leaders and elders in local communities can contradict the legal-rational state 
expectation of accountability and transparency in state’s affairs, where a leader is subjected to public 
criticisms and questions. Magicians and sorcerers have a strong power relation with authority, and this 
undermines the principles of representative and accountable government. 
 
The power of sorcery can be abused and manipulated to suit the needs of an individual or group of 
people (Rio 2010). For example, as further discussed in Chapter Five, in 2007 three men were killed 
during conflict between the community of Ambrym and Tanna in Port Vila over an alleged use of 
sorcery by these men, which, it was believed by the Tanna community, led to the death of a woman 
from Malekula married to a man from Tanna (Kernot & Sakita 2008). Another case occurred in 2009 
in Ambae, when the jif instructed his people to kill three men who were accused of killing several 
people in the village using sorcery or nakaimas in Bislama (Rio 2010). I had the opportunity to attend 
a nakamal meeting on another sorcery case in 2011, where three men from different islands of 
Vanuatu used nakaimas to kill a man from Anneityum over an alleged dispute about a plot of land in 
east Efate. This is one of many examples of cases that were highlighted by Rio (2010), where the state 
is still struggling to reconcile evidence based upon traditional mythologies and beliefs with the legal-
rational standards of law set by modern system of criminal justice. 
 
With regard to the nature of sorcery power, there is an interpretation “gap” between traditional society 
and the state, manifest in the treatment of “sorcery crimes” (Rio 2010). The state, through the work of 
state police and the courts, has intervened in all cases of nakaimas that, it is believed, take the lives of 
many people in rural and urban areas (Rio 2010). The question that remains unexplored is how the 
state reconciles traditional evidence of sorcery or nakaimas with the court’s rules, and on what basis 
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of evidence the court pronounces the verdicts on the plaintiff. The judiciary is facing two major 
challenges. The first challenge is that the state has used its own forms of inquiry and punishment in 
dealing with the popular belief that evil powers affect the lives of ordinary people, but without 
reconciling traditional understanding, myths, and practices of naikamas with legal-rational knowledge 
of crime and criminality. Secondly, the kastom court is operating on different principles, as reflected 
in the case involving the Ambrym and Tanna conflict which, resolved at the nakamal level, 
demonstrated the effectiveness of using the traditional dispute mechanism of ‘restorative justice’ at 
the national level. Despite the benefits of acknowledging traditional beliefs in judicial practice, at this 
conjuncture, the judicial system can be manipulated and abused in a manner where murder cases can 
have different punishments depending on whether they have been dealt with through kastom courts or 
the judicial system. In other words, a gap between the judicial system of retributive justice, and that of 
kastomary dispute resolution based on restorative justice, provides room for corruption through 
manipulation of the court process and infringement on the imposed penalties. In addition, the 
ambiguities surrounding the state judiciary and the kastom court at nakamal are a contagious source of 
corruption in the newly established state of Vanuatu. Again there are many conjunctions between 
traditional and state practices that create spaces for the extension of personalized power and hence the 
abuse of power by state officials.  
4.1.3 Nakamal and Nasara systems 
At the organisational level, nakamal and nasara are traditional structures in a village that symbolise 
the functional system of that village. In a village, each head of clan has his own nakamal, where 
members meet and discuss certain issues affecting their welfare and also discuss ceremonial activities 
such as marriages, circumcisions, funerary services, and birth celebrations (Huffer & Molisa 1999a). 
Members of nakamal are grouped following their ancestral line or bloodline, and the nakamal remains 
an important symbol of identity and also provides an indication of an organised group in the villages. 
As such, the nakamal cements unity in villages because it provides an opportunity for members of a 
family or whole villages to come together to discuss and contribute knowledge about the way of life 
in villages (Huffer & Molisa 1999b). The whole purpose of the nakamal is to bring people together, 
and therefore it serves as an avenue where people from different backgrounds and levels can share 
information in a common space where all can participate. Conflict in the local communities is 
therefore addressed most effectively at nakamal, using traditional dispute resolution approaches. In 
this system, the ultimate purpose and goal is to restore justice in a village and bring back unity 
between the disputed parties rather than penalise the offenders. The parties in dispute admit their 
wrong doings, apologise to each other, and pledge not to repeat similar mistakes in the future. In 
many instances dispute resolution involves the exchange of traditional mats, kava, pigs, food crops, 
and roosters as a way of forgiving each other (Forsyth 2007).   
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The nasara is a ceremonial ground where the jif and his council meet together to discuss the affairs of 
the villages. In a village there is only one nasara and several nakamals, which together make up the 
governing structure of a village. A nasara is a consecrated area and a house where a jif conducts the 
pig killing ceremony, and also it is a place where the heads of clans perform the leadership ranking 
ceremony. A major dispute involving more than one clan is considered at the nasara level, as well as 
cases of killing, stealing, adultery, and land dispute. At this level the jif and his council preside over 
dispute resolutions. Hence, nakamal and nasara are important components of kastom governance, and 
they are a symbols of an organised community and represent the structural functioning of a village 
(Huffer & Molisa 1999b). Nakamal and nasara are the two most important sources of promoting and 
encouraging dialogue and dispute resolution at the local community level. 
 
Furthermore, the jif presides over the allocation of resources at the nasara level, and the resources are 
given out to the heads of the family or nakamal. It is the duty of the heads of the nakamal to distribute 
the goods or resources to the members of his family. The circulation of resources through the family 
circle is an important network system in all local communities. The social, political and economic 
organisations are constructed and organised on the basis of a family, and this is the very foundational 
basis of local communities; which would seem to work in contradiction to legal-rational values. The 
nasara and nakamal, as discussed in this thesis, are the two most important institutions in villages or 
local communities, which manifest the functional structure and governance of each village. This 
general principle can be observed across the whole archipelago; however, there are inherent 
differences in the values, process and norms within and between each island. The pig killing 
ceremony and ranking ceremony take place at the nasara level, and it is at that level that individual 
heads of families can muster support from the family to compete at the nasara level. There may be 
slight differences in some parts of the country where leadership is achieved through a bloodline, as 
Layard (1942) notes in the small islands of Malekula in which there is no competition for leadership 
titles. However, he makes the point that, irrespective of jifly title, there is internal trading competition 
among the general supporters during the grading ceremony called nimangi, where an individual 
strives to bring their best products to the ceremonial ground. As in a graded society, the jif’s prestige 
and status depends more on his distributional role in the society rather than the accumulation of 
wealth.   
 
All these are some of the aspects of the local culture that state-centred governance has paid little 
attention to, particularly when the state introduces institutions that are designed to eradicate 
corruption and promote good governance practices in the society. These are the kastom governance 
practices that people are familiar with and used to in their daily lives, and the state-centred 
governance approaches thus should consider how best they can be incorporated with international best 
practices. Morgan Wairiu (2006) made a similar remark about the challenges of state governance in 
83 
 
the Solomon Islands, and pointed out that the eighty percent of the population who live in rural 
communities are more familiar and acquainted with traditional governance and local practices. As 
such, the legal-rational governance approach that pervades the state and Christianity are to them 
foreign institutions. As argued in Chapter Two, the increase in corruption-related problems in 
developing countries has led to international pressures from the World Bank and other aid 
development agencies for the newly developing states to adopt good governance strategies. This is 
arguably but one more manifestation of the external imposition of radically new political and cultural 
values that are not assimilated to existing traditional governance systems in Vanuatu. 
4.2 Christianity 
Christianity constructs a particular view of the world that also tends to work against traditional values, 
traditional beliefs and traditional practices in Vanuatu’s society. The first religious denominations to 
establish their presence in Vanuatu in the late 1800s were the Presbyterians, the Anglicans, and the 
Catholics, followed by the Church of Christ and the Seventh Day Adventists (VanTrease 1995). These 
churches might be seen as an extension of colonial endeavours to spread the benefits of modernization 
and transform the lives of pagan societies into a higher standard of living (AusAID 2008). In 
describing the involvement of the Presbyterian Church in Vanuatu, Jeremy MacClancy notes that 
‘they are a curious mixture of the sanctimonious Scotch Presbyterian with an admixture of colonial 
cunning and cuteness’ (2002, p. 80). The early religious denominations had dual visions to 
Christianise the local community and to change their way of life through the introduction of Western 
education and health services. As one commentator observed in one of the islands in the northern part 
of Vanuatu: 
The people of west Ambae experienced one of the most significant transitions of any 
rural community in Vanuatu from subsistence to a cash economy. The Church of 
Christ had encouraged local people to plant coconuts for the production of copra to 
give them access to the range of trade goods available from local trade stores, which 
had the effect of undermining the traditional political system (na hungwe) whereby 
graded titles were acquired through the exchange and sacrifice of pigs - copra 
production replaced the rearing of pigs as the most important economic activity 
(VanTrease 1995, p. 5 ). 
The churches endeavoured to transform Vanuatu, and hence church tradition came into conflict with 
traditional authority and socially embedded practice. In the southern part of Vanuatu, the Presbyterian 
Church initiated a ‘Tanna Law’ as part of its mission to stamp out the pagan practices and replace 
them with religious values (Miles 1998). The Tanna Law was a new code of conduct developed 
intentionally by the Presbyterian missionaries to suppress socially embedded practices and, as such, it 
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was in a direct conflict with traditional authorities (Miles 1998; MacClancy 2002; Woodward 2002). 
The intention of the Presbyterian Church was explicitly expressed in the writing of William Miles. He 
noted that: 
[t]o this end Presbyterian missionaries in the New Hebrides [Vanuatu] felt compelled to 
Christianise by stamping out those indigenous customs, practices, and rituals deemed 
incompatible with a chaste and holy life. Dancing, singing, drumming, divination, exorcism, 
immodest dress, and elaborate hairdos were outlawed, in addition to warfare, polygamy, 
widow strangulation, and ritual sex initiation (1998, p. 88). 
Indeed, this was the very essence of the Tanna Law, which focused on establishing the new religious 
values and forcing the local community to adopt them. To effect the changes, the Presbyterian Church 
established police forces and courts composed of the converted local Christians, who were given the 
rights to ‘sanction fines, imprisonment, forced-labour punishment, public whippings and, it was 
alleged, garrotting to coerce abandonment of traditional customs, enforce participation at prayer 
services, and isolate prospective volunteers from French labour recruiters’ (Miles 1998, p .89). Thus, 
Tanna Law was an exemplar of a Euro-centric notion of ensuring law and order in a society, through a 
new formal administrative council and code of conduct that was virtually set up against the existing 
traditional governance system in Vanuatu. This aggressive approach to law and order divided the 
whole society into two groups, which eventually contributed to the setting up of the John Frum 
movement, one of the cargo cults that emerged in reaction to an imposed alien and forceful code of 
conduct by the Presbyterian Church (Growley & Growley 1996). On the island of Nguna, local 
communities were banned from playing on Sundays, and a strict rule was enforced to make sure men 
and women were dressed in white clothes to attend Sunday worship. Tension between traditional 
authorities and churches is still a feature in the present environment, despite the enormous 
development contributions that the churches have made in the areas of health, education, and social 
welfare.  
During the colonial era, churches had almost sole responsibility for education and health care 
services. Since independence, in addition to supporting government schools and health services, 
Churches have continued to provide education services, including rural training centres, early 
childhood, primary and secondary schools. Approximately one third of all education institutions are 
operated by the main churches, using the national curriculum, and with some teachers provided by the 
Government (AusAID 2006). Other social services provided by churches include health clinics or 
dispensaries and basic welfare services for women, youth, the disabled and other disadvantaged 
groups. The perseverance of the churches to transform the lives of local people and improve their 
living standards by converting to Christianity has indeed had great impacts in different parts of the 
archipelago. For instance, by the time of the 1999 Census, well over eighty percent of the population 
85 
 
identified as Christian, and more than one hundred mission schools had been built throughout the 
archipelago (VNSO, 1999). At present, there are over thirty Christian denominations in Vanuatu, the 
majority being Presbyterian, with twenty-eight percent of the total population, the most dominant 
church in Vanuatu. The Anglican is the second largest, with fifteen percent, followed by the Seventh 
Day Adventists (SDA) and the Roman Catholic Church, each representing twelve percent of the 
Vanuatu population (VNSO 2009, p. 1). Christian churches remain potent agents of social change, but 
also sources of social tension and conflict in Vanuatu society. 
Church rivalries began during the colonial era when religious denominations fought for jurisdiction 
over local communities. For instance, the inherent denominational differences between the Anglican 
and Presbyterian traditions have led to a great division among the local communities in Tanna and 
created an ethnocentric view of the Anglican community versus the Presbyterian community (Miles 
1998). In a similar vein, the Protestant missionaries viewed Catholicism as a real threat to their own 
soul-saving endeavours, and this religious politic eventuated in temporary ‘theogeographical’ 
boundaries in Vanuatu (Miles 1998, p 89). Although these temporary boundaries were not formally 
validated by the two colonial masters, Britain and France, the local communities were divided along 
religious lines and people tended to categorise themselves and their community as man presbyterian 
or komuniti blong Anglican (Presbyterian man or member of the Anglican community). This 
temporary boundary saw the Presbyterian Churches take the southern part of Vanuatu, covering the 
islands of Anneytum, Tanna, Erromango, Efate, and the Shepherds. The Anglicans dominated the 
northern part of Vanuatu, particularly the islands of Banks and Torres, Maevo, Ambae, and Pentecost. 
The Catholics claimed the middle part and built their permanent presence in Santo, Malekula, and 
Ambrym. During the colonial period, churches had a strict boundary of operation, as was reflected by 
the church of Melanesia, which restricted its endeavours to Banks and Torres Island, Maevo, and 
Pentecost (Woodward 2002).  
On a more intense level, there was a wider conflict between those who worshipped on Sunday and 
Saturday worshipers, and this conflict often led to damage to property or fighting within local 
communities. The SDA community was not allowed to access the Catholic dispensary and school, and 
vice versa. In our village the Catholic Church was the first church to establish its presence, and started 
to provide basic services such as a school, dispensary, and water supply. In 1988, the SDA came in 
and began to use biblical scriptures to reveal why they worshipped differently from the Catholic 
Church. The Catholic members reacted to what they said and banned them from using their water 
supply services. Hence, for a period of a year the SDA community had to use the main river and could 
not access the water supply services that were funded by the Catholic Church. In retaliation, one 
member of the SDA community destroyed the main source of the water supply, and the whole village 
remained without a water supply until the Japanese Government installed a new water supply service 
in 2000. Vanuatu has seen the influx of large number of religious denominations in the villages, and 
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this has caused disruptions in family relationships and become detrimental to village unity, which in 
turn affects the implementation of development projects. Kalontano; Vatu and whyte (2003) noted 
that, in small villages, competition and church rivalry can fragment resources and relationships, 
suggesting: 
… it may result in an exclusive attitude among congregation members that causes them to 
withdraw themselves from community projects initiated by other church groups. This disunity 
not only contributes to poor cooperation within a community but often time causes tensions, 
confusion and religious competitions and duplication (Kalontano;Vatu and whyte 2003, p. 
67). 
The Vanuatu Christian Council of Churches (VCCC) was established to coordinate the efforts of the 
churches in contributing to the national development goals of the nation; however, each religious 
denomination has been limited by their doctrines and fundamental beliefs. The Seventh Day Adventist 
church has been an observer since the establishment of the VCCC, and it has reservations about 
cooperating fully with the initiatives of the VCCC. While the churches play an important development 
role in social sectors, their rivalries can contribute to the fragmentation of communities and encourage 
resistance to outside influence, including state interventions in development projects. 
On a broader scale, the dual objectives of the churches, to Christianise, and to transform rural 
subsistence societies into “rational” surplus producers, were part and parcel of the colonial project to 
expand its socio-economic and political development in its colonies. Vanuatu, through the 
experiences of churches, European planters and traders, went through a very stressful period of socio-
economic development during the colonial era defined by violence, killings, kidnapping, and 
conspicuous land dealings (MacClancy 2002). Such grossly insensitive attitudes to development have 
had a lasting impact on traditional communities in Vanuatu, encouraging traditional communities to 
fight against the state over development projects in rural and local communities. To appreciate how 
those socio-economic stresses are affecting Vanuatu society, the following sections map out the 
contours of economic change wrought more directly by colonial economic expansion. 
4.3 Traders and planters, 1820-1906 
The traders and planters reinforced the deep-seated tribal conflicts in local communities through the 
introduction of kidnapping and killing using guns and knives. Subsequently, their trading attitudes 
were based on unscrupulous dealings with local communities and the exploitation of resources 
without consent and compensation to landowners. The sandalwood trade began in the mid-1820s and 
in the early 20
th
 century on the islands of Tanna, Erromango and Aneityum (Bedford 2006; Valjavec 
1986; Woodward 2002). This followed a high demand for sandalwood among Chinese Buddhists, 
who used it to burn in their religious ceremonies for the sake of its sweet smell (MacClancy 2002).  
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Australian traders had searched for forests in the Pacific to export wood to China to offset the 
enormous amount of Chinese tea that flooded the Australian market at that time. They came across 
sandalwood on the southern islands of Vanuatu, and began to extract it in large quantities, often at the 
expense of many islanders who lost their lives (MacClancy 2002). Commentators in Vanuatu 
described the early activities of the sandalwood trade as a “bloody business”, run by ruthless men who 
treated islanders badly, committed atrocities and pursued the prospect of large profit at the expense of 
human ideals (MacClancy 2002: 40; Woodward 2002). Large quantities of sandalwood were obtained 
through predatory behaviour, with the only benefits to local communities being in the form of iron 
tools that Europeans used to lure the hearts of local communities in order to allow them to cut their 
forests. These experiences created an impression in the minds of the local communities that 
development was all about exploitation, stealing, humiliation and killing for the sake of profit and 
wealth.  
 
The struggle to control resources is still a cause of tension between Vanuatu local communities and 
the state. The sandalwood trade and labour trade brought home a new concept of development 
through fighting, injustice, and exploitation of resources for the sake of making profit. In a society 
that has been immersed in tribal wars, the fighting over resources between the Europeans and local 
communities exacerbated the conflicts that existed within and between villages and islands. The fear 
of losing lands and resources is one of the reasons for conflict over development between the state and 
traditional land owners. The perception that local communities have of the state as an alien institution, 
representative of foreign investors that have as their ultimate purpose the exploitation of their 
resources, with little benefit to them, does not put the state on good terms with the local communities. 
 
Opposition to development on traditional or cultural grounds was evident in the interruption of a 
multi-million dollar hydropower project, funded by the Chinese government in 1996, by one local 
community in the northern part of Vanuatu called Unmet. This occurred when the community learned 
that the project would have a destabilising impact on the level of the Brenwei River that had provided 
water to them for many decades. Similarly, the Tautu community burned down the air terminal at 
Norsup airport in 2000, the key airstrip servicing the island of Malekula. Accusations were aired over 
inappropriate state compensation and the sharing of the benefits that the land owners would get from 
the state. 
 
The European planters expropriated land by stealth, that is by taking advantage of traditional land 
sharing systems to gain an economic foothold and take permanent hold of land given temporarily and 
in trust. The records show that by the early 1970s over half of the country was owned by foreigners 
(VanTrease 1987). The residents of the two colonial powers (France and Britain) have taken large 
areas of land from local communities to plant large plantations of coconut, cotton, coffee and cocoa 
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(VanTrease 1987). The first to develop coconut, cocoa and coffee plantations were British subjects, 
mainly from Australia, who moved to the southern part of the island of Efate around Havannah 
harbour and later to Port Vila (VanTrease 1995). The commercial plantation activities were carried 
out in an illegal fashion, as lands were stolen and were not registered properly under formal legal 
arrangements. While the local communities gave the right to Europeans to use their lands following 
the traditional land tenure system, European planters took it seriously that the locals had granted them 
ownership of the lands. This misunderstanding of the two systems of land tenure led to an increase in 
disputes and conflicts between the European planters and local communities. By the second half of 
the 19
th
 century, most of the European land speculators and developers had moved into various parts 
of the archipelago, mainly in Efate, Epi, Santo, and Malekual (VanTrease 1995). The Europeans 
claimed large areas of land and transformed them into commercial coconut, cocoa, and coffee 
plantations and, later on, into cattle farms.  
 
The forceful acquisition of lands by the Europeans and the imposed system of land registration gave 
birth to perennial conflict over land management that is still very much a feature of Vanuatu society. 
The attempts by the Europeans to legally register the parcel of land that was given to them by the 
traditional authorities generated greater tensions and disputes between local communities and the 
planters. What Europeans have imposed is a new model of development that calls for individual 
property rights and an economic system that requires people to exchange their labour for wages and, 
as a consequence, become part of the cash economy. Local people were often forcibly recruited by the 
plantation owners to work on their plantations in return for cash wages, which drew people away from 
their villages to live on or near to their place of employment. Furthermore, this was also a model of 
development that came with many atrocities, such as killings, stealing, kidnapping, exploitation, and 
humiliation, for the sake of profit maximisation of the richer companies and individuals (Woodward 
2002, MacClancy 2002, VanTrease 1995). The increased killings and land disputes compelled the two 
colonial masters to forego their political differences and work together on a convention that would 
address the deteriorating law and order in Vanuatu and, most importantly, protect their commercial 
interests. Ironically, their Euro-centric notion of law and order led them to impose Western 
prescriptions of institutions, and to introduce new legal-rational values. They did this rather than 
seeking to build institutions based on local or traditional foundations or to implant ideas in such a way 
that they could take root in the specific socio-cultural landscape of Vanuatu. 
4.4 Joint colonial agreement 1906-1980 
The Joint Colonial Agreement of 1906 instituted a Euro-centric notion of the state in Vanuatu, and 
therefore created an “empty political space” in the local socio-political landscape. This joint 
agreement came about as a result of the frequent violent incidents and increased land disputes 
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between Europeans and local communities, and also the unscrupulous practices of labour recruiters in 
the islands (Bonnemaison 1975; MacClancy 2002; VanTrease 1995). As a way of tackling land 
grievances and deteriorating law and order, France and Britain finally agreed for a convention that 
promulgated the foundation principles of what was known as the ‘condominium’ (Miles 1998). The 
concept of condominium was not unique to Vanuatu, and reference could be made to Cameroun 
where France and Britain had joint power. In Vanuatu, as noted by Miles (1998), the contents of the 
‘condominium’ government were dictated by the divided colonial philosophies and political interests 
of the two countries in Vanuatu, and hence it was oriented towards the protection of the European 
residents rather than the people of Vanuatu (Miles 1998; MacClancy 2002). While Britain saw their 
presence in Vanuatu as that of a temporary sojourner, France took a hard line to extend their territory 
and build a permanent presence in Vanuatu (VanTrease 1987; Woodward 2002). Their divided 
political ambitions and aspirations were reflected in the establishment of the three separate 
administrative organisations, British administration, French administration, and the Condominium; 
which had great ramifications in the manners and ways in which they dealt with land disputes, local 
interests, and internal conflicts between local communities and their residents. The French applied 
French Laws and regulations in addressing internal conflicts and land disputes between its residents; 
and likewise the British used its own laws to deal with the affairs of its residents (Miles 1998; 
Woodward 2002). In this context, the indigenous population of Vanuatu remained stateless and were 
not clearly subject to either one of the colonial masters. 
 
As part of the 1906 Joint Colonial Agreement, the whole archipelago was divided into four 
administrative districts: northern district, southern district, division one and division two. In each 
district there were two separate resident commissioners, British and French, and dual political 
administrations. The French operated a separate administration and services, including schools, 
hospitals, police, telecommunication, and postal services. They worked closely with the French 
speaking churches such as the Catholics to promote the French language in their schools throughout 
the whole archipelago. As a result, French influences spread fast in major areas where Catholic 
churches were established, such as in Malekula, Santo, Ambrym, and later to other parts of Vanuatu 
(Miles 1998; MacClancy 2002). Similarly, the British had their own schools, postal services, police, 
hospitals, and telecommunication. They worked closely with the Presbyterian and Anglican churches, 
and the Church of Christ to run education and health services throughout the whole of Vanuatu. Thus, 
the dual nature of the political influences of the two countries divided the whole community of 
Vanuatu into two major language groups, Anglophone and Francophone. In a similar vein, the 
religious denominations divided the local communities into two groups so that people who became 
members of Catholic churches identified themselves as Francophone and tended to be on the French 
side. Likewise the Anglophones were those who belonged to Presbyterian, Anglican, Church of Christ 
or the Seventh Day Adventist churches. Thus, the whole society categorised themselves along 
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religious lines and, most importantly, on the basis of languages, Anglophone versus Francophone, and 
the school they had attended (Miles 1998).  
 
In 1914 there was a slight change to the 1906 convention, which gave birth to a condominium 
administration, mainly in the areas of courts and dispute resolution (Miles 1998). One of the integral 
features of the protocol of 1914 was the establishment of a Joint Court system to deal with land 
matters, consisting of three Judges, British, French, and a third judge appointed by the King of Spain, 
who acted as President (VanTrease 1995, p. 10). The other aspect of this protocol was the Joint Naval 
Commission, which consisted of officials from France, Britain and local ni-Vanuatu, who patrolled 
the islands of Vanuatu together to ensure law and order. It was through this joint condominium 
administration that local positions were created in each administration, and they were called British 
District Officers and French District Officers (Miles 1998; MacClancy 2002). People who were 
recruited to one of these offices had to either train in French schools or British schools, and the French 
employed only its citizens and locals who spoke French. The impact of this joint administration was 
that very little was achieved in terms of facilitating peaceful resolutions in villages, because of the 
divided opinion between the two colonial masters over land management and the clashes over 
traditional roles of chief and appointed colonial ‘assessors’. The assessors were the middlemen 
between traditional authorities and the condominium government (Miles 1998). 
 
The establishment of the Joint Court was based on the Torrens system of land registration, which 
worked to the advantage of the European claimants and limited the ability of ni-Vanuatu to defend 
their rights (VanTrease 1995). In addition, local communities had limited knowledge about how the 
Joint Court system worked and, as a consequence the colonial system of Joint Courts, among other 
things, did not work well. The implication was that issues relating to land disputes, registration, and 
development were dealt with using foreign laws that were outside the local context and therefore 
worked at the expense of local communities. Straight after Vanuatu gained independence in 1980, 
island courts were established in four districts, and were part of the hybrid policy in which two 
different principles (kastom and legal-rational) were blended together to address land disputes in local 
communities. The concept of the island courts failed because of the complex and diverse kastoms that 
Vanuatu already had, which made it impossible to develop a unified traditional court system that 
could be applied consistently throughout the archipelago. In most cases the traditional land tenure 
system of collective ownership was a major challenge for the state when it clashed with individual 
property rights or the lease system. Kastom law stipulated the collective ownership of land, which 
worked in the opposite direction to individual property rights and ownership. In 2008 the government 
responded to unresolved land disputes over ownership by setting up a Land Tribunal Court to deal 
with all land disputes, and re-emphasised kastom as the determining criteria for ownership. The land 
tribunal court was composed of more than one jif and one or two officers from the tribunal office. 
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However, the inherent challenge of bridging the gap with the legal-rational court system is yet to be 
resolved, which implies that in the appeal court the legal-rational court always takes precedence and 
quashes the decisions of the Land Tribunal Court. Recent experience has showed that the decisions of 
the appeal court to quash the decisions of the Land Tribunal Court has often aggravated the intensity 
of the conflict rather than providing a peaceful settlement. 
 
The issues surrounding land ownership and development during the colonial era were the instigators 
of emerging local political organisations. The first political groupings were influenced by Anglophone 
and Francophone political ideologies, and therefore the two colonial powers had a bearing upon the 
political development of the Vanuatu state. This has worked to exacerbate the divisions within 
Vanuatu society. The first two major political groupings were the nagrimiel movement, and the New 
Hebridean Cultural Association, which is now called the Vanuaku Party (VanTrease 1995). Both 
movements claim to represent the interests of the local population by intending to reclaim all the 
alienated lands that were taken by the Europeans and, most importantly, promoting kastom as the true 
identity of local communities. Thus, land and kastom were the two denominators that were used by 
the local elites to rally support of the local communities towards decolonisation. Initially, they started 
with a common vision to drive out the two colonial masters and restore the self-identity of the ni-
Vanuatu and, most importantly, regain all the alienated land that Europeans had obtained by force. 
However, along the way this concerted vision got diluted into Anglophone versus Francophone 
politics, which reflected the deep-seated divisional political structures of the two colonial masters 
(Miles 1998). Indeed, when Vanuatu gained independence in 1980, it inherited deep-seated divisional 
socio-economic structures and political structures that the two colonial masters, in collaboration with 
the established churches, had institutionalised during the colonial era. These divisions have presented 
almost insurmountable challenges for Vanuatu as an independent state, in two ways. Firstly, 
nationalism has had to be created out of the complex and diverse socio-political and cultural 
differences that are inherent in Vanuatu’s society. Secondly, the state has had to be built from the 
greater socio-cultural diversities and out of the divided political structures inherited from the two 
colonial powers. 
4.5 Post-colonial Vanuatu 
A nation has to be created, and this does not happen automatically (Dinnen 2008). Vanuatu is an 
archipelago of 83 islands, and in the pre-European contact period and during the colonial era, there 
was limited contact between islands. Most of the islands were renowned for their cannibalism and 
tribal warfare, which negated peaceful contact and limited the opportunity for regional interactions 
and integration at that time. These national challenges were exacerbated by the geographical 
dispersion, colonial and post-colonial rivalries, parochial identities, religious rivalries, and the diverse 
92 
 
traditions and languages (Crowley 2000). As a result, the emerging national leaders had to overcome 
these challenges in order to create a national identity that everyone would feel that they were part of. 
Two decades after independence, a former British resident of Vanuatu, Keith Woodward, made the 
following observation: 
 
Vanuatu inherited from the condominium perhaps the most difficult legacy to fall to any 
British colonial territory - enduring division in politics and in education, dual services, no 
proper national civil services, a crippling lack of educated men and women (because there had 
been no secondary school in the country before the late 1960s), and an economic and fiscal 
base so inadequate and underdeveloped that the country could not survive, let alone develop, 
without continuing major injections of international aid (2002, p. 7). 
 
As noted, the state-centred governance system in Vanuatu was borrowed largely from the European 
political ideologies (Miles 1998). As such, the implanting of these new political ideals to the less 
acculturated masses presented a major challenge for the newly independent state of Vanuatu. In 
commenting on the nationalist struggle for Vanuatu, William Miles notes that ‘nationalism in Vanuatu 
still entails overcoming those divisions which brewed during the condominium era and boiled over in 
the pre-independence period’ (1998, p. 45). From the ni-Vanuatu perspective, nationalism can be 
viewed as a dual process, the first step of which was to mount an anti-colonial movement to remove 
the two colonial masters. The second step was the more difficult one for Vanuatu, as it involved the 
need to form an inclusive identity by conferring a sense of national unity on all citizens (Miles 1998). 
 
In the lead up to independence, kastom and Bislama (a linga-franca creole that developed out of the 
plantations) were selected as means to achieve unity. The concept of kastom as a way of life (Bolton 
1999b) is discrete in the sense that it has an opposite relationship with most religious denominations 
and, most importantly, contradicts the economic liberal notion of self-market regulation, 
individualism, property rights and political democratic institutions. The traditional collective 
ownership of land and the practices of kastom, such as kinship inheritances, and patriotic leadership, 
are contradictory to legal-rational expectations of the state. These are based on economic liberal 
values of individualism, self–market regulation, property rights, and political order through 
participatory democracy. On this basis, having kastom as a means of unity and political identity 
further aggravates the gap between the legal-rational expectations of the state and socially embedded 
practices that are ingrained in the Constitution of Vanuatu. However, as is suggested in this thesis, it 
is time to shift the focus from kastom as weakness to the analysis of kastom as a source of resilience 
and growth-enhancing governance in the development context of Vanuatu. Chapters Five and Nine of 
this thesis examine ways in which, in Vanuatu, customary governance, values and norms can be 
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adapted to serve the needs of a modernizing society and improve the governance performance of state 
institutions. 
 
During post-colonial state building, Vanuatu took a unified approach to combine the three competing 
and overlapping institutions, traditional values, Christianity, and the legal-rational state notion, into its 
newly formulated state institutional framework. The Constitution of Vanuatu recognises the three 
development institutions as founding principles and values on which the state is to be built. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the Constitution recognises in its preamble the three governance systems, 
state, kastom, and Christianity. Kastom covers everything in traditional Vanuatu society, ranging from 
the way of living to natural surroundings, and hence indigenous communities feel that it is the right 
terminology to describe their way of life (Tonkinson 1982b). Kastom and land are featured in all 
major sections and chapters of the Constitution. Kastom is mentioned twenty-five times in the 
Constitution, but with little clarification of what it means and how it will work as a vehicle for 
development. Chapter Five of the Constitution is devoted to the establishment of a National Council 
of Chiefs, and makes special reference to kastom as a determining basis for election. The members are 
‘kastom Jifs’, who are elected by their peers sitting in district councils of chiefs. The traditional land 
tenure system is fully covered in Chapter Twelve, and it begins with the profound provision that ‘all 
land in the Republic of Vanuatu belongs to the indigenous kastom owners and their descendants and 
kastom shall form a basis of ownership and use’ (Constitution of Vanuatu 1980. p. 26). On the other 
hand, Vanuatu is the only country in the world that recognizes three foreign languages, French, 
English and Bislama, as its official national languages for communication (Crowley 2000). The 
principal languages of education are English and French. 
 
The state model is based on the Westminster system. It has an Executive, Judiciary, and a Legislature. 
The legislature consists of the fifty-two elected members of parliament, each with a four year term in 
Parliament. The Prime Minister is elected through an Electoral College of the parliament on the first 
sitting after a general election. The executive is made up of Ministers who serve in the government as 
the heads of the thirteen ministerial portfolios. The head of state is nominated by both sides of the 
house and elected through the Electoral College, which comprises all members of Parliament, the 
President of the six Provinces, and the President of the Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs. The 
thirteen chapters of the Constitution provide for decentralization; however, a recent study on the 
drivers of change in Vanuatu observes that: 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
[t]he most obvious unfinished element of the state building project in Vanuatu is the limited 
reach of the state outside the capital. Apart from the primary schools and first aid posts, most 
ni-Vanuatu has little contact with the state. The six provincial governments are under-
resourced and largely unable to deliver services outside the provincial headquarters (Cox et al 
2007, p. iii). 
 
While it is recognized that state-building is an ongoing process, the challenges of implementing new 
political values and meeting the legal-rational governance expectations of the state, and at the same 
time promoting development, are intensified in developing countries, and Vanuatu is a case in point. 
Vanuatu, although it is not alone in this experience, faces multiple challenges, and these include a 
challenge to transform the colonial-era administration into a ni-Vanuatu managed structure, along 
with the development of the functions of a legal-rational state. For the past three decades, new 
institutions have been established to accommodate newly emerging development challenges such as 
climate change, the increased number of youths, rural-urban migration, corruption, gender imbalance, 
and poor rural financial services, and all have taken place against the backdrop of very limited human 
resources (Cox et al. 2007).  
 
The emerging issues of corruption, and of developing and supporting a good governance agenda as 
the principal means to tackle challenges, have led to the development of national and international 
policy proposals, international agreements and anti-corruption programmes and initiatives. The anti-
corruption development initiative and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are examples of 
regional and international development initiatives that filter in all the bilateral partnership agreements 
that nation states have signed with developed countries and international aid agencies. Vanuatu, as a 
nation, has obligations to meet certain international standards of practice and has to carry out a range 
of regional and international development initiatives that it is party to. In 2001, Vanuatu was a party 
to ADB/OECD anti-corruption initiatives, followed by the ratification of the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in July 2011. Other UN ratified conventions weigh the 
government with additional responsibilities, such as in the case of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The implication of these development initiatives for 
Vanuatu is that they stretch the limited human capacity even more thinly and put additional pressure 
on government for institutional reform. Thus, in a context where the state is limited by capacity and 
experiences national budget constraints, leaders and officials become easy prey for international 
business firms and individual investors, and they may well accept bribes in the name of development 
in Vanuatu. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The inherent components of Vanuatu society underscore the multiple fault lines derived from 
religious beliefs and traditional practices overlain with imposed state ideologies imposed or borrowed 
from outside. All these elements can potentially develop into serious conflicts and engender fractures 
within Vanuatu society. The pressure comes from the legal-rational state through its transformation 
policies that have as their ultimate purpose the stamping out of socially embedded practices of 
customary reciprocity, the parochial jifly leadership system, and traditional land tenure. As such, over 
a period of time all these fractures can eventually burst into civil-ethnic tensions, which can have 
profound ramifications for the socio-economic structures of the state. The ethnic tensions in the 
Solomon Islands in 2000 and three successive coups (1987, 2000, 2006) in Fiji were classic examples 
of clashes of two sets of values (Kabutaulaka 2008b; Lal 2009; Lawson 2012). Corruption can be 
interpreted as a consequence of the collision between value systems; which is here, in Vanuatu, 
simplified into a collision between value systems along the vast frontier of tradition and modernity. 
The collision of different values in a shared common political space is, as this thesis argues, a trigger 
for different sources of corruption in Vanuatu government and society. Understanding corruption as a 
consequence of various social relations and pressures in a localised context, and the working out of 
contradictions between traditional kastom practices and beliefs and the requirements of a nation state, 
is critical to understanding why the Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs is an important 
institution to mediate between the two sets of world views. 
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Chapter 5: Case Study One: Jifly Institution and Governance 
5.0 Introduction  
There is an enduring dialectical tension between aspirations for a more locally embedded system of 
governance in Vanuatu and the legal-rational model of sovereignty and power de jure, imported by 
colonial powers and colonisers, to which most modern power elites are wedded. In the post-colonial 
Vanuatu state, kastom authority structures are forced to coexist with a still relatively new, and 
arguably “alien”, set of political institutions. Modern state institutions are based on the liberal political 
principles of majority rule and free and fair elections, while the traditional jifly leadership system is 
based on decision-making through consensus and on the hereditary right to rule. Social friction is the 
consequence of the aggressive imposition of rival colonial systems. In colonial Vanuatu, the 
discontentment of the local communities over the fraudulent possession of large hectares of land by 
the Europeans was a cause of increased violence and violent death. One result was a new authority 
structure imposed by Europeans to establish law and order in the archipelago, on European terms. The 
organisation of chiefs, institutionalised into an administrative council, came partly to regulate law and 
order in the local community, but most importantly to fulfil the objectives of the religious 
denominations and the colonial authority to modernise and rationalise what they viewed as irrational 
and parochial leadership and political systems that existed in local communities. As such, the 
appointment of the ‘missionary chiefs’ and the ‘assessors’ by the Europeans as new additional 
political leaders in the local communities insulted kastom authorities and created leadership fractures 
that still continue today. Governance in Vanuatu should therefore be interpreted in a context of 
multiple and overlapping authorities, each with distinct and frequently conflicting priorities and value 
orientations. 
This case study illustrates how these complexities shape governance dynamics within a specific 
institutional context. Hence, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides an 
overview of the colonial attempt to transform kastom authority and traditional values of social 
obligation in Vanuatu. The second section deals with the problems and weaknesses in the way the 
Constitution was drafted to reform kastom authority and shape a new social order in Vanuatu. The 
third section demonstrates the resilience of kastom authority and its effectiveness and relevance in 
Vanuatu today, followed with an analysis of the legitimacy of the MNCC. The final section illustrates 
that kastom authority and traditional values of social obligation are resilient and are now being crafted 
into the bureaucratic system. As such, this creates a critical need to improve the roles and functions of 
kastom authority and kastom governance at the national, regional, sub-regional, and local levels, in 
order to work collaboratively with the state. 
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5.1 Overview 
The jifly administrative council is an example of a mistake that has been made in reforming or 
transforming power and authority within Vanuatu. As was alluded to in Chapter One and Chapter 
Four of this thesis, the jifly administrative council was conceived and designed by European colonial 
authorities as an administrative agent to mediate between locals and the colonial state. As such, it 
elevated a structure out of local context and created a hybrid system in which legal-rational and 
democratic values were intended to mix with local social order and authority, as reflected in the 
election of kastom jifs. As discussed in Chapter Four, the colonial authorities bypassed the kastom 
authorities and created two new leadership positions, that of missionary chief and assessor, to serve as 
members of the jifly administrative council in local communities (Allen 1984). In addition, a new 
code of conduct was enacted by the Europeans and enforced by the administrative council, which 
went against the kastom authorities and social orders in the local communities (Bonnemaison 1975; 
Guiart 1954). In this context it can be argued that the colonial approach to law and order in the pre-
independent era was as indifferent to local context as is the current World Bank model of good 
governance. 
One could wonder why the missionaries needed to create a new leadership position similar to a 
kastom jif in a local community, when this position already existed. The answer could be partly 
because the traditional authority structures and the values that underpin them were regarded as an 
impediment to the long-term vision to christianise the whole archipelago and create a new foundation 
for the colonial state. In this way, the jifly administrative council was initially established in such a 
way that it would gradually be fashioned into a full democratic institution that they could control or 
over which they could exert more influence. The following is an excerpt from a recent interview with 
a kastom jif who expressed his views on the leadership battle they had at the village level: 
We already had the kastom jifs in our villages prior to the arrival of the Europeans and they 
were still here. When the Europeans came they appointed their own missionary chiefs and 
established an administrative council that followed their own ways and against our kastom 
principles, values, and processes. They appointed their own missionary chief to replace our 
kastom jifs and represented our people in the councils. This was a mockery to our kastom 
authorities and now MNCC wanted to establish another village council in our village. I told 
them that we already had our jifly Council at the Village that followed our kastom ways and 
culture and if they wanted to bring another Western council they would need to go and 
established it in the middle of the ocean. The problem with the missionary chiefs at the 
council was that they were not able to command the leadership authority in the villages and 
they were like `flowers’. In our society today people fought for the leadership title because 
the missionary and the two colonial governments came and introduced their own chiefs, 
(missionary and assessor) that confused people in local communities. Now everyone wanted 
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to become chiefs because the missionary and the two colonial governments created an 
opportunity for anyone to become chief (Tape interview 6 May 2013). 
This quote illustrates the degree of the struggle for power between the European-centred notion of 
authority with kastom authority and the leadership perceptions and challenges in the local 
communities. It also echoes frustration with the external and “top down” approach to institutional 
design and reform evident in many developing countries, where little consideration is given to 
existing authority structures and social order or customary practices. The colonial design of the jifly 
administrative council in the South Pacific region reflected the experiences that they had in other parts 
of the world. The jifly administrative council in Vanuatu reflected largely the colonial patterns 
previously established by the European powers in West Africa and elsewhere (Lawson 1997; Miles 
1993). The Hausa province in West Africa was a case in point, and although the province was divided 
into two parts between the French and the British, it had many similarities with Vanuatu in terms of 
the jifly administrative structure that was established and how chieftaincy was incorporated into the 
state (Miles 1993). William Miles (1993) drew a comparative analysis of the design of the jifly 
administrative council in Vanuatu and chieftaincy of Niger and Nigeria in Africa, all of which were 
colonies of the British and French at one point in time. Three observations can be made from that 
comparative analysis: 
 
 The chiefly institution was designed by the European colonial authority as an administrative 
agent for socio-economic and political development at local and national levels; 
 The traditional authorities were omitted in the design of the chiefly administrative council and 
the Europeans bypassed them to appoint the missionary chief in Vanuatu and the “warrant 
chiefs” in Nigeria to replace them at the council (Miles 1993); 
 The role of chief on the council in both countries was diminished to that of an advisory and 
consultation role, meaning that they did not have the power to make decisions at the national 
level or influence the decision of the state. 
 
The formation of Vanuatu’s jifly administrative council during the colonial era can be read as an 
aggressive move to undermine local values of social order, norms, processes, and kastom authorities. 
Jifs were placed in an awkward if not untenable position, as icons both of tradition and kastom within 
an antagonistic state apparatus. This was one of the major challenges that the local political leaders 
dealt with during the constitutional drafting in the pre-independence period, to ensure that the 
institutional design of the jifly councils was grounded on traditional values of social order, norms, and 
processes. The emergent power struggle between Euro-centred notions of state authority and that of 
kastom authority was clearly displayed in the discussions of the constitutional drafting committee. 
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The following section analyses the minutes of the constitutional drafting committee, within the 
themes of power struggles and the designs of the post-colonial institutions. 
5.2 Institutional design 
In the preparation for independence, a constitutional drafting committee was established by the 
Representative Assembly in April 1979, and was given a six months timeframe to design a whole 
political and institutional framework for the newly independent state of Vanuatu. This committee was 
composed of four major groups, as depicted in Table 5.1: kastom jif representatives; Conseil des 
Ministres (Council of Ministers); Assemblée Representatives (Representative Assembly); and 
members of Vanuaaku Party  (Minutes of the Constitution 1979). At the drafting of the Constitution 
the debates were not so much on how to transpose the legitimacy of individual kastom jifs, and of 
kastom authority in its multifarious forms, onto a jifly institution where jifs were agents of the state at 
the local and national levels, but rather the discussions and negotiations of the constitutional 
committee were on the need to find a space for jifly institutions within the state apparatus. In other 
words, the minutes of the Constitution suggest that the state approach to building post-colonial 
institutions was more assimilationist than transformative, and as such there endured two forms of 
authority that operated on different principles and embraced two different values of social orders and 
leadership expectations. 
Table 5. 1 Members of the Constitution of Vanuatu Committee 
Names Position Affiliation 
1. W. Lini VP President Conseil des Ministres (Council of Ministers) 
2. D. Kalpokas Member Conseil des Ministres 
3. G. Prevot Member Conseil des Ministres 
4. L. Dini Member Conseil des Ministres 
5. A. Malere Member Conseil des Ministres 
6. G. Kalkoa Member Conseil des Ministres 
7. T. Reuben Member Conseil des Ministres 
8. J. Naupa Member Conseil des Ministres 
9. G. Laymang Member Conseil des Ministres 
10. M. Carlot UMP President Conseil des Ministres 
11. W. Bangmatur Interim President Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs 
12. F. Timakata Member Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs 
13. M. Tacemata Member Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs 
14. J. Tambe Member Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs 
15. J. Nerua Member Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs 
16. G. Cronstead President Assemblée Representatives (Commission Ad Hoc) 
17. T. Tungu Member Assemblée Representatives  
18. J. Quarani Member Assemblée Representatives  
19. J.M. Leye Member Assemblée Representatives  
20. V. Boulekone Member Assemblée Representatives  
21. G. Pakoa Member Vanuaku Party (VP) 
22. G. Molisa Member Vanuaku Party  
23. K. Matas Member Vanuaku Party  
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24. B. Sope Member Vanuaku Party 
25. J. Natuman Member Vanuaku Party 
26. L. Vatu Leader Tabwemassana 
27. G. Kalsakau Leader Natatok Efate 
28. S. Regenvanu Secretary General New Hebrides Christian Council 
29. J. Stepen Leader Nagriamel 
30.  Prof. Yash Ghai Technical Advisor British Government Representatives 
31. Prof. Zorgbibe Technical Advisor French Government Representatives 
Source: Minutes of the Constitution 1979 
The inclusion of the kastom jifs in the constitutional committee was important because they remained 
an important political force at the local level and people still relied on them to address their daily 
needs. Their presence and influence in the local communities in Vanuatu is real, and therefore the 
success or failure of the Vanuatu democratic experiment in some ways depends on how this 
traditional political institution is incorporated into the new political order. However, kastom authority 
was from the outset construed as a “threat” to the state, which had to be neutralised rather than 
accommodated, and the “balance of power” reoriented away from the local community level 
institutions towards the centre. Colonialist perceptions and priorities had a defining impact on the 
design of the jifly administration and, as such, the institutional responsibilities of the jifs were 
restricted to advice and consultation. 
The constitutional committee was an opportunity to redress this power “imbalance”, but the 
opportunity was not taken. At the beginning of the discussions, the Chairman of the constitutional 
committee, Gerald Laymang, requested Professor Yash Ghai to prepare a submission paper on the 
role of chiefs and experiences in different countries (Minutes of the Constitution 1979, p. 19). This 
submission paper indeed gave an opportunity for the constitutional committee to explore different 
models and practices around the globe in order to have a better knowledge of different ways to 
incorporate the jifly institution into state structures. 
 
The discussions centred on how Western Africa (particularly in the Hausa province) had integrated 
the traditional institutions of chiefs within the state apparatus (Miles 1993). In Niger, the French 
incorporated pliable chiefs into their own bureaucracy, strictly as executors of French administrative 
policy. The British, on the other hand, conferred great autonomy to the chiefs within their own 
colonies (Miles 1993). As William Miles points out, chiefs under British colonial rule emerged at 
independence with greater power and authority vis-a-vis the national government than did their 
counterparts in former French territory (1993; p. 33). In Nigeria, chieftaincy retained control of local 
government as head of the Native Administration, previously known as the Native Authority (NA). 
However, the joint influences of the two European countries (France and Britain) in Vanuatu resulted 
in a different institutional outcome in which kastom authority remained independent, albeit with an 
unclear framework, as to their interaction with the state. Their power, roles and boundaries at the 
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national, regional and sub-regional levels were not defined clearly and, as such, this became an 
emerging challenge for formal authority and institutions. 
 
The following are excerpts from the summary of deliberation of the committee on the power 
challenge between kastom authority and a legislative state authority. In discussing how to incorporate 
kastom authority of jifs into the state system, the committee agreed that, while a position needed to be 
found for the jifs, their role in the conduct of national affairs should be limited. The discussions were 
intense, as members expressed their views on how best the kastom authority could be incorporated 
with the state, and what sorts of power and role the jifly institution would have at the national level 
(Minutes of the Constitution 1979, p. 19):  
 
Walter Lini Pointed out that chiefs in the New Hebrides [Vanuatu] were more 
political than in other countries, and that the chiefs were national 
rather than local figures. 
 
Maxime Carlot Tried to find a way to incorporate the chiefs into a government 
structure, proposing two possibilities: (1) an upper house of chiefs; 
(2) a chief’s college within the Assembly.  
Professor Yash Ghai Discussed the role of chiefs in a number of countries and summarised 
the previous discussion on chiefs, and felt that the role of chiefs in 
the New Hebrides was somewhat different from that of chiefs in 
other countries. He felt it would perhaps be wise not to take any firm 
decision for the time being. 
 
W. Bangmatur Spoke on the need to ensure that, whatever structure was adopted, 
provision be made for the chiefs to play a role. He expressed his 
opposition to the council and said the Constitution should provide for 
the chiefs to act in times of crisis. 
 
These positions illustrate the tensions between conceptions of the legitimacy of legislative and kastom 
authority, and the place of each within a single national sovereignty. The proposals to have the jifly 
institution as an upper house or to establish reserved seats for jifs in the National Assembly generated 
divided opinions on the powers and roles of the jifly institution. Some committee members felt that it 
was significant to give equal consideration to the powers and authority of jifs with that of the 
legislative authority in the development of Vanuatu. The following is an extract from the minutes of 
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the discussions on the power of kastom authority at the national level (Minutes of the Constitution 
1979, p. 29): 
 
W. Bongmatur Spoke of the need to respect custom and chiefs - he warned that if chiefs were 
not given a proper role to play in the life of the country there would be a 
complete deadlock. 
A. Malere Said that the power and the functions of the chiefs should be defined first of 
all. 
G. Kalsakau Believed that the changing situation should be faced. The chiefs should be 
treated on the same level as everyone else and progress made to help the 
people of the New Hebrides. 
Prof. Zorgbibe Said he examined the possibility of having a second house for chiefs in the 
legislature and explained the nature of the House of Lords in England and the 
Senate in France. He said there appeared to be at least two possibilities in the 
New Hebrides: an upper house for the chiefs; or a reserved number of seats 
for chiefs in a single-chamber Assembly. In the second alternative, he said, 
thought would have to be given to the powers granted to the chiefs - to give 
them the same powers as the democratically elected people’s representatives 
could create problems and conflicts. 
J. Quarani Said it would be extremely difficult for the government to function 
effectively while excluding the chiefs. 
 
These extracts indicate the determination of local political elites to maintain kastom authority on an 
equal footing with legislative authority. There was a clear demonstration that kastom authority should 
be granted equal status and power with legislative authority; however, their views clashed with 
European notions of state-centred authority, as clearly expressed by Professor Zorgbibe. In other 
words, to give kastom authority the same powers as the democratically elected people’s 
representatives could create problems and conflicts. This demonstrated that the two systems of 
authority rested on two distinct sets of expectations of leadership and social order. It simply meant 
that an integrated system would fuel greater tensions and conflict at the expense of development 
objectives, because none of the authorities would want to be subordinate to each other.  
 
Because there was little room to reach a consensus on having equal powers and authority between 
kastom authority and legislative authority, the Chairman of the committee and member of the Conseil 
des Ministres, Father Gerald Laymang, sought the consensus of the committee to quarantine the 
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discussions on the traditional institution of jifs until there was a clear concept of the state political 
structure ( Minutes of the Constitution 1979). The implication of this decision would be that the 
incorporation of kastom authority within the state would be determined by the type of political model 
that the committee agreed upon. Indeed, at the end of the discussions the committee agreed for one 
assembly, as was reflected in the summary of the committee discussions, which showed: 
 
[a] consensus existed within the constitutional committee in favour of one assembly, one 
government, one state, one Constitution and decentralisation. This was because the committee 
did not think that the model of a federal state would be possible to unite all the people of the 
New Hebrides [Vanuatu] (Minutes of the Constitution 1979). 
This decision did not put at rest the fight for equal recognition of powers at all levels of society. The 
kastom authority pressed strongly for their powers to be recognised at the national level and, as such, 
they opted for the position of the Head of State. This was a proposal that put the committee into a 
challenging if not awkward position, and as such it generated deeply frustrated discussions, as 
reflected in the minutes of the committee discussions (Minutes of the Constitution 1979, p. 55): 
 
W. Lini Spoke in favour of preparing something New Hebridean, not excessively 
based on European concepts. He proposed that a solution could be for the 
Head of State to be the chairman of the assembly, who could also be a 
[kastom] chief. 
Professor Yash Ghai Felt that such a compromise might be possible, though he wondered whether 
it would work in practice on account of its lack of internal coherence. 
V. Boulekone Felt a single chief could not hold this position; in order for all the islands to 
be satisfied, it would be necessary for a group of chiefs to hold this position. 
F. Timakata Felt that as New Hebridean traditions and Western political concepts were so 
different, it would be better not to try to mix the two. 
W. Bongmatur It was important, before the elections, to ensure that chiefs were given a 
proper role to play in the life of the country. 
S. Regenvanu   Chiefs could elect a chief to be the Head of State. 
Professor Yash Ghai Said that conflict could arise between the national assembly and the council 
of chiefs; said this was possible; however, the assembly would 
constitutionally be supreme. 
 
These quotations demonstrate that the chances of the local political elites pushing for equal 
recognition of the two authorities in the newly established political institution of Vanuatu were slim, 
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as the European representatives on the committee argued strongly that this would create conflict 
between the legislative and kastom authority. The flow of the discussions were more towards the 
European model of liberal political democracy, and the kastom authority was perceived by the 
colonial representatives on the committee as a threat to a newly democratic institution. This view and 
position influenced the design of the Constitution and the political institutions that emerged in 
Vanuatu, and this resulted in kastom authority being simply located in the Constitution as a separate 
and independent institution. 
 
In the final stage of the constitutional drafting in September 1979, jif Bongmatur, interim president of 
MNCC at the time, made the following comments: 
 
I appreciated that the committee had decided not to go back to any of the agreements already 
reached; however, that it should be aware of the possible consequences of the decision made 
concerning the role of chiefs. The right of chiefs had not been clearly stated in the draft 
chapter on the national Council of Chiefs: the chiefs had, rather, been reduced to an advisory 
body and would find it difficult, as a consequence, to continue to play a leading role in the 
villages. (Minutes of the Constitution 1979; p. 124) 
This quotation illustrates that the kastom jifs were not satisfied with the way the Constitution dealt 
with their power and roles. It also demonstrated that kastom jifs felt that their rights to govern their 
lands and people were infringed by imposed political institutions. This foreign interference in the 
rights and roles of the kastom authority was a perennial political issue; local communities felt that 
foreigners were taking away their rights over land and resources through imposed institutions. As was 
stated by jif Bongmatur, the kastom authority would continue to fight for their rights and roles to be 
recognized at all levels of state administration in Vanuatu. It would be viewed as a mistake for the 
Constitution to suppress the power and role of the kastom jifs to one of consultation and advice. 
Consultative status meant the kastom authority would have no law-making powers; it would be kept 
outside parliament, and thus have only a status independent of the three arms of state, executive, 
legislative, and judiciary. It left in place, however, the political bases of traditional power exercised 
through kastom authority, derived though indirect elections of members by the district/village and 
island councils of jifs. Restricting the role of kastom jifs at the village, island and regional levels 
would not therefore restrict their de facto power (Minutes of the Constitution 1979).  
 
The quote by jif Bongmatur illustrates the dominance of the colonial authority, to override the local 
demands to be a distinct and influential part of the newly created state. It also illustrates a total failure 
of the Constitution to integrate successfully the power and authority of the kastom jifs with the state 
political structures. For instance, Walter Lini, the leader of the pro-independence movement and the 
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first Prime Minister of Vanuatu, expressed the fact that the Constitution was prepared in the best 
interests of colonial authority rather than of the people of Vanuatu:  
 
He felt that a Constitution was being prepared simply to satisfy France and Britain. The 
danger of preparing a Constitution to satisfy France and Britain was that, once the New 
Hebrides [Vanuatu] tried to alter it after their independence to suit their needs and culture, 
they would find themselves already trapped in international, rather than New Hebridean 
practices. He concluded by feeling that the committee was confused by the need on the one 
hand, to satisfy international requirements and, on the other hand, New Hebridean values and 
culture (Minutes of the Constitution 1979; p. 30). 
Lini believed that Vanuatu was to be saddled with the legacy of an institution that did not “fit” into its 
socio-cultural landscape and yet within which jifly members were able to exercise considerable 
informal power. What was not realised at the time was that this tension created the potential for abuse 
and the furtherance of individual political interests. At the national level as well as the institutional 
level, the ambiguities surrounding the power of the legislative authority with the kastom authority are 
an ongoing challenge that Vanuatu will need to make serious decisions about it in order to advance its 
governance reform and development objectives. As part of this research, the present researcher had 
the opportunity to interview the current President of the MNCC, and he echoed similar sentiments that 
were made by the first President of the MNCC, jif Bongmatur, in 1979: 
The Constitution did not tell us how the MNCC will operate. It did not say anything about 
how the MNCC will work with the state, what power and relationship it has with the state and 
so on. This was because they did it in a rush and the leaders at the time agreed that the detail 
of the council of chiefs will be developed after the signing of the Constitution. In the past 
three decades our leaders concentrated more on building the state centred governance and 
rational political institutions and there was not any attempt to pick up the unfinished business 
of the Constitution to revisit the concept of the jifly institution within the state structure. The 
reason why we have power imbalances, a governance deficit, and increased political 
instabilities today is because our leaders have neglected our traditional institution of kastom 
jifs (MNCC President - Tape interview 6 May 2013). 
Although this may well express some frustration and self-interest, this quotation illustrates the views 
of a number of participants, namely that the jifly institution was dropped into the Constitution for the 
sake of satisfying local political interests but with no real intention of allocating any powers to it. The 
quote demonstrated that there were three issues that were side-tracked by the constitutional 
committee, either deliberately or out of ignorance, and those issues are major challenges to the whole 
governance framework within Vanuatu. Firstly, the need for equal power sharing in the development 
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of Vanuatu between kastom authority and the legislative authority was not factored in the design of 
the Constitution, and as such the power struggle between the two institutions is an on-going challenge 
that Vanuatu will need to find ways to manage. Secondly, the shifting function of jifs as an individual 
authority to the function of jifs as institution lacks clarity regarding their working relationship and 
powers at different levels of the council. Thirdly, the Western political model employed in the jifly 
council did not work well given the contradictory practices and opposed values of the two systems. 
These are the fundamental issues that the Constitution failed to deal with, and as a consequence there 
exists a governance shortfall and power imbalance in Vanuatu. 
5.2.1 Implementation and challenges 
 The MNCC council was formally established in 1980 as per the Constitution, and after three years of 
its operation a number of changes had been made in its policy guidelines. Firstly, in 1983 the Council 
had changed its name to Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs (MNCC). The term Malvatumauiri 
was made up of three words: mal (chief), vatu (stones or islands), and mauri (living thing or 
something that grows and expands in the light); and these words were a mixture of dialects from the 
six Provinces of Vanuatu (Bolton 1999a; Lindstrom 1997, p. 217). This was very significant because 
it gives a sense of local ownership and has a name in local languages that people feel they are a part 
of. Indeed, it illustrates the continuous battle to distinguish kastom authority and its institution from 
the state legislative authority and rational political institutions. The Constitution restricted the 
members of the council to kastom jifs only, and this was intentional to avoid confusion between 
missionary chiefs and assessors. However, this provision did not establish any basis for electoral 
legitimacy. The 1983 MNCC policy guidelines defined the criteria for a kastom jifs as follows 
(Lindstrom 1997, p. 219):  
 
  The position of jif must be inherited through a bloodline. 
 A true kastom jif is someone who follows the proper kastom fashion and has a nasara, 
nakamal, land and people. 
 A true kastom jif is someone who is known by the whole village and has killed the pigs at the 
nasara, and people from his village have followed him and participated in his pig killing 
ceremony. 
 His title name and meaning must be in his original language. 
The change of name and the new policy direction were the two substantial changes that added new 
values and meaning to the council as a traditional institution representing the kastom authority at all 
levels of society. Those changes can be interpreted as an attempt by the local political elites to return 
to the original intention to keep kastom authority in its authentic form and grant them equal power in 
107 
 
the development of Vanuatu. However, as was pointed out by Father Walter Lini, once the local 
political elites realised the need to amend the Constitution after independence in favour of their 
traditional and cultural needs, they would find themselves already trapped in an international dilemma 
rather than Vanuatu practices. This is a present dilemma, in which Vanuatu as a state is juggling 
between the notions of either putting tradition within modernity or modernity within tradition. While 
the process of finding alternative pathways is taking place at a slow pace, kastom authority figures 
continue to pressure the state to grant them formal power in the development of Vanuatu. 
5.2.2 Status, power and authority of the council 
The MNCC has an independent status, which implies that it will work independently from the three 
major state institutions: Executive, Judiciary, and Legislature. On April 1982, the council held its 
annual meeting and invited the Attorney General to provide a full explanation of the status and the 
work of the council of chiefs. At the end of the meeting the council requested the Attorney General to 
send the explanation to council. In June 1982 the Attorney General wrote a four-page letter outlining 
the status, functions and powers of the council and its relationship with the state. The letter of the 
Attorney General, dated 9
th
 June 1982, to the President of the MNCC confirmed the following: 
The MNCC is an independent body and it does not come strictly into any of the usual 
constitutionally recognised arms of the state [the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary]. 
At the same time, however the Constitution does contain many references, express and 
implied, as to how and when the council may function in relation to other state institutions. 
The question then: is the national council of chiefs a state institution or not? The answer to 
this question is important because it determines whether or not the council is entitled to 
amongst other things, state financial assistance. As mentioned, the council is an independent 
body therefore it cannot be part of the government of the day. It therefore certainly cannot be 
part of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Department of Attorney General 1982). 
This legal view clearly underlines the constitutional ambiguities surrounding the role of kastom 
authority. It demonstrated that the intention of the constitutional committee and the effort of the local 
political elites to find a space of the jifly institution within the state political system of Vanuatu had 
been derailed by the strong pressure from the two colonial masters. The Attorney General’s views 
were based on the present status of the Constitution, which remained the same from the time of its 
inauguration on the 30th of July 1980. This expressed legal view also demonstrated how powerful and 
influential the Europeans had been in establishing a different political context and their alien 
institutions. It is evident from the aforementioned quote that the Constitution did not achieve its 
objectives to integrate the kastom authority with the state; the legal opinion illustrated that the jifly 
institution is not part of the state.  
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The Constitution accorded a special status to kastom authority, as is clearly suggested, not only by the 
fact that the body is established by the Constitution, but by the fact that the chapter on the MNCC is 
placed second in the way the Constitution introduces the major state institutions, namely: (1) 
Parliament - Chapter Four; (2) National Council of Chiefs - Chapter Five; (3) Head of State - Chapter 
Six; (4) Executive - Chapter Seven; and so on. In addition, an important consideration regarding the 
MNCC is that it reflects the fact that Vanuatu kastom and traditions, the national heritage, is 
specifically referred to as forming one of the bases upon which the Constitution is established. Indeed, 
the Constitution goes on further to explicitly connect the MNCC with the task of preserving and 
promoting this heritage. Still, its position within the structures of the Vanuatu state is ambigious. 
A major shift occurred in 1982 when the state, through the Parliament, committed for the first time 
state finances to support the operation of the MNCC and accepted it as one of the state’s institutions. 
While the Constitution enshrines an independent status to the council of chiefs, since 1982 the MNCC 
has begun to operate as a state bureaucracy. In each financial year the council submits to the Minister 
of Finance its expenditure estimates relating to its functions. Under this working relationship, the 
Parliament and the Executive have a powerful influence on the operation of the council in that the 
Council of Ministers has the power and the final say in the drawing up of the national budget before 
the Parliament considers it. This means that although the MNCC has a constitutional and legal right to 
be funded by the state, how much money the council actually receives in the annual budget allocations 
depends on what the Executive and the Parliament deem are relevant and viable activities to be 
undertaken by the council. The change of MNCC status to that of a functional bureaucracy has altered 
the power dynamics between the MNCC and Executive, in that the MNCC is now assigned its 
administrative roles by the state. As such, it is accountable to the state and not to kastom jifs and the 
people. This is critical because the MNCC as an institution is now being absorbed into the 
government machinery as one of the state’s administrative agents, and as such it has a popular 
mandate. While, in democratic theory, the state is the embodiment of the people’s sovereignty, and in 
being accountable to the state the MNCC is being accountable to the people, this link is not obvious in 
the eyes of the majority of kastom jifs at the local level.  
The kastom jifs are not happy with the integration of the MNCC as an administrative agent of the 
government. They wanted the MNCC institution to be separated, as was implied in the Constitution, 
and to have equal authority and power to actively participate in the development of Vanuatu rather 
than become a follower of the government. This frustration was echoed by the current President of the 
MNCC: 
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The MNCC does not have power to influence government decisions because in the 
Constitution it says government ‘may consult’ the MNCC. We wanted the Parliament to 
remove the word ‘may’ and substitute it with ‘shall’ to make it obligatory for the government 
and the Parliament to consult the National Council of Chiefs on any laws to do with land and 
customary matters. I tell you today I have not seen my space within the government. It is true 
that the Constitution provides for the establishment of the MNCC and recognises the kastom 
jifs but the Constitution and the MNCC Act does not tell us how to carry out our work. I am 
confused and many kastom jifs do not know how to work with the current institution that the 
Constitution gives us (MNCC President - Tape interview 18 May 2013) 
This powerfully illustrates the frustration among the kastom authorities to find their rightful space 
within the current state political institution. This is an on-going issue and a factor in current Vanuatu 
politics. It also demonstrates that the merging of the jifly institution with state administration organs 
has further exacerbated the complexities surrounding the perennial conflict of powers between kastom 
authority and state legislative authority. The frustrations of the kastom authority with the ways in 
which the Constitution diminished their independent authority and reduced their role to that of an 
advisory panel and consulting group cannot be ignored; it will surely have regrettable impacts in the 
future. At present kastom authority is pressuring the state to amend the Constitution in order to spell 
out clearly the power relationship between state legislative authorities and the jifly institution. Indeed, 
the jifs want to have dominion over the manners and ways Vanuatu is planning and managing its 
development programs. One of the kastom jifs from East Pentecost, jif Viraleo Boborenvanua, argues 
that: 
[c]hiefs [jifs] in Vanuatu must be given the necessary power to safeguard Vanuatu’s 
resources. This means giving power to the chiefs and making sure they are responsible for our 
lands, our customs and our country. He questioned government: Why is it that the picture of 
the coat of arms printed on the front of the Vatu [Vanuatu’s local currency] symbolises the 
chief, who is paramount, but the chiefs do not hold the power of this country? He said the 
picture on the Vatu is clear and explained that the government is an institution under the 
chiefs, and Members of Parliament should take their rightful place as workers, working for 
chiefs in Vanuatu (Lini 2005, p. 3). 
This illustrates a view shared by the majority of the research participants, who felt that the state is 
actually taking away their rights and power to govern Vanuatu, and make important decisions that 
will impact on the local communities. This debate is serious because it illustrates the magnitude of 
frustration that the kastom authority has with the state legislative authority and, most importantly, it is 
similar to the argument made three decades ago when the constitutional committee deliberated on the 
power and authority of the two institutions (Minutes of the Constitutions 1979). Critically, the kastom 
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authority has a view that the jifly council is a supreme institution that the parliament and other state 
institutions should be subordinate to. The President of the MNCC shared similar frustrations and 
argued for the kastom authority and institution to take a leading role in the development of Vanuatu: 
I told the government that I am not one of their children. They come out from the nasara and 
as such I am their father. I told them that they need to listen to the advice of the father and not 
for the father to follow the advice of his son. In our kastom children listen to the advice and 
get wisdom from their parents. The reason why we have much political instability is because 
the government does not want to involve us in the sharing of the ministerial portfolios and 
also in the major decision making that affects the lives of our people (Tape interview 18 May 
2013).  
This illustrates the deeply held view that the jifs do not view the government as the sovereign 
authority, and this is critical because it impacts on the legitimacy of the state. As far as political 
democracy and the sovereign state model are concerned, the central government is the supreme 
authority exercising legislative and executive power. The present battle of power between the kastom 
authority and the legislative authority illustrates that the jifs are in actual fact claiming significant 
executive authority for themselves. This is a perennial power struggle between both institutions that 
the drafting Constitution committee failed to address satisfactorily in the design of the Constitution. In 
the Constitution, the role of jifs is diminished to a ‘consultative’ role with no decision-making power.  
In an endeavour to increase their participation in development, the MNCC has a hierarchical structure 
and a bureaucratic system to maximise administrative efficiency. This has exposed them to many 
challenges, and one of those challenges is to do with the infrastructure and financial support to deal 
with a bureaucratic system of administration and also to serve the needs of the local community. Once 
the organisation became formalised and oriented towards globalised approaches to contemporary 
organisational management, the jifs realised that most of their time was spent in dealing with 
administrative matters rather than working with people at different levels.  
5.2.3 Bureaucratisation  
The MNCC is now organised into an administrative agent that reflects global management practices 
and approaches. The secretariat office is headed by a Chief Executive Officer, with five staff; and all 
are employed by the Public Service Commission. The staffs are civil servants who are recruited on 
merit, and their role is to provide secretariat support to the Council of Chiefs. The chairman of the 
council is referred to as President, and he is elected on the first sitting of the council after the general 
election is completed. He is a full time employee for a period of five years and receives the same 
benefits as the Head of State. Beside the Constitution, the MNCC has its own legislation dealing with 
all administration matters and the terms and condition of the members of the council.  
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The members of the MNCC receive sitting allowances of $AUD50 and a subsistence allowance of 
another $AUD50. In addition to that they get a monthly allowance of $AUD300 and a gratuity 
payment of $AUD250, paid at the end of their term in the council. It was clear at the discussions of 
the constitutional committee that the jifs would not be paid for their work and the members of the 
council would only receive sitting allowances rather than wages and salaries (Minutes of the 
Constitution 1979). The committee felt that the practice of paying jifs for their work would set an 
unprecedented scenario where all the kastom jifs would depend on the government to pay them to do 
their traditional jobs. In terms of allowances, this rate is applied across the various government 
committees, boards, and councils. However, it would seems that the jifs got lower benefits than the 
minimum standard wage of Vt30,000 per month, which is equivalent to AUD$300 (Cullwick 2012). 
Their annual allowances are much lower than what the political officials are getting annually as per 
the Official Salary Act of 2008. In Vanuatu, a political advisor gets AUD$20,000 per annum. 
Comparatively, the members of the jifly councils are paid much lower than the other political 
appointees and the civil servants in government. Indeed, the kastom jifs are working voluntarily to 
promote peace and social harmony in all levels of society, regardless of whether they are motivated by 
money or someone instructs them to do their traditional functions. The members of the MNCC are 
elected at the island councils by kastom jifs only, and as such they are not working on a full time 
basis, which means their role is to simply attend the council meetings annually and disseminate the 
information to their respective constituents. 
5.2.4 Election of kastom jifs 
The members of the MNCC council are elected representatives from a narrow franchising restricted to 
kastom jifs only. In other words, their election to the MNCC is a restricted franchise, which is kastom 
jifs only; and as a consequence this minimises the legitimacy of the MNCC. Furthermore, because 
MNCC does not go through a popular election and does not have a popular mandate from the people, 
this creates tensions in power perception with legislative authority. As is argued in this Chapter, if 
MNCC were to be allowed to be elected through popular mandate and not through a restricted 
franchise of kastom jifs, it might be able to connect directly with the local people in rural Vanuatu. 
This also implies that it might have a greater legitimacy than what it is currently does; but that 
opportunity was not taken by the constitutional drafting committee, because they were concerned 
about MNCC becoming a source of political opposition to the state. They did not want to give MNCC 
a popular mandate to criticise the state. The aim of the constitutional drafting committee was to build 
a coherent state system within Vanuatu, and just to accommodate kastom and kastom jifs in the state 
structure by bringing them into the state and making them, largely, paid as government officials, 
whose office is gained through a limited election of kastom jifs only. This was to diminish the power 
of kastom jifs and strengthen the position of the state with regard to kaston authority.  
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Hence, MNCC and Island Council of Chiefs are composed of the elected kastom jifs, and this is a 
strict criterion. The representatives of the Urban Council of Chiefs are not elected, but the law makes 
provision for the Island Council of Chiefs to appoint them to become members of the MNCC.  
Chapter Five of the Constitution stipulates the following provision in relation to the election of the 
council of chiefs: 
The National Council of Chiefs shall be composed of custom chiefs [kastom jif] elected by 
their peers sitting in District Councils of Chiefs. (2)The Council shall make its own rules of 
procedure. (3) The Council shall hold at least one meeting a year. Further meetings may be 
held at the request of the Council, Parliament, or the Government. (4) During the first sitting 
following its election the Council shall elect its Chairman (Constitution of Vanuatu, 1980). 
This clearly suggests a hybrid system of government that is not commensurate with the Vanuatu 
context. While the value of elections was acknowledged, voting rights for the election of MNCC 
representatives is limited to the kastom jifs, which denies popular mandate for decision-making. In 
Vanuatu, kastom jifs either inherited their position or gained it through the ranking system, as 
explained in Chapter Four. As discussed in this chapter, the codification of the inheritance principle 
arguably also contradicts useful flexibility inherent in jifly rule, and again represents the adoption of 
western European notions of aristocracy and royalty into Vanuatu’s independence Constitution. This 
is indeed a political model that does not work well in practice and arguably works against the grain of 
the traditional political value, leadership through community consensus, because the decision to 
appoint MNCC members excludes the communities that kastom jifs are supposed to serve. An 
important element of community oversight or accountability is lost in the process. 
 There are twenty members of the MNCC, who are elected by the twenty Island Council of Chiefs. 
The state, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, can by order provide for the regulation and 
conduct of elections of members of the council, at national and island levels. This provision provides 
room for the state to control and influence the election and the number of the members of the 
councils. The first election was held in 1979, and the process of election and the total members of the 
council were prescribed through the order made by the Minister of Internal Affairs, in which it was 
agreed that five kastom jifs would come from each district. There was no record of the kastom jifs 
throughout the archipelago, and the election had many irregularities in voter registration and the 
number of voters. It is often the case that, prior to an election, the Island Council of Chiefs have 
already decided on their candidate through ‘consensus’, and the selections are done on a term basis, 
which gives the opportunity for all area councils to become members or the President of the MNCC. 
When asked how many registered number of kastom jifs are in Vanuatu today, the Chief Executive 
Officer of the MNCC responded that it was difficult to figure out because the term ‘chief’ is 
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ambiguous and anyone could claim this title. Thus, the challenge for the council is to register the 
kastom jifs and their boundaries or individual nasara: 
During independence the Constitution talks about the notion of bringing the role of kastom 
jifs to the national level or bigger scale. The organisation of MNCC and the representation in 
the National Council follow the principle of democracy (election). Our challenges now is to 
clarify the following, which are critical to functioning of MNCC on a democratic basis and 
these challenges include: (1) identify customary boundaries (nasara); (2) identify who is the 
kastom jifs; (3) organise the area and village council of chiefs. Based on these works we can 
elect representative of kastom jifs who come from nasara to become members of the Island 
Council of Chiefs and MNCC (MNCC Secretary General - Tape interview 6 March 2014) 
It is apparent that kastom authority and its institutions have been left behind and are neglected by the 
state. In other words, the jifly institution has not modernised, and remains purely in its traditional 
nature and form. The current election practice is that the village jifs within each island area would 
send representatives to an island wide meeting, which would select representatives to a district-wide 
meeting of jifs, which in turn would vote for a single regional jifly representative to become a member 
of MNCC. Throughout this process, the exact character of this ‘Electoral College of chiefs’ and the 
specific qualifications of village, island, and district jifs remain blurred and undefined; nor could they 
be easily codified from the above, given Vanuatu’s flexibility and variation in local leadership 
practices (MacClancy 2002). The codification of jifly inherited status undermines the future 
legitimacy of the jifs by accepting MNCC institutions as an administrative agent of the state. In other 
words, MNCC has been absorbed into the state and exists as a bureaucratic entity accountable to 
government and executive. These changes restrict the capacity for kastom authority to contribute to 
the development of Vanuatu, and disconnect MNCC from its sources of traditional legitimacy.  
The ordinary citizens are excluded from voting and participating in this election process, and therefore 
they have no voice or ability to decide who should be the members of the Island Council and MNCC. 
Indeed, the limited financial resources and the capacity of the kastom jifs prevent them from 
competing in the election, which means that the election is done by consensus rather than competition. 
Thus, the limited participation of kastom jifs and the exclusion of the population in the election of the 
jifly councils was a deliberate intention to protect traditional political values of hereditary rule; but in 
actual fact it contradicts the principal values of democracy. In other words, the inherited status of the 
kastom jifs cuts against democratic principles, and therefore there is a need for Vanuatu to rethink 
MNCC election processes. Thus, an opportunity to use kastom authority to build the foundation of a 
democratic society has paradoxically been sacrificed in the interests of administrative convenience 
and state building, as opposed to nation state-building. The other feature that was incongruous in the 
context of Vanuatu was the decentralisation function of jifs, which was demarcated by the two 
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colonial powers based on the principle of administrative efficiency. This has not been working 
because of different traditions and cultures mixing together within one vaguely defined boundary, and 
there is no clear understanding of specific rules as to which culture and traditions took precedence in 
local political affairs. The ambiguities and tensions this created has merely increased opportunities for 
the abuse of power. 
5.2.5 Decentralisation 
Despite the above concern and ambiguities, the jifly councils have a fully-fledged organisational 
structure, which begins at the national level and flows through to the village level, as depicted in 
Figure 5.1. It has four administrative councils: MNCC, Island Council of Chiefs (ICC), Urban 
Council of Chiefs (UCC), and Area Council of Chiefs (ACC). At the time of writing this case study, 
there were only three councils that were fully operational: MNCC, Island Council of Chiefs, and the 
Urban Council of Chiefs. There are twenty Island Councils of Chiefs, two Urban Councils of Chiefs, 
and seventy-five Area Councils of Chiefs.  
 
Figure 5.1 Jifly organisation structure 
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The decentralisation of jifly institutions parallels the national government organisational structure 
down to provincial government and the Area Council. The jifly councils are divided into four 
organisational levels: national, regional, sub-regional, and village. At the national level, the MNCC is 
intended to bridge the gap between the state and the rest of the jifly councils; however, the majority of 
the participants in the present study felt that this intention has not been translated into a practical 
working relationship between the two institutions. The Island Council of Chiefs works closely with 
the MNCC and the Area Council of Chiefs, and similarly the Village Council of Chiefs. Their primary 
role is confined to information dissemination and awareness, because the upper councils have no 
authority to direct and influence the kastom jifs at the village level. At the village levels, individual 
kastom jifs have their own jifly councils that are based on the traditional clan structure and follow their 
respective traditional norms, rules, and processes. Unlike the Area Council, Island Councils and 
MNCC, where there is opportunity to weave a thread of commonality on general principles of 
consensus, the Village Council is challenging because at this level traditional leadership structures 
and customary practices and values are highly diverse from one village to another. 
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Figure 5.2 Colonial administration boundaries -1906-1994 
Source: Vanuatu Government 1994a, Colonial Administration Boundary-1906-1994, 
https://www.google.com.au/search?q=vanuatu+map&biw 
The organisation of the councils was based on the colonial boundaries, as depicted in Figure 5.2, 
which divided the whole archipelago into four districts: Northern District, Central District number 
one, Central District number two, and Southern District. However, the challenge that remained with 
these colonial boundaries was that it intertwined multiple diverse kastoms and cultures in a quagmire 
of administration, which impeded the organisations and the function of the councils at different levels. 
In 1994, the government reviewed the boundaries and divided the archipelago into six provinces, as 
shown in Figure 5.3. Although it was not perfect, it nevertheless advanced the ongoing efforts to 
improve the administrative effectiveness of the councils at all levels. For instance, the MNCC has 
currently organising area councils that have similar cultures and traditions, as is in the case of 
Emae/Mataso/Makira and Tongoa/Tongoariki/Buniga. This has demonstrated that there is the 
opportunity to weave a common thread of values at the level of the area councils in each island; and if 
this can be achieved at the area councils it will bring impetus to whole notion of jifly council as an 
agent of development and administration at local and national levels. Thus, in the presence of 
unresolved challenges regarding the power and roles of the two institutions, the jifs have demonstrated 
the capacity and capability to perform effectively at all levels of society; and indeed, it is the only 
authority that people at the local community level are getting used to and familiar with. 
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Figure 5.3  Provincial government boundaries-1994 
Source:  Vanuatu Government 1994b, Boundaries of Provincial Governments 1994 
https://www.google.com.au/search?q=vanuatu+map&biw 
5.2.6 Functions  
The Constitution spelled out two primary functions of the jifly councils: 
 A competence to discuss all matters relating to custom and tradition and may make 
recommendations for the preservation and promotion of ni-Vanuatu culture and languages; 
 Provide inputs and answers on any question relating to traditional land and custom, in 
connection with any bill before parliament. 
 
These two principal functions have been further elaborated in the MNCC Act of 2006, and the 
functions now include: ‘resolve disputes according to local kastom; prescribe the value of exchange of 
gifts for a kastom marriage; promote and encourage the use of kastom and culture; promote peace, 
stability and harmony; and promote and encourage sustainable social and economic development’ 
(National Council of Chiefs Act 2006). The rest of the sections in the Act confine the functions of the 
council to the registration of kastom jifs and advice on matters relating to custom, as well as 
overseeing the operation of the Island Council of Chiefs and the Urban Council of Chiefs. There was 
no mention of the working relationship of the MNCC with the state, except the provision that the 
Constitution provided for an opportunity for ‘consultation’ between the two institutions, Parliament 
and MNCC. In this framework, the working relationship of the jifly council with the state is pitched at 
the advisory and consultative level. 
 
The potential for kastom jifs to play an active role in the development of Vanuatu received insufficient 
attention during the constitutional design. Father Walter Lini said that if the jif wanted a leadership 
role in the development of the state they had the choice of becoming the political leaders and 
contesting the national parliamentary seats (Minutes of the Constitution 1979). To date, the kastom jif 
has proven beyond doubt that they can make a meaningful contribution to the development of 
Vanuatu without contesting elections for national parliamentary seats. As already discussed in 
Chapter Four, at the local and national levels the jifs play an important role in taking care of the socio-
economic needs of their community, and people rely on them to address their needs. In the everyday 
lives of rural people, the prime institution of authority remains the kastom jifs, and to a limited extent 
the state (Howell & Hall 2010). Several studies on the role of jifs at the rural area suggest that jifs play 
an important role in realising customary law, addressing disputes about land ownership, and 
maintaining peace and social order within and among tribes (Howell & Hall 2010; Maltali, Sandy & 
Tamashiro 2009). In a similar vein, a decade ago, William Miles observed that the chiefs were more 
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effective in tackling social problems such as‘land disputes, property rights, marital problems, and 
child illegitimacy’ (Miles 1998, p. 16).  
 
In 2009, the Foundation of the People of the South Pacific (FSP) conducted a comprehensive study on 
the roles of the kastom jifs at local levels. They explored how the jifs have played their role in 
addressing new development challenges that their local communities have experienced, such as 
unemployed youth in villages, development projects, and new forms of crime (Maltali, Sandy & 
Tamashiro 2009). The study focused on the whole Province of Penama, which covers three main 
islands in the north, Ambae, Pentecost, and Maevo. The study highlighted examples of what the jif’s 
do in their communities throughout the archipelago. In Ankoro, north of Pentecost, the jif mustered 
the support of the whole village to put their hands and efforts together to build a big nakamal, in 2009, 
which is commonly used for public gatherings, meetings, and social functions such as marriages 
(Maltali, Sandy & Tamashiro 2009). Similarly, in Sara village the community came together to build 
a Pastor’s house on land that their jif allocated to the Anglican Church. In Bulebale community the jif 
led his people in erecting a stone wall at the entrance of Bwatnapi Junior Secondary School (Maltali, 
Sandy & Tamashiro 2009). In the north of Tanna, Jif Harry Maimai led his whole community to build 
five kilometres of road named “Harry Maimai Highway”, using local tools such as axes, 
wheelbarrows, spades, and knives. All these are examples of how the kastom jifs at the local 
community level can take initiatives to address the development challenges that their communities 
face little support for from the state. It also illustrates the capability and the effectiveness of what jifs 
can do in addressing development and justice both at local community and national levels. 
5.3 Effectiveness and relevance of jif’s role at national level 
At the national level, the jifs have demonstrated their capacity to adapt to a changing development 
context and to still be effective in addressing social problems as well as new development challenges. 
The following examples demonstrate that over the last three decades the kastom authority has had the 
capacity and the capability to deal with contemporary development conflicts and, most importantly, 
they can become an equal partner with the state in addressing the development challenges that 
Vanuatu is confronting (AusAID 2010; Kernot & Sakita 2008). This has been reflected in the roles the 
councils have played in major conflicts in the capital that the state would not have been able to deal 
with without the assistance of the kastom jifs. These include: 
 
a) The abduction of the Head of State by Police in 1996 
This was an incident that involved a conflict between the state institutions and the legislative 
authorities, and yet it would seem that the state through its institutional mechanisms was not able to 
resolve it. On August 1996, members of the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) expressed in writing to the 
government their grievances over their outstanding allowances and demanded the government pay 
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them without further delay. The timing of their demand was critical because it was a period in which 
Vanuatu was going through political turmoil with a change of leadership and major key government 
institutions such as the public service, judiciary, and parliament all at various times under attack and 
in peril (Ambross 1997). Amidst the law and order challenges that the country was confronting, the 
police and VMF took advantage of the situation to push their grievances onto the government agenda 
ahead of the national security. 
 
 The Prime Minister, Serge Vohor, rejected their demands on the grounds that the state faced budget 
constraints and the VMF’s claims could not be accommodated within a severely constrained national 
budget. In an act of rebellion on 12 October 1996, an armed detachment of the Vanuatu Mobile Force 
abducted the President of the state, Jean Marie Leye, from his bed, and dragooned a VanAir pilot 
from his sleep, commanding him to fly the President to Malekula to meet the acting Prime Minister, 
Barack Sope (Ambross 1997, p. 505). While on Malekula, it was discovered that their intention was 
not to seize the state but rather to push their claims for ‘$US980,000’ in outstanding allowances 
(Morgan 1998, p. 289). At the meeting the acting Prime Minister Sope was forced to agree to the 
VMF’s demands, and at the same time promised an amnesty for the leaders of the “industrial coup” 
(Morgan 1998). 
 
In the capital, the VMF confiscated the patrol boat RVS Tukoro, and occupied the Police 
Headquarters, Bauerfield International Airport, Telecom and Radio Vanuatu, sending shock waves 
throughout the regions (Morgan 1998). The acting Prime Minister flew back to the capital and met 
with the kastom Jifs and the MNCC, and requested them to negotiate a peaceful solution with 
members of the VMF. On 19 October, the Jifs managed to conclude the reconciliation with all the 
political party leaders and the members of the VMF with a kava ceremony at the chief’s nakamal 
(Morgan 1998). This incident demonstrated the robustness of the jifly system and their traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms at national levels, using new forms of conflict resolution involving the 
legal-rational state authorities and institutions. Undoubtably, the jifs had proven to have the capability 
to adapt to new challenges and their readiness to tackle new conflicts at the national level. 
 
b) The 1998 Vanuatu National Provident Fund (VNPF) riots  
In this particular riot, the state had to call upon kastom authority to diffuse serious tensions and restore 
law and order using traditional mechanisms. On 12 January 1998, five hundred men and women 
gathered in front of the Vanuatu National Provident Fund’s (VNPF) office building, in central Port 
Vila, expressing their dissatisfaction over the misuse of their retirement funds (Amnesty International 
1998). This followed the state Ombudsman’s report, which accused the senior politicians and 
individual business enterprises of allegedly borrowing funds from the VNPF that they had not repaid 
for various reasons (Kernot & Sakita 2008). The protesters clashed with police, and some of them 
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threatened to harm the VNPF staff and started throwing stones at the VNPF building, smashing 
windows. With the assistance of the police, the staff of the VNPF managed to safely vacate the 
building. The violence was intense and saw the protesters overturn police cars and other cars that were 
reported to belong to VNPF’s staff (Amnesty International 1998). About twenty police officers in riot 
gear were forced to withdraw after being attacked with stones, sticks and metal rods. At least five 
police were injured and treated in hospital; two officers were admitted to hospital for observation, one 
with a fractured arm, one with a broken leg (Amnesty International 1998, p. 2). 
 
The businesses that were implicated in the Ombudsman’s report were destroyed and many shops were 
looted. With hundreds of people joining the protesters, the violence soon spread to other offices and 
private homes of people who were believed to have borrowed the funds from the VNPF. The 
increased violence compelled the government to request the assistance of the kastom jifs to quell the 
violence and restore law and order. The jifs in the capital responded immediately and managed to 
restore law and order. Kernot and Sakita provided a full analysis of the incident, and made the 
following observation:  
 
Many of the rioters were from the Tanna community, and so it was the [jifs] from Tanna who 
addressed the crowd. Eyewitnesses suggest that on their (jifs) arrival, the jifs were able to 
quieten the crowd, asking people from Tanna to sit and listen. The jifs spoke politely to the 
people, asking them to return to their homes and to stop the violence. In response to this 
request, most of the rioters did move away from the VNPF building (1998, p. 6). 
 
The jifs once again emerged as peace-makers, and their politeness, gentleness and compassion to help 
people were additional elements that gained the respect of the people. People gave more legitimacy to 
kastom authority than to state officials, and in this particular example the state police could not restore 
law and order regardless of the fact that they had used the latest crowd control equipment to diffuse 
the riot. This can be interpreted to suggest that there still exists an informal popular mandate for the 
exercise of kastom authority, which is still recognised as one of the important pillars of peace, unity, 
and harmony in Vanuatu’s society. Critically, the effective interventions of kastom jifs in many social 
problems at the national level demonstrates that the state cannot function effectively without them. 
 
c) Tanna and Ambrym community conflict in 2007  
This was another level of conflict that involved two ethnic communities in an urban centre, and the 
successful involvement of the jifs’ representatives from the two communities demonstrated that 
despite diverse traditions there is a possibility for two ethnic communities or islands to work together 
in addressing social problems. The Tanna and Ambrym conflict happened in Port Vila on March 
2007, over an alleged used of sorcery that took the life of a woman from Malekula who was married 
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to a man from Tanna (Independent 2007). This prompted the Tanna community to accuse the 
Ambrym community of misusing sorcery, or naikamas as it is known in Bislama. The quarrelling 
between the two communities finally turned into fierce violence between both communities, and saw 
three man killed, homes burnt and about two hundred and sixty people temporarily misplaced (Garae 
2007; Willie 2007). The three men who were killed included a man from Tanna and the other two 
were from Ambrym. It was also reported that over one hundred and forty people from Tanna and 
around one hundred and twenty people from Ambrym were forced to seek refuge in emergency 
housing because their houses were damaged during the violence (Willie 2007). 
 
The Prime Minister pleaded for peace by performing a kastom ceremony with a pig and traditional 
mats to Tanna jifs (Kernot and Sakita 2008). The jifs from Tanna responded immediately and 
managed to restore law and order. As a way of preventing further violence and restoring peace, the 
Jifs from Tanna liaised with the Jifs from Ambrym and decided on the path for peaceful restoration 
within the two communities. The process of the reconciliation took two steps: the first step was 
reconciliation within the Tanna Community, and the second step was reconciliation between the 
Tanna community and Ambrym community (DailyPost 2007). During the interviews for the present 
research a member from the Ambrym community alluded to the fact that the state was not able to 
solve the dispute between the two communities in Port Vila: 
 
In our society jifs are an important political force because when there is a problem in the 
community they can resolve it without any wages or someone forcing them to do it. With the 
Ambrym and Tanna conflict in 2007, we were happy that our jifs were able to resolve it using 
our traditional culture and although many lost their properties and life everyone was satisfied 
with the outcomes of reconciliation that we had at jif’s nakamal in Port Vila. The government 
promised us to do a commission of enquiry and until now we have not heard anything from 
the report. In all the conflicts that happened in Port Vila, government want a commission of 
enquiry before they responded to the victims and until now government had not implemented 
the recommendations of those reports. This tells us that government is not able to resolve 
ethnic tensions and conflict in Port Vila and in the various islands of Vanuatu (Tape 
Interviews 9 May 2013) 
 
Perception of the kastom authority as a peace-maker challenges the legitimacy of the state in many 
ways and begs for a closer cooperation between the state and jifly institutions. The ethnic tension 
between Tanna and Ambrym communities involved loss of lives and properties; however, the jifs of 
the two communities managed to reconnect the families using traditional powers and culture for 
restoring peace. This is one of the strengths of the traditional dispute resolution system, which once 
again is proving to be effective and relevant in a contemporary society. 
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d) Port Vila prison escape in 2006 
 Critically, the nature of the social problems that jifs have successfully addressed using their 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms varies across the spectrum. This particular case 
demonstrates that the jifs can handle serious cases such as prison escapees. This is indeed something 
that it is outside the jurisdiction of the kastom authorities, and again it demonstrates that, where the 
state has its limitations, kastom governance can complement it through the enormous work that the 
jifly councils and individual jifs are doing within their respective jurisdictions.  
 
In 2006, due to poor conditions in the prison house in Port Vila, twenty prisoners escaped into the 
jungle, causing fear amongst the whole population of Efate and Port Vila (Independent 2006). Despite 
several attempts by the Police in conjunction with the Vanuatu Mobile Force to catch them, there was 
little success. On the first night of their escape, a European was murdered in his house at Devil’s 
Point, about thirty kilometres from the capital, and the incident was believed to be linked with the 
activities of the escaped prisoners (Independent 2006). In various parts of Port Vila, there were 
incidents of looting, stealing, and raping, which were also believed to be linked to the escaped 
prisoners. The government, through the joint efforts of the Police and the Vanuatu Mobile Force, 
could not capture all the escapees even though they used guns and other weapons. 
 
The jifs were requested by the government to go on radio to make a public appeal for all the prisoners 
to surrender to them, and then they would deliver them safely back to the government. Within two 
days, all the prisoners surrendered to a kastom jif from Tanna who lived in the Black Sands 
community, and upon receiving them the kastom jif from Tanna contacted all the other jifs residing in 
Port Vila to arrange for the communities to feed them (Independent 2006). The jifs kept them one 
night at nakamal and the following day they organised a reconciliation ceremony at the MNCC 
nakamal, where they handed over all the prisoners to the government. The prisoners tended to listen 
when their jif representatives called for them to surrender to kastom authority in order for them to be 
delivered peacefully to the state police. One jif commented that: 
 
The government used the guns to search for the prisoners when they ran away from the prison 
cells. We [jifs] had used our kastom fashions to capture them. When we made a call they 
heard our voice because they knew that jifs were here to make peace and reconciliation in an 
amicable way that reflected love for everyone. There were several occasions that we asked the 
government to come to jif’s nakamal here and took the prisoners back to prison cells and we 
asked the state police not to hit them (Tape interviews 19 May 2013). 
 
This again demonstrates that local communities give more legitimacy to kastom authority and 
institutions. It also demonstrates the strength of the traditional mechanisms, where a murderer and 
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criminal can respect the calling of kastom authority at the nakamal. In this case the jifs showed that 
prisoners will listen to them even if the state does not provide them with any safety guarantee to 
address serious cases like that of the prison escapees. Those escapees were delivered peacefully by jifs 
to police who charged them with crimes they had committed. This is a classic example of a 
collaborative effort between the state and kastom authority to address contemporary development 
challenges in Vanuatu society. 
 
e) Millennium Challenge Account ring road in Efate and Santo 
While the jifs have demonstrated their capabilities to mitigate different forms of development conflict 
at the national levels, their role has not been limited to dispute resolutions. Over the last three decades 
there is concrete evidence of development projects that jifs were instrumental in bringing to success. 
This covers a wide range of projects of different scales and size. Because of limited space, the present 
case study selected one particular project worth $US65 million for which jifs have clearly 
demonstrated their effectiveness in mustering the support of their local communities in managing such 
an immense-scale project without disruption.  
 
In 2004 the US Government, through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), selected 
Vanuatu as eligible for MCC assistance, after having met its pre-condition eligibility criteria for a 
funding compact. In March 2006, the Vanuatu government concluded all the formalities for the 
funding, followed with the signing of the compact worth $US65.69 million, earmarked for two major 
infrastructure projects in Efate and Santo (MCA 2008). The project implementation began in April 
2006 and was completed in April 2011. This was the largest infrastructure project that Vanuatu had 
embarked on since independence. However, the interesting key player in this project was the role of 
jifly councils in the two islands, and these were highlighted as the major drivers of the success of this 
project. The 97 kilometre ring road had the support of Efate Vaturisu Council of Chiefs and the local 
communities living adjacent to the road. The President of the Efate Vaturisu Council of Chiefs, jif 
Kalkot Murmur, mustered the support of individual kastom jifs and their people along the ring road to 
support the project by giving their quarries and allowing the road to be built on their land. Integral to 
this community support was the concept of the “Good Will Entitlement” (GWE), which is another 
term for compensation. Jif Murmur had spearheaded the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), which 
focused on landowners and leaseholders affected by the temporary or permanent relocation of 
structures, crops, fences or loss of income, in a way that is appropriate and consistent (MCA 2008). 
The RAP was an important plan that the department of agriculture used to replace the crops, fences, 
and trees that were damaged during the road construction. The following quotation reflects upon the 
shared experiences of the Project Director about the importance for government to have regular 
dialogues with jifly councils, and recognises the important contribution that they can play at their level 
to manage development projects: 
124 
 
 
We met with the jifs at the local communities to explain the concept and the benefit of the 
projects and through our several education awareness programs that we had with them the jifs 
began to understand clearly the outcome of the projects. Once we created ownership of the 
project with the jifs at different levels of councils (island, area, and village council of chiefs), 
we reached an understanding that the communications and the work plans of the project will 
be communicated through Island Council of Chiefs to area council and the village council. All 
our communication related to the project were channelled through the Island Council of 
Chiefs and they liaised on our behalf with individual kastom jifs, and through this means the 
project went successfully without any disruptions from the landowners and the local 
communities (MCA Project Director - Tape interviews 9 May 2013) 
 
In summary, this project was an eye opener for the government and development aid agencies such as 
the MCC, on how effective jifs were in managing the implementation of a sixty million dollar 
infrastructure project. One of the important lessons learnt from this project was the role of Vatirusu 
Council of Chiefs in negotiating the quarries, on behalf of the government, with individual kastom jifs 
and land owners: 
 
The council of jifs played an important role to negotiate the quarries with the landowners and 
because of their involvement it reduced the risk of the disputes among the landowners about 
the quarry. When we went to the villages we used the kastom jifs to communicate to their 
people, and most importantly we used the jifs to solve any disputes associated with the 
project. The jifs and people were happy when the government respected their channel of 
communication and used their traditional process to work with them. This model of engaging 
local communities through their jifs created the ownership of the project and the communities 
and traditional authorities were keen to participate and support the project until the end (MCA 
Project Director - Tape interviews 9 May 2013). 
 
This project demonstrates the possibility for the kastom authorities to work with the state in 
addressing development challenges at local levels. When the government respects traditional 
institutions, values, processes, and engages the local communities as equal partners in any 
development project at community levels, there is a greater sense of the ownership of the project by 
the local community. This is one of the few cases that occurred on an ad hoc basis; and it is something 
that government needs to recognise and formalise it in its national development frameworks, so that 
roles and powers of kastom authority are clearly identified with clear boundaries. 
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The work of most kastom jifs is relevant and effective in the local communities; and therefore their 
presence at the councils in village, island and national levels gives greater relevance to jifly 
institutions. However, the extent to which one can tell whether their work is effective is assessed by 
looking specifically within their customary boundaries, because their performance varies from one 
village to another. The current relevance and effectiveness of the MNCC is measured through the 
normal state performance assessment critieria using budget expenditure against their activity plans. 
These narrow evaluations do not capture the subtle dynamics of kastom governance; nor the 
contribution of kastom to social order. 
5.4 Relevancy 
The position and the work of the kastom jifs from village to national levels are deemed relevant and 
important to the people of Vanuatu (Howell & Hall 2010; Maltali, Sandy & Tamashiro 2009; 
Mitchelle 2008). As such, their presence at the MNCC gives greater relevance and credibility to the 
MNCC organisation. However, the general population is caught in the middle, between the role of the 
kastom jifs as individual leaders and the role of chiefs as an institution that is represented by the 
MNCC and its organisational structure. Many speak of the relevancy of the role of kastom jifs as an 
individual authority and, because of the absence of the impact of MNCC at village level and island 
levels, the relevancy of the MNCC is limited to Port Vila only. The kastom jifs unite a society 
together in ways and manners that the central government cannot, and this is reflected largely through 
their traditional roles in establishing peace through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms: 
In Vanuatu there will be no peace without the kastom jifs. Kastom jifs were here before the 
colonialisation and when we talk about the governance system of Vanuatu, one fundamental 
pillar is our jifly system. Without peace you cannot build a nation and Vanuatu was fortunate 
to have jifs who played an important role to maintain peace, which is a critical part of life. 
The jifs work every day in their villages or local communities without salary or someone 
motivating them to do their job. Yesterday, a kastom jif from my village approached me to be 
part of a reconciliation ceremony involving a wife and husband relationship. I did not know 
who the couple was but the jif told me that they were my relatives and I needed to find out. 
The jifs volunteer to do their job but they got no recognition from the state (Political Advisor - 
Tape interview 17 May 2013) 
It is increasingly apparent that the jifly institution is one fundamental pillar of peace and governance 
in Vanuatu. This quotation also demonstrates that the works of the kastom jifs in peace and 
development is not motivated by money and materialism. The jifs carry out their duties willingly and 
lovingly because they love the people and they are born to serve and make other people happy. It was 
on that basis that the Constitution recognised kastom governance and authorities as crucial 
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institutional values that the state should be built upon. As demonstrated in this case study, the roles of 
jifs in peace building at all levels of Vanuatu society are critical for development: 
If there is an infraction on custom or a dispute between two communities the kastom jifs can 
resolve them, but the state cannot fix the ethnic conflict crisis. For example, the kastom jifs 
stopped the ethnic conflict between Ambrym and Tanna community in 2007 and the 
government promised them to compensate the victims, but until today there was not anything 
done despite the report of the commission of enquiry. This is one of examples of the inability 
of government to resolve ethnic conflict or customary dispute (Political Advisor - Tape 
interview 17 May 2013) 
This quote demonstrates that the state’s institutions have their own limitations and cannot do 
everything. It also demonstrates that the failure of the state to accommodate jifly institutions and 
recognise their roles in state development will create a governance shortfall that will impede 
development objectives. Recognising the limits of state institutions at all levels of society highlights 
the need for state institutions to work collaboratively with jifly institutions in all areas of development 
at all levels of community. The work the kastom jifs do in respective communities, both at the 
regional and at the national levels, shows how relevant they are. The presence of kastom authority in 
all local communities gives more legitimacy to their institutions than the legislative authority and state 
institutions. 
5.5 Institutional legitimacy 
In discussing the legitimacy of the MNCC it is important to differentiate the MNCC as an institution 
from the roles of the kastom jifs as individuals. The legitimacy of the kastom jifs at the village level 
can be classified into two main streams: moral legitimacy, and performance legitimacy. The kastom 
jifs ought to carry out their leadership duties within the norms, values, and processes of the village. 
This is what is referred to here as a ‘moral legitimacy’, in which people hold high expectations of 
their jifs to perform morally in accordance with the rules, values, and norms of their society.  
In addition, there is also a performance legitimacy, and this is quite distinct from one village to 
another depending on their political leadership system. For instance, in hereditary villages the jifs do 
not perform other duties beside their ceremonial duties and judgmental role to ensure justice, peace, 
and unity in their villages. In this context the jif’s legitimacy is based on his moral standard rather 
than performance. In the villages where the leadership title is through ranking and wealth 
accumulation and distribution, the legitimacy of the jif is based both on his moral and performance 
standard in his village. However, when the role of jifs is transferred to the MNCC institution there is a 
disconnection in the line of accountability between kastom jifs and their people at the village level. 
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Unlike Village councils, the Area and Island councils and the MNCC are both representative and 
administrative entities. Village councils exercise greater local authority but are highly diverse. 
However, the external influence in the management of MNCC from the government and development 
aid agencies has had great impact on the status of MNCC administration at the national level. In 
speaking at the 2006 Land Summit in Port Vila, the Pango Naar Maal Council of Chiefs rejected all 
the recommendations in relation to land leases, arguing that the MNCC did not have the power to 
approve these. Their rejection was based on the view that MNCC is not a legitimate kastom 
landowner. In a similar vein, the ‘natatok’ of Efate kastom landowners argues that: 
[t]hey do not recognise the MNCC as customary and traditional representative of land in 
Vanuatu. The concept of MNCC is foreign and would seem to have the intention of taking 
over land matters in Vanuatu (DailyPost 2005). 
This quote demonstrates that the existing design of the MNCC has a flaw in it, and many participants 
acknowledge that there is a great need to refine it to reflect the common understanding of the people 
of Vanuatu. The kastom jifs in the islands share the view that because the MNCC is controlled by the 
government it puts their roles as representatives of kastom authority into question. One of the kastom 
jifs in Erromango raised his concern that the MNCC has been influenced by the government and 
outsiders, and he fears that the risk of giving the MNCC powers over development could operate at 
the expense of the kastom jifs and their people in local communities. One of the kastom jifs pointed 
out during an interview for the present research that the MNCC is not representing the interests of the 
kastom jifs: 
MNCC is a political institution and therefore we do not want to be politicised. Government 
and donors are now controlling the MNCC and it is no longer an independent institution as it 
implies in the Constitution. They tricked us and wanted the kastom jifs to follow them and 
must not go against them. I told them [MNCC] the work they are doing now is not reflecting 
the needs of our traditional society. Today government treat MNCC as a ‘rubber stamp’ 
institution and they run to them only when they have problems. The kastom jifs are the 
decision makers in their own customary boundaries and when they come to MNCC they 
become followers of government. The kastom jifs who are members of the MNCC are 
powerless because they cannot make any decision that is against the government and as such 
they are like the puppet of the government (Tape interviews 18 May 2013) 
This illustrated an on-going leadership frustration among the kastom authorities with colonial and 
state authorities and their failures to negotiate and consult with kastom jifs at the initial phase. It also 
demonstrates that the kastom authorities do not appreciate being seen as subordinate to the state, and 
the majority of participants believe that the state should be under the kastom authority. Because of the 
conflicting power struggle over which authority should be supreme, the MNCC as an institution has a 
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legitimacy crisis without the presence of the kastom jifs who are members of the Council. This reflects 
the ambiguities of the roles between individual kastom jifs and the council as an institution. The 
traditional authorities want to be fully independent from the state and have the power to decide on the 
development directions of Vanuatu. 
The Constitution granted an independent status to the council of jifs and Article Thirty one 
defined plainly the scope of the work of the council. The Constitution said that the role of jifs 
will be at the village, island and regional levels. I did not know why the government has to 
establish another administration structure separated from the jifly structure. This is a waste of 
resources because we have two parallel structures that cost a lot of taxpayers’ money but it 
does not work effectively. It is better to get rid of the provincial government structure and let 
the council of jifs manage the development at the village, island and provincial levels (kastom 
jif - Tape Interview 9 May 2013). 
This clearly illustrates the frustration being felt at the community level in relation to the kastom 
authority becoming an equal partner. The kastom jifs are aware that the state is not fulfilling the 
requirements of the Constitution to grant the rights to them to administer development at the 
provincial, sub-regional, and local levels. The bottom line is that the state is trying to use kastom 
authority without realising that it is a living institution that cannot be tamed with imposed governance 
models and foreign forces. Therefore, to make a change there is a need for development institutions 
and policy makers to change their focus and mindset, from the analysis of the traditional institutions 
as a threat to the analysis of traditional institutions as critical components of development architecture 
in developing countries. The implication of this approach is that it will certainly pave the way forward 
to integrating local practices with the international best practices.  
5.6 Organisational change for participatory development and transformation 
The MNCC, as an institution, is one of the unfinished tasks of the building of state in Vanuatu. The 
participants in this research recognised the weaknesses of the Constitution and the failure of the state 
to expand on the work of the constitutional Drafting Committee and enhance the kastom governance 
system. As one of the participants alluded, the governance deficit in state administration is due to the 
fact that kastom governance has been acknowledged by the state but is not fully developed to support 
the legal-rational state governance system at the various levels of administration: 
Because it was a difficult time, at the last minute, the leaders agreed to mention the kastom 
authority in the Constitution and left the details for the state to develop them after the 
independence. This was one of the weaknesses of the state because when we got our 
independence the leaders forgot the kastom governance system and how to develop the 
institution of chiefs into a full-fledged organisation that would support the development at the 
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regional, sub-regional, and local levels. The focus of the state was more oriented to the 
international best practices and legal-rational governance institutions but little had been done 
to promote and enhance our traditional governance system of chiefs. We must remind 
ourselves that in Vanuatu we had two governance institutions that were critical for promoting 
peace and harmonious environment for the development to flourish and these include formal 
and informal governance institutions. So the state will need to seriously make it one of its 
development priorities to enhance the informal governance system in order to bring a balance 
in the overall governance of the state (Government Bureaucrat - Tape Interviews 18 May 
2013). 
This illustrates the long-term governance challenge in Vanuatu where there is an imbalance or 
shortfall between government and governance. The majority of the participants in this research argued 
for the need to address this shortfall, and this need has been a major agenda item of the subsequent 
MNCC summit - to find better ways to address this gap. At the 2011 national summit on the MNCC 
there were nineteen resolutions put forward by the stakeholders, composed of the government, jifs, 
non-government organisation, donors, and the business enterprises. These resolutions focused on the 
roles of the kastom jifs and the capacity of the MNCC as an administrative institution that was 
intended to link the national state administration with the works of kastom jifs at the village level. 
These resolutions were summarised in four areas: 
 Customary boundaries and authorities - The recommendations 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10 and 12 of 
the summit dealt with the identification and registration of kastom jifs and their customary 
boundaries. This includes: the registration of the kastom jifs; documenting custom governance 
of each tribes and clans; securing and protecting each customary landmark and historical site; 
and writing customary rules, norms and laws of each tribe and island. 
 Management of land and resources - The recommendations 4, 7, 8, 11, 18 and 19 covered 
the need to empower kastom jifs and authorities to control and manage their customary lands 
and customary ways of managing resources. The summit recommended that the kastom 
authorities in each village, area and island should approve the land leases, and it requested the 
state to remove the power of the State Minister to approve and sign land leases on customary 
lands. This includes the power of the kastom jifs to settle customary land disputes and identify 
the true customary owners. Recommendation 18 singled out the need to use the customary 
system of recording customary land boundaries and land transactions. 
  Institutional capacity of MNCC - The recommendations 15, 16 and 17 focused on the 
capacity and the role of the MNCC. This includes the following: strengthen the structure of 
the MNCC to link the state administration at the national level with kastom authorities; 
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strengthen the consultation process from national to village level; and organise a national 
conference of the kastom jifs biannually to monitor the progress of their works. 
 Implementation mechanism - In recommendations 5, 13 and 14, the summit tasked the 
MNCC and the State through the Ministry of Lands and Justice to raise awareness, 
consultation and training throughout the archipelago on these proposed changes. 
Recommendation 14 called for the review of the Constitution and relevant legislation 
pertaining to lands, the MNCC and the work of the kastom jifs. 
In August 2013 the thirty members of chiefs, representing the Vaturisu Council of Chiefs of Efate and 
offshore islands, requested the government to amend the Constitution and the MNCC Acts to give 
chiefs greater recognition and roles in the development of Vanuatu: 
The act needs to be changed to ensure the important role of chiefs in the everyday life of the 
communities of the country is better valued. Over the last 33 years of independence, the 
government has needed the jifs’ cultural, traditional and peacekeeping roles on countless 
occasions, but this service has never been credited with the value it deserved. Many feel that 
the important role of the chiefs is recognised in the Constitution, when it features in the 
supreme national code, before other important institutions such as the parliament and 
government. However, this recognition in the Constitution has never translated into a reality 
within the formal governance structure of the country, seen through the legislative, executive 
and judiciary bodies (Cullwick 2013a, p. 1). 
Kastom authorities are continuing to fight for the state to recognise their roles and, most importantly, 
grant them equal power sharing in the development of Vanuatu. In December 2013, the government, 
through the parliament, passed two major amendments: the Customary Land Management Act, and 
the Land Reform Act. This followed a change to Articles 30 and 78 of the Constitution, which makes 
it compulsory for the parliament to consult with the kastom jifs through the MNCC about any changes 
to land law in Vanuatu, and gives power to kastom jifs to determine the customary owner groups for 
an area of land. The Minister of Lands commented that: 
[t]he new laws bring determination of [kastom] owners back to customary institutions, it 
removes the power from courts and the government to determine who the [kastom] owners 
are and puts it back under rules of custom (McDonnell 2014, p. 1). 
The changes to the Constitution and land laws do not alter the fact that the Constitution has 
recognised legal-rational and traditional land tenure system as foundations for dealing with lands in 
Vanuatu. However, in practice these two systems of land tenure work in contradiction to each other, 
and this becomes a major source of land conflict and increased disputes in rural and urban 
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communities. Indeed these changes would seem to further reinforce the degree of conflict between 
state governance systems and kastom governance. The new Customary Land Management Act 
provides for all determinations of land ownership to be made in accordance with the rules of 
customary law, and, most importantly, it enables the customary institution of nakamal to make 
determinations about custom owners of an area of land. These new amendments were passed by 
Parliament in 2013 and gazetted and made law in February 2014. Given the fact that about ninety- 
seven percent of land areas in Vanuatu are under the traditional land tenure system (World Bank 
2011), the kastom authority has more power to influence development and, most importantly, they can 
abuse their power in the absence of the established institutional mechanisms to govern them. The 
MNCC as an institution, according to the amendment of Article 30 of the Constitution, will now 
become a strong partner of the state in the areas of land management. This is critical because it 
illustrates a change of approach that is taking place gradually to recognise the significant role that the 
kastom jifs can play in the development of Vanuatu. While the state is venturing in that direction, it 
perhaps unconsciously increases the power and authority of the kastom jifs and its institution at all 
levels of society. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The efforts to transform and fully integrate jifly institutions into a legal-rational state architecture 
failed, and as a consequence Vanuatu continues to embrace two distinct forms of authority that are 
based on two different set of social orders and expectations. Design for the MNCC as an institution 
was based on the concepts of modern administrators and the needs of a modern administration, and it 
was intended to bridge a gap between kastom authority and state authority. However, the shift in the 
functions of the kastom jifs as individual authorities within their respective jurisdictions to the 
functions of jifs as an institution created a wider gap of understanding between the functional 
relationship of the individual kastom jifs with councils and the state. In other words, the boundary 
between kastom jifs at the village levels with councils and the state is blurred, because the democratic 
values of the state and the pre-existing values of the traditional political authority of jifs overlap and 
blend together, and come into conflict in ways that are contradictory and mutually transforming. In 
Vanuatu the jifs have advocated for equal powers and authority with the state, and have wanted to 
become an equal partner with the state in all development implementation. This is a plea the 
Constitution failed to accommodate, and as such it remains a recurrent governance challenge for 
Vanuatu.  
Kastom authority and governance are lively and resilient institutions that serve well the socio-
economic and political needs of eighty percent of the population who live in rural and remote islands 
of Vanuatu. They also contribute to effective government and the well-being of communities under 
social and economic stress across the nation. The jifs continue to promote a governance model based 
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on traditional values of social orders and authority that fail to work consistently in parallel with 
rational legal state governance expectations. The conflict between these two sets of values and 
expectations at the state administration level too often creates an empty space into which there is a 
significant opportunity for corrupt practices to emerge within Vanuatu government institutions. An 
understanding of the governance challenge, in terms of conflicting social relations and orders in a 
localised political context, engenders greater appreciation of the jifly institution as a better 
collaborative organisation to mediate the conflicting relationship between different political 
authorities in Vanuatu.  
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Chapter 6: Case Study Two: Tension Between Kastom Practices and 
Formal Rule of Law 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter makes the case that failure to fully acknowledge the significance of traditional authority 
relationships and local values of social obligation in the formation of government institutions creates 
spaces in which kastom authority and practices undermine legal-rational forms of authority. The case 
of the Vanuatu Development Bank (DBV) exemplifies the practical consequences of the gap between 
a system of government based upon one set of practices, and traditional society based upon another 
set of practices. This is compounded by the fact that the Vanuatu Constitution recognised and 
embedded the jifly institution and kastom governance as additional pillars to the building of the post-
colonial state. Hence, as argued throughout this thesis, Vanuatu has competing authority systems that 
complicate government and governance, in a context where there is no prior concept of public interest 
and private good. The ambiguity of the term corruption has implications in the manner and way it is 
categorised for analytical purposes. Hence, although it is understood that there is some overlapping of 
the categorisation of corrupt practices in this chapter, it should be noted that the headings utilised are 
for the purposes of illustrations, discussion, and analysis. 
This chapter analyses the tensions between kastom practice and formal rules using the DBV as a 
representative case of contemporary governance challenges in Vanuatu. The DBV was established in 
1979, and closed down in 1997 following alleged corrupt practices by bank officials and politicians. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides an overview of the institutional 
design in order to show that policy measures that work in the West may fail when cultures clash over 
corruption in another cultural context. The second section analyses the dimensions of corruption in the 
process of lending and management of the DBV funds. Finally, the third section assesses what works 
with regard to the system of credit in Vanuatu, especially for people in rural areas.  
6.1 Overview of the institutional design: Development Bank of Vanuatu: 1979-1997 
The Vanuatu Development Bank was established by an Act of Parliament in September 1979 to 
provide loans for small but ‘sound’ projects that could not meet the scale and security requirements to 
satisfy commercial lenders. Its primary purpose, as per its amended Act of 1983, is to facilitate and 
promote the economic development of the national resources of Vanuatu, with special attention to 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, manufacturing, sea transport, tourism, retail shops and cooperatives. 
Traditionally, the demand for agricultural credit by small farmers has been limited, with the major 
inputs being family labour and land, and the relatively small amount of cash required has been 
supplied through the sale of copra (Weightman 1989). The Agriculture and Industrial Loans Advisory 
Committee (AILAC) provided credit to farmers during the colonial era, to support ni-Vanuatu who 
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wanted to participate in the growing field of business opportunities but lacked the initial start-up 
capital. It helped the farmers in the cattle industry by providing funds for the purchase of fencing 
materials and foundation herds. According to Weightman (1989), AILAC’s annual report for 1973 
shows that of the total 497 loans advanced from 1965, 306 were for cattle farming, all of which were 
in the smallholder sector. Widespread defaulting on repayments and disagreement over effecting their 
recovery contributed to the transfer of AILAC loan facilities to the DBV in 1979 (Weightman 1989).  
The DBV gave particular attention to rural development. It encouraged the training of ni-Vanuatu and 
their effective participation in national development, with the goal of creating processing and other 
industries that were intended to reinforce the country’s economic independence. To achieve this, the 
Bank was empowered to grant loans, purchase shares, give security for loans originating from other 
sources of finance and provide its technical assistance to the projects it financed, be they public, semi-
public or cooperative organisations. When the DBV was designed in 1979 it did not take into 
consideration the nature of the traditional society at the time, which revolved around subsistence 
living and collective rights to natural resources. It also failed to take into account other infrastructure 
constraints to economic activities such as roads and telecommunications. 
The concept of the Development Bank of Vanuatu was framed towards the development of productive 
rural sectors and modernization of the lives of people throughout the archipelago. As such, it came 
with a set of economic expectations different to those of traditional society and, most importantly, was 
thereby disconnected from the lived economies of the very people it was meant to serve. Other 
activities that contribute to the overall wellbeing of people in traditional communities were not part of 
this new economic system, which measured economic performance through Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Regenvanu 2009). GDP is an economic measurement system that measures total output 
production of a country in a given year, and is limited to activities that can be quantified in monetary 
terms and, most importantly, valued in the market (Esteva 1992; Khan 2007; Regenvanu 2009). As 
one commentator notes: 
Obviously, GDP as a measure of well-being does not reflect the many tangible social and 
economic benefits delivered by the traditional economy, but which do not have a cash value. 
The lack of recognition of the traditional economy in most policy is directly related to the 
lack of any measures we have for valuing it – it is indeed a truism that what we cannot 
measure, we cannot value (Regenvanu 2009, p. 32). 
 
In addition, the trading of traditional mediums of exchange or currencies such as pig, shell money, 
and hand woven mats are regarded as inferior to money as the medium of exchange in a market 
economy. Therefore, some traditional currencies cannot be utilised as collateral for local borrowings 
at the Bank because their values cannot be reconciled with standard commercial banking principles. 
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Indeed, the DBV was a typical example of an agent of transformation or transition of social life from 
one standard to a presumed higher level of organisation with largely foreign operating principles, 
values, norms, and processes. The DBV, along with similar development banks in the Pacific region, 
was in this regard different to commercial banks because it enjoyed very broad mandates and its 
lending operations were guaranteed by the state (Siwatibau 1997). To fulfil this broad mandate and 
make sure that the ni-Vanuatu in remote villages and areas had access to the credit facilities, the Bank 
introduced another scheme in July 1981 called ‘Micro- Credit Loans’, targeted at rural areas only. The 
ni-Vanuatu in rural areas were allowed to borrow up to VT50,000 (AUD$500) at a six percent rate of 
interest for a maximum of two years, to buy materials for constructing copra driers, fences, and 
buildings. Other equipment such as outboard motors, fishing nets and lines, agricultural tools and 
spare parts were also considered under this scheme. 
While there had been considerable changes in the early 1990s to bank policies and management 
practices, including lending procedures, the composition of the Board of Directors remained largely in 
the realm of politics. DBV was an independent statutory body operating under the direction of its own 
Board of Directors with responsibility to the Minister of Finance. The Minister of Finance was the 
principal director of the Bank and was responsible for appointments. From its establishment up to its 
closure in 1997, the DBV Board comprised politicians drawn from whichever party was in power, 
many of whom were appointed irrespective of their qualification (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999). This 
exposed the Bank’s operation and management to direct political interference, which in turn created 
significant opportunities for the development of direct lending practices outside the Bank’s processes 
and policies. This would seems to be one of the loopholes in the legislative framework governing 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other institutions that are meant to work as independent statutory 
organisations (Cain & Jowitt 2004). As part of the ongoing reform commitment of the Vanuatu 
government, the ADB was tasked to undertake a review of all SOEs with the intention to close the 
loopholes and improve their performance. The review was concluded in July 2014 with a two day 
presentation of findings (Simon 2014). At the opening, the State Minister responsible for SOEs, Mr 
Simelum, made the following statements: 
Apart from poor management, the practice of political appointments in the boards does little 
to help the situation. Some of our State-Owned Enterprises continue to be poorly managed 
year after year and I have noticed that for the last five years these state entities have not been 
filling annual returns to the government as per the Customs Act. The issue of direct political 
appointments to SOE boards is a concern which I believe can only be addressed through 
appropriate legislation which stipulates who gets appointed to which board. It is hoped that 
through such a review undertaken by the ADB that we will be able to rectify the weaknesses 
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and to solicit necessary assistance to enable the government and management of SOEs to 
implement the necessary reforms to put the SOEs back on the right track (Simon 2014, p. 1). 
This quote illustrates that Vanuatu SOEs are struggling because the existing laws that governed SOEs 
in Vanuatu and more broadly in the South Pacific region gave greater powers to State Ministers to 
control management and policy directions. This would seem to be an issue in the cultural context of 
the newly democratic state of Vanuatu, where leadership of elected political leaders has become 
entangled with local norms, expectations, and kastom practices. In the case of the DBV, there were 
two provisions in the Act that gave leverage to the Minister to influence the operation of the Bank. 
Firstly, the Act mandated the Minister to give the Bank policy directions that were consistent with the 
Act on the exercise of the functions and policies of the Bank. Secondly, the Minister was given the 
discretion to appoint the Board of Directors based on given criteria, which included: the appointees 
represented the different geographical divisions of Vanuatu; and had more than ten years’ experience 
in finance, commerce, industry or agriculture. In addition, the Act also defined the criteria of persons 
that should not be appointed as members of the Board of Directors, and these included: Members of 
Parliament or the Ministers of State; not over seventy years of age; not be judged bankrupt; and not in 
contempt of court. The Act further provided for the Minister to appoint the chairman of the Board and 
also make a temporary appointment to the position of Managing Director in lieu of illness or 
incapacity. Critically, this exemplifies how, in the building of the post-colonial state, certain 
institutions were created in a manner that granted substantial power to political leaders without there 
being any consideration as to how such powers might be abused. As this case illustrates, there is 
increased entanglement between two different sets of social obligations and expectations in the way 
bureaucrats and politicians run the formal socio-economic and political institutions. For instance, this 
case study also demonstrates that, despite the set rules and policies, the Minister appointed his 
political allies to the Board of Directors, and that none of those appointments followed the criteria laid 
down in the DBV Act (Cain & Jowitt 2004; Jowitt 2014; Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999). 
However, the partnership that the DBV had with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) strengthened the Bank’s operation, by establishing new 
international banking practices of fair competition, prudent risk management policies, and new policy 
guidelines and processes. These new policy directions and reforms, premised on the concept of a 
liberal economic system, have led to an increased gap in understanding between eighty percent of the 
population in local communities and a handful of local elites in urban centres. This is compounded by 
poor infrastructure, dispersal of population across the archipelago, and low financial literacy in local 
communities. This low level of financial literacy in rural and remote communities meant that local 
educated elites who were in public positions gained an advantage. This inequality in turn created an 
incentive for those disadvantaged by the formal power structure to seek alternative means of credit. It 
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also tended to legitimise the inappropriate appointment of Board of Directors irrespective of the 
established criteria and merit principles, partly because there was no public accountability in a social 
context where the public did not fully comprehend the formal legal and economic principles upon 
which this new institution was to be built. Consequently, rural and local communities extended their 
family networks into state institutions in order for them to benefit from state resources and services by 
working outside established rules, policies, and procedures (Adam & Tim 2013). 
The loan cycle gives an insight into how this strategy was implemented. Figure 6.1 depicts the loan 
cycle the DBV built on international bank lending management principles. People who wanted to 
borrow from the Bank had to lodge formal loan applications. The Bank used the agriculture extension 
officers to assist local farmers and communities to prepare their loan application and to provide 
awareness of the Bank’s services in local communities. The agriculture extension officers were not 
trained as bankers and therefore they had limited knowledge of the banking system. This reflected the 
lack of consideration given to the capacity on the ground to manage the new economic institution and 
to transition successfully. The DBV records showed that about seventy to eighty percent of the loans 
at DBV did not strictly adhere to the processes of the loan cycle and Bank policies, and were thus 
irregular (DBV 1994; Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999). 
Figure 6.1  Loan cycle 
 
Source: Development Bank of Vanuatu Annual Report 1994 
It was a common tradition for a bank to require borrowers to deposit a percentage of the total value of 
the asset to be purchased. Table 6.1 illustrates respective contributions expected from borrowers on 
certain categories of loans. Given that ninety-five percent of the population at the time was in the 
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subsistence sector and not earning a cash income, the required deposits were quite substantial. Lands 
and other natural resources are communally owned in Vanuatu, which means that individuals cannot 
use them as collateral. This is another classic example of how traditional values of communal rights 
clash with financial and market mechanisms and principles. To address this challenge, the state, 
through the government of the day, became the guarantor of the loans to local communities. This 
provided a significant opportunity for elected and appointed politicians to manipulate the Bank’s 
distribution process and policies to their personal interest. As will be explored further in this Chapter, 
this policy guideline was susceptible to capture by vested interests. In almost all cases, the Ministers 
and political officers wrote letters of support for individual party supporters to borrow from the Bank, 
and as a consequence loans were granted in circumstances that, while not technically illegal, 
nonetheless subverted the core aims set for the DBV in legislation. 
Table 6.1 Borrower contribution 
 Borrower Contribution 
All Project Minimum 25% 
Purchase of New Vehicles 35% 
Purchase of re-conditioned Vehicles 40% 
Purchase of new or used marine vessels or boats 
for use in transport projects 
40% 
Repairs to vehicles or marine vessels or boats 50% 
Purchase of Industrial equipment 35% 
Transfer of ownership of assets, shares, etc 35% 
Construction of buildings and related works 30% 
Working Capital including stock 50% 
Source: Development Bank Annual Reports 1994 
The Bank set four basic standards by which loan applications were to be assessed: economically 
justified; technically viable; financially viable; and credit-worthy. Rules specified that loans would 
not be approved where applicants held criminal records or had a poor record of repayments. There 
was also a view that loans should not be given to people approaching retirement age, which is 55 
years in Vanuatu (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999, p. 6). 
The DBV was created according to a rational economic logic with the aim being to control and 
channel what Marcus Felson called ‘primary human imperatives’ through formal rules, policies and 
processes (Felson 2011, p. 12). According to Felson (2011), ‘primary human imperatives’ include 
both looking after one’s personal interests and meeting social commitments to friends and relatives. In 
other words, it is natural for each person to take care of themselves and their family and friends, even 
in violation of general rules and roles (Felson 2011). While self-interest would seem to be acceptable 
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in a traditional and patrimonial society, in a legal-rational system the attempt to seek self-interest 
often involves breaking rule of law, and this behaviour is deemed corrupt (Rose-Ackerman 2010). As 
this case study illustrates, a strong tension is inherent between these personal interests and the legal-
rational policy, which implies that this rational economic and social system has a different set of 
expectations that work in contradiction to the lives of the eighty percent of the population who live in 
the rural and remote islands of Vanuatu. As one commentator on the traditional subsistence economy 
in Vanuatu notes: 
All too often in our national development plans and charters, and in our regional and 
international prescriptions for development in Melanesia, there is little or no mention of the 
traditional economy and the predominant role it plays in providing sustainable livelihoods and 
many of the sustainable development outcomes we say we wish to achieve. More regrettably, 
many policies and activities that are implemented in the name of development directly 
displace and erode this traditional economy (Regenvanu 2009, p. 32) 
 
This illustrates clearly that the DBV worked within and contributed to an economic system that 
created what Eric Uslaner refers to as an ‘inequality trap’ in local communities (Uslaner 2008). This 
economic system creates disparities in wealth, income, status, and power between and within local 
communities, including individual members of a family. He further argues that in such a circumstance 
there is significant opportunity for economic inequality to create political leaders who will ‘take care’ 
of their constituents and families at the broad expense of public interest or society at large (Uslaner 
2008, p. 24). It also necessitates the establishment of a patron-client network relationship as a 
mechanism to address disparities in wealth, status, and power in local communities, as well as a 
system to connect the state to marginalised sections of society.  
This case study demonstrates that a patron-client network based on customary practices and 
traditional values of social obligation is broadly accepted and practiced throughout the archipelago. In 
the traditional communities of Vanuatu, the patron-client network is a recognised and acceptable 
system of social and political advancement that is based on different forms of reward and reciprocal 
exchanges. On the other hand, in a legal-rational world these practices are deemed corrupt because 
they contradict formal rules, policies, and procedures. The following section explores the relationship 
between this cultural dynamic and corruption, using data from the 1999 Ombudsman’s Report on 
DBV and the data generated through semi-structured interviews with former staff of the DBV, 
government officials, youth, and non-government organisations. 
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6.2 The nature of corruption in the Development Bank of Vanuatu 
This thesis argues that corruption in Vanuatu is a product of the interplay of values between kastom 
authority and the social obligations within a legal-rational authority. Under kastom authority the 
recruitment of family members to a public position or manipulating bureaucratic processes and rules 
in favour of family requests are not necessarily seen as morally wrong acts that should attract 
punishment. In a legal-rational state there is a separation of formal roles and duties from the personal, 
family, and political groupings along family lines. A strong tension emerges when an individual or 
group uses traditional values of social obligation, such as respect for family and kastom authority, in 
such a way as to exploit public office for personal gain, thus undermining public interests. The 
following section explores the dynamic of the interplay between (a) local values of social obligations 
and authority, and (b) social, economic and political systems trying to control and constrain kastom 
practices to achieve fairness, justice and inclusiveness through separation of personal allegiance from 
formal roles and duties. The emerging governance issues identified and analysed in this case study 
exemplify broader and continuing challenges for formal authority and state administration in Vanuatu. 
Hence, to unravel these challenges a patron-client relations model makes sense when one weighs 
structural disadvantages, power imbalances, and social expectations in a traditional social context. 
6.2.1 Nepotism 
One of the cultures featured strongly in the administration of DBV loans was a strong family network 
and favouritism known as “nepotism” in legal-rational perspectives. A strong family connection is a 
foundation of unity and social order in local communities, and the ways and manners this connection 
is maintained and developed can undermine formal rules. Examples 1 and 2 illustrate how family 
networks at the political and bureaucratic levels enable formal government processes to be overridden 
and how elected political leaders and senior bureaucrats can manipulate processes to favour their 
immediate families. 
141 
 
 
This example illustrates the challenges of governance in Vanuatu stemming from ‘patron-client 
network relationships’ in which family members holding public office can act as a patron to facilitate 
favours for clients such as close relatives or political cronies. Within the sphere of a patron-client 
network, personal ties are an important characteristic, in which a patron maintains their clients by 
rewarding them for their faithful service and, similarly, if the clients want to continuously receive 
rewards from the patron they have to give him/her loyal services (Ackerman 1999; Sharon 2002). 
Thus, this obligatory reciprocity of the patron-client relationship is the defining characteristic of 
traditional politics in Vanuatu, which can be traced back to nimangi and grade-taking ceremonies in 
which leaders acquired their political status and power in local communities (Allen 1981). In the 
traditional political leadership system the family unit remains the core foundation and primary source 
of support for their leader, and as such there is a heavy transaction and exchange of resources between 
the family members and their leader (Allen 1972). People often organise themselves along their 
family lines to celebrate marriages and births, participate at funerals, support one another in hard 
labour, and help each other with school fees for their children. This personal and social tendency is a 
deep-rooted feature of traditional communities in Vanuatu. From a legal-rational perspective, when 
people are favoured because they are related to a person in power, the demonstration of partiality and 
preferential treatment is judged corrupt. The natural tendency to help each other and take care of each 
Example 1  
Strong family connection  
Mr X1 was a strong supporter of the Union of Moderate Party (UMP) and he got his loan during the time 
UMP was in Government. His brother, who was the Minister of Finance responsible for the affairs of the Development 
Bank of Vanuatu and the shareholders’ representative, offered his land to Mr X1 as security for the Loan. The loan 
was made to finance an intended garage operation. This loan was requested and approved during his brother’s term as 
Finance Minister. 
Mr X1 made no cash or in kind contribution as per the bank’s policies and procedures. This appeared to 
contravene the bank’s policy requiring borrowers to contribute some 30% equity to the project financed by the loan. 
The cash flow projection estimated by the credit officer in his appraisal report was hypothetical and did not reflect a 
true picture of the client’s actual revenue and expenditure operations. A business operating profit of VT22, 448 is 
inadequate to service an expected repayment level of VT185, 338. Mr X1’s capacity to repay the loan was not 
considered by the Bank. If it had been considered, the loan would not have been granted initially. As a consequence of 
non-regular repayment, the balance as of 11 November 1998 stood at VT14, 520,121, with VT4, 166, 949 in arrears. 
The loan was disbursed before securities could be put in order. As they stand, the securities would be 
difficult to enforce. The Minister of Finance and Mr X1 consistently declined to sign security documentation to secure 
the loan they borrowed. A few attempts by the bank to have the borrowers sign collateral documentation before the 
Commissioners of Oaths failed. Furthermore, the intended collateral documents were not appraised by reputable 
appraisers and are likely to be worth far less than the amount outstanding. The lending officer who appraised Mr X1 
loan was a relative of Mr X1’s and the Minister of Finance. 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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other’s wellbeing is, however, embedded into the traditional political system; and Example 1 
illustrates how this cultural norm was practiced in a formal system of economic organisation. In this 
example, there is a strong element of family connection reflected in the close relationship between a 
State Minister and his brother, and a lending officer (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999). While traditional 
politics is sustained through a strong family connection and reciprocal exchanges of resources, its 
extension into a formal rational system of economic and social organisation can be detrimental to their 
development objectives. One of the kastom jifs who participated in the present research interviews 
believed that family connection is an important cultural value that has deeper roots in land and 
resources in local communities: 
A strong family connection is a foundation of everything in our society. Family unite together 
during the time of birth celebration, marriages, nimangi, grade taking ceremony, and most 
importantly help each other in school fees and in hard labour. In Vanuatu people who do not 
have a sense of helping family and who do not participate in family activities, they are 
strangers. Family connection is important because through family members people have the 
right to land, resources, and get support from each other in time of need. In Vanuatu, if you 
have no family it means you have no land and you are not from Vanuatu (Tape interview with 
a kastom jif May 2013). 
This quote illustrates how and why the wider advantages of family connection remain integral to 
social identity. Local communities organise themselves along the family lines, to look after their own 
socio-economic and political interests as well as meeting social commitments to friends and relatives. 
The challenge for family connection networks is that family lines are continuously expanding through 
marriages and birth, which means a leader can have a wider support from his/her extended family 
lines. This practice can be sustained in local communities following a traditional way of life using 
abundant natural products from gardens or resources from forest and sea. In other words, there is a 
level playing field in which everyone can participate with unlimited resources. However, the 
encroachment of limited resources, in the form of money and material goods, distorts community 
economic relations through the substitution of cash and commodities for traditional resources, a 
process that is most advanced in the two urban areas - Port Vila and Lugainville. Because of the 
increased scarcity of money and material goods in individual’s hands, this necessitates a need for 
stronger family networks at the places where resources are available. In other words, the new 
economic system of organising the needs of society through formal rules and processes is actually 
creating an inequality of resources at the various levels of society. In order to address this inequality 
people have opted to use family networks as a means to access resources and services from the state. 
Thus, a strong family network can become a strong political interest group that can be influential in 
distorting the process of justice and fairness in resource distribution. For instance, with regard to the 
143 
 
Vanuatu Development Bank, helping family by circumventing formal processes and requirements 
cuts against the legal-rational principles upon which the DBV depends for its financial viability. 
Thus the behaviour of the leaders to work outside formal rules, policies and procedures to meet the 
needs of families are acceptable moral standards in local communities, and as such this has not 
impacted on their social legitimacy and political status. The re-election of political leaders to 
parliament who were implicated in various Ombudsman reports because of alleged corrupt practices 
signifies a fundamental flaw in the design of socio-economic and political institutions. The State 
Minister implicated in Example 1 is a member of parliament at the time of writing. When this 
research was conducted the lending officer was working as the Managing Director of a major 
financial institution in Vanuatu. The present author had the opportunity to interview him, and he 
ventured the following observations: 
Our political leaders believed that when we achieved our political independence it will 
provide greater opportunity for us to achieve our economic independence. My personal view 
is that economic independence should be an individual goal and not the national goal, which 
means that it must happen at personal and individual levels. Government supported this view 
by acting as guarantor, which enables DBV to give loans to everyone who came to the Bank 
irrespective of their financial capacity. During the time of DBV, the ninety five percent of our 
population were in rural areas with low financial and banking literacy. Our job at DBV was to 
help them to make sure that everyone has equal opportunity to improve their social and 
economic status (Tape Interview 13 May 2013). 
This quotation illustrates the rationale behind the action of the lending officer in facilitating Mr X1’s 
request by developing a hypothetical profile in order for him to access the loan from the Bank. It also 
implies that the DBV, as a new form of economic organisation, emerged with standard expectations 
and processes that disadvantaged group of customers that were in a similar situation to Mr X1. This 
new system of economic and political organisation has become a barrier to eighty percent of the 
population of Vanuatu who are practicing subsistence living. While the act of fabricating a false 
profile was accompanied with good intentions to assist a marginalised customer, this act is 
condemned by national and international law as a crime. According to the Vanuatu Penal Code Act of 
1981, Section 6, false information and reporting are classified as criminal because it is an act of 
robbing the Bank by granting a loan based on inaccurate facts. Hence, a strong family connection can 
undermine public interest and development objectives of the state or an organisation such as the DBV. 
Example 1 also demonstrates the weak institutional capacity to enforce compliance and uphold 
standards of the Bank. The Bank as an independent institution failed to redress many loans that were 
in arrears, and this weak enforcement from the Bank provided an incentive and opportunity for 
customers to flout the law. Most importantly, weak public accountability provides greater opportunity 
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for patron-client networks to develop. While the DBV was sufficiently concerned to act to reclaim a 
bad loan, debt recovery can be compromised by family or personal connections. Cain and Jowitt note 
that for all the alleged corrupt activities against elected politicians in Vanuatu, many were not 
prosecuted by the Court (Cain & Jowitt 2004). This creates an incentive for individuals and local 
communities to affiliate to political parties or have a strong attachment to elected politicians as a 
mean to subvert rules and also, most importantly, escape punitive action. It also provides the 
opportunity for senior bureaucrats to work outside established rules and formal procedures. Indeed, 
this example is representative of other cases where there is strong evidence of abuse of power, conflict 
of interest, and lack of respect for the rule of law, as reflected by the Minister and Mr X1’s wilful 
refusal to be bound by the rules or legal instruction of the Bank (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999). The 
Minister, Mr X1, and the lending officer were identified in the Ombudsman’s report as closely related 
to each other and all were employed by the state (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999).  
Example 2 demonstrates how the Managing Director of the DBV undermined his position of trust to 
manipulate the Bank’s processes in favour of his niece. 
 
 
 
Example 2  
Abuse of power and conflict of interest 
Ms X2 was the niece of the then Managing Director of the DBV. Eight employed guarantors supported Ms 
X2’s loan. The Managing Director processed the loan application personally. However, in a letter to the Ombudsman, 
he stated that her loan was approved on merit. 
This loan was for the purpose of the acquiring vehicle that the bank had seized from a Mr M, who had 
defaulted on his loan. The vehicle was transfer to Ms X2, who took over Mr M’s outstanding debt and VT192, 700 in 
repair costs. Ms X2 made no contribution. The bank obtained no information regarding her assets and liabilities, 
income and expenditures. The bank did not conduct a credit check. 
The vehicle was shipped to Longana area as a taxi. The vehicle could not generate sufficient revenue to meet 
the required VT105, 500 monthly payments. The repayment was irregular and an arrearage began to accumulate by 
5/2/97, only five months into the collection period. When the bank attempted to execute its assignment of salary 
deduction, two guarantors requested that their guarantees be cancelled. The bank declined both requests. 
The bank, the client and Mr. B., a guarantor, met regularly and, on 17 November 1997, the bank restructured 
the loan and offered new conditions favourable to Ms X2. Up to the time of the Ombudsman’s investigation, a total of 
VT662, 900 was paid. The bank decided to write VT662, 900 off the debt, reducing the balance to VT3, 514,743. 
Other terms and conditions remained unchanged. Even with this new arrangement. Ms X2 could not meet her 
obligation, and the account continued to deteriorate. 
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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Example 2 demonstrates how a family can cooperate to subvert formal legal-rational processes 
independent of politics and political influence. Indeed, Examples 1 and 2 further illustrate that neither 
the State Minister nor the Managing Director cared about their formal roles to protect the public 
interest and promote the development objectives of the DBV. In both cases the need of family took 
precedence over the rule of law and both the Minister and the Managing Director abused their 
position of trust to process loans outside legal rules. They could have avoided abusing their powers by 
directing their close relatives to responsible Bank’s officials who could have dealt with their request 
without their interference. This case reflects vividly that the line between personal relationships and 
formal roles is difficult to draw in an environment where eighty percent of population uphold kastom 
practices and give high legitimacy to kastom authority. In a democratic society a leader is expected to 
deliver public services in an impartial manner and there is a clear separation of private from public 
interests. Articles 66 and 67 of the Constitution and Leadership Code Act of 1998, Section 13 to 14, 
criminalises the direct distribution of public goods and services between leaders and their families or 
close political allies. In the traditional political system, goods and services have to be distributed 
directly by leaders to family members because this is how a leader gains his/her prestige. The local 
communities value a face-to-face distribution of resources, and most importantly a leader has to make 
sure that his/her contribution to family and community is feasible and outstanding enough to get 
praise from them.  
Examples 1 and 2 help illustrate how the separation of personal interest from public interest 
challenges family bonding and disadvantages members of families who do not have connections to 
public officers. They become disadvantaged because of their low financial literacy rates, and because 
of their lack of connection to people in power, and poor infrastructure support in terms of roads, 
wharves, and airstrips, which prevent their full participation in a market economy. In such a difficult 
environment, public officials are valuable to family members and close relatives because they can 
assist them to access state services and opportunities. This means that families who do not connect to 
either elected politicians or bureaucrats can be further marginalised and secluded from public 
resources and services. As such, Vanuatu politics is strongly shaped by influences of family and 
support from the larger population in rural and remote islands. 
6.2.2 Patronage 
Patronage is commonly referred to in literature (Adam & Tim 2013) as the glue that holds many 
traditional communities together; and in Chapter Four of this thesis presented an explanation in detail 
of some of the significant structures and relationships in Vanuatu. The DBV Case Study illustrates 
that the exchange of gifts and favours were predominant in the administration of loans, and customers 
perceived loans as gifts rather than something that you have to repay with interest. It also 
demonstrates that formal economic organisations provide an opportunity for political leaders to 
exchange favours informally or irregularly with their personal entourage. For instance, whenever a 
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new government was formed, the Minister in charge of the DBV terminated the existing Board of 
Directors and made new appointments favouring his/her political supporters (Vanuatu Ombudsman 
1999). As is further illustrated in the DBV Case Study, in Vanuatu politically elected leaders are 
given licence to appoint their followers or clients to positions of authority irrespective of their merit. 
This was intentionally put in place by the constitutional framers to facilitate the decision-making of 
the party in government and, most importantly, enable them to implement their policies. People who 
were appointed as members of the Board of Directors for the DBV were political supporters of the 
party in government, and as such they were obligated to the Minister (patron) who, in turn, could and 
did seek influence, wealth, status or power. Patronage, as argued by Kettering Sharon, is a ‘system of 
personal ties and networks in which a person or superior offered protection and support to an inferior 
or client, who owe him loyalty and services in return’ (2002, p. 418). Example 3 is a case in point. 
 
 
This case illustrates that patronage can be an effective means for the personal advancement of elected 
political leaders. The culture of political parties in government having their political supporters in key 
senior positions in the state is apparently observed in all democratic countries (Buchan & Hill 2014). 
However, the risk is higher in developing countries where there is often poor transition from a 
traditional and patrimonial system of authority to legal-rational authority (Felson 2011; Rose-
Ackerman 2010). This practice has an underlying assumption that established rule of law and 
accountable institutions are powerful enough to constrain personalisation of power and odd practices 
Example 3  
Patronage-exchange of gifts and favours 
Mr X3 was a former Prime Minister of Vanuatu and was a Minister of Economic Affairs and President of 
UMP when the loan was granted to him. As Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr X3 was responsible for the DBV. The 
Board of Directors, the majority of whom were UMP members, approved Mr X3’s loan. 
His initial request was for a loan of VT2, 300,000 to purchase a truck. He agreed to contribute VT1, 226,583 
and to repay the loan at VT80, 900 per month. He later declined to make the contribution and requested the Board’s 
approval for the bank to meet the full cost of the truck. It appeared from the documentation that the loan was disbursed 
before it was formally approved. Security documentation was prepared months after the release of the funds. Mr X3 
requested duty exemption approval from the Minister of Finance. His request for duty exemption was approved  
The DBV did not have files containing information on Mr X3’s liabilities and assets. There was no data on his 
income and expenses, which is necessary to assess Mr X3’s ability to repay the loan. The loan account was classified as 
a political loan and was only accessible by the Managing Director. Due to Mr X3’s failure to honour the agreement, the 
Vehicle was seized and sold for VT850, 000, which helped reduce the loan amount. Mr X3 was expected to repay the 
outstanding balance, but he had not made any arrangement to have the loan repaid. 
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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that can undermine the public interest and derail the whole objective of state organisations. However, 
in a country where eighty percent of the population have a strong adherence to traditional values of 
social obligation and leadership, the transition between personal into impersonal roles is difficult to 
make in the public arena. The above example illustrates that where there is overlapping of values, 
roles, and norms, people in positions of authority take advantage by abusing one system and getting 
cover-up from another system. 
 
Example 3 also illustrates how a Minister sought favour from the Board of Directors, in that he made 
a special request for the Bank to cover the full cost of his loan. Thus, a strong political connection is a 
well-established medium for mobilising patronage, which in turn generates strong bonds of 
obligation. This bond of obligation depends on loyalty, obedience and trust from both parties. The 
failure to remain loyal to the Minister could lead to job dismissal for Board members, and therefore 
the Minister was in a comfortable position to influence the Bank in whatever direction he wanted. 
Example 3 also illustrates that the Minister can choose to be above the rule of law, which 
demonstrates clearly how a strong patronage system can undermine formal legal-rational institutions. 
Indeed, Example 3 is representative of other cases that illustrate that a strong political connection can 
defy the rule of law (Cain & Jowitt 2004).  
 
Example 3 further illustrates that a strong political connection and allies within public organisations 
can have a wider influence on state resources vertically and also horizontally. A Minister can 
influence the organisations of which he/she has a direct mandate to manage, and also work through 
other State Ministers to seek favours from his/her portfolios. For instance in Example 3, Mr X3 used 
his power to borrow funds from the Bank outside processes and rules, and at the same time requested 
a duty exemption from the Ministry of Finance. The loan and duty exemption were granted to him 
outside formal government processes and policy guidelines of the Bank. 
6.2.3 Lack of record keeping and assessment 
Example 4 illustrates that for all illicit loan dealings with the DBV there were no records in files, and 
most importantly there was no Bank assessment and appraisal of the loans. 
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This example again demonstrates the tensions between Bank officials seeking to enforce terms and 
political interference that can circumvent such enforcement. This loan was processed on the basis of 
the Minister’s letter to the Bank. There was no formal application process and Mr X4 was granted 
favourable terms of more than ten years instead of three years as per the policies of the Bank. 
Standards of documentation were weak, making it difficult for auditors to follow the trail of 
favouritism, through the DBV. The Ombudsman investigation revealed that there were thirty three 
cases of loan disbursements at the DBV that have either partial or no records in the file (Vanuatu 
Ombudsman 1999). The absence of such records reflects that most of the loans were disbursed by oral 
communication between the Minister to the Board of Directors, or Board of Directors to the 
Managing Director of the Bank. In a tightly rule-governed organisation, record keeping and reporting 
are critical features, because they assist decision-makers to trace the performance of the organisation 
and also ensure transparency and accountability. The culture of keeping records and communicating 
instructions in writing is a new norm that challenges the local norms and culture of giving verbal 
instructions and recording and retaining past experience in oral traditions only. 
 
A quick survey of the Ombudsman’s reports from 1996 to 2000 illustrates corruption cuts across a 
number of issues, meaning that in any particular case it is likely that more than one action will be 
found to be corrupt. Table 6.2 presents a brief breakdown of corruption cases to demonstrate how 
complex corruption is in an entangling environment, where principles of Christianity, kastom, and 
legal-rational state functions are adopted as pillars of state governance. The element of conflict of 
interest would seems to be present in all incidences of corrupt behaviours found in DBV Case Study 
and also reflected in Table 6.2. 
Example 4  
Lack of record keeping and assessment 
Mr X4 was a strong UMP supporter who was employed by the UMP Government as the Public Works 
Department’s foreman on Tanna. Mr X4 did not submit a loan application form. The bank processed the loan based on a 
letter of request. The Bank’s Board of Directors approved Mr X4’s loan and, on 30 April 1998, he received VT800, 000 
to purchase a second-hand mini bus for tour operations. The loan agreement required the repayment in three years, but 
the term had been extended to more than ten years, exceeding the authorised period. 
The security was never evaluated and its value was not known. The Trader’s Bill of Sale documentation was 
defective and cannot be enforced. As of 11 November 1998, the loan balance stood at VT1, 577, 423, with its interest 
set at zero to stop its further growth. Following Mr X4’s failure to make regular repayments, DBV seized the vehicle. 
There was no evidence as to whether the vehicle was sold by the bank or returned to Mr X4 following an alternative 
arrangement  
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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Table 6.2 Breakdown of the Ombudsman reports from 1996 to 2000 
No of cases Nepotism Extortion/Coercion  Patronage Bribery/reciprocity Conflict of 
interest 
52 21 5 9 17 52 
Source: Edward Hill (2001b) 
In a similar vein, Figure 6.2 shows a more recent analysis of the cases investigated by the 
Ombudsman Office. These are the cases that the Ombudsman’s Office has officially received from 
complainers and registered for investigation; there may be more cases unreported. The corrupt 
activities were broadly categorised into three main areas: maladministration, leadership code, and 
language rights. The maladministration refers to activities of public officials outside rules, processes, 
and misuse of government agencies. The incidents of maladministration are increasing, which gives a 
sense of how difficult it is to draw a line between private and public interests by those in public office. 
Leadership code violations involve elected political leaders who are suspected of breaking the law and 
of ministerial misconduct. This involves allegations of granting licences to family and friends, illegal 
recruitment to public positions, using government vehicles outside official hours, and unlawful 
dismissal. The reason for the decreases in number of complaints against leaders in 2012 reflects 
general public perception that they have wasted their efforts in complaining because to date there is 
no prosecution of leaders who have been implicated in corrupt practices (Vanuatu Ombudsman 2012).  
 
Figure 6. 2  Types of complaints investigated by Ombudsman 
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Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 2012. 
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6.2.4 Bribery and reciprocity 
Examples 5 and 6 below involved the two most important authorities in the Bank, Chairman of the 
Board of Directors and Managing Director of the Bank, who both were involved in the process of loan 
outside the Bank’s policy. Mr X5 was the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank, and DBV 
Case Study strongly illustrated that he and the Managing Director had been involved in bribery known 
in Vanuatu as “rubbing each other’s back”. In other words, if you are kind to me I will be kind to you 
in the same manner. The value of reciprocity facilitates corruption internally within public institutions 
because social understandings do not require written agreements, meaning that corrupt actions can be 
obscured and difficult to trace. This was evidenced in Examples 4 and 5, where records were not 
retained, implying that there was intent to disguise, which in turn implies illegality. 
 
 
 
Again, Example 5 illustrates that there was strong family support, as Mr X5 was supported by his 
brother and sister, and this was indeed a clear example of a strong family network supporting each 
other. This particular case re-enforces the argument, made on several occasions in this thesis, that in a 
traditional society the process of how the resources have been extracted from the state is frequently of 
little or no concern to family connections and local communities who benefit; which in turn 
demonstrates a significant gap in understanding about how the legal-rational world operates. In other 
words, the focus of community is on the relationship between people and leaders rather than on the 
leaders and the rule of law. Because the knowledge and understanding of laws are limited within the 
eighty percent of population in rural areas, the performance of a leader with the rule of law gets little 
attention and would seem to be of no concern to them. 
 
Example 5 
Bribery 1 
The loan was approved during the period Mr X5 sat on the DBV Board of Directors as a chairman. The 
original amount disbursed was VT3, 000,000, with small additional disbursements thereafter despite poor repayment 
history. The loan was to cover Mr X5’s personal expenses and not for developmental purposes. This loan violates the 
bank’s mandate. Mr X5’s failure to make regular payments resulted in a current balance of VT5, 291,218 with VT5, 
761,965 in arrears. 
Mr X5 made no contribution and offered no security apart from the personal guarantees of his brother and 
sister. There was no evidence that Mr X5 submitted a written application. The Managing Director handled Mr X5’s loan 
personally and as such the loan was granted outside the bank’s process and violated bank’s policy. This account was 
restructured several times with instalment levels reduced in favour of the client. The bank did not attempt to enforce the 
personal guarantees. 
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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Example 6 illustrates that in the same manner, the Managing Director had borrowed from the Bank to 
fund his personal expenses. Again, as was demonstrated in example 5, these two cases were 
representative of other cases where politicians and bureaucrats bribe each other to subvert formal 
rules and process for their self-interested deals in public institutions. The example 6 involved the 
Managing Director of the Bank. 
 
 
 
Examples 5 and 6 illustrate bribery between the Chairman of the Board and Managing Director of the 
DBV. These examples further illustrate a broad challenge of the DBV, where Senior Managers of the 
Bank were involved in corrupt dealings, whether in coalition with elected politicians or independent 
from political support. While there may be some incidents of money-laundering, a review on the 
implementation of United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) by the United Nations 
reveals that to date there has been no prosecution of cases related to money-laundering in Vanuatu 
(United Nations 2013). Furthermore, Example 6 illustrates the entanglement of traditional rights 
versus formal responsibilities in relation to taking care of an institution on behalf of the people. 
Within the traditional political sphere, a leader has a traditional right to divert resources to where it is 
needed most, and also to make sure that his/her people have a fair share. This traditional right is 
informal and it is not in black and white, making it complicated to distinguish it from formal rights 
and the right to look after resources in the interests of the public or state. In an interview with a former 
regional manager of the DBV for the present study, he made the following observations: 
 
The law of DBV was not strong enough compared to laws of most existing banks today. 
Many people who were employed at DBV were not appointed on merit. The Bank was full of 
people who have a strong political connection and as a consequence they followed not the 
Example 6 
Bribery 2 
Mr X6 was the Managing Director of the DBV. He applied for this loan to re-finance outstanding debts valued 
at VT1, 759, 347 and to reimburse the bank for VT520, 000 that he spent on personal items while on a tour in the USA. 
The Board of Directors instructed the Bank management to give an additional VT106, 890 to be released to cover Mr 
X6’s personal telephone expenses. As per the bank’s policies, the use of bank’s money by staff should be subject to 
disciplinary action and should not be covered by a loan from the bank. 
The unsecured loan was granted for a very generous nine-year term and required monthly payment of VT36, 
100. Mr X6 drew it as a personal loan in breach of DBV policies and rules, which set VT200, 000 as the maximum 
amount for personal loans to staff. Mr X6 was terminated from the bank and he made a new arrangement with the bank 
and the records show that he made only one monthly payment and went into default.  
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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process of the Bank to give out loans. Some of the senior officers of the Bank made friends 
with politicians and thus most loans were politically motivated and outside Bank’s policies. 
Those practices put the Bank in a very difficult position (Tape Interview 13 May 2013) 
 
This quotation shows that a political connection with bureaucrats can have a powerful influence on 
formal economic, social and political organisations. In a legal-rational system there is a clear 
separation of sovereign authority (heads) with subjects (civil servants) and they are meant to work 
separately but complementarily. This line of separation is difficult to make where both sides have 
similar vested interests to enrich themselves at the expense of the population at large. 
 
Furthermore, Example 5 and 6 illustrate an inherent gap in understanding between public officials and 
elected politicians who are meant to be custodians of state resources for the people and manage them 
in the best interests of the public. It could also imply a lack of educational awareness of the rights of a 
custodian compared with a traditional right where whatever is at your disposal can be used or given to 
your family. Similarly, State Ministers have this sense of ownership, which means they feel at liberty 
to divert public resources at their disposal to activities that may undermine public interests. For 
instance, a State Minister might ask the head of a department to use public funds to pay his airfare to 
attend his party congress. If the head of department refuses the request, he/she may impair their close 
relationship with the minister. This is now a norm in the public sector where Directors, Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) and heads of public institutions make friends with State Ministers and 
politicians, and as such it complicates their line of impartiality and the borders between politicians 
and bureaucrats.  
 
Example 6 also illustrates that the DBV failed to take appropriate security to cover the loan, although 
Mr X6 owned two houses with discharged mortgages. The Board of Directors allowed the Bank to 
make a termination payment directly to him, rather than compelling him to make full repayment of his 
own debt. This violated the policy set out in the Staff Manual, which states that all staff loans were 
payable upon termination or resignation. In addition, the Bank took no effort to pursue the default in 
court in order to obtain a judgement to access Mr X6’s salary. Thus, Examples 5 and 6 are also 
representative of other incidents of conflict of interest where those who occupied top positions in the 
government made decisions that benefited them privately. 
6.2.5 Conflict of interest  
In all examples of corrupt practices at the state level there is an element of conflict of interest. The 
following cases exemplify broad challenges to the state where public officials and elected politicians 
are involved in self-dealing for personal gain. Example 7 illustrates conflict of interest involving 
members of the Board of Directors and senior staff of the DBV. 
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This example clearly illustrates evidence of a conflict of interest, in which Mr X7 as a member of the 
Board of Directors influenced the Bank to grant him several loans outside the Bank’s processes and 
policies. As a member of the Board he had a duty to safeguard the interests of the Bank and act 
independently and objectively to promote the Bank’s development objectives. Furthermore, it 
illustrates the weaknesses of the Bank to enforce rules and recover the outstanding loans to the Bank. 
In a similar vein, the elected politicians found it difficult to draw a line between the general interests 
of their electorate and the communities they represented, and the interests to promote the development 
objectives of the DBV. Example 7 is a case in point, where a State Minister had a conflict of interest 
as a member of the UMP party and the Minister responsible for the operation of the DBV. 
Ministerial instruction is a typical example of the current features of Vanuatu’s state administration, 
where state resources are committed on the written commands of the minister; but, it is reasonable to 
presume, sometimes these commands follow unwritten and self-serving political instructions. As the 
above cases demonstrate, there were no government records and it was very difficult to construct an 
Example 7 
Entanglement between family and state duties 
Mr X7 was a staff member of the bank until he was compulsorily retired in January 1995. His brother was the 
Minister of Finance at that time when he applied for a loan to purchase an irrigation system and provided working 
capital for squash cultivation on the Teouma plains. As security, Mr X7 offered a vehicle registered number T344 and 
the irrigation system. The value of this property was not known. The bank took a Bill of Sale over these assets. Mr X7 
stated in his interview with the Ombudsman’s Office that the loan was a normal loan, rather than a staff loan.  
Mr. X7 applied for the loan when he was employed by the Nambawan Bottle Shop. The First Secretary of the 
Finance Ministry supported the application through his letter dated 5/4/95, which stated in part, “ I recommended that 
this application be appraised for the Board decision”. The First Secretary addressed his letter to the Acting Deputy 
Managing Director. The Managing Director authorized his deputy manager to handle the application. In an interview 
with this officer, Mr X7 said the project was his own and, as part of this contribution, he provided tools. The loan had 
nothing to do with the fact that the Minister of Finance was his brother. 
The loan agreement required repayment over a period of seven months, with instalment of VT58, 796 until a 
lump sum payment was made to retire the loan. Mr X7 did not honor the agreement and the loan entered arrears. The 
entire amount outstanding was in arrears. After many contacts and proposed arrangements to garnish Mr. X7’s salary (as 
manager of Vanuatu Holdings) failed, the bank issued a Letter of Demand dated 13/2/96. The security assets were put 
out for tender. Another person purchased the irrigation system for VT650, 000 on 1/10/96. The bank took no further 
action to recover the outstanding fund owed. 
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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audit trail. This practice challenges the function of law enforcement agencies and other accountability 
institutions in that they are not able to challenge it in the court because of the lack of evidence.  
As stated previously, getting direction from kastom authority and implementing these accordingly 
demonstrates respect for leaders and authority in the local community, and this social norm has great 
influence on the operation of legal-rational institutions. The strong respect for leaders in the local 
community is one of the local values of social obligation that is embedded within the legal-rational 
system of state and economic administration. This is reflected in the identified cases in this Chapter, 
where elected and appointed politicians wrote a “Ministerial letter of instruction” to the Managing 
Director of the Bank on behalf of their party members allowing them to borrow from the Bank 
without formal application. We have seen local political elites use traditional values of social 
obligations and authority to undermine formal institutions, and as a consequence they derailed the 
whole objective of the organisation. Example 7 was representative of other cases where elected 
politicians gave instruction to distribute state resources to certain individuals outside formal 
processes. It also illustrates how strong family connection and political groupings can undermine 
bureaucratic rules and government processes to extract state resources, simply through a one-sentence 
letter of instruction to the Bank.  
6.2.6 Extortion 
The use of force or coercion was one of the identified characteristics of the way DBV loans were 
administered. The staff of the Bank were pressurised by both appointed and elected politicians to 
grant loans to their political cronies and close relatives in contradiction to formal processes, policies, 
and rules (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999, p.8).  
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Example 8 is representative of cases where elected politicians gave direct instructions to the 
management of the Bank to grant loans to their political supporters. Those instructions were either 
verbal or in the form of a letter, as is reflected in Example 8b. 
Example 8 
 
Mr X8 was a member of the UMP party and held the position of the third secretary and later second secretary 
to the Minister of Finance. He was a former Chairman of the Board of the Development Bank of Vanuatu and the 
National Bank of Vanuatu. The DBV granted Mr X8 three separate loans during the period the UMP was in 
Government. 
The first loan was for the purchase of a bus to operate in the city of Port Vila. The Loan Committee initially 
refused the loan application. The Managing Director of the bank communicated the decision to Mr X8 in a letter dated 
13 June 1995, advising that the request was not within the requirement of the bank’s normal lending policy. Upon 
receipt of the bank’s letter, Mr X8 solicited support from political leaders in the government. Two days after the date of 
the bank’s letter, the First Political Advisor of the Ministry of Finance wrote to the bank requesting the Loan Committee 
reconsider the loan for approval.  
In a letter dated 12 September 1995, the Minister of Finance expressed his support for the loan application and 
asked the Loan Committee that it be treated as an unsecured loan. The Minister further requested that the DBV waive its 
requirement of a cash contribution of VT500, 000 but increase the interest rate to 17%. The request of the Minister was 
not disputed by the bank and the Managing Director approved the loan on the terms suggested in the Minister’s letter. 
Mr X8 failed to honor the loan agreement, which resulted in substantial repayment arrears. Despite the bad performance, 
the bank granted him another two additional loans. Details of the loans were not available in bank files. 
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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This letter can be referred to as a ‘letter of credit’ because many political supporters were able to 
borrow from the Bank using Ministerial instruction. On the other hand it can be interpreted as a form 
of coercion in which the staff of the Bank were exhorted to grant loans in contradiction to the Bank’s 
guidelines, policies, and rules. When the transaction involves the use of force of threat or intimidation, 
those who are employed to stand by legal-rational principles become easy prey to political superiors. 
The evidence presented in Example 9, when interpreted in context, is evidence of extortion, 
misappropriation, self-dealing, conflict of interest, abuse of discretion, nepotism and, most 
importantly, patronage. Example 9 is a Ministerial instruction to the Managing Director of the Bank 
seeking special favour and treatment for his political supporter. He even cautions the Bank to limit 
this special treatment of zero deposit to only political supporters. 
Example 8b 
12th September 1995 
 
 
XXXX 
Development Bank of Vanuatu 
P.O.BOX 241 
Port Vila 
 
Dear XXXX 
RE: Mr X 8 Loan Applications 
Mr X8 applied for a loan to purchase a Mini bus and to operate it as public transport in Vila town. 
Your letter to him dated 19/7/95 confirmed the board approval under certain terms and conditions which must 
be adhere to before any disbursement can be made by the Bank. The most difficult part under the terms and conditions 
is his personal contribution of VT500,000. He finds it difficult to fulfil this requirement. 
My view is that the security offered to the Bank which was the right to have bill of sale over his property title 
No......should be accepted by the Board as his contribution, in order for the loan to be released without further delay to 
Mr X8. 
  
 I would appreciate very much and further request that if you agree, loan should be released on the condition 
that two lots of securities stated above satisfy your requirements. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Minister of Finance 
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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Example 9 also illustrates the wider practice of appointed politicians writing on behalf of their State 
Minister instructing the Board of Directors and the Managing Director of the Bank to release funds to 
their political supporters. These official instructions from higher political authorities can be in two 
forms, written instruction and verbal communication. Examples 8b and 9 are one form of Ministerial 
instruction to bureaucrats, directing them to act in conflicting ways because if he/she rejects the 
Minister’s instruction it will reflect badly on his/her reputation in their local community. In addition, 
the failure to process a Ministerial instruction could mean that officers in charge could lose their job 
as a consequence. The second form of instruction is a culture of Minista i talem se (Minister said), and 
this culture is open to abuse by appointed politicians who use the names of State Ministers to 
intimidate civil servants to facilitate their demands. 
Like in other cases, the senior bureaucrats who worked for the top ranking politicians were under 
pressure to act against their better judgement. In a letter to the Ombudsman’s Office dated 13 August 
1999, the Managing Director of the Bank made the following comments: 
True you could refer to these loans as “political loans”. The Bank’s Management could not do 
much about stopping them from being approved. There was direct intervention from high 
government authorities as well as the Board to have the loans concerned approved. It was an 
extremely difficult time for the Bank’s Management to do anything. We are under pressure 
Example 9 
16th September 1992 
 
 
XXXX 
Development Bank of Vanuatu 
P.O.BOX 241 
Port Vila 
 
Dear XXXX 
RE: Mr XX Loan Application 
I am aware that his loan has already been supported by the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the DBV 
Board of Directors. 
And in compliance with the agreement reached between you and my first secretary on September 11th 1992, I 
hereby, authorise you to disburse the loan under the special condition (zero deposit) 
However, note that any of your customers cannot benefit that special condition without prior approval, 
pending the new lending policies guide line which will be approved soon by the Board. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Minister of Finance 
 
Source: Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999 
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continuously from the high authorities to approve the loans. But we did our best despite the 
difficulty (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999, p. 44) 
This quote epitomises the experiences of bureaucrats who have seen and participated in facilitating 
corrupt dealings involving elected and appointed politicians, which in turn gives them incentive to 
become implicated in similar practices. The Vanuatu state became engulfed in an environment of 
corrupt dealings as a means for enrichment, social and political advancement, and improving the 
economic status of a few individuals within the system. There are two implications. Firstly, the trust 
and confidence that citizens put in elected leaders to represent their public interest and manage the 
state’s resource in a sustainable manner have deteriorated, to the extent where mistrust of leaders 
creates significant opportunity for corruption. Secondly, the low trust environment creates political 
leaders who work for their personal interests and selfishly favour their political allies and relatives. 
The further consequence of these two implications is that it hurts people who live in remote and rural 
communities, including marginalised sections of the population. The above quotation further 
illustrates that political connection and influence are powerful enough to derail public programs and 
distort the distribution of government resources. Indeed, the DBV Act was designed in a way that 
permitted State Ministers and the Boards of Directors, who were political appointees, to extract more 
of the DBV resources for themselves (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999, 2001) 
6.3 Public perception and understanding 
A series of forty semi-structured interviews were also conducted, as part of the present research, to 
test the understanding and perceptions of the general populace about corruption, distinguished by 
occupation, age and gender. The responses show that, in general, there is a wide consensus that 
corruption is bad and that there is need for a concerted effort to fight it. The respondents were divided 
on their views about the definition of corruption, and some confined their answers to parameters of 
the laws as well as making inferences to international understandings of the term. Table 6.3 illustrates 
that, in general, different sections of Vanuatu’s population condemned certain corrupt practices such 
as nepotism, bribery, and patronage. There is some reservation when it comes to ‘gift giving’, and as   
is shown in Table 6.3, there were three groups who believed that gift giving can be both positive and 
negative depending on the size of the gift and the motivation of the presenter. There were another 
three groups who strongly opposed gift giving, and these were the people who are business and 
development oriented. Their responses reflect largely their past experiences in Vanuatu about how gift 
giving was abused by certain groups of people to distort the process of justice, fairness and equity in 
the business and development environment. The kastom authority believes that gift giving is 
appropriate because it shows how people appreciate services rendered to them by friends and leaders. 
It also shows a level of respect when one visits a leader or enters a different nasara and nakamal. 
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Table 6.3  Number of respondents by category who condemned corrupt practices 
No of 
respondents 
Category Nepotism Bribery Gift giving Patronage  
6 Bureaucrats      +ve and -ve   
4 Private Sector         
7 Non-government 
Organisation 
    +ve and -ve   
8 Kastom authority      accept   
4 Youth         
5 Women
2
         
5 Members of 
Parliament  
    +ve and -ve   
1 Aid Donors         
Total 40       
Source: Author’s own work 
On the other hand, Table 6.4 is a flipside of Table 6.3, which illustrates largely that out of the forty 
participants, the majority had a strong view that helping family, respect for family and authority, and 
strong family connection are important community values. There is broad consensus that these 
practices are not corrupt and reflect community values and personal values. The private sector and aid 
donors shared a divided opinion, and felt strongly that there is need for government to legislate these 
values and draw clear boundaries in order to avoid misuse and misinterpretation. With regards to 
reciprocity, women and non-government organisations shared the same view as the private sector, that 
there is need to legislate this in order to avoid abuses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Women were separated for analytical purposes. Three of them are working as government officials. 
The other two represent churches and farmers. 
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Table 6.4 Number of respondent by category who believe that this is an acceptable value 
No of 
respondents 
Category Helping 
family 
Reciprocity Strong 
respect for 
family  
Strong family 
connection  
6 Bureaucrats          
4 Private Sector +ve and -ve +ve and -ve +ve and -ve +ve and -ve 
7 Non-government 
Organisation 
  +ve and -ve     
8 Kastom authority          
4 Youth         
5 Women
3
   +ve and -ve     
5 Members of 
Parliament  
         
2 Aid Donors +ve and -ve +ve and -ve +ve and -ve +ve and -ve 
Total 40      
Source: Author’s own work 
Table 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate tensions between those who adhere broadly to kastom values and 
principles and those adhering to a legal-rational system. This thesis identifies a possible way to 
manage values of social obligation and maintain community values in a manner that does not 
undermine formal legal authority. 
 During the interviews, the DBV participants acknowledged that the DBV assisted ni-Vanuatu to 
participate in development. A former manager of the lending portfolio commented: 
Yes, political interference was one of the major contributing factors to poor management of 
the bank. In my view the government should not closed the bank because the bank made a 
great contribution to develop the basis of our economy. You go around the islands of Vanuatu 
today and you see plantations of coconut, cocoa, cattle farms, and coffee and these were the 
plantations that the DBV financed. In financial terms we can say the DBV failed but in terms 
of development I think the DBV made huge contributions to our development (Tape 
Interview 1 May 2013). 
 
                                                          
3
 Same as in footnote 1 
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This quote broadly illustrates that, out of the forty participants interviewed, many refuse to describe 
the political influences on the Bank as corrupt if they are based on family ties, or they claim that, even 
if formally illegal, the practices are socially acceptable and economically beneficial. In their view they 
believed the DBV was successful because it established a basis for the Vanuatu economy by assisting 
farmers and local communities to develop their own plantations. It empowered ni-Vanuatu by giving 
them the means to invest in their farms and households, and to improve their social status in that more 
parents were able to send their children to schools. However, DBV cases demonstrate that there is a 
need to formally manage family networks to ensure that economic benefits are distributed according 
to principles of fairness. It is becoming a challenge where the state resource is scarce and only those 
who are in public positions benefit at the expense of the rest of the local communities. The following 
section demonstrates the attitudes of political leaders and individuals who come from other sectors 
and borrow funds from outside the formal processes. 
When asked if the identified cases of corrupt practices were a reason that led to the closing of the 
DBV, one respondent made the following comments: 
 
The government should not listen to ADB advisors to close DBV. This was a great mistake 
and I do not think that there was corruption at DBV. Our political leaders made sure that 
everyone in Vanuatu accessed the loans so that they can develop themselves and be able to 
send their children to schools. We are fortunate to have our political leaders who work with us 
and it is not like in colonial days where only Europeans were allowed to borrow from the 
bank and operated business. DBV was meant to help ni-Vanuatu to develop and outsiders 
made the bank’s rules and policies very difficult for the rural population to access it. This is 
the reason why I think our political leaders at the time did a right thing and we cannot say 
they are corrupted because they help people of Vanuatu to participate in economic activities 
(Tape Interview 31 May 2013). 
 
This quotation highlights a gap between public expectations of government and the legal-rational 
standard espoused by international institutions. The majority of those interviewed about the DBV 
thought politicians were not corrupt because they helped ni-Vanuatu access loans at the Bank. If the 
minister abuses his/her power to facilitate family requests to borrow from the Bank outside the Bank’s 
formal processes, it is believed they are doing it for a good cause. As such, within the traditional 
context it is morally sound, because the Minister helps a poor farmer who cannot afford to follow 
sophisticated Bank procedures and requirements so that they can have equal participation. There may 
also be a mismatch between traditional values of social obligation and practices, on one hand, and 
efforts to develop impartial bureaucratic processes and democratic systems, on the other hand. 
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The heavy political involvement in the operation of public institutions has impacted on the legitimacy 
of those institutions so that the public has lost confidence and trust in them. In a country where eighty 
percent of its population have a strong adherence to kastom governance and give more legitimacy to 
kastom authority, the transfer of excessive powers to political leaders in public institutions is a major 
governance challenge because most of those leaders have a strong kastom influence on them. 
Generally, all government institutions are subjected to political directions, and to some extent the 
State Ministers have a direct functional relation with those institutions. The DBV Case Study reveals 
that people who participated in what were classified in this chapter as incidents of corruption were 
political leaders and officials who benefitted from it at the broader expense of the eighty percent of 
the population in rural areas. 
6.4 Institutional legitimacy 
In Vanuatu state institutions suffered a legitimacy crisis because institutional design did not 
acknowledge and compensate for local contextual considerations. As argued in previous chapters, 
many new socio-economic and political institutions are grounded on new principles and power 
structures that are alienated from traditional social bases of order and power. Then spaces emerge in 
which it becomes possible and relatively easy for interested parties to subvert rules and procedures. In 
almost all public institutions legislative authority took control of the management and policy 
directions, but in a context where accountable mechanisms are weak and law could not restraint 
inappropriate behaviours, there is significant opportunity for corruption. The land leasing system, and 
management of this, is another government institution that became a hotspot of public criticism 
concerning the practices and ways Ministers exercised their legislative powers to grant leases 
favourable to their political supporters or close relatives (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998b). In a similar 
vein, the Ministry of Finance, despite the intensive reform, is continually facing allegations over the 
way the central tender boards perform. Contracts and tenders were awarded to individuals, family and 
friends without following legal standards and procedures. However, despite efforts by external 
agencies such as the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), to support the implementation of program budgeting across ministries and 
departments, to strengthen the revenue and tax collection system, and to improve tender and contract 
processes and budget reporting across all ministries, there are continuous challenges over the practices 
and ways government tenders and contracts are handled (ADB 2002; Bazeley & Mullen 2006). 
 
All these practices demonstrate how legitimacy of public institutions can be challenged; and therefore 
the need for a grounded approach is critical to balance how power and social order in those 
institutions are geared towards promoting development objectives. When the Government initiated the 
Agriculture Development Bank in 2006, the local elites were against the initiative, based on the past 
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experiences of the DBV, the Vanuatu Maritime Authority (VMA), and the Vanuatu Copra Marketing 
Board (VCMB), to name just a few. Although these institutions were established for a good reason, 
the maladministration and mismanagement of resources by these bodies painted a negative picture in 
the minds of the local elites. This, indeed, had ruined the legitimacy of those public institutions and 
most importantly created distrust of the political leaders and public officers. 
 
In recent years, however, there have been positive steps taken to address the expectation gap and to 
create a bridge between traditional and legal-rational state practices, which will, it is hoped, facilitate 
a transition in attitudes and practices. The micro-credit component of the DBV was transferred to the 
National Bank of Vanuatu (NBV), which reoriented the whole management structure in line with 
existing governance institutions and the local socio-economic and political context. This 
organisational change reaffirms the argument that is developed in this thesis: to ground new 
institutions in the real socio-political context, where negotiation must take place between the state and 
society to accommodate different values and approaches. 
6.5 Organisational change for participatory development and transformations 
The National Bank of Vanuatu (NBV) took over the micro-credit component of the DBV and 
incorporated it within its portfolio, but retained its objectives to help ni-Vanuatu participation into 
economic activities. The rest of the performing loans that were received from the DBV were 
restructured in accordance with the policies of commercial banks, which means that former DBV 
customers who had their loans transferred to the NBV will now be treated equally with everyone else. 
What is more interesting is the performance of the micro-credit loans and how they have become 
successful compared to their poor performance at the DBV. Indeed, the success of the micro-credit 
facilities at the NBV provided a new organisational perspective in Vanuatu on how international best 
practices can be best incorporated into existing institutions at the local level to deliver development 
objectives. What do they do differently? The NBV incorporated the traditional economic system into 
its financial literacy, particularly the traditional currencies such as Pig, Shell, Mats, Yams, and Taro 
bisinis, and how each local community put value on these materials and objects. Pig, Shell, Mats, 
Yams, and Taro are traditional currencies that are seemingly used in almost all the islands of Vanuatu, 
and they operate in a similar way to a rational banking system. Traditionally, local communities were 
used to the traditional concepts of borrowing and interest rates, saving, and investment. As depicted in 
Figure 6.3, the local communities of Vanuatu had a vibrant economic trading system, which had all 
the features of a rational economic banking system. The NBV has used the traditional economic 
concepts of Pig, Shell, Mats, Yams, and Taro to construct an alternative understanding of rational 
micro-credit loans. In other words, the concepts of loans, credit, saving, interest and investment do 
exist in traditional society. Across the whole archipelago local communities were familiar with the 
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Pig, Shell, Mats, Yams, and Taro bisinis and although there were slight differences in how each 
society values those items, the principles have been and are observed throughout Vanuatu societies 
since the pre-colonial era until today (Huffman 2005). This alternative understanding, which draws 
heavily from traditional knowledge and understanding of Pig, Shell, Mats, Yams, and Taro bisinis, has 
then been incorporated into financial literacy programs that the NBV has used to raise awareness and 
educate local communities about how to use micro-credit loans to their benefit.  
 
One of the reasons why the NBV micro-credit loan schemes grew faster and successfully in rural 
areas is the integration of the Pig, Shell, Mats, Yams, and Taro bisinis concept into the bank’s 
financial literacy training, which focuses on three broad questions: How to start a business? How to 
grow a business? How to save and to invest? These questions were answered using the Pig, Shell, 
Mats, Yams, and Taro bisinis concept, which traditionally has all the key elements of a banking 
system: saving, borrowing, interest, repayment and investment. Figure 6.3 demonstrates how Pigs, 
Mats, Yams, Shell, and Taro have been traded with each island and people were consciously aware of 
how they save, invest, and borrow at certain interest rates using traditional wealth of pigs, mats, shell, 
yams, and taro. The Managing Director of the Micro-credit loan schemes made the following 
observations: 
 
We were able to connect nine thousand farmers in 2012 and people can do far better than 
expected and it is a matter of helping them understand how they can utilise the new economic 
system. People were easier to make transition when we connected them with the existing 
practices and concepts of Pig, Shell, Mats, Yams, and Taro bisinis that they were familiar 
with. We use the concept of traditional currencies that people are familiar with to teach 
rational banking principles and they resonate well with their traditional knowledge and 
practices. They understand how to divide their Pig, Shell, Mats, Yams, and Taro to meet 
certain plans and objectives, such as marriage ceremony, trading, saving, and investment. The 
bank builds on those concepts and integrates them into our financial literacy programs. Our 
financial literacy programs focuses on sources of income, needs of their family, and how to 
start a new business. We start with the training on saving and help them to develop the 
attitude to make a saving of VT100 each week and this has great impact on ways people use 
and manage their incomes (Tape Interview 13 May 2013). 
 
This illustrates that the efforts of the NBV, to build bridges between the traditional economy and the 
rational economic system in order to help people transform their traditional mindsets to new values of 
doing business, have had remarkable success. People who borrow from the micro-credit scheme are 
able to pay their loans and use their money wisely in meeting their family needs and social 
obligations. There is also a trusting relationship between the bank and people who borrow, which is 
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due largely to the commitment of the bank to work at their customers’ levels and help them participate 
in business activities. In addition, the NBV has branches in the whole archipelago and this provides 
accessibility to people in rural and remote islands of Vanuatu. Indeed, the level of corrupt practices, 
defined by working outside the bank’s processes and political interference, has stopped, and people 
are beginning to see the NBV as a legitimate institution that addresses their needs through the micro-
credit loan schemes. The NBV experiences with micro-credit loans demonstrates that once people 
clearly understood the expectations of new institutions and were able to link them to existing concepts 
of Pig, Shell, Mats, Yams, and Taro bisinis, they could easily make the connection and use these 
systems very well. 
 
Figure 6.3 illustrates that the traditional economic system has been practiced for over a century prior 
to establishment of the rational economic system in Vanuatu (Regenvanu 2009). The map shows the 
routes of trading exchange by ni-Vanuatu between and within islands throughout the archipelago. It 
also illustrates that foreign imported conceptual governance practices can be easily integrated with 
local understanding, provided the opportunity is given to understanding existing systems of 
governance and socio-economic systems. Figure 6.3 furthermore illustrates that the concepts of 
borrowing with interest, saving, and investment have been traditionally practiced over ages, and that 
local communities are well versed with these concepts rather than with the rational banking system. 
The need to find how to bridge this range of understanding is central to the present research, and is 
critical to the development of a resilient governance system.  
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Figure 6. 3 The northern and central part of Vanuatu showing traditional patterns and 
relationships of exchange as reconstructed from ethnohistory. 
 
Source: (Huffman 1996) 
As such, the micro-credit scheme provides an opportunity to bridge the two sets of conceptual 
understanding, of a rational economic system with that of a traditional economic or subsistence living 
system, by using existing institutions. For instance, another contributing factor to the growth of micro-
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credit loans in rural and remote areas of Vanuatu is the trusting relationship that the NBV has with 
kastom jifs, who establish development profiles of their people in villages and assist them to engage in 
business, which gives them greater comparative advantages. One of the roles of the kastom jifs in 
villages is to help individuals who face challenges to repay their loans, and this is achieved through 
collective efforts of the whole village. For example, according to the Managing Director of Credit: 
 
We had two containers of yams and taro sitting at the wharf ready to sell in Port Vila market 
to assist some of our customers in South West Bay and Pentecost who face difficulties with 
their loan repayments. The kastom jifs mustered the collective support of their villages to plan 
taro, yams, or kava that the bank can sell to recover the arrears and assist the members who 
have difficulty to repay their loans. Our working cooperation with kastom jifs and their people 
is valuable and without them we would face great challenges in our works in rural areas and 
local communities (Tape Interview 13 May 2013). 
 
This quotation illustrates the relevance and effectiveness of kastom authority in dealing with 
contemporary development challenges using the social capital system of traditional communities. 
Collective support in local communities is one of the traditional values that is critical to wellbeing of 
the people in these communities. Families lend each other a hand in various activities that require 
more than one person, and this culture is now valuable in the management of credit in villages, 
particularly those who are unable to repay their loans. The NBV model, of working with existing 
traditional values of social order and authority to develop an alternative understanding of the rational 
banking system, demonstrates that there is the possibility that the two value systems can work 
together to promote the development objectives of Vanuatu. 
 
Finally, the Board of Directors of the NBV are individuals with renowned expertise, skills, and 
experience in the industry, agriculture, rural development, and financial sectors. In addition, the NBV 
has partnered with the ADB and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which strengthens its 
financial and technical capacity to discharge its operations in accordance to prudent global 
management practices, decreasing opportunity for political interference and corrupt practices. The 
experiences of the NBV demonstrate that corruption can be managed and reduced in Vanuatu by 
negotiating and providing opportunity for local communities to redefine their values in accordance 
with international best practice.  
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6.6 Conclusion  
The nature of corruption in Vanuatu is quite complex, because it would seem to be rooted in 
traditional values of social obligation and authority. For instance, abuse of power to help someone is 
not seen as corruption but is part of the social norms and interaction. There seems to be a wider 
understanding gap, between what in the local context is deemed as moral and sensible and that of the 
legal-rational governance expectations. In the DBV Case Study, there is strong evidence of nepotism, 
bribery, patronage, abuse of power and position, extortion, conflict of interest in granting loans, 
working outside Bank policies, rules and formal procedures, and lack of respect for the rule of law or 
wilful refusal to be bound by the rules. However, the DBV respondents refused to label the 
operational challenges of the DBV as corruption, and they believed that granting loans to close ties 
and families is morally sound and the rightful duty of a leader. It is behaviour arising out of the social 
norms and interactions between leaders and their people that outsiders see as corrupt; but local 
participants in the present study’s interviews viewed it as acceptable and moral. 
In other words, nepotism that helps one’s friends or families can look like moral behaviour in a 
Vanuatu context. Political leaders have an obligation to help those who elected them to Parliament; 
and similarly, public officials have to help their families and relatives who at one point in time might 
have contributed to their school fees. When elected Members of Parliament gain a ministerial 
portfolio and have the opportunity to enrich themselves, they have an obligation to share generously 
with those who helped them to advance. We see this social practice at the DBV, which has led 
Ministers, political advisors, senior managers and lending officers to act contrary to bank policies, 
procedures, and laws in order to facilitate a loan to a member of a political party and/or family. Thus, 
corruption is a systemic issue that emanates from the collision of traditional values of social orders 
and leadership expectations with that of the state value of legal-rational governance. As depicted in 
the NBV example, finding the right kind of language and understanding to discuss governance and 
corruption in Vanuatu, rather than just importing language and discourse from World Bank and 
AusAID, would help reduce conflict and the opportunity for corrupt practices.  
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Chapter 7: Understanding Corruption in Vanuatu 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to interpret the research findings obtained through document analysis, the 
literature review, the two sets of case studies, and previous chapters. In Chapter Four an exploration 
was presented from a historical perspective of how the intersection of traditional values of social order 
and authority and the legal-rational authority of state governance in Vanuatu has created a space or 
“gap” in which there is an opportunity for corruption. This understanding was grounded in the 
literature review in Chapter Two, which counter-poses international aid and the legal-rational values 
and assumptions underlying aid, against socially embedded local practices and local expectations. 
Development aid programs are couched in terms of global “good” governance, with its philosophical 
foundation in liberal theories of economic modernization, democratisation and the rule of statutory 
law. Chapters Five and Six describe the research evidence that was generated in the Vanuatu context, 
and both inform this research. Chapter Five presented a case study of the Vanuatu jifly institution 
(MNCC), which reveals that the two colonial powers failed to transform kastom authority and social 
obligation in Vanuatu into a legal-rational system that mirrors the liberal “good governance” ideal. 
Chapter Six presented a case study of the DBV, which reveals that Vanuatu was working with a 
foreign and global definition of corruption as the misuse of power for personal gains. However, local 
communities have a different understanding about this. The research findings highlight persistent and 
critical divides within Vanuatu society; broadly, but not purely, between rural and remote 
communities on the one hand, and local elites and urbanised populations on the other. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first provides a discussion framework by restating the 
research aims and research questions. The second part explores the understanding of the concept of 
corruption in the Vanuatu context based on the documentary analysis, literature reviews, case studies 
and, most importantly, the perception and understanding of the ni-Vanuatu about the term. Finally, the 
third part focuses on the whole framework for explaining corruption in the Vanuatu context. The 
argument here, as throughout the thesis, is not that traditions must be abandoned or expunged, but 
rather that those rules and structures that underpin formal institutions of legal-rational governance 
need to be rethought in the Vanuatu context.  
7.2 Research aims and research question revisited 
The overarching aim of this research is to understand sources of corruption within Vanuatu 
Government and society, and how corruption can be addressed in the context of Vanuatu. The main 
research question based on the core aim of this research is: 
What are the sources of corruption within Vanuatu government and society?  
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This is followed with research sub-questions that are formulated to guide the design of the data 
collection: 
a) What is corruption in Vanuatu? 
b) What are the dimensions of corrupt behaviour within the Vanuatu society? 
c) How do we explain the phenomenon of corruption in Vanuatu? 
d) What strategies are available using indigenous cultural means and cultural traditions to 
actually build a more resilient system of governance within Vanuatu? 
The final question is addressed in Chapter Eight, which focuses on how traditions and culture can be 
used to build a more resilient system of governance in Vanuatu. The next section reviews the key 
concepts covered in this thesis and how they relate to the overall discussion framework presented in 
this chapter and how they inform the findings of this thesis. 
7.3 Revisiting key concepts and their applicability to the Vanuatu context 
Corruption is a term that gains currency and, perhaps, some confusion largely as a consequence of 
democratic systems of government. In the Western world, the removal of the system of absolute 
monarchy was seen as necessary because under this system the monarchy could do whatever they 
wanted without being seen as corrupt (Buchan & Hill 2014). However, in Vanuatu it seems 
impossible to remove kastom authority and its governance system for the sake of eliminating 
corruption. Hence, as mentioned on several occasions throughout this thesis, the major focus of this 
research is to examine a way to negotiate between different systems of thinking and powers contained 
therein, rather than to claim that one system is better than the other. 
Within a democratic society and its notions of sovereignty, the power is removed from the hands of 
people and put it in the hands of elected politicians and of special interest groups. Thus, the 
government is expected to represent the interests of all its citizens and, as a consequence, the public 
interest makes corruption a crime. It is a crime because corruption undermines the rule of law and 
works in contradiction to the public interest. Hence, within liberal forms of government and 
governance, corruption is seen as an abuse of power and the violation of bureaucratic processes of 
government. In developing countries, international development institutions and other aid agencies 
have promulgated the notion of corruption as the misuse of public office and abuse of power for 
personal gain, to design policies that target the elimination of corrupt practices. The two sets of case 
studies above, however, demonstrate that those governance initiatives have addressed the symptoms 
rather than the sources and root causes of the corruption. This is often reflected through the 
framework of good governance reform, which has similar conceptual ambiguities to corruption. While 
corruption is broadly referred to as a abuse of power in public office for personal gain, governance, on 
the other hand, focuses on the process by which power is exercised in the management of a country’s 
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economic and social resources for development (World Bank 1992). Again, the questions of what is 
corruption and what is good governance have raised possible answers that can only be sourced with 
reference to a country’s socio-economic and political context. The diverse and complex socio-political 
nature of each country renders the universal definitions of corruption and good governance, and their 
principle features of little relevance in developing countries. Because of the conceptual ambiguities of 
corruption and governance, what is understood as corruption and good governance in one particular 
cultural context, or sub-culture, might not have a similar understanding in another cultural setting 
(Larmour 2008). Hence, this thesis advocates for ways in which local communities in Vanuatu can 
appropriate alien ideas and address those practices that have allowed corruption to emerge. Part of 
that unlearning involves re-engagement and a reconnection with traditional arts of decision-making 
(Tiostanova & Mignolo 2012).  
Cultural differences challenge universalist approaches to corruption, because culture impacts on the 
design of institutions in developing countries, leading to many localised variations in practice that 
open opportunities for the misuse of public office. These dissonances are defined by a mismatch or 
disconnection between local values of social obligation and authority and those of a parliamentary 
system and legal-rational authority. This creates a space within which there is significant opportunity 
for practices to be interpreted differently, either as official corruption or, as highlighted in this thesis, 
as socially acceptable methods by which resources are provided by patrons, or “big men”, to their 
followers, including allies and extended kinship communities.  
Daniel Kaufmann’s definition of good governance as ‘traditions and institutions by which authority in 
a country is exercised for the common good’ reflects a conventional understanding of the democratic 
process in liberal states (Kaufmann 2005, p. 82). This definition is broad enough to cover kastom 
authority and local social norms that are integral to local governance, or any ‘formation and 
stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as 
well as economic and social actors interact to make decisions’ (Goran Hyden, Court & Mease 2004, p. 
26). Again, as mentioned on several occasions in this thesis, governance is ‘the multiple ways by 
which people manage their common affairs’ (Commission on Global Governance, 1996, p. 2) in their 
localised context, and as such it does not need an external order to dictate how they manage this 
relationship. The transplanting of liberal forms of democratic government and governance in the 
Pacific region was done so abruptly that local communities saw it as an intrusion into their social and 
political rights and way of life. As is argued throughout this thesis, each society is different in the way 
its members view what is moral and logical, and as a consequence the imposed liberal democratic 
system creates a significant opportunity for social and political tensions rather than the solution to 
their development challenges. However, democratization is only partial in Vanuatu, because in the 
democratic ideal, people are able to participate fully in the life of a democratic society. In Vanuatu, 
many people, indeed the majority, are either excluded or included according to education, gender, 
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kinship associations, social status and political connections. For a democratic society to evolve 
according to the ideal, the idea of public interest and public consultation needs to be embedded in the 
practices of state-building. Indeed, according to Felson (2011), corruption has greater potential in a 
legal-rational system as a consequence of clashes between existing expectations and authority, and 
new political, economic and social systems of organisation. 
7.4 What is corruption in Vanuatu? 
Corruption is an ambiguous term and does not have a cognate in the local languages of Vanuatu. Even 
in Bislama, a proper synonym for the term corruption cannot be found. However, the English word 
“corruption” is now used in Bislama in normal conversation. When I asked, “What is the Bislama 
term for corruption?” one respondent referred me to the concept of kruket fasin, which in itself does 
not get closer to the understanding of corruption as misuse of power. The term kruket is a term used to 
refer to someone who is not following the straight path, which could imply activities that are outside 
the rule of law in a local community or in a state. Thus, within the 110 languages of Vanuatu, there is 
a real challenge to find a local term that matches the English meaning of the word “corruption”. The 
findings of this thesis reveal that there is a need to move away from foreign ideas, terms and practices 
that have been imposed upon Vanuatu by colonialism and international development agencies. Thus, 
as part of decolonisation process, stakeholders in Vanuatu need to consider the methods of governing 
that are most appropriate to Vanuatu’s circumstances (Mignolo 2009). This entails finding local 
cultural roots for political ideas upon which modern states are built. 
As discussed, corruption is a concept historically specific to Western liberal democracy and the liberal 
democratic state. As has been mentioned in Chapters Two and Four, government in post-colonial 
Melanesian societies is largely built on a transplanted Western model of political democracy, which 
means that local institutions and legal frameworks were either ignored or artificially encoded with 
Western socio-political and economic norms. As a result, the state incorporated a formal set of rules 
and laws that clashed with traditional values of social obligation, kastom authority, and leadership 
expectations. The findings generated for this research reveal that Vanuatu has applied an international 
legal definition of corruption and, as such, its rules and laws were encoded based on Western 
understandings of corruption in public office. In the last three decades, beginning with the 
Constitution, Vanuatu enacted certain key legislations earmarked to protect values of liberal 
democracy such as fairness, equity, transparency, accountability, justice (Rhodes 2007), and most 
importantly, to stop personal self-interest from undermining state authority and functions. Among a 
range of legislation the following key pieces demonstrate how Vanuatu should be accountable to 
liberal practices and governance values such as transparency, efficiency, accountability, equity, 
fairness and justice (Bevir 2009; Chris, Helen & Stephen 2003). Indeed, ninety-five per cent of 
Vanuatu’s laws dealing with corruption criminalise traditional practices and challenge traditional 
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values of social obligation and authority, without any consideration being given by government, 
international agencies, or indeed international governance experts, as to how these liberal norms 
translate into local governance practices. 
7.4.1  Constitution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4.2  Leadership Code Act No.2 of 1998 
This whole Act is directed towards minimising the opportunity for corruption by requiring standards 
of behaviour from leaders in their personal lives and professional careers, and by outlining principles 
of disclosure and openness. Furthermore, it states that a leader must behave fairly and honestly in all 
 Article 25(4) provides for the establishment of the Auditor General’s Office, with a 
mandate to audit government expenditure and report to parliament on an annual 
basis. For the last three decades, government expenditures have never been debated 
and discussed in the parliament. 
 Article 59 provides for the establishment of an independent Public Service 
Commission, free from political interference and external influence. The practicality 
of this provision has proven to be difficult when it comes to implementing a public 
service without political interference. The members of the Public Service 
Commission are political cronies, and every time the government changes, the party 
in power makes sure that the Chairman of the Commission is a strong devoted 
member of the party. 
 Article 61(1) establishes an Independent Office of the Ombudsman with specific 
duties to enquire into the conduct of any public officials (bureaucrats and elected and 
appointed politicians). However, the Ombudsman Reports cannot be used by the 
judiciary as evidence against any perpetrators, and if there is a need to use it in the 
court the police have to carry out a separate investigation. This is another expensive 
process that costs the state double the expense, and many times the Court’s request 
for a second investigation may be seen as a delaying tactic by the judiciary. For all the 
reports released by the Ombudsman, no prosecutions have been made to date (Cain & 
Jowitt 2004; Jowitt 2014; United Nations 2013). 
 Article 66 made provision for a Leadership Code. Article 67 defines the term 
“leader”. A leader is limited to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and 
other Ministers, members of Parliament, and such public servants, officers of 
government agencies and other officers as may be prescribed by law.  
Source: Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu 1980 
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his or her official dealings with colleagues and other people, avoid personal gain, and avoid behaviour 
that is likely to bring his or her office into disrepute. A leader must ensure that he or she is familiar 
with and understands the laws that affect the area or role of his or her leadership. 
Section 13(1) (a-d) outlines general duties of a leader that he/she is expected to comply with, such as  
the rule of law, the principles of leadership contained in Article 66 of the Constitution, and duties, 
obligations and responsibilities established by this Act, including other enactments that affect the 
leader. Subsection (1d) makes it plain that a leader must not influence or attempt to influence or exert 
pressure on or threaten or abuse persons carrying out their lawful duty. 
Section 14(a-c) deals with the appointment of people on merit. This section lays out how a leader 
should go about making appointments to public positions. A leader is expected to act fairly in 
appointing people to offices and positions for which he/she has responsibility, and to make sure that 
people are appointed impartially and on merit. This section includes the provision of ensuring equal 
participation of males and females according to their abilities. Finally, a leader must not interfere or 
make any attempt to interfere in the functions of the Public Service Commission. Section 15(1) 
provides for a leader to give priority to his/her official duties at all times over his/her private business 
interests. 
Sections 16 to 17 deal with disclosure of personal interest. Section 16(1)(2) suggests that for a leader 
who has a business interest in a matter that he/she has to deal with in his or her official capacity as a 
leader, they should disclose in writing that interest. If he/she has a conflict of interest, he/she has to 
declare in writing this concern to the parliament, council, commission or any other body concerned 
with the matter. Sections 17 and 18 deal with a State Minister who is a member of the Council of 
Ministers; he/she has to make sure that he/she declares his/her interest before the Council. 
Sections 19 to 31 of Part 3 deal with breaches of the Leadership Code. Section 21 provides specific 
clauses on activities that contravene the terms of the Leadership Code. This includes misuse of public 
money and acceptance of loans. Section 22(1) (a-g) covers undue influence over a person who is 
another leader or any other person holding public offices. In other words, a leader must not influence 
or attempt to influence or exert pressure or interfere with persons carrying out statutory functions. 
Sections 23 and 24 deal with bribery and conflict of interest. Bribery, as per section 23(a-e), refers to 
a leader who corruptly asks for, receives, agrees to ask for, obtain, or offer any money, property, or 
other benefit of any kind in exchange for his/her acts or omissions as a leader or being influenced in 
any way, either directly or indirectly. Section 24 expands on the definition of conflict of interest in 
sections 7(1) and (2) and suggests that a leader must not act in relation to the matter in which he/she 
has a conflict of interest, or arrange for someone else to act in relation to the matter, in such a way that 
the leader or a member of his/her close family benefit from the action. Section 30 provides for 
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penalties for a leader who is found guilty under any of the provisions of this Act. These include a fine 
of AUD$50,000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years. 
7.4.3 Penal Code [CAP 135] Act 17 of 1981 
This Act is an important yardstick for determining corrupt practices in that it criminalises passive and 
active actions of public officials who contravene the rule of law. Most importantly, it contains over-
ambitious provisions against corruption, the majority of the terminologies used coming from 
international laws and conventions against corrupt practices. Sections 15, 16, 18, and 21 deal with 
bribery and trading influence. Section 73(3) defines bribe and public officer. Bribe means any money, 
valuable consideration, office, or employment or any benefits, whether direct or indirect. Public 
officer means any person in the official service of the Republic (whether that service is honorary or 
not, and whether it is within or outside the Republic), and any member or employee of any local 
authority or public body, including police and judicial officers. Any member of a public body would 
be widely interpreted to include Members of Parliament. It was confirmed that judges could also fall 
under the definition, but no such case examples exist. 
7.4.4 Proceeds of Crime Act of 2003, 2005, and 2012 
This piece of legislation is quite comprehensive and provides for the state to make offenders forfeit 
any properties used in connection with or for facilitating the commissions of serious offences. Section 
23 and 24 criminalises money-laundering, whereby if a person knows or ought reasonably to know 
that given property is the proceeds of crime; acquires, possesses or uses, or engages, directly or 
indirectly, in an arrangement that involves such property; converts or transfers such property; or 
conceals or disguises the true nature, source location, disposition, movement, ownership of or rights 
with respect to such property. Sections 17, 19, 20 and 22 address embezzlement, abuse of functions 
and illicit enrichment. In a similar vein, Section 123 of the Penal Code provides that a person commits 
misappropriation of property if he destroys, wastes, or converts any property capable of being taken 
that has been entrusted to him for custody, return, accounting or any particular manner of dealing 
(not being a loan of money or of monies for consumption). The causing of loss to another through 
misappropriation is criminalized under section 125(b) of the Penal Code. 
 
However, the 2004 and 214 National Integrity Report notes that there is no single legal definition of 
corruption in Vanuatu (Cain & Jowitt 2004). When the present researcher asked about corruption in 
Vanuatu, the legal investigator of the Ombudsman’s Office made the following response: 
 
Unfortunately there is no official definition of the corruption in Vanuatu. The Ombudsman’s 
Office uses the legal definition defined in the Leadership Code Act of 1998 and article sixty-
six and sixty-seven of the Constitution, which simply refer to corruption as when a leader 
misuses his or her position for personal gain. I came back from a workshop on the UNCAC 
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review and it was agreed at the workshop that the team will work on the official definition of 
corruption in Vanuatu (Tape Interview 2014). 
Consequently, Vanuatu has, for the last three decades, used an imposed concept of corruption and 
governance model that has not connected to existing knowledge and understanding in local 
communities. There is a wide gap of intellectual understanding of these two concepts, between the 
twenty percent of the population in urban areas and the eighty percent of the population in rural and 
remote communities of Vanuatu. Thus, in Vanuatu the term corruption is closely connected to 
imposed political institutions, and as such the term does not apply to other authorities such as kastom 
authority, church leaders and other civil society organisations that are not recognised and prescribed 
by the state laws and rules (Cain & Jowitt 2004). As a consequence, most ni-Vanuatu see corruption 
as limited only to public institutions and officials. This perception has been reinforced through most 
of the state institutions that set parameters and legal codes of how public officials should behave. 
Hence, the formal global definition of corruption that is currently used in Vanuatu as misuse of public 
office for private gain has major flaws in its application. One of these flaws is related to the perceived 
definition of corruption, which excludes other institutions and authorities that are not public 
institutions and, most importantly, not defined by the laws of the state. Although kastom authority and 
its institution were embedded into the Constitution, individual kastom jifs are not defined as leaders as 
far as Articles Sixty-six and Sixty-seven of the Constitution are concerned. The implication is that the 
corrupt behaviour of the kastom jifs, church leaders, and other ordinary citizens do not get public 
attention compared with corrupt practices of public officials (Cain & Jowitt 2004). According to the 
Vanuatu National Integrity Systems Report (NIS) of 2004, ‘actions of members of parliament and 
civil servants are more likely to attract charges of corruption than actions of the [kastom jifs] or 
community leaders, including church leaders. Actions of individuals who benefit from or encourage 
corrupt behaviours tend not to be seen as corrupt’ (Cain & Jowitt 2004, p. 10). This is a major gap or 
flaw that will be further discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
In addition, this definition of corruption assumes that public interests, and public and private roles, are 
clearly established and distinguishable (Huffer 2005). In Vanuatu it is not easy to determine where 
private and public roles begin and end. The state is still finding it difficult to make that distinction at 
all levels of administration in Vanuatu and more broadly in the Pacific region (Huffer 2005). In 
Vanuatu society there is no concept of private and public good, and therefore it is difficult for the 
people to grasp and work with such a concept in their daily construction of life. The only goods that 
may be considered as public goods in local communities are roads, land, beaches, seas, and rivers, and   
all members of the community have the right to use them. These goods are under kastom laws and the 
kastom jifs can put restrictions on some of them for certain periods of time for the purpose of 
sustainability and security reasons. For instance, the kastom jifs have the right to ban fishing for a 
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certain number of years in order to allow the fish to replenish and multiply. In a similar vein, the jifs 
can put certain rules on how people use rivers so that the rivers are not polluted and put at risk human 
health. When people transgress these rules they are subjected to punishment under the kastom law.  
While in a sense a kastom jif acts in the interest of his/her local community, it is very difficult to make 
a distinction between his private and public roles. In local communities rulers treat resources and 
decisions as their personal responsibility. When someone is without a piece of land for gardening, a 
kastom jif can reallocate land immediately to him without consultation because that is his/her 
mandatory role and this practice is accepted as the local norm for the society. Because of the 
increased diversity of traditions and cultures across Vanuatu, each society displays a strong mixture of 
traditional and patrimonial features of authority. This ambiguity between private and public interest 
was apparent in the ways political leaders managed the affairs of the DBV. In other words, the DBV 
Case study demonstrated that the notion of private versus public roles and interests was not embedded 
in the minds of public officers and leaders. 
This thesis has presented further evidence to the effect that the introduced notion of corruption and its 
legal definitions are alien to the people of Vanuatu. The proposed governance arrangement described 
in Chapter Nine provides an avenue to unlearn colonial structures and decolonise alien ideas that bear 
little relevance to Vanuatu’s context (Mignolo 2009; Tiostanova & Mignolo 2012). In other words, 
this thesis recognises that a lot of problems of governance in Vanuatu are because the country is not 
able to find the ways to connect the external imposed political structures with indigenous organic 
structures within Vanuatu society. 
Many practices that are condemned by the laws of the Republic of Vanuatu and to a larger extent by 
international laws are understood differently in the Vanuatu context. For instance, reciprocity is 
understood in Vanuatu as showing strong family support to solicit social legitimacy and, most 
importantly, giving back to family and political supporters a share of their contribution towards a 
person’s success. A leader’s interest is entwined with family social welfare, and as such it is very 
difficult to draw a line between family and leader. In the traditional political system, leadership has its 
foundation in the family unit and extended families, and as such there is no separation between a 
leader and family. In legal-rational based societies, elected leaders are expected to perform their 
public duties impartially, and separate these from their personal interest or the interests of their 
family. The DBV Case Study illustrates that the opportunity for corruption emerges at the interface 
where indigenous understandings of social obligations and leadership expectations meet with state 
governance expectations. It is at this intersection that we find certain behaviours that are arguably 
labelled as corruption through legal-rational lens, but nevertheless might be interpreted as acceptable 
norms in the local context.  
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The DBV Case Study exemplifies this paradox between what is deemed as morally sound and 
acceptable in one society and interpreted as corrupt practice in another society. The implication is that 
to address corruption in Vanuatu there is a need to address the fundamentals that are buried below the 
surface. These traditional values of social obligation are called fundamentals because they are the 
underpinnings that people feel they share and own, which define their own identities, and which 
maintain the vibrancy of social collectivity. Indeed, they are the basis upon which political leaders 
derive their legitimacy and, most importantly, a source of political identity in the south Pacific region 
(Lawson 1997). Local communities react when this collective sense is disrupted, and can choose not 
to follow the codified rules if they see it as a threat to their communal life. Thus, as argued throughout 
this thesis, the nature of corruption in Vanuatu is complex, and cannot be addressed through imposed 
foreign institutions and practices. However, this is not to say that corruption is static and it cannot be 
reduced. It is acknowledged in this thesis that, because corruption emerges as a consequence of 
imposed political institutions and authority in a localised context, it can only be changed through a 
collaborative means of negotiation and consultation with local communities about different values of 
social obligation and leadership expectations.  
Figure7.1  Traditional values of social order and authority 
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Source: Author’s own work 
Figure 7.1 illustrates that, very often, state policies and donor’s programs have tackled corruption at 
the surface level, and as a consequence corruption is re-occurring. Because corruption is hinged on the 
values of social obligations, authority and, most importantly, resource distribution in a localised 
context, a concerted effort needs to be made below the “green grass” level in order to change 
Conflict of interest 
Nepotism 
Bribery  
Work outside rule 
Abuse of power 
Political appointment 
Family support 
Gift giving 
Traditional society 
State administration levels 
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languages and effect meaningful changes internally. This means that changes have to be driven 
internally by the local communities at large, and the roles of the state and development agencies 
should be to provide educational awareness to support them to recognise a need for change and help 
them to make that change. This process involves consultation and negotiation at the nakamal level 
rather than in five star hotels in external countries, where the people of Vanuatu see little relevance in 
bringing about appropriate changes in local communities. The international policies and programs that 
have been targeted to eliminate corruption have had little impact in improving the status quo, because 
in Vanuatu corruption has profound roots at the local community level. As Chapter Eight below 
suggests, the challenges of governance in Vanuatu are complex and can only be addressed effectively 
if there is greater consideration to existing informal local governance systems, and to how informal 
institutions can be integrated with best international practices to promote development objectives. To 
have a deeper appreciation of these contradictory understandings, between a legal-rational system and 
traditional society in Vanuatu, the following section explores in detail how corruption can be better 
understood in the Vanuatu cultural context. 
7.5 Understanding corruption within the Vanuatu cultural context 
In Vanuatu, corruption stems from government systems and powerful individuals not operating the 
way they should. One of the reasons is the on-going conflict between traditional values of social 
obligation and authority, and that of legal-rational authority. The legal-rational system emerges with 
new expectations and norms that create a fundamental tension in society (Felson 2011; Huffer 2005; 
Rose-Ackerman 2010). As has been discussed in Chapter Four, Vanuatu is predominantly a 
subsistence society, and this subsistence economy is heavily influenced by kastom governance that 
facilitates human basic needs and productivity in local communities (VNSO 2009). The jobs and 
employment at the local community level are assigned based on family. As such family remains an 
important political unit in local communities. 
The legal-rational system of economic, social and political organisation is dominated by formal 
practice and bureaucracy that draws a clear separation between personal interests (family, friendships, 
and political allies) and larger interests (Felson 2011; Rose-Ackerman 2010). The expectation is that 
people who are employed in this system have to follow rules and fit into formal roles that keep them 
separate from their personal interests. Thus, there is a clear distinction between operation of self-
interest and position. Furthermore, under this system formal organisations are goal-oriented, which 
implies that people who are employed in this system have to pursue organisational goals rather than 
their individual goals. Hence, the legal-rational system of economic and social organisation 
incorporates certain rules, norms, and processes in order to facilitate the high attainment of 
organisational goals.  
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These new formal rules work in contradiction to the traditional system of socio-economic and 
political organisation and, most importantly, many of these rules are in opposition to traditional values 
of social obligation. For instance, the law governing property rights and contractual obligation is in 
direct contradiction to the traditional values of collective rights and family benevolence as the social 
binding factor in local communities. These contradictions, as argued in this thesis, can be better 
managed by negotiating between different systems of thought rather than imposing international 
practices that works in another context but may not be working in the Vanuatu context. 
As is argued in this research, corruption can be better understood through a nuanced analysis of the 
traditional basis of social obligation and authority, and how people in traditional positions of power 
have in some cases been able to use that to corruptly gain access to state resources. This line of 
argument implies that corruption needs to be understood not as a failing within Vanuatu society as 
such, but looked at as a systemic problem that arises from not being able to find a way of making a 
connection between contemporary society and traditional values of social obligation and leadership 
expectations. The two sets of case studies reveal that this tension has a significant potential to increase 
in the current legal-rational system of economic and political organisation, as is exemplified by the 
DBV Case Study. 
7.5.1 Strong family connection and impartiality 
Th present research reveals that family is the foundational basis of community, society, and the nation 
of Vanuatu. The notion of a family is understood in the local context as an important socio-economic 
and political unit upon which individuals get support and also from which they derive their social 
esteem and political identity. It is even deeper than that, in the sense that it is rooted in the notion of a 
place, boundary, and most importantly resources. Hence, individual members are identified through a 
kastom name, which links to a particular place, island and province. All these considerations imply 
that choices not to respect family and be part of a family connection can have great repercussions on 
individual’s socio-political identity and status in local communities. The Vanuatu politic is largely 
composed of family units as a foundational basis that each elected leader gets strong support from. 
Hence, governance challenges in Vanuatu need to be understood in that context, and how the family 
dynamic can influence government processes to facilitate specific favours. 
As the DBV Case Study illustrates, the appointment of unqualified personnel and family members to 
public positions clashes with the principle of recruitment on merit. As already seen, Part Two and 
Section 14(a) to (c) of the Leadership Code Act of 1998 set a code of conduct for a leader in the 
appointment to public office. A leader must act fairly in appointing people to offices and positions for 
which he/she has responsibility, and this is to make sure that people are appointed impartially and on 
merit. The Act calls for equal gender participation according to their abilities, and most importantly, 
states that a leader must not interfere in the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Act (cap 
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246) outlines in detail a structural and procedural mechanism that a leader can work through in order 
to avoid breaches of the Leadership Code and Public Service Act in relation to recruitment and 
appointment to public office positions. Within these parameters, the recruitment of families and 
political cronies to public posts are seen as corrupt, because it is contradictory to established national 
laws. As the DBV Case Study illustrates, helping families to access loans from the Bank and 
appointing members of political allies to the Board of Directors did not contradict kastom practices 
and local norms. However, in accordance with the rule of law it is an offence because such 
appointments are not following bureaucratic process. Hence, family nepotism can complicate the 
function of legal-rational institutions such as the Public Service Commission and, most importantly, 
undermine their performance. As a further consequence, it weakens public sector capacity to uphold 
standard performance and deliver effective and efficient services to the population at large. An 
unhealthy public service has impacts in poor implementation of government policies, poor 
management of state resources, and increased maladministration at both the political and bureaucratic 
levels, which reduces people’s trust in government (Cain & Jowitt 2004; Edward 2001b). The DBV 
Case Study demonstrates that most of the political recruitment and recruitment in the public service 
was strongly influenced by personal affections irrespective of merits and established processes.  
It was a normal practice that, whenever a new government came into power, the new Minister 
terminated old Board members and appointed members of the political parties in Government. 
Likewise, other key public positions and commissions, such as the Public Service Commission, 
Teaching Service Commission, Police Service Commission, and Judicial Service Commission, that 
are under Ministers’ discretion to recruit and fire, have also experienced similar trauma when there is 
a change in government leadership. The resulting increased political instability that Vanuatu has 
experienced in the last two decades has caused increased upheaval in major state institutions and 
undermined their performance to deliver public expectations (Morgan 1998; VanTrease 2011). This 
culture was prevalent in the DBV until it was closed in 1997. The members of the Board of Directors 
were either political supporters of the government or close relatives of State Ministers in government. 
The laws of the Bank granted to the State Minister the power to appoint the Board of Directors and 
oversee the policy directions of the Bank. Hence, again, this is an example of where local political 
elites can design institutions that will facilitate the operation of their self-interest at the broad expense 
of society. 
The practice of appointing close political allies and relatives to public positions occurs at all levels of 
state institutions, and the earlier Ombudsman reports illustrate that this was one of the most common 
challenges facing the Vanuatu public service. Besides the DBV Case Study, there were a number of 
Ombudsman reports that indicated attitudes of political leaders who have abused their powers in this 
way. These include: 
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 Public report on the improper appointments and promotions of health workers in November 
1995 – April 17, 1998 
 Public report on the improper appointment of Mr. Luc Siba as the Commissioner of Police 
and his misconduct in office – August 13, 1998 
 Public Report on the Improper hiring of Leonard Kalo and Mr. Louis Urleles as Dental 
Officers - August 18, 1998 
The political appointment of unqualified personnel to public positions demonstrates strong traditional 
values of respect for family versus merit principles and, most importantly, the nature of the 
distributional function of kastom jifs or leaders, as discussed in Chapters Two and Four. While it is 
acknowledged that traditions and cultures may sometimes be used as an excuse for corruption 
(Larmour 2006; Rose-Ackerman 2010), there is inherent evidence that traditions and cultures cannot 
be easily dismissed in understanding the nature of corruption in many developing countries. The 
findings generated from the two case studies above show that local social obligation and kastom 
practices of the societies have had powerful influences on the ways and manners in which the state 
runs its public affairs. The elected politicians and civil servants that manned the DBV operation were 
not kastom jifs by kastom definition; however, the DBV experiences demonstrate that, because their 
social legitimacy depended on conforming to local norms and practices, their impartiality clashed 
with feelings of duty and loyalty to family and political supporters. 
It has now become an accepted norm that individuals who are elected to parliament as national 
leaders, but who are not from jifly lineage, are required to go back and go through a customary 
leadership process in order to gain social legitimacy from the people and thus to be able to command 
respect in the public domain. This includes elected leaders, starting from the Head of State to Prime 
Minister and members of parliament; and they are required to perform a kastom ranking ceremony to 
get a new kastom name or jifly title. The implication is that when there is a clash of traditional values 
of social obligation with that of the legal-rational state, it is more likely that elected members of 
parliament will conform to social norms rather than the rule of law. The two case studies demonstrate 
that some political leaders and senior government officers who occupy top positions in the public 
sector are finding difficulty in making the transition from traditional values (such as loyalty to family 
and respect for family and leaders) to state governance expectations of impartiality and respect for the 
rule of law. 
At all levels of state administration there are political leaders and civil servants who claim jifly status, 
either via heredity, appointment, or ranking ceremony. As a result, there is a significant opportunity 
for members of parliament, civil servants and those in public offices to act according to kastom, either 
from good intent to strengthen unity in local communities, or for personal gain. Thus, the conflict of 
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impartiality with kinship and family loyalty is a current feature of the leadership challenge in most 
public sector institutions in Vanuatu, as has been shown in the findings of the two case studies. A 
former Prime Minister was allegedly accused of appointing his sister to a public service position; and 
there are many more other cases that have become major subjects of Ombudsman reports over the last 
three decades. These include the following: 
 Public Report on the former Prime Minster, Mr. Korman’s use of his influence in the exercise 
of his official duties in favour of his sister, Mrs. Antoinette Coulon – February 19, 1999. 
 Public Report on the appointment of the Deputy General Manager of the Vanuatu National 
Provident Fund - November 15, 1996 
These two incidents present strong evidence of how the collision between traditional values of social 
obligation and authority and imported political institutions creates opportunities and incentives for 
practices deemed corrupt. They also demonstrate that there is an understanding gap between what is 
seen as moral and sensible in local communities and that of legal-rational order and leadership 
expectations. These challenges have deep historical roots, and understanding this gap will take time to 
bridge. Therefore, what has become manifested in daily government administration as corrupt 
practices have their sources deep within the culture of Vanuatu, as depicted in Figure 7.1. A recent 
study, conducted collaboratively by the MNCC and the Vanuatu National Statistic Office on 
traditional wellbeing indicators in the Melanesian region, indicated that reciprocity, respect for 
culture, helping others, strong family, respect for kastom authority, respect for family, and going to 
church, are strong personal values in both rural and urban communities. These indicators, as shown in 
Figure 7.2, are instrumental in the creation of strong social relations between each family unit. 
Figure 7. 2 Importance of Melanesian values, by percentage 
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Strong support for political groupings and family has had a powerful influence on public 
administration; and the DBV Case Study demonstrates that it is one of the major causes of diversion 
of resources outside the rules, laws, and formal procedures. Political and family influence in the 
operation of the DBV came out strongly; and these two factors have had a strong influence in the 
operation of all the government organisations where State Ministers have their powers extended to 
oversee their policy and operation directions. Inadequate political structures and organisations provide 
opportunity for members of political parties and relatives of State Ministers to have direct access to 
those in power and influence Ministers to make decisions in their favour. This was clearly reflected in 
Example One, where the Minister pressurised the management of the Bank to disburse the loan, even 
if it was outside the Bank’s policies and procedures.  
7.5.2 Traditional or local politics and the public interest 
As discussed in Chapter Two, graded society is highly valued as a forum of reciprocal exchange; and 
so, similarly, is the nimangi system. Thus, graded society and other forms of the traditional political 
leadership system, such as ‘toka dance’ in Tanna and nimangi in Malekula, are categorised as an 
idiom of reciprocal exchange (Allen 1981). In other words, reciprocity is a kastom practice that is 
observed throughout the archipelago, and it becomes a foundation for the traditional political 
leadership system in local communities. The kastom jifs maintain their leadership prestige through the 
distribution of resources to their people, with an expectation that during their pig killing ceremony 
people will voluntarily supply them with all the required number of boars. The DBV Case Study 
reveals that one of the reasons why corruption has been able to arise in Vanuatu in its present form is 
because people have used various means to acquire sources of power. As a consequence, the obstacles 
to achieving good governance reform in Vanuatu is the fact that corrupt practices that are identified in 
this thesis are actually a significant source of power. 
Each family is organised into small units, and they play important roles in the traditional political 
system in local communities. During the grade-taking ceremony and nimangi, each family contributes 
by offering their best boars and required resources to grade-taking candidates. These exchanges create 
a strong bonding relationship between leaders and their people, which can be displayed by their active 
participation in caring for each other’s wellbeing. In the two sets of case studies there is a strong 
indication that power is dependent on the adherence to cultural values and social norms. As such, 
power, in the traditional social context, cannot be disassociated from social obligations and 
connection to family. This interplay between power and social obligation bore substantially on the 
management and operation of the DBV. It is anticipated that a cynic could argue that corruption 
occurs because people want to monopolise power, and is not really about culture and traditional 
practices. However, this thesis reveals that in Vanuatu people do draw on culture and traditional 
practices to seek, monopolise, and compete for power. There are some power structures that need to 
be tackled and challenged in a manner that allows greater reflection and understanding among 
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different authorities, in order for decolonisation to actually occur. In other words, there are powerful 
interests that control the allocation of state resources, whose interests need to be considered and 
challenged in a manner that promotes stability and development objectives of Vanuatu.  
The two case studies used in this thesis illustrate how traditional local values of distribution collide 
with codified rule of law governing public resources. The distribution of resources to close political 
allies and family relatives is one that features highly in Chapter Six, and is also classified in various 
Ombudsman reports as outside formal processes, rules and law (Edward 2001a; Vanuatu Ombudsman 
1999). The kastom jifs are leaders in their respective jurisdictions because they care about the 
wellbeing of their people and, as such, their role to distribute resources and goods fairly to everyone 
in local communities is recognised as moral kastom practice. Figure 7.2 demonstrates that in all local 
communities there is a high respect for leaders and family, and therefore there is a strong bonding 
relationship between leaders and their people. 
This notion of resource distribution as a way of gaining and building jifly prestige is at odds with 
international legal practices and domestic laws that define how a transaction should occur between 
distributor and receiver. In a traditional society, public/private distinction is absent and, most 
importantly, carries little weight; a fact that can be observed in many different post-colonial contexts 
(Punyaratabandhu 2008). We see this interplay between private and public interest in the DBV Case 
Study, which illustrates clearly that the distinction is missing. While this separation is plainly made in 
various state laws, the implementation is another challenge for Vanuatu. This is because of the small 
size of the public service, where everyone is familiar and to some degree are related to each other as 
friends, family, schoolmates, and workmates. This web of friendships and close relationships provides 
potential opportunity for corruption at the public service level and, most importantly, puts public 
officials in difficult position in keeping their official boundaries. 
In local communities, people pass positive judgements on the gesture of giving, assuming that a leader 
who distributes goods to them is doing so with good intentions. Hence, how a resource is distributed 
and where it comes from often does not gain the attention of people. This is because in traditional 
communities goods are distributed following customary norms, values, and processes, and this is done 
at nakamal or nasara levels where it is transparent to everyone. Thus, giving out goods to family and 
others demonstrates strong personal and community values of respect for culture, helping others, 
respect for family, and most importantly, care for each other’s wellbeing. This circulation loop might 
be seen as corrupt because of direct distribution to close families and relatives. 
The other area of tension is the concept of collective rights to resources, which transcends the borders 
of the public realm. In this understanding, state resources belong to everyone and no one has a right to 
stop people from accessing them. The DBV Case Study demonstrates that the Bank’s policies and 
formal procedures were perceived as unfriendly to the local population, and many were finding it very 
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difficult to understand the terms and conditions of their loans. Because everyone throughout the 
archipelago has a right to access loans at the DBV and use them, foreign laws cannot keep that right 
from people. In traditional society, land and other resources such as rivers, sea, and forests are 
collectively owned, and everyone has a right of accessibility to use them for their own benefit. This 
right can be accessed by obtaining consent from the kastom jif, who has the role to distribute them to 
people. This practice is rampant in state institutions, where individuals go directly to State Ministers 
and those in power to obtain their consent to use public resources without adhering to established 
rules and procedures. As was evidenced in most of the DBV loans, political supporters obtained loans 
through a letter of support from the Minister or those employed as political secretary for the Minister. 
Indeed, in their view this is morally acceptable, because they are going through the right approach to 
obtain permission from their leader; a notion that clashes with legal procedures, rules and policies of 
the state institutions. This is because, in a legal-rational world, the rule of law governs the processes 
of how public resources are to be distributed, and this includes formal written applications in 
accordance with established criteria. However, the findings of this research suggest that when it 
comes to respect for rule of law, family respect and support take precedence and, as such, might be 
seen to justify the actions of members of parliament and senior government officials who work 
outside legal processes, rules, and laws. 
The public organisations and agents that distribute state resources and services to people are major 
sources of where we find clashes of different expectations and alleged incidents of corrupt practices. 
These include, as has already been discussed, land dealings, giving of licences and contracts, 
scholarship awards, recruitment to public service positions, and judicial services, to name a few. 
However, these alleged corrupt practices have profound roots in traditional values of social 
obligations and political leadership expectations, as demonstrated in Figure 7.1.  Using this 
understanding, we find that behaviours labelled as corrupt have strong links with social norms, 
traditional values of obligation, leadership expectations and, most importantly, with resource 
distribution (Uslaner 2008). As has been highlighted in Chapter Two, social obligations and 
distribution of resources are two fundamental pillars of the traditional political system, which simply 
means they work complementarily to create a strong basis for kastom authority. As it has been 
observed on several occasions in this thesis, the nature of corruption in Vanuatu is quite complex and 
sensitive, because in addressing it we are indirectly intruding into the heart of the traditional political 
system in local communities. This has multiple repercussions, because the traditional political system 
is embedded strongly in lands and other natural resources, which local communities feel they are part 
of. 
7.5.3 Reciprocity and bribery 
A reciprocal relationship between leaders and people, and individuals with close family, is often acted 
out in distributing wealth. The benefits can be in tangible form, such as borrowing money from the 
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Bank and also material distribution to kinship ties or political support, or intangible form such as 
appointments to public positions. Members of Parliament get elected because families, relatives, and 
political supporters have in one way or another sacrificed their time and resources to help them get 
elected to parliament. As such, they have an obligation to share part of their wealth generously to 
those who helped them to be elected to parliament. In a similar vein, the professional legitimacy of 
civil servants that prosper from their training as public administrators, based on the Western model, 
clashes with their social legitimacy, which depends on conforming to local norms and practices. 
Individuals who made it to senior positions in the public sector are seen as great achievers by their 
families, and thus their families expect them to become windows of opportunity for them to access 
state benefits and services, either in material resources, scholarships, or employment, to name a few. 
The norms of traditional society support social interactions that by law and international standards are 
condemned as corrupt, but that the local participants view as acceptable and even moral. Vanuatu’s 
legislation criminalises reciprocal exchanges based on kastom practices such as a direct distribution of 
public resources to family or close political supporters. In a legal-rational world, personal interest and 
self-interested dealings are constrained by rule of law; the state enacts certain laws governing the 
process of public resource distribution in order to make sure that resources are distributed in a 
transparent and impartial manner. Section 73(1) and (2) of the Penal Code of 1988 criminalises active 
and passive bribery. Furthermore, the Leadership Code of 1998 Section 23 covers bribery in detail; 
but as the DBV case exemplified, no prosecutions have been made under this code to date (United 
Nations 2013). The Leadership Code criminalises corrupt intent of a leader who asks, receives, 
obtains, or offers any money, property, or other benefits or advantage of any kind for himself/herself 
or another person, in exchange for his/her acts or omissions as a leader being influenced in any way, 
either directly or indirectly. Bribery in relation to votes falls under the Representation of the People’s 
Act of 1998. Indeed, this is one of the more contentious pieces of legislation, in which gift giving or 
donation during an election is treated as bribery. 
7.5.4 Work outside government process and rule of law 
In the case of the DBV, ninety-five percent of the loans were disbursed outside the Bank’s formal 
processes and policies (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999). However, the enactment of these practices is 
undertaken by many officers of the Bank and the politicians, either elected or appointed. The findings 
suggested that diversion of resources outside formal rules and laws by politicians and civil servants 
were done for two reasons. The first reason is the self-interest of individuals who work in the 
organisation and use their public position to extract state resources for their personal gain. For 
example, Case Three involved a State Minister who borrowed from the Bank through a verbal 
communication directly to the Managing Director, without any formal application and loan appraisal. 
The second reason occurs when those in positions of power use their privileges to facilitate a request 
from their immediate family or group to have access to state resources. For instance, Examples One 
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and Two demonstrate that the State Minister and Managing Director responsible for the Bank used 
their power and authority to instruct the Bank through a letter to disburse loans to individual political 
supporters. Example Two implicated the Managing Director, who facilitated a loan to his niece 
without adhering to Bank due diligence processes. In a similar vein, Example One demonstrates that 
the borrower was a close relative of the Minister responsible for the DBV, and that the Minister used 
his authority to instruct Bank officials to process their loan without conducting the Bank’s due 
diligence process. 
 
This practice has now become an embedded practice in the public sector, where most civil servants 
and politicians use state resources outside formal rules and laws to further their own personal 
interests. For instance, according to Royson Willie (2014), senior officers of the Department of Lands 
manipulated the land laws in order to allocate thirty pieces of land to each of themselves outside legal 
procedures and rules. He further argues that: 
[i]t was found that some officers used Minister’s instruction to by-pass the established 
processes of obtaining a lease and this includes; registration of title without any 
administrative and premium fee paid; registration of title with 10% premium payment; 
registration of title with administrative fees paid and no premium; and registration of title 
with premium and some administrative fees paid. Some officers also abused the system and 
ignored Minister’s instruction to change the terms of their lease from 50 to 75 years. (Willie 
2014, p. 1). 
This quotation supports the findings of the DBV Case Study, in which borrowers used the Minister’s 
letter to borrow outside Bank processes and policies. Respect for leaders and the practice of getting 
orders from the kastom jif are highly regarded in local communities, and there is an inherent local 
norm that once a leader gives his/her consent or instruction, everyone in the local community ought to 
respect it and carry out the instruction without question. The failure to abide by the instructions of 
leaders is regarded as immoral and outside social norms, and therefore there are social implications or 
sanctions against persons who refuse a leader’s instruction. The parliamentary administration system 
is built on legal-rational principles and democratic values that tend to have limited relevance to 
countries where the deeply embedded traditional values of social obligation and authority are buried 
beneath externally imposed bureaucratic institutions.  
 
This practice of working outside formal rules and laws is also influenced by a number of international 
business enterprises and companies. Over the last three decades Vanuatu has witnessed a number of 
cases where State Ministers were implicated in corrupt dealings with foreign individual business men 
and women, companies, and enterprises, in the name of the people of Vanuatu (Edward 2001a). These 
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included the selling of passports to individual foreigners, and engaging in business dealings that were 
politically motivated at the broad expense of the state (Cullwick 2013b). In the last three decades, 
there were many cases of a similar nature, where outsiders worked with local political organisations to 
procure a business deal outside laws and formal procedures. For instance, the Ombudsman’s Office 
published a number of reports on corrupt dealings of leaders with foreign companies and individuals. 
These included: 
 Public report on the improper concessions given by the former Minister of Public Works, Mr. 
Amos Andeng to Mr. Li Zhong Heng – February 25, 2000 
 Public report on the conduct of Hon Barak Sope and the VNPF Board in a proposed 
investment in the internet bank “Cybank” venture - October 16, 1996 
 Vanuatu Commodities Marketing Board utilisation of the 1.3 billion vatu STABEX Funds 
Subsidy - August 6, 1996 
 Public Report on Resort Las Vegas and granting of illegal Passports - December 3, 1997 
 Public Report on the illegal issue of ordinary and diplomatic passports to Jian Peng Chen and 
family and misconduct of Prime Minister Serge Vohor, Former Minister Willie Jimmy and 
others – February 6, 1998 
 Public Report on the improper and unlawful issue of diplomatic and official passports to 
“Honorary Consuls”, “Trade Commissioners” and other “Special” Vanuatu representatives 
and Ministerial “Advisors” – March 13, 1998 
 
These reports demonstrate that where the deals were politically motivated or influenced by strong 
family ties with strong political support, there was a high chance of those in power abusing their 
public position and diverting a portion of the resources to their family and political groupings outside 
the laws and formal procedures. From a liberal perspective, these activities can be classified as “grand 
corruption”, which involves political leaders at the top of the state hierarchy and their close associates 
(Rose-Ackerman 2010). This type of corruption concerns the awarding of major contracts and 
concessions, and the privatization of state enterprises. Vanuatu remains notorious for such practices, 
as reflected in the following recent cases, which raised eyebrows in the media, the community, and to 
some extent in international communities and development partners. These cases included a fifty year 
concession agreement that the Government of Moana Carcasses signed with a company called 
Vanuatu Trade Development Pty Ltd (VTDPL), incorporated in Singapore, to build, own and operate 
an international airport for Vanuatu (Makin 2014). This concessional agreement, worth US$350 
million, and which was signed by the then Prime Minister and his Deputy Prime Minister and the 
Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs, was challenged in the Court. The Court found that the 
VTDPL was not registered with the Vanuatu Promotion Authority (VIPA) and the concession contract 
was signed prior to the tender process and due diligence (Joshua 2014). The airport conspiracy and 
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corrupt dealings led to the formation of a new Government in May 2014, which went into Parliament 
to withdraw Government support for the new international airport (Cullwick 2014). The leaders who 
transgressed the laws of the state and worked outside the rule of law are currently in Opposition, and 
there seems to be no punitive measures taken against them. As reflected in the two Case Studies, 
leaders and individuals can choose not to respect the rule of law and, most importantly, refuse to be 
bound by the law. This illustrates one of the arguments made in this thesis, that the reason for 
differing perceptions as to what is corrupt is complex in the Vanuatu cultural context. What is deemed 
in local communities as moral and sensible may not carry a similar understanding and perception in 
the legal-rational world. 
7.5.5 Oral communication and record-keeping  
The cultural preference for communicating orally about important transactions runs counter to the 
record-keeping requirements of major international anti-corruption laws that have some bearing upon 
Vanuatu. For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) requires all communication 
transaction to be formally documented. Given that the US definition of corruption is asserted globally 
through the World Bank’s anti-corruption drive, it is easy to see how such a legal-rational principle 
can create value conflict in countries such as Vanuatu. The FCPA has two major provisions, and these 
include anti-bribery provisions that cover corrupt payments to foreign officials, and the accounting 
provisions requiring issuers to make and keep accurate books and records and to devise and maintain 
an adequate system of internal accounting controls. Furthermore, the accounting provisions also 
prohibit individuals and businesses from knowingly falsifying books and records or knowingly 
circumventing or failing to implement a system of internal controls (United States Department of 
Justice 1977). All these suggest that record-keeping and reports are critical for disclosing information 
on corrupt payments to foreign officials, and also facilitate greater transparency regarding the work of 
the law enforcement agencies. The DBV cases reveal that the absence of record-keeping is a crime 
and jeopardises the function of law enforcement agencies. 
 
Given that Vanuatu is one of the Tax-haven countries, massive efforts have been put into creating key 
institutions involved in the criminalization of corruption and law enforcement, and these include, 
among others, the Vanuatu Financial Intelligence Unit (VFIU) and the Transnational Crime Unit 
(TCU), both of which generally prohibit the bribing of foreign officials. This indeed urges Vanuatu to 
align its rule of law to international laws dealing with money-laundering and bribery. The Penal Code 
Act of 1998, section 73(1) and (2), criminalises active and passive bribery. Furthermore, Section 11 of 
the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2012 (POCA) criminalises money-laundering, and this is not to mention 
other related laws that cover extensively different forms of bribery, such as the Leadership Code of 
1998 and the Representation of the People’s Act of 1998. 
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In traditional culture, record keeping is a new development. People are more familiar with traditional 
norms of communicating instructions, history and important messages, through word of mouth. Even 
at present oral communication remains a valuable and legitimate form or means of transferring 
information and communicating messages at all levels in local communities throughout the 
archipelago. The records of what is happening in local communities and their histories are stored in 
individuals’ brains, and it benefits society when everyone can remember and is able to provide checks 
and balances on each other’s information. However, the application of this cultural practice in a 
rational economic organisation works against the rule of law and the established system that 
encourages greater transparency and accountability. The DBV Case Study illustrates that most of the 
loan transactions have no file records, such as loan applications, legal documents relating to 
mortgages and other security arrangements, and records of repayments. It also illustrates that some of 
the loans were released through either verbal communication or letters of instruction from a higher 
authority. However, this traditional norm of verbal communication can undermine the legal-rational 
system of administration, where record keeping is critical to auditing organisational performance. 
 
The DBV case illustrates how verbal governance practice, when absorbed into public governance 
practice, weakens the principle of public accountability and undermines the formal efficiency of 
government budgetary policy. This is exacerbated by weak state accountable institutions (such as 
Police, Public Prosecutor, Auditor General, and Judiciary), unable to enforce compliance to rules and 
adherence to good governance measures at all levels of government administration. The investigated 
cases in Examples One to Nine illustrate that there were incomplete records on file and in most cases 
detailed information was missing, for unknown reasons. This weakened the function of the DBV and 
the Public Prosecutor because there was insufficient evidence to justify each allegation at Court. The 
findings of the DBV also illustrate that the Bank took no legal actions to prosecute those who 
committed crimes and, most importantly, recover the outstanding debts. One of the reasons that came 
out strongly from the DBV Case Study was that most senior managers and Board of Directors of the 
Bank were all implicated in the illicit dealings of loan disbursement from the DBV. As such, they 
were reluctant and did not feel obliged to pursue legal actions against the customers who owed the 
Bank. There were a few cases, in particular Cases Two, Six, and Nine, where the customer did not 
take seriously the legal instructions from the Bank and confidently ignored these. 
 
Chapter Six revealed that many loans that were granted outside formal policies and rules were written 
off for unknown reasons. We have seen in Cases One to Nine where, despite legal attempts by the 
DBV to prosecute those who failed to honour their contracts, most of the cases were dropped for 
unknown reasons. This is a governance challenge in Vanuatu, where many political leaders and civil 
servants who were implicated by the law remain unprosecuted. In most cases, political parties use 
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allegations of corruption as one of the causes of political instability; but rarely is any individual 
politician who is implicated by the allegation of corruption punished (Cain & Jowitt 2004). 
 
This thesis argues that major state institutions, especially the Judiciary, the Auditor General, and the 
Police, are not functioning according to models established by the international communities with 
regard to the perception of corruption. The following reports from the Ombudsman’s Office accuse 
many political leaders of allegedly corrupt practices; however, many of them are currently members 
of parliament and holding ministerial positions in the government.  
 
 Public report into multiple breaches of the Leadership Code and other unlawful actions by 
Hon. Barak T. Sope – December 10, 1996. 
 The Provision of Bank Guarantees given in the Sum of US$100,000,000, in breach of the 
Leadership Code and Section 14(f) of the Ombudsman Act and related matters thereto - July 
3, 1996. 
 Public Report on the payment of  “compensation” to Hon. Maxime Carlot Korman, Hon. 
Willie Jimmy and Hon Barak Sope in breach of the Leadership Code and the Compensation 
Act 1994 – July 3, 1997. 
 Public Report on ex gratia Payments to 23 Members of Parliament - December 18, 1997 
 Public Report on breaches of the Leadership Code by Sato Kilman, Minister of Lands – 
February 24, 1998. 
 Public Report on the conduct of 19 Members of Parliament, including the Prime Minister, and 
Ministers of Justice, Public Works, Tourism, Telecommunications, Home Affairs, and 
Foreign Affairs, in seeking a pardon for a fugitive from justice – January 30, 1998. 
 Public report on the breach of the Leadership Code and misuse of Cyclone Betsy account by 
the Former Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Mr. Maxime Carlot Korman – February 26, 1998. 
 Public Report on the alleged bribery of voters and alleged breach of the Leadership Code by 
Mr. Barak Tame Sope – July 17, 1998 disciplinary action outstanding – July 9, 1998. 
 Public report on the improper conduct by Mr. Hilton Tarileo, Deputy Director of 
Cooperatives Department, and lack of disciplinary action against Mr. Tarileo – May 7, 1998. 
 Failure of Some Leaders to file annual returns to the Clerk of Parliament - February 29, 2000. 
 
These reports have raised greater awareness through the media; however, media coverage is limited in 
Vanuatu to people who can afford to buy a newspaper, watch TV, and who reside in areas where radio 
transmission is clear. As a result, alleged corrupt practices within public institutions receive little 
weight in most local communities. Many of the political leaders who were alleged to be corrupt in the 
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Ombudsman reports continued to be re-elected as members of the parliament. As Cain and Jowitt 
(2004) argue: 
 
The strongest illustration of this is the re-election of Barak Sope, following his conviction for 
fraud. Sope, who was Prime Minister from December 1999 to April 2001, forged two 
government guarantees near the end of his period in office. In July of 2002 Sope was 
sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years. In November 2002 Sope was pardoned by the 
President on the grounds of ill health. In 2003 he contested the by-election for his seat, and 
was re-elected to Parliament (p. 10). 
 
This illustrates that there is a mismatch between the introduced notion of corruption and local cultures 
in the Vanuatu context. As Cain and Jowitt (2004) observe, the general population see corruption as 
largely irrelevant and another term that is imported, rather than home grown. As such, the acts of 
corruption tend not to attract general public moral outrage, as they may do elsewhere (Jowitt 2014). If 
there were public outrage it would be limited to local elites and urban populations, as it was in the 
VNPF riot of 1998. The VNPF riot illustrates that the Vanuatu population are consciously aware of 
what are immoral and moral acts in local communities, even if they do not connect this to the idea of 
corruption in international law. It also illustrates that people felt more responsible when they had 
ownership of institutions, as was in the case of the VNPF riot over allegations of corrupt dealings and 
management. Again, as mentioned on several occasions in this thesis, lack of local ownership of the 
new imposed political institutions, and more broadly of many development projects in Vanuatu, is due 
to negligence about effective consultation and negotiation with local communities on the part of the 
state, and those state builders who established the governing institution in Vanuatu. 
7.5.6 Trading in influence 
Trading in influence is an act of putting pressure on another officer, and it has been covered in various 
pieces of Vanuatu’s legal system to guide the conduct of elected leaders and bureaucrats in public 
offices. The Leadership Code Act of 1998, Section 22 and 23, prohibits the practices of ‘undue 
influence’ whereby a leader must not influence, attempt to influence, exert pressure, threaten, abuse or 
interfere with a person carrying out statutory functions. In a similar vein, the Penal Code Act of 1981, 
Section 73 and 130B, prohibits individuals from obtaining money by false or misleading statements. 
The use of force or coercion to extract payments or public resources was obvious in the DBV Case 
Study, and this included letters of instruction from the State Minister and appointed politicians to the 
management of the Bank. Examples One to Nine indicate that all political loans were accompanied 
with an implied threat of force, and many were not necessarily physical forces. The fear of being fired 
by political superiors saw many loans granted to individuals who had strong political connections 
outside the Bank’s formal process and policy guidelines. As seen in Example Eight, the borrower was 
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an appointed politician to whom, despite his poor performance on his previous loan, the Bank granted 
another loan. 
 
The other case was seen in Example Nine, where the management of the Bank and the Board of 
Directors received forceful instructions from the Minister and his political staff to grant a loan to one 
of their supporters. The loan was outside the Bank’s requirements, and the borrower did not lodge a 
formal application in order for the Bank to assess his ability to repay the loan and to decide whether 
his request was within Bank policies and rules. Bureaucrats often find themselves compromised in 
order to protect their jobs and also maintain their social legitimacy by conforming to social norms. 
While many would want to abide by the formal rules, the institutions are framed in such a way that 
those who are employed as bureaucrats do not have legal protection to safeguard them to remain 
impartial in their duties. Even if there is legal protection in place, the weak accountable institutions 
and judicial services imply that public servants will in the end become victims of their impartial 
decisions. In addition, as was demonstrated in the DBV Case Study, the institution itself was very 
weak in enforcing compliance within its legal framework. This challenge is compounded by weak 
accountability mechanisms, and also by lack of public demands for more accountability from the 
elected leaders. 
 
As the DBV Case Study demonstrates, the environment is conducive at all levels of government 
administration for public employees to act contrary to organisational rules and guidelines. Because 
there is no protection at the bureaucratic levels, senior civil servants who occupy high-ranking 
positions in the public sector have made friends with politicians as a way of safeguarding their 
employment in the public sector. This provides an opportunity for high-level bribery between 
politicians and high-ranking public servants in order to avoid the threat of suspension or termination. 
There was strong evidence in the DBV Case study that the Managing Director of the Bank handled all 
the political loans to senior party members and the Minister of State (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1999). 
Example Three is a case in point, where the Managing Director dealt directly with a request from a 
State Minister responsible for banking and a former Prime Minister. In this case there are mixed 
signals of corrupt activities, ranging from conflict of interest to extortion or fear of job loss, if the 
demands of political superiors were not met satisfactorily; even if this was outside the rules of the 
Bank.  
7.6 Explaining corruption in Vanuatu. 
The corruption in Vanuatu can be better explained through the lens of traditional values of social 
obligation and authority, which is manifested in social network practices or patron-client network 
relationships that undermine legal-rational organisations and formal authority. These findings suggest 
that using global definitions in the Vanuatu context places local social traditions and leadership 
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expectations on a direct collision course with state governance expectations. The literature 
demonstrates that corruption can be defined in various ways, and the most common definition relates 
to public office corruption whereby a leader misuses his/her public office for personal gain (Huffer 
2005; Larmour 2006; Rose-Ackerman 2010). The literature also suggests that corruption can also be 
explained through more than one lens: an economic explanation, a legal explanation, a public office 
explanation, and a moral explanation (Huffer 2005; Larmour 2008). As depicted in Figure 7.3, the 
legal and economic explanations tend to get more attention in the economic and political discourse 
and, as a consequence, in this sphere of thinking, local values of social obligation and authority tend 
to be seen as criminal because they undermine government processes that are meant to promote public 
interest and democratic values. However, as noted by commentators on corruption in the South 
Pacific region, none of those explanations capture the essence of the complexities and diverse 
understandings of the term in traditional society (Huffer 2005). Thus, while the patron-client network 
explanation may not give a satisfactory explanation, it nevertheless provides greater opportunity to 
give a nuanced analysis of how interpersonal power relations and social interaction in local 
communities influence behaviour and the ways people see and understand the world around them. 
Figure 7 3 Different explanations of corruption 
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Source: Author’s own work 
The economic explanation of corruption emerged in the 1990s and became prominent among 
international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and other aid agencies, which viewed a 
state monopoly as an impediment to economic growth and development (Huffer 2005). This view 
formed the rational explanation of the liberal economic reform that put greater emphasis on free 
markets as drivers of economic growth and development. The state monopoly is viewed as a 
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contributing factor to rent-seeking, in the sense that it has excessive control over resources at the 
broad expense of its citizens. While the economic explanation cannot answer cultural questions, it can 
help one understand the implications of a society’s choices (Ackerman 1999). The economic school of 
thought views corruption as imposing a cost on society. This explanation underpinned the liberal 
economic reforms in the 1990s, where there was greater focus on free markets and the reduction of 
the state’s involvement in the market. Indeed, this notion of thinking promotes a new value of social 
orders, whereby such orders are achieved through contractual arrangements and the mechanism of the 
market to set prices and allocate resources. As demonstrated in the Literature Review in Chapter Two, 
this notion of a free market has limited relevance to developing countries and is against traditional 
values of social order, where resources are collectively owned. 
 The legal explanation defines corruption within the confines of the rule of law and, as such, the 
actions that occur outside the rule of law are deemed corrupt. The building of the state post-colonial 
institutions were built on law codes that owe their origin to Western models, and thus perpetuated 
classical understandings of corruption as misuse of power, bribery, gift giving, and nepotism. This 
formal set of laws and rules criminalises many kastom practices and traditional values of social 
obligation, and at the state administration level these are classified as corrupt. For instance, land 
legislation in Vanuatu is geared towards facilitating private sector led growth and individual property 
rights through a leasing system that works contradictory to the traditional land system of collective 
rights. As a result, land dealings and management in Vanuatu create an opportunity for corrupt 
dealings through stealing and bribery between traditional land owners and individual investors or 
government (Vanuatu Ombudsman 1998b). In this view, corruption is basically what the laws of the 
state say it is. In other words, laws define ethically moral standards that may not be agreed at the local 
level; and this is what has been witnessed in Vanuatu since the birth of the nation in 1980. 
In a similar vein, the notion of public office corruption has gained prominence over the last century, 
and many international institutions subscribe to this notion. Though the distinction between the 
private and public concept is not achievable in many developing countries, it would seem that there is 
an inherent assumption that once the distinction is made plainly in the laws it will then gradually 
translate into the practicality of real life situations. The definition and explanation of public office 
corruption is blurred and concentrates mainly on public officials. The charges include nepotism, gift 
giving, and bribery, to name a few. The findings of the present research have shown that those 
charges have different interpretations and understanding in the local context. In Vanuatu, people 
esteem the spiritual values underlying the gesture of giving, and helping families to climb the ladder 
of opportunity in public office is an acceptable social norm. These spiritual values, shown in Figure 
7.1, are hidden below the “green surface”; and the lines between the notion of private and public 
corruption in this context appear blurred.  
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The moral explanation is a view promulgated within the religious domains and most non-government 
organisations that have a direct link with established churches in Vanuatu. This view is predominantly 
shared among the sixty-seven percent of the total population who have become Christians and 
assimilated themselves into a range of religious denominations (VNSO 2009). However, this view 
clashes with traditional values of social obligation and the process of how corruption is dealt with in 
the legal-rational world. In local communities it is quite common to find most people holding 
traditional beliefs and engaging in traditional kastomary practices, while also still following a 
Christian religion. Indeed, they have two world-views that are in tension here, over what is deemed to 
be appropriate behaviour in local communities. 
The church cherishes the view that what is described as corruption is actually “sin” in disguise and is 
a sign of moral decay in society (Buchan & Hill 2014). This view can be traced back to the medieval 
era, when corruption was seen as a result of moral decay or fault in a person’s character. In this view, 
some churches believe that only through the power of God can human beings have the ability to 
abstain from evil doings and follow a path of righteousness. A local church leader commented that: 
 
Corruption is sin. Sin is the transgression of God’s law, which is a standard of righteousness. 
The bible refer to God’s law as the ten commandments because it contains ten principles of 
righteousness and people who follow God’s law are likely to establish a good relationship in 
the community. This is because God’s law is about sharing love to each other. When the 
whole community share their love to each other through sharing resources, helping those in 
needs, and visiting those in hospital, there is peace, joy, and happiness in communities. The 
presence of God in individual beings protect them from evil wrong doings and this is the 
reason why we have in our motto, Long God Yumi Stanap (in God we stand). If the people of 
Vanuatu follow God’s law there will be no corruption and evil doings against each other 
(Tape interview 19 May 2013). 
This view is not markedly different from a medieval point of view on moral degeneration, and it 
would seem that the church shares a similar view, that failure to uphold God’s law creates a 
significant opportunity for what they understand as “sin”. In other words, sin is the transgression of 
God’s commandments. This view also suggests that people who commit sin should pray to God for 
forgiveness and, most importantly, ask God to give them the ability to forgive each other and treat 
each other lovingly. In this sphere of belief, problems associated with sinning can only be solved by 
praying to God for forgiveness and cleansing through the blood of his son. Thus, the churches 
acknowledge that sin-related problems cannot be measured, which means that every evil action, such 
as stealing, killing, swearing and so forth, are all categorised as sin. In other words, you cannot put 
them on a scale, and regardless of their seriousness they are sins and are subject to God’s judgement.  
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Human beings do not have the right to judge one another because we are all sinners and therefore only 
God is a righteous judge. This also suggests that all sinners who repent should be forgiven, and this 
forgiveness exists outside notions of law and regulation. However, what is morally sensible and 
acceptable within the realm of Christianity differs widely from the traditional understanding of 
inappropriate behaviours.  
The church view on how to tackle corruption in developing countries also differs from the legal-
rational approach of enforcement through the criminal justice system. The implication of their views 
is that what is categorised as corruption from the rationalist perspective is actually a “sin” within the 
domain of church beliefs. As such, there is tension over the practices and ways state laws deal with 
corruption. In the same manner, there is also tension between traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms and the court retributive system over the ways people who are charged with corruption 
are treated. Given the size and the degree of influence that the church and kastom authority have in the 
lives of the population of Vanuatu, their views about corruption should be given considerable 
attention in policies and development institutions.  
While the economic, legal, and moral notion of corruption remains unchallenged, little attention has 
been given to cultural and traditional explanations of corruption. One wonders how it could be 
possible to invest a million dollars in good governance reform in a local context, where the knowledge 
of what is corruption is limited. Traditionally, international institutions make their judgements based 
on “trusthworthy” sources of information, usually framed around Western ideas and experiences, and 
this is at the expense of local knowledge and understanding.  
The social or patron-client network model would seem to be an appropriate and relevant model to 
explain issues of corruption in Vanuatu. There are, however, divergent arguments among scholars on 
whether strong family support can be of any benefit in contemporary society, particularly in 
developing countries (Huffer 2005; Larmour 2006, 2008). Depending on where one stands on this 
debate, the findings gathered for the present research would seem to suggest that the political 
behaviours and the leaders’ attitudes that Vanuatu is attempting to address through the auspices of 
good governance reform have deeper roots in local social obligation and leadership expectations.  
Society is made up of families, unlike rational organisations and institutions, which are dominated by 
individuals with particular characteristics. A recent study that was jointly carried out by the 
Government and the MNCC indicates that respect for family, strong family support, and collectivism 
are strong personal and social values in Melanesian society (MNCC & VNSO 2012). This, as has 
been shown in the Case Studies above, has had a powerful influence on how political leaders and civil 
servants understand the legal-rational system and manage public resources. 
In local communities extended families work together as a team, and they do things together to 
support one another in all aspects of life. Families work together to support one another in paying 
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school fees for their children until they find a job. They help in cutting copra to pay for the school fees 
and also lend money to each other to pay the school fees. This social support occurs at all levels of 
socio-economic and political development. For instance, as mentioned on several occasions, family 
support is of critical importance during the time of marriages, deaths, birth celebrations, and pig 
killing ceremonies. Local communities organise along family lines, and because of intermarriages in 
local communities the number of the extended family is continuously growing, to the extent where a 
family could imply a whole community. The present researcher’s grandfather married fifty wives and 
his father had ten wives; and to the present researcher’s view a family spans from fifty to hundreds. 
Family or kinship networks form part of the essential social infrastructures of traditional societies; but 
the strength of these ties can present a challenge to legal-rational governmental institutions. This is 
not to argue that tradition is an impediment to “progress”, but rather that ways need to be devised to 
mitigate the consequences of prior and “primary loyalties” to family and village. 
 
A child who is able to make it to university and find permanent employment in government is an 
outcome of the cooperative efforts of his/her close family and extended families. In other words, 
individual personal achievement in life is also an achievement for the family and the whole 
community to some extent. In a society where eighty percent of the population has a strong adherence 
to local social orders and kastom practices, civil servants and politicians find it very difficult to make 
the transition from social legitimacy to their professional legitimacy or to become impartial in their 
duties. The two Case Studies demonstrate that social legitimacy takes precedence over their 
professional training and the rule of law. The politicians who are elected to parliament or appointed to 
state positions are the result of efforts from the whole community, groups, and families, and therefore 
there is an expectation that they will share generously part of their wealth back to communities, 
families, and in-groupings. In a similar vein, civil servants and public officials who got support from 
the close family and extended families to climb the ladder of opportunity in education and 
employment have a high expectation placed on them that they will share part of their wealth back to 
their families. 
 
Thus, patron-client network relationships are an ever-present feature of local communities and now 
seem to occur at all levels of state administration. The patron-client relationship based on kastom 
practices is viewed by international communities as corrupt, however, because of practices of 
nepotism, conflict of interests, and bribery. This is because the patron-client relationship network is 
maintained through helping families access loans at the Bank, obtaining licences, land leases, and 
contracts. The findings of the present research illustrate that, although acting on these reciprocal 
relationships is not obligatory, it is socially moral and acceptable for political leaders and civil 
servants to adhere to them in order to maintain their identity and place in their community. In other 
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words, social legitimacy requires individuals to locate themselves within their local social order and 
show respect for kastom authority. Thus, strong family support and respect for authority is deeply 
rooted in the individual’s sense of socio-political identity, which cements a strong link to family, 
lands and notions of origin. The notion of originality or man ples simply refers to local practices that 
demonstrate who a person is and where he/she comes from. Neglect of family support can be 
interpreted in many ways, the most obvious one being that he/she is a naturalised outsider or someone 
that does not have roots in the local community. All these have great implications when someone is 
occupying a public position and has a duty to fulfil the requirements of the law and at the same time 
remain loyal to family or kinship. And at times it can also have a powerful impact on an individual’s 
psychological health and wellbeing: “drink blood” (suck blood out) is a slogan used to describe a 
situation where someone went “broke” because he/she has distributed all of his/her wealth to families. 
On the other hand, distribution through the family loop can be an effective system that the state can 
tap into and legalise in ways that ensure accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness (Duncan 
2011). Thus, effective and acceptable governance strategies to address corruption need to be 
understood and instituted in the context of how social networks and local social structures can become 
part of solutions to development challenges in Vanuatu. In the broader context of governance, 
international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations, donors, and other aid 
agencies should consider the patron-client network system and how it can be integrated with the 
delivery of aid in developing countries such as Vanuatu. 
7.7 Corruption and governance 
The reports on corruption in Vanuatu have concentrated on public office corruption, and one 
consequence of this approach is that understandings are increasingly based on Western models and 
methodologies of how corruption is measured and assessed globally. The results of the two case 
studies above reveal that corruption in Vanuatu is deeply rooted in the conflict between traditional 
values of social order and authority and that of imported state governance. In Vanuatu there are two 
co-existing and conflicting sources and forms of authority. The understanding gap between the two 
authority systems was not addressed by the post-colonial institutions; and the findings presented in 
this thesis suggest that Vanuatu is taking an ‘accommodation approach’ through its Constitution to 
recognising the two values of customary governance and state governance. This means that there is an 
urgent need to address governance and government shortfalls through negotiation and consultation 
between these two values of social orders and authorities in the best interest of development 
objectives. 
The way in which kastom governance and authority were embedded in the Constitution gives no 
options for the government to pursue a transformative policy approach, to actually transform and 
incorporate traditional understandings, social obligations and kastom practices into formal political 
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structures. The Constitution has mandated kastom authority to work independently from the state and 
to preserve and promote kastom governance and cultures in Vanuatu in all domains of life. This has 
resulted in the existence of two prominent forms of social obligation and authority, kastom authority 
and legal-rational authority, which the Constitution implies should operate together as instruments for 
the development of Vanuatu. As discussed in Chapter One, the two systems of governing are built on 
different principles of social obligation; and the challenge for Vanuatu is how to bridge the 
understanding gap between both systems. 
The challenge is extremely complex, because since independence Vanuatu has been run by political 
leaders who were brought up within the system of kastom governance, and very often Vanuatu has 
witnessed elected Prime Ministers and Presidents performing pig killing ceremonies in order to be 
invested with jifly title and authority. In other words, there exists a dilemma, where State Ministers 
and members of parliament, including public servants, claim to understand and acknowledge the two 
authorities, kastom and legislative, but their national performance according to rule of law were 
compromised. As indicated in the two sets of Case Studies, there is now a wider gap between 
traditional values of social order and authority and rational legislative authority, which provides 
greater opportunity for corrupt practices. The manifestation of corrupt practices at all levels of state 
administration indicates that what is termed public office corruption results from the tensions between 
different understandings of social obligation and the way different authorities ought to conduct the 
public affairs of their local community or, for that matter, their country. 
7.8 Conclusion 
Governance reform is a slow incremental process. That said, the issue of corruption in Vanuatu is 
amenable to intervention. It is not appropriate or useful to suggest that corruption is a Western 
construct and does not matter. This thesis acknowledges that corruption is a reality and it causes 
dysfunction within our democratic society (including within government institutions and private 
businesses) and needs to be resolved; but it needs to be resolved in a way that actually enables people 
to understand what corruption is and how corruption can be detrimental to their interests. Thus, to 
effect this change, the meaning of corruption needs to be negotiated with the general populace in 
order for people to understand, and in doing so actually reconstruct and alter the common basis of 
understanding of what corruption actually means. In other words, changes have to be negotiated and 
understood and accepted by the general populace rather than enforced. 
 The international community uses the standard definition of corruption as “the use of public office 
for personal gain” (United Nations 2004; World Bank 2007).  Most developing states and national 
anti-corruption institutions tend to follow definitions set out in the law, which creates a mismatch with 
traditional social orders and authority in local communities. Public office corruption is criminalised in 
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legal codes corresponding with the international conventions that prescribe bribery as 
misapropriation. Vanuatu follows the legal definitions provided in the Leadership Code and the 
Constitution, which define leadership expectations and behaviour. On that basis, corruption is referred 
to and, too often, poorly understood in a foreign sense as misuse of public office for private gain. 
Too often this view differs from traditional views of inappropriate behaviours, and the view of 
corruption as sin within religious circles. Thus, the three institutions (church, kastom, and legal-
rational state) tend to clash over their understanding about what is corruption in Vanuatu. The 
implication of this is that what are moral and sensible practices and values in traditional society differ 
greatly from the expectations of churches and the legal-rational state. In Vanuatu, corruption is a 
consequence of the collision of social relations and the conflict of social orders that provide 
opportunities and incentives for leaders to abuse their powers in contradiction to established rules and 
laws. The gap between these two sets of understanding is where we found sources of corrupt 
practices, as demonstrated in the two sets of Case Studies in the previous chapters. Understanding 
sources of corruption as a consequence of the conflicting values of social orders and authority helps to 
develop an appreciation of the significant role that the MNCC and jifly institutions can play in 
reducing tension and clashes between the different systems of authorities in Vanuatu. The next 
chapter argues that practices are constructed. Institutions are socially constructed. And if they are 
socially constructed they can be socially reconstructed and deconstructed. Therefore, jifly institutions 
and the nakamal concept can become part of a process that collaborates between different political 
authorities to define institutions and define the values that those institutions are to uphold and 
implement. 
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Chapter 8: Building a Resilient Governance System in Vanuatu 
  
8.0 Introduction 
 A resilient governance system in Vanuatu is one that integrates informal governance institutions at 
the local community level into national processes of negotiated transformation. The findings of this 
research suggest that governance challenges in Vanuatu emerge from frictions arising from the 
imposition of political institutions ill-matched to existing traditional governance forms and norms. 
There is substantial scope, however, for this friction; while arguably this is also an inevitable 
consequence of socio-political change influenced by many “external” factors, to be mitigated through 
kastom governance. Kastom governance, as used here, is not merely reliance upon conformity to 
kastom, but rather a practice of dialogue between different governance systems, one set influenced by 
customary ideas and another set shaped very much by the forces of modernization. Kastom 
governance is a traditional form of deliberative governance, if not quite “democratic governance”. 
The idea proposed here is for the integration of kastom to create a process of “collaborative 
governance” across Vanuatu (Ansell & Gash 2007; Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh 2011).  
This chapter focuses on the suitability of the jifly institution for deliberation within an informal system 
that can be used as a foundation for a “best fit” system of government in Vanuatu. While it is 
recognised in this research that traditional authority structures and the jifly system based on the 
nakamal fall short on many criteria of good governance, in Vanuatu traditional authority structures 
still remain quite resilient, whilst in the case of a number of other developing countries that have been 
through longer processes of colonisation, traditional authority structures have tended to break down. 
In Vanuatu colonialism ended much more recently (1980) and, as a consequence, there is a greater 
possibility that traditional structures can be used to help guide Vanuatu through the processes of social 
change that may well provide the basis for a resilient and independent state. 
 The first section of this chapter deals with the traditional understanding of the nakamal as a 
mechanism of traditional dispute resolution, consultation, and negotiation between and within local 
communities. The second section explores features of conflict management and how these features 
can be integrated with international best practices to reduce policy and development tensions between 
different existing authorities. The third section examines the relationship between state and kastom 
authority and how this relationship can be enhanced with the goal of advancing development 
objectives. Finally, I outline a collaborative governance model to enhance and deepen interaction 
between kastom authority and the state so that development objectives can be achieved in the best 
interests of all parties. 
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8.1 Nakamal as public venue for meeting 
The nakamal serves three functions: a venue for meeting; a venue for ceremonial activities and rituals 
such as circumcisions and pig killing: and as a venue for kava drinking. In this chapter I focus on the 
first function, that of a meeting place for the whole community. The whole community usually comes 
together at the nakamal to exchange information, carry out consultation and negotiation and, most 
importantly, to resolve conflict within and between local communities. It is also a place where jifs 
meet with their counterparts, government officials, and visitors from other villages that carry 
important messages for jif, either regarding any bilateral relations or disputes between two villages. 
Furthermore, nakamal is also a place where planning for local development and ceremonies occurs. 
Inherent in these functions is the jifly institution as a prime authority in local communities and, most 
importantly, the roles of kastom jifs in traditional conflict management. Others refer to nakamal as a 
‘place of peace’, where people who have conflict come to find a solution (Walker & Garu 2009). 
What is more interesting about traditional conflict management is its principle features, from which 
threads of commonality can be linked and woven into a resilient governance system for Vanuatu 
society. These features can be solicited from a nuanced analysis of the procedural elements of village 
meetings. These processes are crucial because they contribute to a conducive environment for 
achieving a peaceful resolution and restoration of the relationship between conflicting parties. As 
mentioned on several occasions in this thesis, these local processes, values, and norms that govern 
nakamal meetings can actually be woven into a new fabric for addressing contemporary governance 
challenges in Vanuatu. 
Chapters Four and Five demonstrate that traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in villages are 
simple, accessible, and happen on at least at two levels. Firstly, minor disputes at the family level are 
resolved in their own nakamal, and usually it is the head of clans or nakamal that mediate the dispute. 
Secondly, major conflicts that involve more than one family or nakamals are brought to a central 
nakamal, as depicted in Figure 8:1. At the central nakamal, the kastom jif and his council members 
preside over a dispute, and this level is regarded as the highest court of a village or community. This 
chapter draws on the observations of the author for the last thirty years on the Island of Malekula; 
however, similarities can also be found in other parts of Vanuatu. Indeed, the anthropological 
literature on Vanuatu explores conflict management in the different islands, and much of this 
literature has exposed in great detail the roles of kastom jifs and processes for conflict resolution 
(Deacon 1934; Forsyth 2009; Lindstrom 1990). During one interview, a kastom jif from the island of 
Maevo explained how the nakamal system works in his island: 
The kastom governance of Maevo is very strong. All individuals sit inside the system of 
nakamal and this includes jifs, police, church, health workers, and farmers. Kastom 
governance is governed by the four pillars of our unwritten kastom laws and these include: 
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Mataguti  Love 
Malanalgorna  Respect 
Dododernu  Fear 
Dodotambu  Fairness 
Inside the nakamal all participants respect each other and everyone know the rules and 
process. We have eleven tribes and the leader of the tribe gives the last decision. You see the 
rules of nakamal are made to help our people and to create an environment where everyone 
feels that society love them and respect their rights (Tape Interview 13 May 2013). 
This quote illustrates the crucial importance of the nakamal system and how the nakamal has become 
an institution where people air mutual concerns and find support and respect, and in which they have 
high hopes that they can secure resolutions through negotiation. In each village, the central nakamal 
has fundamental principles and characteristics that are self-reinforcing in terms of manners and ways 
that contribute to restoring peace and positive relationships between conflicting parties. Under the 
leadership of the kastom jifs, matters that concern the whole community are debated at the central 
nakamal. Some islands have nakamal and nasara with different functional levels of authority. For 
instance, in Malekula, a nasara can serve the function of a higher court, which means that the nature 
of cases and penalties imposed at the nasara level are different to those at the family nakamal. 
Murdering, adultery, and stealing are some of the types of cases that usually involve heavy fines from 
the disputed parties to jifly council and also between the parties in conflict. Even so, the principles, 
norms, values, and processes that govern the proceedings of nakamal and nasara are similar, and they 
follow a similar general pattern thoughout the archipelago where both institutions are present.  
Figure 8.1 Structure of a nakamal 
 
Source: Authors own work 
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Figure 8:1 can be further illustrated with a specific example from one of the offshore islands of Efate, 
Emau, which has three functional levels of authority at the nakamal in the local community. The 
author interviewed a kastom jif  from the village of Emau, and he provided the following explanation: 
The Emau village has the following nakamal system, and this includes: 
1 Nakainang jifs at the nasara level 
2 Natoto  jifs at the family level 
3 Narewo  jif ruling over a boundary 
Narewo is the head of village jifs and his ruling and leadership has to be based on kastom law, 
norms, rules and processes. Even though Narewo is the head jif and has the authority to make 
final decision, at the nakamal the decision is always based on consensus of everyone (Tape 
interview 13 May 2013). 
This quote illustrates that the nakamal system is structured with clear functions and a division of 
labour between leaders within a kastom boundary. In addition, the MNCC Case Study and previous 
chapters demonstrate that meeting at the nakamal level is ordered and accepted with clearly 
recognised operating principles, which include consensus decision-making, restorative purpose and 
mutual respect and trusting relationships. These principle features are observed throughout the 
archipelago, although cultures of mediation and communication may vary across the islands.  
8.1.1 Consensus decision making 
Decisions taken at nakamal and across local communities as a whole are consultative and involve 
debates or discussions over issues until consensus is reached (Lindstrom 1990). In other words, the 
nature of decision-making in the local community is consultative and reflects the collective wisdom of 
elders, jifs, and the participants at the meeting. Other scholars suggest that jifs consult local opinion, 
but often they are more autocratic than democratic in their behaviour (Forsyth 2009; Rodman, W 
1977). In some islands high ranking jifs possessed the ultimate sanction and the legitimate right to 
order punishment of offenders (Allen 1981). Despite these leadership differences, the nakamal 
process, in the main, is one of intense discussion and debate. For instance, Lindstrom (1990) observes 
that conflict resolution on the island of Tanna creates the opportunity for reconciliation through 
nakamal, where difficult debates become the vehicle for establishing consensus. The present author 
has also witnessed similar practices on the island of Malekula, in which the planning and operation of 
nimangi as well as the activities of the community are carried out in consideration of the views of 
everyone. This cultural norm of consensus decision-making is a socially embedded norm evident in 
early anthropological writing about Vanuatu. For instance, in Malekula, Deacon (1934) notes that 
daily activities that involved the local community were carried out in full view of everyone. Similarly, 
as mentioned in Chapter Four, Rodman (1977) observes that in Ambae the meetings are more 
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consultative than autocratic, and the link between ratahigi (leader) and his followers rests in great 
measure on rule by consent rather than coercion.  
From the manner and way decisions are arrived at in local meetings, either for conflict resolution or 
development planning, there is strong evidence of deliberation, comprising debate, consultation and 
negotiation, which are important social tools for ensuring legitimacy and the building of local 
ownership over policy and development projects. In a more recent account, Miranda Forsyth (2009) 
further explores many of these features in the context of conflict management, where she notes that 
despite leadership and power variances, consensus decision-making would seem to be a common 
characteristic of nakamal meetings throughout the archipelago. At the end of each hearing the kastom 
jif and his council would meet separately to draw their conclusion on the matter at hand, based on the 
hearing. Using this process the council is involved in consulting and negotiating with the members to 
make sure that whatever judgement or decision that is handed down is justifiable, fair, and according 
to kastom laws, norms, and values. From village to the national level, the consensus decision-making 
of the nakamal is respected and carried at all levels of conflict resolution (Kernot & Sakita 2008). 
The participation of women, however, in decision- making varies across the spectrum, and in some 
islands women are involved directly in decision-making, such as in the islands of Pentecost and Big 
Bay in Santo (Thomas, Andrina 2013). However, as Jolly (1997) argues, there is a perception that 
tradition equals male domination while modernization involves the liberation of women and presents 
a challenge to established social order. In Vanuatu women are asserting their rights in both traditional 
and modern society past and present, and in doing so women are trying to dissolve invidious 
dichotomies, and negative perceptions that still threaten their status (Jolly 1997). In other words, it 
might be suggested that assertions that the traditions of Vanuatu are male dominated reflects limited 
understandings of the local context, and pre-concieved mindsets of scholars influenced by Western 
traditions and democratic values. 
The MNCC Case Study demonstrates the diverse nature of the conflicts that the kastom jifs resolved 
using the nakamal principle of consensus decision-making. The Council is arguably the clearest 
evidence that “dialogue” between traditional leaders and modern state institutions is the most likely 
avenue for development to proceed in Vanuatu, if social division and conflict are to be avoided. It 
therefore offers the possibility for a more inclusive approach to governance at the national level, 
although the attitudes of kastom jifs to social change have to adapt. 
8.1.2 Restoration of relationships 
Unlike legal-rational conflict resolution, which is outcome driven, in traditional dispute resolution the 
ultimate objective is to restore relationships between the conflicting parties (Walker & Garu 2009). 
Given the diversity of the socio-economic and political structures throughout the archipelago, there 
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are variations as to how relationships have been restored when there is conflict within and between 
villages or islands. For instance, Forsyth (2009) provides useful accounts in anthropological literature 
about how inter-village and inter-island resolutions restore relationships; depending on the nature of 
conflict most of them require “payback”. This payback system can be in the form of physical assault 
and death, or in the form of pig exchange. Nevertheless, restoration of a peaceful relationship is a key 
output, and it is acknowledged in many places that there is more than one path to achieve this (Forsyth 
2009; Lindstrom 1990). In other words, traditional conflict resolution at the nakamal level is a “win-
win” situation, which means that neither one of the conflicting parties is losing face at the end of the 
process. This is different to the Western model of conflict resolution that Vanuatu is used to, where at 
the end of the process one party has to be free and the other has to be punished either by a prison 
sentence or payment of fines (Walker & Garu 2009). In a traditional nakamal, when the jifs deal with 
conflict, they make sure that whatever punishment they come up with is shared equally between the 
two parties. In some cases the conflicting parties may have disagreements about the outcome of their 
conflict resolution process; however, the data generated in Chapter Five demonstrates that in the long 
term they find that the judgement was of great benefit to them.  
As discussed on several occasions, creating the opportunity for a “win-win” situation is embedded in 
the culture of local communities. This cultural resource can be drawn upon to share development 
benefits in contemporary Vanuatu; but first the government has to recognise this and engage with 
local communities with kastom authority and their people. Previous chapters have shown evidence of 
conflict emerging from the approaches of government towards development in rural and remote 
islands of Vanuatu. Friction emerges from the manner in which benefits of development are shared 
within local communities or between the local community and the state. Chapter Five illustrates that 
the kastom authority offers a more effective means to ensure resources are shared fairly and equally. 
The President of the MNCC believes that the reason why there is increased political instability and 
conflict over resource distribution is because the kastom authority is not part of that distribution (Tape 
Interview 26 May 2013). The concept of restoration has inherent features of equity, fairness, 
transparency, and inclusiveness, which are critical features of a liberal democratic state; and as is 
argued here, there is a possibility to draw a linking node between the state and kastom authority by 
integrating these features. 
8.1.3 Mutual respect and trusting relationships 
Another significant feature of nakamal meeting is mutual respect and trust, which are important for 
the social fabric of local communities down to the family level. The feature of respect and trust is 
gender neutral and applies to everyone in local communities. Children are taught to respect their 
parents, authorities, and individuals outside their family circle, and it becomes a norm of society that 
everyone ought to respect each other and most importantly their leaders. As such, it becomes a norm 
of the local communities not to criticise leaders but in all ways respect them for their given 
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responsibility and status in the community. This has great impact on the role of jifs as individual 
leaders in dispute resolutions and also on the nakamal as the highest institution in local communities. 
As already said, it is a norm for everyone in the community to respect the institutions and authorities 
in their community, and the absence of such respect is seen as a disgrace to parents, leaders, and the 
whole community. Because of this high respect the people render to authorities and institutions in 
local communities, when they are in the nakamal they give greater respect to the rules and norms 
concerning conduct during the hearings. This creates a conducive environment for jifs to restore peace 
in a satisfactory manner, as far as the kastom law is concerned.  
Using the family unit as a primary source for training young pupils in the traditional virtues of 
respect, trust, sharing, and kindness has had great impact on peaceful and harmonious relations in 
local communities, society and, generally, at the national level. This reflects a fundamental belief held 
by local communities that the success and prosperity of a society, and a nation, depends upon the 
influence of a family on their children. Because of the greater emphasis on respect at the family level, 
Vanuatu as a society has sometimes experienced times of great tranquillity and peace at the local 
level. However, this is not to suggest that during times of stress violence does not occur within and 
between families and communities. As discussed in this chapter, nakamal plays a crucial role in 
reducing tensions and conflict by providing a widely accepted forum for resolving stresses and the 
potential for conflict. There is much to learn from this cultural feature if the state wants to see 
peaceful relationships at the national level. 
8.2 Protocols and process of nakamal meeting  
The nakamal has protocols and processes that are self-reinforcing and play an important role in 
contributing to an environment whereby the kastom jifs are able to restore and maintain relationships 
between conflicting parties. Chapter Five illustrates various cases as to how these features are used in 
the meeting of kastom jifs at all levels of the community. These include: 
8.2.1 Agenda setting 
The meeting and the development agenda in villages are set by the people in consultation with their 
kastom jifs. The collective nature and holistic way of working together provides a strong foundation 
for teamwork and team spirit in all aspects of development. A few communities have started to 
experience fragmentation of their social fabric due to the external impact of religious influences, and 
as a result of more young people migrating to urban areas. However, this social governance structure 
can be observed in all villages throughout the archipelago, and it is something that could be revisited 
to strengthen local governance structures in places where this is weak. The families wanting their 
cases to be heard at the village council of jifs come to the spokesman of jifs to register their cases for 
consideration. It is the role of spokesman to brief his kastom jif about the agenda and set the time for 
the hearing. Traditionally, as argued in Chapter Four, this working framework mimics the legal-
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rational style of Court and state administration, and it is one of the traditional values that has been 
neglected in the design and building of post-colonial state institutions. Most importantly, it tends to 
work quickly, locally, cheaply and effectively. This process of agenda setting involves consultation, 
discussions, briefings, and seeking the consensus of everyone to participate at the meeting. 
8.2.2 Seating arrangements 
When people assemble at nakamal they show great reverence towards the kastom jif of the village, 
and this is reflected through the seating arrangement protocols, and the way communication takes 
place at the meetings. For instance, in Tanna, the kastom jifs often take the centre position, followed 
by heads of a clan. Other members sit where their head of clan is sitting. As Lindstrom (1990) notes: 
Men attending a debate sit along the periphery of the circular kava clearing. Arcs of the 
periphery are owned by certain of the local groups involved. These arcs are situated near the 
point of egress of the trails, or roads, which link kava ground to kava ground. Protagonists, 
consistent with island dualism, sit at antipodal points facing each other across the clearing. 
Those who witness their debate mediate this dualism, positioning themselves between the 
sides (p. 379) 
This quote illustrates the orderly manner in which debates and meetings are organised at nakamal. It 
also illustrates general common practices throughout the archipelago governing certain protocols and 
code of conduct at the meetings. Although it might appear gender specific, in the traditional context it 
may not be so, because women are still part of meeting discussions but have a different role to play in 
ensuring overall consistency and fairness in the processes of the meeting. For instance, in Malekula, 
women play a liaison role between jifs and disputed parties by negotiating suitable dates and the 
venue of the meeting. In the past their roles covered the distribution of the agenda to various parties, 
and these roles were critical during tribal wars.  
The effectiveness of debate depends on how the agenda of the meeting is structured and presented for 
discussion. For instance Lindstrom (1990) observes: 
Debate usually begins with a discussion of side issues. After talk has begun to flow, someone 
will bring up the main problem at hand. If this problem is minor, the focal antagonist may 
themselves make the initial statements. If things are more serious, however, and emotion 
engaged, supporters who are more likely to keep a cool head will carry the early debate, 
setting forth their version of the dispute or problems (p. 379). 
The Tannese experience has one thing in common that can also be observed in other islands, and this 
is the organisation of the meeting agenda and the structure of debate at the meeting. The level of 
organisation and collective skills of elderly people and jifs to moderate debate creates a trustful 
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environment where people believe that emotional sentiments and sensitive issues will be handled 
professionally by the kastom authority. 
8.2.3 How to speak and who to speak? 
In traditional conflict resolution the jifs tend to use indirect forms of communication such as 
storytelling, parables, and noncoercive language. This is done on purpose to create an atmosphere 
where parties in conflict are not spotlighted and made to feel guilty (Walker & Garu 2009). It also 
demonstrates a level of respect the jifs give to conflicting parties by using communication forms that 
are not offensive. The culture of communication in a public forum and in particular during conflict 
resolution varies widely from one island to the other. Nevertheless, the principle of indirect forms of 
communication is seemingly observed throughout the whole archipelago. In the northern part of 
Vanuatu they use a third person to address individuals at the nakamal during conflict resolution, and 
this is regarded as a respectful way of dealing with tensions and conflicts. At times this becomes 
frustrating, because if you are new person you will have difficulty finding out who in particular the 
jifs are talking to (Walker & Garu 2009). At the central nakamal or nasara the family will come 
together to plan a communication strategy as to how they will respond to jifs and judges, and usually 
someone will be nominated to speak on behalf of the victims. This is quite different from the conflict 
resolution at the individual nakamal level, where the victim is allowed to speak, but with the 
assistance of his/her immediate family. Thus, the skills of communicating at the central nakamal 
during conflict resolution are important, because they facilitate and lead the conflicting parties to 
amicable solutions. As such, the jifs communicate in such a way that it does not arouse anger, and 
most importantly, jeopardise the process of restoring a peaceful relationship between the conflicting 
parties. 
8.2.4 Who takes part? 
At the traditional conflict resolution, participation is not restricted, and usually it is characterised by 
multiple parties who represent extended kinship and community relationships (Walker & Garu 2009). 
In a similar vein, a general meeting at the nakamal is inclusive and everyone is at liberty to participate 
in accordance with protocols and the code of conduct specified in kastom laws and norms of the local 
community. Women and youth, including strangers in local communities, have a right to attend the 
nakamal meetings. There is no restriction on any gender; however, in circumstances where the kastom 
authorities are of the view that the issues at hand are sensitive, and for the security of the 
communities, they might need to limit participation to certain groups or individuals. In Tanna, women 
participate at the meeting as listeners and observers and can provide checks and balances on 
traditional processes, norms, and rules of nakamal. Usually, after the meeting when everyone retires 
to their houses, women and husbands engage in intense reflections about the meeting discussions, 
processes, norms and rules. Women can make their general observations known to their husbands and 
also point out important issues that require nakamal attention. The husbands will take note of the 
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points raised and will presented these at the next nakamal meeting. In an indirect manner women thus 
still participate in the processes of consensus decision-making and still play important roles that can 
only be understood in the cultural context (Lindstrom 2010). Girls and boys participate as observers, 
listening to the different forms of communication during dispute resolutions and, as a consequence, 
the process is a learning ground for them to observe how people behave in a meeting place. Lamont 
Lindstrom notes that on the island of Tanna: 
[m]eetings always include more listeners than speakers. Women have no right to public 
speech and sit behind men on the periphery of bush and clearing as befits their political and 
cosmological status. Although all men may speak, and will certainly do so at some meeting or 
another that touches their interests, generally at any one meeting only about one third of those 
present actually speak. This is especially true of important debates attended by up to several 
hundred people (1990, p. 380). 
This quote suggests inclusiveness but practices involved can be both inclusive and exclusive, 
depending upon how kastom jifs define the agenda of debate. The culture of nakamal conduct in 
Tanna presents the extreme case in which women are excluded from speaking publicly but indirectly 
can raise their views through their husbands or kinsmen. The experiences of Tanna are quite different 
from a matrilineal community such as in the island of Pentecost and Mantatas in Santo where women 
hold a powerful position as kastom jif and have the same privileges as other kastom jifs in patrilineal 
communities (Jolly 1994; Thomas, Andrina 2013). For instance, Ms Hilda Lini was vested with the 
traditional jifly title of Salvan Tamatan Vanua, which is the highest women chiefly title in Turaga 
Indigenous Nation of Pentecost, after the death of her mum. She was the first woman in Vanuatu to be 
elected to Parliament in 1987. From 1991-95 she was the Minister of Rural Water Supply and Health. 
In 1996 she was appointed as Minister of Justice, Culture and Women’s Affairs (UNDP 2010). 
Despite limitations on the right to speak, there is evidence that a meeting at nakamal is inclusive and 
everyone is given the opportunity to listen and voice their views, whether directly or indirectly. 
Indeed, the nakamal offers further scope for kastom to be an effective means to advance social change 
in the area of women’s rights.  
8.2.5 Nakamal and gender 
While the nakamal system would seem to provide unfair and unequal treatment in terms of gender 
equity, it is worth noting that the cultural and traditional diversity of Vanuatu renders limited room for 
generalisation. In some islands women are in the background and do not have the right to speak 
directly at the nakamal. However, as has already been seen, in some parts of Vanuatu women have an 
equal right to speak at the nakamal and can hold jifly title such as in the island of Pentecost, Epi, north 
Ambae, and Mantatas in Santo (Amanda 2009; Thomas, Andrina 2013). It is easy to identify 
contradictory practices within and between islands, and these practices can be seen by outsiders as 
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working in tension with the notion of gender equity that is promoted by the World Bank and other aid 
development agencies. For instance, the MNCC is dominated by male kastom jifs, and that in itself 
creates an awkward position as it is not a true representation of the diverse political structures of 
Vanuatu. There is still a tension between islands as to whether the MNCC is a legitimate institution to 
represent kastom authority (DailyPost 2005). This implies a need for re-invigorating the MNCC to 
reflect the socio-political diversities of Vanuatu. In other words, Vanuatu has to recognise its diverse 
traditions where in some societies females of a certain lineage assume leadership authority. 
Furthermore, Amanda (2009), in her accounts of women in Vanuatu, tends to view Vanuatu society as 
dominated by males. The present thesis illustrates that such an argument is too general and does not 
reflect the realities on the ground. With a wide degree of traditions and cultural variations in Vanuatu, 
women have in some places been endowed with high political status, such as Salvan Tamatan Vanua, 
a traditional jifly title given to Hilda Lini of Pentecost, and they play similar leadership roles to males. 
However, the traditions and culture that tend to exclude women are established practices, and this 
means that international attempts to increase the roles of women in a developing country like Vanuatu 
have to be done by changing these cultural practices from within. Rather than saying this is unequal 
and unfair, the strong international pressure to have equality could actually destroy the institution and 
be denying Vanuatu of its value. In other words, challenging those power structures in traditional 
local communities can actually be damaging to the longer-term interest of promoting positive change. 
Hence, the nakamal system, despite its flaws, is the best avenue where gender challenges can be 
addressed and contesting boundaries can be discussed in order to create a more inclusive society and 
community. While this thesis is not about gender relations in Vanuatu, it is acknowledged that kastom 
has to evolve in line with national and international expectations. In this regard, the MNCC has a vital 
role to play in navigating a path towards positive social change in Vanuatu. 
8.2.6 Power structure 
At the end of the process, a kastom jif has the power to sanction public order in local communities and 
order punishment and fines on the guilty party. As discussed in Chapter Four, despite external 
influences on power structures in the local communities, there is a greater recognition among local 
communities that kastom jifs are still the figureheads in villages. Other scholars explore how the 
influences of Christianity and the European-centred state notions have impacted on the degree of 
power held by kastom authority in the local communities, such as is seen in the case of the use of 
black magic and ancestral spirits (Deacon 1934; Forsyth 2009; Rodman, W 1993). These supernatural 
powers were believed to be used by kastom authority as a means of enforcing obedience to kastom 
laws and the rulings of kastom authority. The experiences discussed in Chapter Five illustrate that the 
absence of supernatural powers does not lessen the importance and role of kastom authority in 
sanctioning public order and resolving disputes in local communities and in contemporary society in 
Vanuatu. 
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Beside kastom authority, it is widely acknowledged that elders in local communities possess critical 
information and power, and as such they have been respected by the communities for their wealth of 
information on local kastom practices and histories. Because kastom laws, rules, norms, processes and 
values are unwritten, the elders in local communities remain critical sources of information, meaning 
kastom jifs work closely with them. As Lindstrom (1990) observes in the island of Tanna, those who 
possess a wealth of information have greater access to speech in public meetings and this symbolises 
and maintains a person’s political power. All this illustrates that consensual decision-making in local 
communities is based on kastom laws, rules, norms and values and, most importantly, reflects the 
collective views or wisdom of elders and jifs (Forsyth 2009; Walker & Garu 2009). In some islands, 
power at the nakamal has been neutralised, as Lindstrom (2010, p.6) notes in the island of Tanna, 
where village ‘moots’, known locally as nagkriariien, (which simply means ‘talk’ or talking), are very 
much egalitarian by nature. As Lamont Lindstrom observes: 
Village moots have no judges or anyone else with authority to weigh fact, determine 
responsibility, or impose a settlement, fine, or sentence. Accepted fact, distributed 
responsibility, and consensual settlements all arise out of public discussion and debate.  
……Generally, only older, married, and established men feel comfortable taking the “floor” 
(coming into the center of the ground to speak). Younger men remain in the audience 
although the more ambitious among these might dare to rise and offer a comment or two.  
Older, experienced men with political clout often hold their council until the end of the 
meeting hoping thereby to control the manner in which the outcome settlement becomes 
publicly enunciated. Women, on the other hand, have or used to have no rights of public 
speech and must speak through kinsmen. Although gender inequalities may recently be 
easing, in the 1980s I often saw women—even those to whom direct questions were posed—
whisper their responses to spokesmen who stood to represent them in the public debate (2010, 
p. 8). 
This quote illustrates the power variances in the way a nakamal meeting is conducted, which clearly 
shows another important characteristic of the nakamal system. Tannese experiences illustrate how the 
nakamal can be an important avenue for different authorities to address power inequalities and create 
a level playing field where every participants can participate freely. Although women have some 
restrictions, as mentioned on several occasions in this thesis, they still have a mechanism to present 
their views and become part of debates. Thus, at the nakamal level, state and kastom authorities, 
including other civil society members, can come together to discuss freely development issues and 
challenges such as human rights, and gender inequality. Evidently, traditional processes of 
governance in Vanuatu are not inherently incompatible with modern notions of social democracy.  
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8.3 Existing consultation processes between state and society 
The Constitution provides room for the state to consult the kastom authority on matters relating to 
kastom, and that provision has been enhanced recently following a constitutional amendment that 
made it obligatory for the Government to consult kastom authority on any bills that are put before 
parliament. The two case studies earlier in this thesis demonstrate that kastom authority is a powerful 
political institution throughout the archipelago, which gains broad legitimacy from Vanuatu’s 
population across all levels of the community. The Constitution has recognised kastom authority as an 
independent institution, which means that its role in the development of Vanuatu cannot be neglected 
by the state; and there is a pressing need to find how they can work together in the development of 
Vanuatu. The data presented here suggests that there is leadership fragmentation between kastom 
authority and legislative authority, and both institutions are claiming sovereign rights over the 
development and management of Vanuatu. This leadership fracture emerges from the ways kastom 
authority has been treated by the state in the development process and management of Vanuatu’s 
national affairs.  
8.3.1 Development consultation and agenda setting 
The DBV Case Study, and Chapter Two, demonstrate that there is a significant divergence between 
Western concepts of corruption and good governance, and traditional values of social obligation and 
what traditional culture deems as moral and sensible in local communities. This implies that there is 
an understanding gap between rural local communities and urbanist populations, and that this gap 
could easily be minimised if the process of negotiation and consultation reached everyone in local and 
remote communities in Vanuatu. The national development policies and plans are driven by local 
elites who claim they represent the population of Vanuatu and understand well their needs and how 
those needs can be met. The data gathered from this thesis suggests that the risk is that development 
aid agencies are caught up in a democractic syndrome of ‘representation’, whereby a few local elites 
are selected to speak on behalf on their organisations, communities, groups, and islands. However, the 
experiences illustrate that very often international institutions and aid donors are working with local 
self-interested elites who tend to promote policies and programs that are contrary to the stated aims of 
all involved. This is at the broad expense of remote and rural traditional communities. One of the 
reasons for this, as per the findings of the research in Chapters Five and Six, is that the policy and 
development consultation process is limited to local elites who are working in government or non-
government organisations, who have the education and the means to assert their claims in ways which 
resonate with international development norms.  
The challenge is that political elites see an opportunity to consolidate their powers at the expense of 
the broader population, and they have manipulated and, too often, marginalized traditions to achieve 
their ends. This generates conflicts and tensions with kastom authority, because the kastom jifs feel 
they are not consulted and that the development model that Vanuatu is pursuing pushes them further 
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back. Chapter Four of this thesis illustrates some examples where the failure of the state to consult 
and negotiate differences in social obligations and leadership expectations resulted in great conflict 
over development in rural and local communities. The kastom authority and their people fight against 
the state over land issues, and the state compensation for land never satisfies the whole community. 
Chapter Four provides classic examples of cases involving disputes between kastomary land owners 
and the government over two major projects, Brenwei Hydropower and Norsup Airport. The state 
found it very difficult to pay compensation because of the collective nature of land ownership, which 
implied that the state had to recognise every individual who was part of the community in which the 
project was allocated. The two case studies and subsequent chapters illustrate that many of those 
development tensions stemmed from the fact that there was not proper consultation and negotiation 
with the right people with authority in local communities. The kastom authority, as demonstrated by 
the MNCC respondents, felt that they were not part of the development process and had little role in 
contributing to development in Vanuatu. 
The state decides on the development agenda and policy direction of Vanuatu, via a top-down process 
that leaves many people, groups and organisations behind in the process. In 1997, through the 
Governance Reform Program, the Government established a triangular model of consultation, as 
depicted in Figure 8.2. Prior to the National Summit, there is a provincial retreat and a business 
forum, both of which are deliberately organised for members to meet with government and discuss 
different development challenges in their respective jurisdictions. These two forums are a ground 
preparation stage, and it is from there that the socio-economic and political agenda is established to 
discuss at the National Summit. This summit is an annual event that gathers over two hundred 
participants from different sections of Vanuatu society. The participants are selected by the 
government, and they come as representatives of their communities, organisations, and groups. As the 
case studies have shown, kastom authority felt that they were not part of the overall government 
machinery and that their participation in the development of Vanuatu was minimal. 
Figure 8.2 National policy consultation mechanisms 
Business Forum
Provincial Retreat 
National Summit
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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In this overarching consultative framework, the participation of the kastom authority and the wider 
section of the population is very limited. In most cases Government ends up talking to Government, 
without inputs from the broader society. Given the geographical locations and infrastructure 
challenges that Vanuatu is facing, it is very expedient for the Government to run these consultation 
forums and summits annually. However, costs can be one of the binding constraints that limit broader 
participation. The way this consultation mechanism was framed does not take into consideration 
power inequalities and differences in individual backgrounds, and their ability to participate actively 
to make sure that their voices are heard and taken into consideration. In reality, the business forum, 
the provincial retreat and national summit are predominantly composed of Government officials from 
different sectors talking to each other about development challenges and priority needs of the country. 
The nakamal system proposed here is a way of encouraging genuine grassroots participation in a 
significant reform process across Vanuatu society. This is unlike the participation often promoted by 
international institutions and major donors, which tends to be very limited and excludes many people 
on the basis of their geographical location, languages, and level of their education. 
While these forums and summits have built on the notion of participation, consultation, and working 
together with multiple networks of authority in Vanuatu, the attendance and participation of ni-
Vanuatu is very limited. Hence, some features of the existing traditional authority structures can be 
used to intergrate with democratic values of collaboration and deliberation to increase the 
participation of everyone in rural and remote communities in Vanuatu. The current decentralisation of 
government is only limited to provincial centres, and most peripheral areas remain disconnected from 
central state and provincial administration services. As the MNCC Case Study suggested, the jifly 
institution is one of the very few that connects people from rural and remote areas of Vanuatu to the 
national level, and with which people are familiar. Figure 8.3 represents the existing practices; 
however, this process would seem to occur on an ad-hoc basis, and it only functions when a conflict 
requires the intervention of kastom authority (Cullwick 2013a). In other words, when there is the 
potential for developmental or social conflict involving the state and other groupings in the country, 
the state might call for kastom jifs to bring the two parties together at the nakamal level. At the 
nakamal level the kastom jifs apply the norms, rules, and procedures of traditional dispute resolution, 
and the MNCC Case Study demonstrated that this approach works well in dealing with contemporary 
development conflict. However, MNCC respondents acknowledged that the state only used kastom 
authority when needed, particularly when there are a development conflicts involving all levels of 
society (Cullwick 2013a). This sporadic working relationship dissatisfies kastom jifs because they feel 
they are not fully involved into the development process of Vanuatu. The participants in the MNCC 
Case Study acknowledged that the Government has needed jifs’ cultural, traditional and peacekeeping 
roles on a significant number of occasions, but that this has rarely been recognised or acknowledged. 
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Figure 8.3 Existing relationships at the national level 
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Source: Author’s own work 
Currently, the state is highly centralised. Formal government stops at the provincial level, and there is 
no institutional mechanism to connect to people at the village level, as depicted in Figure 8.3. In all 
policy consultation and negotiation, the provincial officers are used to represent the views of the local 
authorities and their population. This is where communication between state and society breaks down, 
and sometimes the views of local authorities and population are not captured in the national policy 
processes. There are certain factors that contribute to limited participation of the eighty percent of the 
population in rural areas: infrastructure support, skills and capacity to participate at the intellectual 
level, and the financial cost to mobilise mass numbers of the population to attend a forum. Even if 
they are consulted, there is little likelihood that their views will be reflected in the final policy 
documents and directions. Indeed, the jifly institution and nakamal system are cheaper and already 
exist in rural and remote areas of Vanuatu, and it is the only system that connects the population in 
local communities, including the marginalised section of the population who are under the care and 
support of families.  
8.3.2 Policy implementation 
Chapter Four and the two case studies illustrate that Government and the state are not controlling 
development, and on many occasions where the state wanted to build schools, dispensaries and 
infrastructure in local communities, there has been tension between land owners and kastom authority. 
The findings of this research show that more than three quarters of the total land area is in customary 
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title, which means that it is governed under the traditional land tenure system of collective ownership 
(World Bank 2011). The kastom jifs are powerful authorities because they preside over communities 
occupying, in total, three quarters of the total land area in Vanuatu, and work closely with eighty 
percent of the total population in rural and remote areas. Chapter Four of this thesis cited two cases as 
being representative of intense development tensions between kastom authority and the state, over the 
implementation of projects where there was not a proper negotiation and consultation with the local 
population and kastom authority: Brenwei Hydropower and Norsup Airport. The MNCC case studies 
demonstrate that, where the state worked collaboratively with kastom authority to implement a 
development project in the local community, the results were successful, as was the case of MCA and 
the micro-credit scheme at the NBV.  
The MNCC respondents acknowledged that the efforts of the state to involve kastom authority in the 
development process in Vanuatu has contributed to improved commitment and shared understanding 
at the local community, regional, sub-regional, and national levels. The two case studies illustrate that 
the level of commitment and willingness of the local community to engage in community projects 
funded by the state and development aid agencies increases when they are involved in the designing 
process and also manage the implementation. The MNCC respondents noted that, with the MCA 
infrastructure project, the conflict of the quarry ownership was reduced because the kastom jifs 
negotiated with local communities without the involvement of the state. The kastom jifs organised the 
labour and divided the work at the local community level, which reinforced mutual trust and respect 
between the jifs and their people in the community as well as with the Government. The Ministry of 
Infrastructure communicated directly with jifs, who then passed on the information to their people at 
the community level. This partnership approach between kastom authorities and the state has proven 
to work well, with the US$65 million infrastructure project to lay a bitumen road around the island of 
Efate. As mentioned on several occasions, the kastom jifs used the nakamal as the main central node 
in local communities, where they met with Government officials and local communities to discuss 
project priorities and negotiate differences between local communities with the state. 
8.3.3 Resource sharing and management 
The management of resources is another source of tension between the state and kastom authority. 
Indeed, as is demonstrated in the DBV Case Study, resource allocation is one of the sources of 
corruption within the Vanuatu Government. The findings of this research strongly suggest that 
resource conflict can be reduced by working with existing governance arrangements such as the 
nakamal approach and, most importantly, involving kastom authority in the process and management, 
as was the case of the micro-credit facilities at the NBV. The MNCC President commented that the 
reason why there is tumas rao rao (many disputes) over resource distribution is because the jifs were 
not part of the sharing process. He further argued that: 
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[t]he reason why we have increased political instabilities is because the state does not want to 
allow the jifs to distribute the portfolio. In our village, resources are shared at the nakamal, 
where everyone in the village has their share. At the nakamal the process of sharing follows 
our kastom, and the sharing was transparent and fair because it is done in public domain 
where everyone in local community can witness it. Our politicians are fighting for ministerial 
portfolio or high position in government, and until today the government cannot meet the 
demands of everyone. I told the government that in the next parliament, they will give 
opportunity to jifs to distribute the ministerial portfolio. In nakamal, everyone is satisfy with 
whatever they received, even if the resources are limited people are happy with their share 
(Tape Interview 14 May 2013). 
This quote demonstrates that within traditional institutions there are serviceable norms for achieving 
justice, fairness, and equity that are different from, but not incompatible, with state expectations. The 
MNCC Case Study demonstrates that the jifly institution is relevant and effective in handling the 
different nature of conflict in contemporary society. The state has to build on that strength and find 
ways they can complement it, in order to build a resilient governance institution that is grounded in 
the local context.  
8.4 Collaborative and deliberative governance framework between state and kastom 
authority 
Collaborative governance has been used to replace adversarial and unilateral modes of policy making 
and implementation in Vanuatu (Ansell & Gash 2007). In a similar vein, it has been argued that 
deliberative governance leads to a greater political democracy (Dryzek 2000, 2009). The governance 
framework for Vanuatu proposed in the present thesis builds on the theory of collaborative and 
deliberative governance to discover a formula to enhance participation of mass population in affairs of 
state, and thereby to assist the state to realise its full democratic values.  
According to Ansell and Gash, collaborative governance refers to: 
A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state 
stakeholders in a collective decision making process that is formal, consensus oriented, and 
deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or 
assets (Ansell & Gash 2007, p. 544). 
This definition has six practical implications, as Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 544) argue: 
 The forum is initiated by public agencies or institutions, 
 Participants in the forum include non-state actors, 
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 Participants engage directly in decision making and are not merely ‘‘consulted’’ by public 
agencies, 
 The forum is formally organized and meets collectively, 
 The forum aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not achieved in 
practice), and  
 The focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management. 
 
According to John Dryzek, ‘deliberation that is authentic, inclusive, and consequential is central to 
democracy’ (2009, p. 1399). As a consequence, the more authentic, inclusive, and consequential 
political deliberation is, the more democratic a political system is. In this sphere of understanding any 
system of deliberation has to meet three conditions. Firstly, authenticity is the extent to which 
deliberation connects claims to more general principles without coercion. Secondly, inclusiveness 
applies to the interests and discourses present in a political setting. The third condition is 
consequential, which means deliberative processes must have an impact on collective decision or 
social outcome. In other words, according to John Dryzek, ‘a polity with a high degree of authentic, 
inclusive, and consequential deliberation will have an effective deliberative system’ (2009, p. 1382). 
The nakamal system, despite its limitations, is based on a combination of tradition and participatory 
innovations and mechanisms (especially if associated with carefully targeted training), which should 
allow Vanuatu to restore state legitimacy through communications with multiple governance networks 
and authorities. The MNCC Case Study demonstrates that at the nakamal the kastom jifs use 
noncoercive mechanisms and language and, most importantly, indirect forms of communication such 
as widely shared and accepted parables, story telling, and rhetoric, to create a conducive environment 
for achieving the peaceful restoration of fractured relationships in local communities and, when given 
the opportunity, at the national level. There is thus a “natural fit” between nakamal and the ideal of 
deliberation. As discussed in this chapter, the collective nature of traditional management of resources 
in the local community is also reflected in the nature of nakamal decision-making, which is 
specifically about collective decisions. Thus, nakamal provides an avenue where different political 
authorities and various sections of society meet together to work collectively on any development 
issues and challenges confronting local communities, islands, provinces, or the nation as a whole.  
A new collaborative governance framework was developed based on the findings of this research and, 
in particular, how Vanuatu can use traditional values of social order and authority to build a resilient 
system of governance (Forsyth 2009; Huffer & Molisa 1999b; Walker & Garu 2009). The aim is to 
develop a contingency approach by using the existing mechanisms to change the nature of policy 
making and implementation. In this new collaborative framework, the development agenda will be set 
at the nakamal level through a deliberative process involving kastom jifs, state, and other 
stakeholders. The stakeholders used here refer to other entities such as church, youth, private sectors, 
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non-government organisations, women, and aid donors, which can come together at the nakamal level 
to deliberate on the development agenda. Non-government organisations and development aid 
agencies are treated as secondary stakeholders in that they exist to implement development policies 
set by the state. This implies that development aid agencies and non-government organisations have 
responsibilities to harmonise their development assistance and program activities in line with national 
policy priorities of the State. Therefore, in Figure 8.4, they are positioned at an arm’s length from the 
implementation of the state development objectives. The nakamal becomes pivotal to the engagement 
of stakeholders in a way that promotes appropriate and more broadly accepted development objectives 
for Vanuatu. 
Figure 8.4 Proposed collaborative governance model 
 Legislative authority kastom  authority
National Level
Regional Level
Sub-regional Level
Local Level
Central Government
Provincial Government
MNCC
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Area Council of Chiefs
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Negotiation 
and 
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Negotiation and 
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External Partners
Non-Government Organisation
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sharing
 
Source: Author’s own work 
This model was developed based on the findings of this research to address the nature of contested 
political institutions that impeded delivery of services and the quality of life of people in remote and 
rural areas of Vanuatu. It took into consideration the conflicted nature of established political 
institutions and suggested how different perceptions about rulers and ruled can be better managed and 
also how development challenges can be address in a collaborative and deliberative manners. Using 
the existing institutions, this model illustrates how Vanuatu can increase participation of mass 
population in rural areas and most importantly create an opportunity for active participation of kastom 
authority in decision making on any development aspects that impacts on livelihood of their 
communities. The decentralisation of government machinery and services is an unfinished business of 
the state (Cox et al. 2007).  and this model is an option that is well researched and could possibly be a 
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means to create a development platform where all different sections of society are actively 
participated rather than involved them in a mere consultation. 
During the process of finalising this research, the Honourable Prime Minister, Hon Charlot Salwai, 
tabled a policy paper in August 2016 at the Council of Ministers addressing issues pertaining to 
operation of decentralisation in provinces. The title of this policy paper is strengthening the 
Provincial Government through increased development funding to all area councils in 2017. This 
paper addressed inefficient and ineffective delivery of government services and cost of having power 
concentrated in central government levels. The discussions touched on some of the finding of this 
research and reflected very well on the proposed model of collaboration though nakamal as an avenue 
where development priority needs are determined at village council of chiefs. The Decentralization 
Act of 1998 made provision for nominated members from pillar group at Area Council: namely 
chiefs, women, youth, and church representatives to also attend Provincial council meeting. Figure 8:4 
suggested that the Provincial Council meeting can be conducted at the nakamal which is a neutral 
ground and also has a greater significance in the lives of people of Vanuatu. The Provincial Council 
meeting at the nakamal will provide an opportunity where different political authority and 
stakeholders can negotiate and collaborate on how state architecture can be better reconnected at 
provincial levels. 
The MNCC Case Study illustrates how the jifly institution uses a “grassroots” approach to planning, 
because authority remains strong at the village levels. The MNCC, Area Council of Chiefs, Island 
Council of Chiefs, and Urban Council of Chiefs are all administrative bodies that facilitate the 
development initiative at the village level with the state. They take instruction from village authority 
and pass this on to the state; and similarly they take information from the national levels and pass this 
to respective village council of chiefs. This framework for a bottom-up approach to development is 
already there; the central government can strengthen its effectiveness by formalising it into a national 
consultation framework. This will help reduce the power struggle between kastom authority and 
legislative authority in controlling the development process of Vanuatu. It will indeed reduce the 
conflict between traditional values of social obligation and authority and that of legal-rational state 
governance expectations, because the nakamal consultation will allow multiple authorities to 
negotiate their preferences and find common ground to support development objectives. Because of 
nakamal’s nature as a meeting place and its existence in all communities, it provides a significant 
opportunity for increased participation of local communities in negotiating for better institutional and 
developmental outcomes. It is also a venue where masses of the population can hold their local 
leaders accountable, and this increased participation of local communities will provide checks and 
balances on local elites who can manipulate processes for their own benefits. 
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The nakamal meeting is an existing governance organisation that is valued at the national and local 
levels, and therefore, rather than re-inventing the wheel or imposing an external wheel, the data 
gathered for this thesis suggests that it can be streamlined in line with deliberative democratic values 
of participation, authorisation, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, solidarity, 
inclusiveness, authenticity, and consequential (Chris, Helen & Stephen 2003; Dryzek 2009). The 
model presented in Figure 8.4 builds on the outcome of the two case studies and the literature review 
to reform and, where appropriate, reinforce the existing institutional mechanisms by consolidating the 
relationship between the legislative authority and kastom authority at the nakamal level. This 
approach of working with the ‘grain of society’ is considered to provide new dialogue spaces that are 
able to accommodate citizen engagement, reach a wider range of the public, and be more responsive. 
At the nakamal level the kastom jifs mediate between conflicting parties; and the data suggests that 
decisions of the nakamal are carried and respected. The nakamal approach to conflict is a low cost 
alternative that has been increasingly used for other purposes, such as policy consultation, forums, and 
seminars. The church, government, and non-government organisations come to nakamal to discuss 
their development plans and consult one another on issues where they have differences. Thus, the 
nakamal approach is an ideal model that could be integrated into a national system. In this way it is 
possible to explore possibilities for traditional practices to become synthesised over time into an 
inclusive national development process (Dryzek 2009). Of course, the direction of this evolutionary 
synthesis cannot be known; but it promises opportunities that are denied by prevailing governance 
gaps within Vanuatu society. 
The participants in the MNCC Case Study acknowledged that the state has a shortfall in dealing with 
social conflict in Vanuatu. As the evidence suggests, the jifly institution is more effective in handling 
major socio-economic and political conflict that involves different ethnic groupings and organisations 
in Vanuatu, than the state is. Beginning at village level, the kastom authority handles all the conflict 
that occurs at the village or community levels (Forsyth 2009). Its organisational structure, as the 
present thesis argues, creates a foundation to enhance the role and participation of the kastom 
authorities and the rural population in the development of Vanuatu. This will create a sense of local 
ownership and leadership in the development process, and a strong local commitment to policy 
implementation, and enhance a sense of transparency and accountability at all levels. 
This collaborative governance process will provide a greater opportunity for face-to-face dialogue 
with multiple networks and, in particular, the kastom authority and legislative authority over 
development challenges in Vanuatu. It indeed allows great participation of the kastom authority in 
actively contributing to setting the development agenda for Vanuatu. At the nakamal, the kastom 
authority has the sole right to mediate, chair, and facilitate the discussions, unless there is an 
alternative arrangement with the authority or organisation concerned. Formalising this process will 
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mean that development consultation with international development institutions will have to go 
through this new process. This will allow participation by everyone in local communities, to voice 
their views as to how best Vanuatu can be developed to achieve its development goals and objectives. 
This approach would be in keeping with contemporary governance theory, incorporating elements of 
deliberative governance and inclusive decision-making, as advocated by Ansell and Gash (2007), and 
improving the relationship between network governance and respresentative democracy (Chris, Helen 
& Stephen 2003). 
Using the nakamal as a point of consultation would address three fundamental challenges that 
Vanuatu as a state would not be able to address without the the complementary efforts of the jifly 
institution and authority. Firstly, the nakamal gathers all levels of skills, education, languages, 
abilities, cultural backgrounds, and power inequality within and between different groups, 
community, and organisations. It is a neutral institution where everyone feels they are a part, and the 
kastom jifs genuinely attempt to ensure that everyone in local communities, including strangers, feel 
they are included as part of the nakamal. Secondly, the challenge of remoteness and infrastructure can 
be alleviated with an integrative approach using nakamal and jifly institutions, because they are close 
to people and exist in all communities where the people live. The MNCC respondents acknowledged 
that the kastom jifs work voluntarily and are not motivated by money or status to do their traditional 
roles in maintaining peace and looking after the wellbeing of their communities. In other words, the 
kastom jifs do not get paid for their roles in local communities, regional and sub-regional, except at 
the MNCC level, where they get sitting allowances. Wherever people live in the rural and remote 
islands of Vanuatu, there is a nakamal institution, and the kastom jifs use nakamals to meet different 
dignitaries who visit their villages or local communities, and arrange for well-understood and 
accepted patterns of dialogue. 
Finally, the nakamal approach to development consultation, as is argued in this thesis, is an effective 
form of collaborative governance that can be used to develop models of participatory democracy that 
include traditional authority structures. It is informal and relevant to people in remote and rural 
communities of Vanuatu and, most importantly, development consultation can be communicated on 
their level of understanding. Even in places where there is no permanent nakamal institution, the 
kastom authority and its people resort to other options such as using the shade of a banyan tree or any 
other tree that is ideal for meeting place. For instance, in Tanna, kastom jifs have used the banyan tree 
as a nakamal where people in local communities meet to discuss and resolve conflict. As the data 
suggests, there would be increased participation if the government embedded the nakamal institution 
in the process of its development consultation and agenda setting. This approach would allow greater 
inputs from local communities and contribute to the reduction of social and political tensions between 
different development models and values and, most importantly, improve policy implementation. 
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Furthermore, this collaborative governance approach would remove the adversarial nature of policy 
planning and implementation, and reduce conflict between the multiple networks of authorities that 
operate in Vanuatu. This would facilitate greater negotiation between and within different political 
authorities and provide significant opportunity for local input and participation. In this collaborative 
model the development agenda will be established at the nakamal level, which takes into account 
various recommendations from village, sub-regional, and regional nakamals. The role of the jifly 
institution should be to communicate face-to-face with the government to make sure that local inputs 
have been factored into national policy and planning frameworks, and this should be done through the 
familiar process of negotiation and discussion.  
However, like any other models, the nakamal system of collaborative and deliberative governance has 
limitations, and these include and reflect power inequalities within traditional society, and significant 
differences in power and status between people depending upon their background, kinship, and 
gender; and advocating for this system of nakamal does not necessarily mean that it is a perfect 
solution, because there are shortfalls and challenges. Nevertheless, this thesis acknowledges that it is a 
starting point to create a system of government that can recover some lost state legitimacy through 
deliberation (Dryzek 2009) and effective communication with the broader population of Vanuatu. At 
the same time, it is acknowledged that there are many other issues to overcome and flaws to remedy 
within the traditional system of governance. The nakamal system is one real possibility, and it is 
recognised in this thesis as a significant and appropriate social institution that Vanuatu can draw upon 
to assist in the restoration of state legitimacy. It does, indeed, provide an opportunity to encourage 
people to start thinking again about how they would like to be governed at the national level and how 
national government might be better structured, and how then Vanuatu society as a whole can be 
progressively reformed. 
In Vanuatu, kastom authority is still exteremly powerful, but the nakamal system provides an 
opportunity to accommodate differences in status, gender, and power within an accepted nation-wide 
framework. The nakamal system and kastom authority are significant and should not be swept away 
for the sake of bringing in new political processes and institutions. This research recognises that the 
foreign pressure that Vanuatu experiences from international institutions such as World Bank and 
other development aid agencies tends to encourage, if not force people to abandon their traditional 
ways, which actually puts greater strains on social relationships and traditional political structures. 
The collaborative and deliberative governance model proposed here through the nakamal system is a 
mechanism to secure a basis for democracy that involves reflective acceptance of collective decisions 
by actors who have had a chance to participate in “consequential deliberation” (Dryzek 2009). It also 
provides an opportunity to restore some disconnects within Vanuatu society in order for the state to 
actually hold the society together as it goes through a process of significant change. 
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8.5 Conclusion  
The nakamal approach outlined in some detail in this chapter has all the features of collaborative and 
deliberative governance, which can be used to moderate the current, more adversarial nature of policy 
approaches and planning. The nakamal approach is low-cost and hence cost-effective, and accessible 
to everyone. This research demonstrates that the jifly institution is an effective and relevant institution 
that has the capacity to address contemporary development conflict in Vanuatu society. The kastom 
jifs have used the nakamal approach to deal with social, economic, and political conflict at the local 
and national levels. It is suggested that the proposed collaborative governance framework be built on 
the existing local governance system of nakamals, and that this be integrated with international best 
practices of development consultation. This will help reduce tension and conflict between multiple 
networks of authorities, hence increasing the participation of local communities in the development 
process of Vanuatu. This, in turn, would allow for more effective evaluation of development projects. 
The findings of this research demonstrate that the jifly institution has the capacity and capability to 
play an effective role in bridging the current shortfall in governance and governmental approach to 
policy development and implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.0 Introduction  
This thesis has mapped out layers of customary practice and authority in Vanuatu and highlighted the 
ways in which their absorption into the modern structures of government has led to serious problems 
of official corruption. Certain sections of Vanuatu’s elites have used kastom authority, kinship 
networks, and the power of the state to entrench their interests and those of their clients. There is, 
however, an aspect of kastom authority that offers a means to break down these power structures, 
through processes of dialogue and reform that harnesses kastom practices as a way to re-engage the 
country’s populations, in a national governance reform process. 
Whilst acknowledging the limitations of kastom governance, especially its conservative, patriarchal 
and hierarchical structures of authority, the institution of jifs at least enjoys a measure of legitimacy 
with the general population. This thesis offers a reminder that politicians and public officials in the 
legal-rational state of Vanuatu enjoy substantial patronage power as a consequence of their positions 
within the kastom authority network. The distinction between tradition and modernity is presented so 
as to contrast authority-making practices, between jifly clans, exemplified by nakamal, and the legal-
rational processes of the state, exemplified by the use of patronage power, to effect the directions of 
state resources. The juxtaposition of tradition and modernity is used to stress that the practices of 
modern democratic state building have not been aligned to existing conventions of authority and 
social order so as to permit co-development and negotiation of shared understandings of how 
government should be organised. It is argued here that corruption is not easily stamped out in a 
context where networks of personal influence are woven through the fabric of the state government 
structure. It is important to recognise the legitimacy of power and authority outside that of the state. 
This chapter concludes the findings of this research and demonstrates the significance of the 
contribution of the research. It consolidates the major findings that directly address the research aim 
and objectives that were formulated to inform this research. As such, this chapter is divided into five 
sections. The first section links the research aim and objectives with the key research findings and the 
conclusions that emerged from the discussion chapters. The second section demonstrates the original 
contribution to knowledge of this research. The third outlines the broader implications of the study 
and suggests policy and practical recommendations. The fourth recognises the limitations of this 
research; and the final section suggests possible areas of future research. 
9.1 Linking research aims, key research findings and the research conclusion 
Corruption is an on-going challenge, both in functioning democracies and in countries that are 
adopting new institutions premised on neo-liberal political democracy. Hence, since the mid-1990s it 
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has been perceived amongst neo-liberal proponents ‘that corruption constitutes an obstacle to 
domestic and global development, which itself is said to hinge on financial investment in nations 
exhibiting broadly liberal and democratic standards of good governance’ (Buchan & Hill 2014, p. 2). 
This view of corruption as an obstacle to domestic and global development shapes international 
efforts to formulate global development strategies against corruption. One of these strategies is the 
notion of establishing anti-corruption commissions or “watch-dogs” over the public service and 
elected officials; and these anti-corruption commissions have demonstrated clearly conspicuous 
features of liberal democratic practice that spread in countries that adopted Western liberal political 
institutions (Buchan & Hill 2014). As Buchan and Hill observe, at the supranational level, the anti-
corruption conventions were adopted by the European Union in 1997 and the United Nations in 2003 
(Buchan & Hill 2014; United Nations 2004). Building on this development apparatus was the work of 
international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other 
development aid agencies, where their focus from the late 1990s was on anti-corruption and good 
governance as a requirement for economic development. This culminated in the Governance and 
Anti-corruption Strategy announced in 2006 (World Bank 2006b). 
Chapters Two and Four of this thesis illustrate that the global governance and anti-corruption 
strategies have flaws when they are applied in different socio-political and cultural contexts. This is 
because in developing countries the understanding of corruption and governance differs from the 
international applied definition - misuse of public office for private gain. In a similar vein, governance 
carries connotations of anything that is valued as moral and sensible practices in one particular 
cultural context; but these cultural practices may not have similar understanding when transplanted 
into another cultural context (Felson 2011; Rose-Ackerman 2010). The aim of this research, as stated 
in Chapter One, is to understand the sources of corruption within the Vanuatu government and 
society. This is followed with two additional objectives. The first is to explain corruption in the 
Vanuatu context. The second objective is to examine the potential for traditional institutions, 
especially the jifly institution, which enjoys broad legitimacy and credibility, to play a role in bridging 
conceptual differences of corruption and governance. To address these objectives, the following 
question was formulated: what are the sources of corruption within Vanuatu government and society?  
This was followed with additional sub-questions that were answered using normative and historical 
approaches. A document analysis was conducted and followed up with an empirical analysis of the 
two case studies that were representative of issues and challenges questioned in this thesis. The 
methods of data collection deployed in the two case studies involved semi-structured interviews, 
policy and document analysis, and participation observation. The two case studies, document analysis, 
and chapters on cultural background and relevant literature generated useful data that informed the 
discussions in the following chapters. This section draws an overarching conclusion by linking the 
research question to the key findings and conclusion. 
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I have summed up the findings of this research using a simple illustration of a canoe, representing 
Vanuatu, and two paddles, representing traditional values of social obligation and authority and state 
legislative authority and governance. As depicted in Figure 9.1, Vanuatu’s Constitution recognises 
kastom authority and legislative authority as independent institutions that operate in a partially empty 
political space. However, the findings of this research suggest that the shifting of jifly institution to a 
legal-rational world was done with limited consultation and negotiation with local communities; and 
this attempt is represented by the two paddles being on one side of the canoe. As a consequence, the 
nation of Vanuatu is built on two systems of authority that work in contradiction to each other. This 
contradiction is evident in different expectations about rulers and ruled, and, most importantly, from 
different social norms under each authority system, which creates a significant gap in understanding. 
This gap, between kastom authority and traditional values of social order on the one hand, and those 
of state legislative authority and governance expectations on the other hand, provide room for 
practices that are frequently deemed as moral and sensible in traditional local communities of 
Vanuatu, but have been interpreted at the state level as corrupt. In other words, there are complex 
governance and government shortfalls that cannot be easily solved by implanting institutions without 
consultation and negotiation with targeted recipients. The reform spearheaded by the state in 
collaboration with external development agencies would seem to put more concentration on formal 
state institutions, with limited consideration given to informal governance structures. 
Figure 9.1 Existing gap between kastom authority and social order and state legislative authority 
 
Kastom authority 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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This thesis has demonstrated that in Vanuatu corruption emerges as a consequence of conflicting 
values in localised socio-economic organisations and political institutions. As such, the charges of 
corruption are confined to imposed legal-rational organisations that owe their legitimacy to the rule of 
law and which are funded by public money. The identified corrupt charges laid against public officials 
too often stem from: the political appointment of unqualified personnel to public positions; conflict of 
interest in granting loans, licences, land leases and contracts; work outside government policies, rules, 
and formal procedures; and lack of respect for the rule of law or wilful refusal to be bound by the 
rules (Cain & Jowitt 2004). This thesis demonstrates that, by understanding traditional kastom 
practices, the traditional basis of authority, and how people in traditional positions of power have in 
some cases been able to use them to corruptly gain access to state resources, corruption can be better 
targeted and addressed within Vanuatu government and society. Hence, there is a need for greater 
consideration of the traditional cultural dimension, where anti-corruption strategies connect with the 
expectations of people far removed from the centre of political power.  
The purpose here is not to argue for the acceptance of personalised power or the misappropriation of 
state finances, but to highlight the need to change social expectations in rural areas in order to 
convince people that government is not a matter of power and control over resources. This thesis 
advocates for ways in which traditional ideas and practices, and the modern world, can be better 
reconnected so that society can be reformed in a way that does not generate conflict. As such, it is 
suggested that nakamal system and traditional authority structures, despite their limitations, provide 
an avenue for Vanuatu to restore state legitimacy by involving the whole society in participation in a 
reflective processes that leads to collective decision. The international and bilateral donors focus on 
the importance of tackling corruption, but they do not actually understand how to tackle corruption in 
a country like Vanuatu. Corruption is seen by these bodies as being similar in all countries; but it is 
not. There are differences, and there is a need to take into consideration local cultural variations and 
traditional differences, and understand the nature of local practices that are considered corrupt. What 
is frequently deemed corrupt practice in the legal-rational world is deeply embedded in traditional 
values of obligation and authority; and as a result addressing corruption in Vanuatu is sensitive and 
complex.  
This research has demonstrated that it is possible to reform or change Vanuatu society for the better: 
Vanuatu’s public institutions are not static, and it is possible to effect change. However, such change 
requires a deeper, more profound understanding of the nature of the challenge of corruption. The 
answer, therefore, is to actually reconstruct kastom practices, or to construct new but familiar ideas 
about governance in Vanuatu that are more closely in harmony with traditional lines of thinking about 
what constitutes government and good governance. In other words, the following questions need to be 
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raised within the local context: What is a good government? What is the right kind of authority? What 
legitimates and justifies political authority in Vanuatu? What qualities do we expect of the good 
leader? These are the foundations upon which good governance needs to be built in Vanuatu. It is 
about finding the right kind of language to discuss governance and corruption in Vanuatu, rather than 
just importing language from the World Bank, AusAID, and development aid agencies. As John 
Dryzek suggests, ‘democratic politics has to be politics in the vernacular’ (2009, p. 1394). The 
findings of this research illustrate that a much bigger obstacle to effective participation of the whole 
society as a whole is when elites cultivate a form of alien language unavailable in local dialect to the 
masses, as a way of bolstering their standing and power. The concept of corruption and public interest 
are cases in point. 
Understanding sources of corruption as emerging from the collision of social values and practices in a 
localised context, this thesis draws on the jifly institution as a connecting node between the state and 
other political authorities. Despite frequent, often opportunistic, political criticisms, the jifly institution 
and its roles have proven to be adaptive and resilient in addressing contemporary development 
conflict using traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. As a consequence, it is suggested that the 
traditional nakamal approach to conflict resolution has all the democratic values of participation, 
transparency, consensual decision making, inclusiveness, accountability, and responsiveness (Walker 
and Garu 2009). The process of arriving at consensual decision-making involves intense debates, 
consultation, and negotiation between kastom authorities and local communities (Lindstrom 2010). 
This interactive and deliberative culture has the critical tools of policy credibility that, this research 
suggests, are needed for the state to integrate into its national policy making process. Indeed, the 
nakamal approach is cheap and is accessible to the whole population of Vanuatu. It is a convenient 
source of meeting where different political authorities and organisations can come down to the 
community level and talk face-to-face. The nakamal approach would arguably reduce the adversarial 
nature of policy decisions and planning in Vanuatu through the virtues of communication where 
individuals reflect on their preferences and are open to preference change. It is an avenue that 
normalises power inequalities and creates opportunities for local communities to participate freely and 
express their views unreservedly. The negotiation and consultation at the nakamal level, as this thesis 
argues, will assist in eliminating conceptual misunderstandings of corruption and governance, and 
will also reduce the power challenges. It will, furthermore, give more sense of leadership to kastom 
authority over the development of Vanuatu. 
9.2 The original contribution of this research  
Corruption is a perennial problem; however, in Vanuatu it appeared on the government development 
agenda and other development reports in the early 1990s. In the South Pacific region there seems to 
be little in-depth scholarly writing on corruption. Two of the authors that have made substantive 
233 
 
contributions to knowledge about corruption in the region are Peter Larmour and Ron Crocombe. 
Their scholarly writings focused on the overview of corruption in the region, but without focusing on 
specific cultural contexts. Others combined governance and politics, but without making corruption 
their main focus (Huffer 2005). In addition, a few case studies and reports have been published over 
the last two decades: in particular, the Ombudsman reports, the National Integrity System Assessment 
reports, and other published materials by Transparency International and other aid agencies such as 
AusAID, the World Bank, ADB, and UNDP. However, most of these works are descriptive and rather 
superficial in nature, rather than analytical, and hence provide little information about corruption 
beyond the different forms it takes in various parts of the regions. Indeed, there is no nuanced analysis 
of each state in the South Pacific region about the sources of corruption. In addition, there is little 
evidence of sustained research at the local or community levels. In the area of governance, corruption 
is perceived by the international institutions and aid development agencies as a cost to development 
progress and, therefore, much effort and resources have been undertaken by econometricians to 
identify causes and impacts of corruption on development in developing countries. 
The present research has highlighted a wide range of theoretical and empirical issues relating to 
governance and corruption in Vanuatu and, more broadly, in other Pacific countries. Despite 
contemporary scholarship on governance and politics in the Pacific there remains a dearth of 
scholarship on Vanuatu. Hence, this thesis contributes to academic knowledge in the areas of 
governance (finding best fit institutions) by undertaking a detailed study of local political culture and 
analysing how it can be best integrated with best international political practices. Furthermore, this 
research study also adds a new perspective to the understanding of corruption in Vanuatu, and how 
individual states in the South Pacific region can build resilient governance institutions using available 
cultural and traditional institutions to restore state legitimacy. The findings of this research suggest 
that corruption in Vanuatu emerged as a consequence of the collision between traditional values of 
social obligation and authority, and state governance expectations. The gap between the two values 
leaves a space for certain practices that can be interpreted as corruption from a Western perspective, 
but can be understood in the local context as moral and acceptable behaviour. Understanding sources 
of corruption as a consequence of the collision of these social relations in a localised context helps us 
to appreciate that corruption cannot easily be wiped out with imposed global governance standards 
and political institutions. 
Therefore, changes can only be made by recognising traditional values and understandings of social 
order and authority in the local context. It is argued that there is a need to work with these values and 
through negotiated and accepted international political values. Taking this view, good governance 
should flow from a myriad ways of working together, so that the differences within and between 
multiple networks of authority are settled through negotiation, consultation and participation, by 
everyone in local communities working towards achieving development objectives. Under this 
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approach there is a shift of perspective, from seeing traditional values of social obligation and 
authority as causes of corruption, to a view of traditional governance institutions as being part of the 
process of eliminating corruption. This view has both practical and theoretical implications, to which 
this research is making a new contribution by examining how corruption can be alleviated and 
governance can be better addressed in the context of Vanuatu and, more broadly, across the South 
Pacific region. 
9.3 Implications of the research 
This research has both theoretical and practical implications with regards to strategies that 
international institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations and other development agencies 
use in approaching corruption and governance in Vanuatu. The gist of the argument put forward in 
this research is that the persistent failures of the international institutions to recognise and work with 
local values of social obligation and authority is a primary cause of persistent corruption and 
governance failures in Vanuatu. Governance models in Vanuatu need to build upon existing 
institutions, through a process of education, deliberation, negotiation and consultation with kastom 
authority, the state, and other multiple local governance networks that have a different view of 
leadership. This implies that government and development institutions in Vanuatu have to change 
their mind-set and approaches to development, and acknowledge different multiple local governance 
networks that exist in the country. As the research finding has demonstrated, Vanuatu is still holding 
on to the traditional mode of governance where power is centralised and development policy, 
planning and implementation emerge top-down at the expense of other multiple governance networks 
and local communities. 
The Constitution obliges the two authorities (kastom authority and state) to consult on all 
development aspects that impact on the people, land, and kastom governance. The collaborative 
governance framework, using the nakamal approach, will help the state to engage fully with different 
local governance networks using kastom governance of nakamal (Ansell & Gash 2007). This, indeed, 
provides the opportunity for the kastom authority to engage fully with the state in nakamal to set the 
development agenda and participate in the sharing of development benefits and in the implementation 
process. The implication is that the state has to accept a shift from centralised power to decentralised 
power relations, and identify key driving players in the state’s development through which it can 
established a fruitful working relationship to promote development objectives. Figure 9.2 sums up the 
proposed collaborative and deliberative governance framework outlined in Chapter Eight, and 
suggests that one way of eliminating this conflict is through consultation and negotiation at nakamal 
meetings, which would give a greater sense of responsibility to kastom authority in the national affairs 
of Vanuatu and also involve the whole society to drive major reforms. 
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Figure 9.2 Proposed balanced governance 
 
 
Source: Drawing was taken from www.canstockphoto.com>illustration; Script: Author’s own work 
In Figure 9:2 the canoe represents the nation of Vanuatu travelling on a socio-economic and political 
journey. The two people steering the canoe encompasses the two sets of authority. Unless they can 
work together the canoe will founder or capsize. This thesis illustrates that for the last three decades 
Vanuatu has experienced governance and government shortfalls that have had great impacts on its 
development outcomes. Hence, this critical need for working together is inevitable in the present 
changing development context, as many of these new development initiatives require a resilient and 
balanced governance system.  
In order to facilitate effective team work there is a need to demarcate clear roles and to indicate where 
complementary efforts are needed within a range of multiple local authorities. The findings of this 
research demonstrate that the Constitution clearly stipulates the jurisdiction of the kastom authority, 
which is at the provincial and local levels. In the process of writing this thesis, the present researcher 
has become aware that the Government has begun the process in TAFEA province of instituting jifly 
institutional authority to control development at the provincial level. This will help in reducing the 
power battle between legislative authority and kastom authority and, most importantly, in alleviating 
the development hurdles that emerge from land disputes. In addition, with the new Customary Land 
Management Act and Land Reform Amendment Act of 2014, the kastom jifs are empowered to hear 
their custom land cases in their individual nakamals instead of in Western style court rooms (Garae 
2015). The proposed collaborative governance framework in Chapter Eight accommodates this new 
emerging process, of shifting power to kastom authority at the provincial level and managing the 
power relationship at the nakamal institution. As discussed in Chapter Eight, the nakamal is an 
avenue where the question of power differentials, human rights, and gender issues can be addressed 
Vanuatu 
Kastom authority 
Legislative authority 
Negotiation & Consultation 
Nakamal 
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more successfully and a place where collective decisions can be made. It is further suggested that the 
nakamal also has the credibility to manage the differences in a way that promotes harmony and 
facilitates development objectives. Thus, this research offers more practical and nuanced ways of 
closing the gap between different understandings of social obligations, expectations, and authorities. It 
also identifies and indicates how more effective international development initiatives and approaches 
can be integrated with existing local governance practices to build resilient and inclusive governance 
in Vanuatu. 
In practice this means that it is now time to shift the focus from perceiving informal local institutions 
as a weakness to an analysis of them as a source of resilience assisting growth-enhancing governance 
in the development context of Vanuatu. The international institutions have to accept that governance 
is not about imposing best practices and offering technical solutions, but is more about finding the 
best fit (Carothers & Gramont 2011; IDS 2010). In recent years there has been a shift in discussions 
among development practitioners, academics and aid institutions to deliberation on how the local 
context can become the solution to the development challenges in developing countries (Carothers & 
Gramont 2011). The proposed nakamal system, although containing imperfections like any system of 
governance, nevertheless would enable the state to reconnect with existing traditional authority 
structures in navigating different development issues, and to be able to construct a meaningful reform 
in Vanuatu society. The shift from best practices to best fit institution implies that informal 
institutions are now a critical development equation in developing countries. The academics, 
development practitioners, and international institutions such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations have to accept and learn from their past experiences that informal institutions, such as kastom 
governance in Vanuatu, can offer solutions to many development challenges in the country. Hence, 
there is a need to change the mind set and development approaches, both in theory and in practice, as 
well as in terms and in conversation, to address governance challenges in Vanuatu. 
9.4 Limitation of the research 
The major focus of this thesis is to identify strategies to close a conceptual gap in social and political 
system and, as a consequence, to establish a bridge that will facilitate greater inclusiveness and build a 
resilient governance system in Vanuatu. In other words, this thesis is about addressing the critical gap 
between localised social obligations and expectations, and the legal-rational model of governance. 
Reporting of research findings has to some extent been limited by the identification of the sources of 
corruption within the Vanuatu government and society as a consequence of the collision between 
traditional value of social obligation and authority and the state governance expectations. The focus 
was on the point where the two sets of values failed to engage and, as a consequence, collided. It was 
at that point that the sources of corruption in Vanuatu society were found. This was explained through 
an understanding of traditional kastom practices, traditional basis of authority and how people in 
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position of power have in some cases been able to use their power to corruptly gain access and extract 
state resources for their own personal benefits.  
As a consequence, this thesis is about the sources of corruption, and is not specifically about the 
impacts of corruption on the Vanuatu government and society, although these are investigated in some 
detail. Understanding the sources of corruption as a collision between different values operating in a 
shared common political space helps in formulating specific policies and programs that can alleviate 
corruption in newly developed states such as Vanuatu.Future research should focus on causes and 
impacts of corruption in Vanuatu. 
9.5 Recommendations for further research 
This research has highlighted a wide range of theoretical and empirical issues relating to governance 
in Vanuatu and, more broadly, in other developing countries. The knowledge of traditional values of 
social order and authority is limited in the realm of development studies, and little empirical evidence 
has been available to policy makers and international development institutions. To create a best fit 
governance institution, there is a need to undertake a detailed study of local political culture and 
analyse how it can be best integrated with best international political practices. This research has 
contributed to this process. This is particularly critical given the very recent catastrophic cyclone that 
devastated much of my country.  
There is a wider empirical and understanding gap between kastom governance and state governance 
expectations. As such, one area that further research could focus on is more local traditional values of 
social order and authority and how best they can become a solution for development challenges in 
Vanuatu. Another avenue of research would be to consider how kastom governance and authority 
impacts on the legal-rational principles of public administration and how they can be re-written to 
accommodate existing traditional values of social orders and practices. Furthermore, future scholars 
are encouraged to consider undertaking research on how Vanuatu could develop formal practical 
strategies for legislative, legal, and education methodologies for implementing the suggested 
recommendations made in this thesis. These practical strategies could also explore in detail the 
potential for traditional institutions, especially the jifly councils which enjoys broad legitimacy and 
credibility, to play a pivotal role in building a resilient governance system in Vanuatu and to 
contribute to briging modern and traditional concepts and practices of governance. 
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9.6 Conclusions 
Institutional designs that do not give greater relevance to the local context have serious flaws, which 
this research has identified. These flaws encourage certain corrupt practices detrimental to overall 
development objectives. In Vanuatu, corruption stems from the Government operating inappropriately 
because of the increased demands, ambiguities, clashes and conflicting values of social order and 
authority, including tensions in the practice between state governance and kastom governance. As 
indicated in Chapters One and Two of this thesis, corruption is a term that is restricted to and 
understood mainly within imposed political institutions, and thus it relates more to the activities of 
those employed in public offices as civil servants and members of Parliament. In other words, people 
who work in public offices are more likely to be charged with corruption and be under public scrutiny 
compared with kastom authority and ordinary citizens. And, in a narrow sense, this is most probably 
how it should be; but it does very little to assist in the understanding of or alleviating the challenges of 
corruption. 
The gap in understanding between the two worlds can be bridged using the existing governance 
institution of the nakamal. The nakamal is a meeting place that is flexible enough to be accessed by 
everyone in local communities. It is also highly regarded and valued. Its functions have been 
increasingly moving towards various development consultations, including seminars, symposia, 
conferences, and summits, and very recently there has been increasing recognition of the roles the 
nakamal can play in meeting Vanuatu’s governance and development challenges (Garae 2015). 
Giving greater recognition to kastom institutions and authority in development would certainly reduce 
the adversarial nature of policy and planning and, most importantly, reduce the conflict between 
emerging expectations and different values of social order and authority in Vanuatu. 
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Appendix A: Interview questionnaires 
 
A) General questions 
 What is your understanding about government? 
 
 What is your expectation about government? 
 
 Why is appropriate development not happening in other islands? 
 
 How would you describe the relationship between state and kastom? 
 
 What is kastom? 
 
 What is your understanding about kastom governance? 
 
 How important is the kastom governance today? 
 
 What roles does kastom governance play today in the development of Vanuatu? 
 
 What are some of the features of kastom that we can develop or better utilise to support 
development today? 
 
 What are some good examples where the two systems seem to work together? 
 
B) Specific question on the two sets of case studies 
 
Case study One National Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs 
Objective One explain how the “collision” between traditional values of social order 
and authority, and modern imported models of rational-legal 
government, creates opportunities and incentives for practices deemed 
“corrupt”   
Objective Two examine the potential for traditional institutions, especially the jifly 
councils which enjoy broad legitimacy and credibility, to play a pivotal 
role in building a resilient governance system in Vanuatu and contribute 
to bridging modern and traditional conceptions and practices of 
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governance 
Questions Who is a kastom chief? 
What is the relevance of the National Council of Chiefs?  
 
What are the roles of chiefs today in the development of Vanuatu? 
 
How satisfied are the people with the role and services provided by the 
kastom authority? 
 
How does the National Council of Chiefs represent and promote the 
kastom governance in Vanuatu today? 
 
What are some of the areas where the chiefs work together well with the 
government to bring services and development to the people? What are 
some of the problem areas? 
 
How important is the collaborative working relationship between the 
national government and Malvatumauri Council of Chief? 
 
What are better ways to improve working relationships between the two 
systems? 
 
Case study Two Development Bank of Vanuatu (DBV) 
Objective three Understand corruption as a consequence of social and political tensions 
traceable to the colonial era in Vanuatu  
Questions What is your expectation of DBV? 
 
Why people are not satisfied with the services of DBV? 
 
Why Government closed DBV? 
 
What is corruption? 
 
Do you have the concept of Corruption in your own language? 
What would you consider as corruption in your village? 
Why corruption is bad? 
Why do you think there is corruption? 
How should we stop corruption? 
Are there any other issues that we have not discussed and that you find 
worrisome? 
Do you want to add anything on the challenges of DBV services? 
 
